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Abstract 
This thesis examines the role of religion in national-EU relations. The focus is on 
how EU membership (or potential membership) may affect nations of a particular 
religious background in a particular way and, furthermore, whether religious difference 
affects national-EU relations in a particular way. The study is based on an internal 
perspective to two countries-Greece and Turkey-whose religious traditions stand 
outside a `core' of religious traditions within the European Union (that is, Roman 
Catholicism and Protestantism). On the basis of these two cases I argue that neither 
religion per se (as theology or doctrine), nor the prevalence of a particular faith are 
definitive factors in national-EU relations. Rather, it is mainly in the domain of 
institutional interests of the `church' vis-ä-vis the `state', that we find religion influencing 
national-EU relations. These institutional interests are, in turn, shaped by the relationship 
between religion and national identity in each case, and the relationship between `church' 
and `state'. The differences in these relationships in the cases of Greece and Turkey yield 
vast differences in the way `religion' affects national-EU relations. 
The empirical research which undergirds this thesis comprises a series of 
interviews with religious, political, and academic elites in each country. Beyond seeking 
insight into attitudes to the EU and perceptions of the role of religion in national-EU 
relations, the interviews focus on specific issues in each case. In the case of Greece, my 
focal point is the church-state conflict which arose around the `identity card issue', when 
the state decided to remove reference to religious identity from the national identity 
cards. In the case of Turkey, my focus is on Islamists and their `conversion' to pro- 
Europeanism in the wake of the `February 280' process' and what I identify as its 
`legacies'-Le., state measures through which Turkish Islamists were increasingly 
limited in their freedoms. Each `case within a case' was chosen as a fruitful basis upon 
which to examine the complex role played by religion in national-EU relations. 
As background information to the interview research, secondary sources are used 
to explain the relationship between religion and national identity, and between `church' 
and `state' in each case. 
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Introduction 
The aim of this study is to explore the role of religion in national-EU relations. 
The critical approaches to the relationships between nations and the European Union are 
lacking in attention to one crucial factor: religion. Religion has been a somewhat 
neglected area of research in studies of European integration and in discussions of the 
relationship between national identity and European integration. This fact stands in stark 
contrast to the history of European integration which was, indeed, strongly marked by 
religion. The works of the most prominent `historians of Europe' provide us with the 
theoretical and historical underpinnings of 'European identity' as it was widely conceived 
of in the early stages of European integration'. Such works reveal religion as a crucial 
factor underlying their conceptions of Europe. Through their common attention to such 
themes as the influence of Christianity on early projects to unite Europe, a religio-cultural 
distinction between East and West, and a focus on unity in western culture (often equated 
with European civilisation), Europe is largely portrayed as united in Western Christianity. 
Furthermore, the'founding fathers' of the European integration project (e. g., Robert 
Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasped, and Jean Monnet) were all Roman 
Catholic trans-territorialists. And, considering the Cold War context in which the 
European integration project began, it is clear that the post-War divisions provided a 
dynamic in which the ideas of Europe as Christian (as opposed to Communist atheism), 
and especially Catholic or at least Western Christian, were accentuated and solidified. 
' E. g., works by Christopher Dawson (Understanding Europe, 1952; The Making of Europe, 1946), Denis de 
Rougement (The Meaning of Europe, 1963; The Idea of Europe, 1966), and Oscar Halecki (The Limits and 
Divisions of European History, 1950). 
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Thus my interest in this subject began with the question of whether Europe's 
religious heritage plays a role in contemporary EU developments. The crucial 
background to my examination of this question was comprised of two factors. First, the 
Maastricht Treaty's introduction of the concept of `European identity' as part of the 
integration project: the Treaty indicates the development of a common `European culture' 
as an objective of the European Union. The fact that religion is a fundamental aspect of 
culture in general, and of conceptions of Europe's cultural heritage in particular, gave rise 
to questions of whether this Maastricht Treaty project for the development of a European 
culture might reflect Europe's particular religious (Western Christian) heritage in a fairly 
exclusive fashion. In other words, I wished to know whether this EU expansion into the 
realm of culture might be problematic for nations which stand outside a `core' of 
European religious culture. Second, the waves of intellectual debate following Samuel 
Huntington's works on the `clash of civilisations': Huntington's thesis is particularly 
interesting because it places Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam outside of Western civilisation. 
In light of these debates, I wished to know the extent to which relations between the EU 
and nations of non-Western Christian backgrounds effectively support Huntington's 
thesis. 
In spite of the lack of scholarly attention to such questions, they are currently 
rising to the fore within the European Union. Evidence of this can be found in the intense 
debates over whether reference to religion should be included in the Constitutional Treaty 
of the European Union. There have been equally protracted debates about the conditions 
for entry of predominantly Muslim Turkey into the European Union. Both these issues 
point to the same questions: what is the role of religion in the European Union? does the 
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EU represent a `Christian', or more specifically a `Western Christian' Europe? At the 
broadest level, the question of religion's role in the European Union is especially 
important in light of post-Cold War theories on the replacement of ideological conflict 
with cultural, civilisational and religious conflict. Through its treaties and its 
enlargement policy, the EU has the potential to either confirm or refute such theories. 
This is one dimension of the role of religion in the European Union. Another is the 
extent to which religion is a factor in national-EU relations. 
This thesis focuses on this second dimension. It examines, specifically, the role 
of religion in relations between the European Union and nations whose religious identity 
stands outside a `core' of religious traditions within the European Union (that is, outside 
Western Christianity)2. Such an approach is instructive in showing how EU membership 
(or potential membership) may affect nations of a particular religious background in a 
particular way and, furthermore, whether religious difference affects national-EU 
relations in a particular way. 
The cases chosen for this study are Greece and Turkey3. My interest in these cases 
was stimulated by observation of expressions of anti-Europeanism within religious 
circles in Greece, and a- curiosity as to how this phenomenon would compare with 
Turkish Muslim attitudes to the EU. I have chosen these cases for three further reasons. 
First, the two countries stand outside the Western Christian tradition which prevails 
within the EU. Second, they are the two countries with such religious difference which 
currently have the closest proximity to the European Union (Greece is presently the only 
2 I. e., outside Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. 
3 These are border cases, both in geographic and in religious terms. Of course, these two dimensions are 
interrelated, in the extent to which religious divisions-particularly those between `Eastern' and `Western' 
Christianity, and those between Christianity and Islam-were largely shaped by geography. 
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Eastern Orthodox member, and Turkey is the only Muslim country with a long-standing 
application for membership). Third, the difference between their religious traditions 
allows an examination of whether degree of difference from such a `core' of European 
religious identity is a defining factor in national-EU relations. 
The argument 
My examination of each case revealed a very fundamental but complex role of 
religion in their relations with the European Union. Neither the Maastricht Treaty's 
promotion of a common European culture as such, nor Huntington's thesis are at all 
helpful in understanding this role. The role of religion in national-EU relations is not 
dependent on difference from or similarity with theological traditions predominating in 
the European Union: doctrine and theology, and the prevalence of a particular faith are 
relevant only in their social and institutional context. Rather, it is to the place of religion 
in state and society that we should turn our attention. The place of religion in state and 
society determines certain interests on the part of the `church' and on the part of the 
`state'. And membership (or potential membership) in the EU has a particular and 
important effect on the institutional interests of the `church' vis-ä-vis the `state', and vice 
versa. Thus, it is in the domain of institutional interests that we mainly find religion 
influencing national-EU relations. 
The elaboration of this argument requires an examination of three dimensions. 
First, the relative relationships between religion and national identity in the cases of 
a Bryan Wilson speaks of the place of religion in state and society in terms of `the significance religion has 
for the operation and organisation of the social system'. See A. Davidson, Secularism and revivalism in 
Turkey, p. 92. 
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Greece and Turkey: the differences between these relationships in Greece and Turkey 
yield vast differences in how religion influences national-EU relations. On the basis of 
these two cases, I argue that religion is important in national-EU relations not because of 
theology or doctrine in themselves; rather, the crucial nexus is the relative ways religious 
tradition feeds into national identity--either positively or negatively or, as in the case of 
Turkey, in a bifurcated manner. 
The relationship between religion and national identity largely underlies the 
relationship between `church' and `state' which develops in a particular country contexts. 
Church-state relations form a second dimension which I examine in this thesis. As will 
become clear with reference to these two cases, it is not so much the particular 
constitutional provisions for church-state relations that affect national-EU relations, but 
the way the institutions of `church' and `state' relate to one another in practice6. As 
mentioned above, each of these institutions has particular interests concerning the place 
of religion in state and society.. Their active defence of these interests entails manifest 
problems in national-EU relations. 
5 `Church' and `state' are placed in inverted commas because whilst in the case of Greece I refer to an 
institutional structure called the Church, there is not such a comparable institution in Turkey. Rather, I use 
the term `church' with reference to Turkey to indicate the diffuse force of Islam, which includes the ulema, 
(a community of scholarly `men of religion' who are generally more informed on the precepts of Islam 
than the rest of believers), and a number of religious sects and brotherhoods. (For more on distinctions 
between `church' and religion in Turkey, see Serif Mardin, `Lalcite en Turquie et en France: propositions 
pour une meilleure comprehension', pp. 291-295). My use of the term `state' in the case of Greece is also 
relatively straightforward, whereas in the case of Turkey it indicates a state structure which also includes 
the military, due to its significant influence on state matters. Finally, where `church' is written with a 
capital `C', this refers to a specific church (e. g., the `Church' of Greece). 
6 There is a broad variety of church-state traditions within the EU and the EU does not, so far at least, 
regulate these relations as such. The formal type of church-state relations tells us very little about the role of 
religion in national-EU relations. Greece's type is similar to those of England, Denmark, Sweden and 
Finland (i. e., close links of great consequence between state power of decision and the existence of the 
church), yet it has far more in common, in terms of the social relevance of religion, with Spain, Italy, or 
Ireland rather than with Denmark or England. Thus, an examination of church-state relations without 
reference to the intricacies of the relationship between religion and national identity is far too limited for 
my purposes. For, a combined approach offers insight into why problematic aspects of `church'-`state' 
relations (that is, aspects which negatively affect national-EU relations) persist in individual country cases. 
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Finally, the third dimension examined is how membership, or potential 
membership in the EU, affects the institutional interests of `church' and `state'. It is 
important here to introduce the framework through which the EU affects institutional 
interests. On the one hand, the EU is devoted to the safeguarding of the cultures of the 
member states and their national identity, and it shows special respect towards 
traditionally developed institutions of ecclesiastical law in member states. Accordingly, 
it does not directly involve itself in religious matters, nor does it prescribe a particular 
form of church-state relations. At the same time, though, the EU espouses the principle 
of neutrality in questions of religion and philosophy, claiming to show tolerance towards 
different religious and philosophies and to grant equal treatment to religious 
communities. In short, the EU itself espouses the principle of pluralism. By defending 
religious freedom, the EU creates freedom of action for the religiously motivated activity 
of religious communities. Religious communities within the EU are in principle subject 
to the Community legal requirements of freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, 
free distribution of services and the prohibition of discrimination. Meanwhile, according 
to the Treaty on the European Union, the EU respects fundamental rights as they are 
guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 9 of the ECHR 
protects the freedom of religion as a right of the individual and of communities. This 
article dictates that individuals, churches and religious communities have a privilege of 
complaint in their own right before the bodies of the ECHR. This right is designed to 
secure the free exercise of religion in the Community by adherents of particular faiths. 
The jurisdiction of the ECHR, as ascertained in its foundational Article 9, safeguards the 
right of the churches to unhindered organisation and carrying out of services, instruction 
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and the exercise of religious rites. Clearly then, through its potential influence on the 
activities of religious communities in individual nations, and on state activities in relation 
to these, the European Union has a particularly important effect on the institutional 
interests of both `church' and `state'. 
Applicability beyond the two cases 
My examination in this thesis of the relationships between religion and national 
identity and `church' and `state', as well as the ways in which the EU affects the interests 
of the `church' vis-ä-vis the `state', is specific to these two cases. Again, there is a great 
deal of complexity in how each of these factors is manifested in each case; I do not aim to 
present a full causal argument of how religion affects national-EU relations8. Instead, I 
draw attention to a number of correlations between the role of religion in national 
identity, on the one hand, and `church'-`state' relations on the other, and I examine how 
these correlations significantly shape the role of religion in national-EU relations. 
Furthermore, the complexity in these two cases is not conducive to a neat 
comparison. Accordingly, I treat each country as a distinct case and, on the basis of my 
The information on the ECHR is drawn from G. Robbers, `State and Church in the European Union'. The 
ECHR has also, to a great degree, acknowledged the right of self-determination of the religious 
communities. According to the practice of the European Court of Justice, the highest standard valid in a 
Member State must be used as basis in determining common constitutional traditions using evaluative 
comparative law. Insofar as fundamental rights and other legally protected third party rights are affected, 
the best possible combination of both legal positions must be accepted as a general principle of Community 
law. The principle of subsidiarity governs EU policy on religious matters and acts as a restriction on the 
action of Community law in matters of the law of religion in the Member States of the EU. TEC Article 3b 
provides that the Community, according the principle of subsidiarity, takes action only if and insofar as the 
goals of the particular measures cannot adequately be achieved at the level of the Member States and thus, 
because of their scale or their effects, may be better achieved at the Community level. See G. Robbers, 
`State and Church in the European Union', p. 330. 
8 For instance, `religious' attitudes to the EU are surely affected by other factors beyond institutional 
interests which arise from religion's place in state and society (e. g., economic factors). Space limitations do 
not allow a thorough examination of all related factors. 
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examination of each, perform a comparative analysis in my concluding chapter. The 
primary aim of this study is not to generalise conclusions across Europe on the basis of 
one case or the other. Rather, by offering a deeper understanding of each case, I seek to 
dispel essentialist assumptions about how particular faiths relate to the European Union. 
However, I do believe that there are broader lessons to be learned from this study. 
The fact that one cannot generalise about religious activities and interests is one such 
lesson: it is important to understand, with respect to any nation, the particularities of 
religion-nation and `church'-`state' relations, and, especially, the intersection between the 
two. Thus, it is with reference to such particularities that the broad theme of the role of 
religion in the European Union should be examined. Furthermore, one cannot generalise 
about religious attitudes to the European Union. It is not the case that the further from a 
`core' of religious traditions within the EU, the more anti-European a religious group's 
adherents are. Also false is the assumption that the less `modern' a religion, the more 
prone are its adherents to resist `European secularisation'. I contend that, beyond these 
two cases, attitudes to Europe and to secularisation depend on the relative experiences of 
religious groups within their national contexts and the relative interests of religious 
groups which stem from these experiences. This argument deserves a preliminary 
introduction, with reference to each of my cases. 
`Religious' attitudes to the European Union 
Based on interview research with religious leaders and spokespersons in both 
countries, I argue that crucial to their respective contemporary attitudes to the EU are the 
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different perceptions of the European Union's potential influence on the place of religion 
in relation to the state. Both national religious traditions-Turkish Islam and Greek 
Orthodoxy-have a history of anti-Europeanism. An examination of religious 
publications of previous decades in each country reveals quite similar criticisms of the 
European integration project, and common reasons for resistance to participation therein. 
But the contemporary rhetoric about the EU of religious groups in each country is 
significantly changed. My aim is to identify the causes and the theoretical implications 
of such change9. 
Turkish Islamists' change has been more drastic, from outright anti-Europeanism 
and resistance to Turkish membership in the EU to extreme pro-Europeanism10. Besides 
the factor of worsening national economic conditions and heightened attention--across all 
sectors in Turkey--to the economic benefits expected with EU membership, a major 
element of religious groups' changed perspectives on the EU is increased attention to 
rights to political and religious freedom for Turkish Islamists. Beyond the forced closure 
of a succession of religious-oriented political parties in Turkey, religious journalists, 
intellectuals and politicians have faced arbitrary convictions for `inciting the public to 
religious hatred"', and civil servants and military personnel have lost their jobs through 
9 As Casanova declares, `the interesting sociological question is not whether religious and salvation needs 
remain universally constant across time and space.. . but rather the changing character of their cultural 
manifestations across societies and through history'. See Casanova, `Religion, the new millennium and 
globalisation', p. 11. 
10 See chapter five for an explanation of my use of the term `Islamist'. Also, there are significant nuances to 
the above-mentioned `extreme pro-Europeanism' which should be noted: whilst all interviewees consulted 
for this study expressed support of Turkish membership in the EU, the pro-Europeanism of some was not 
without concern for possible negative social and religious implications. In these cases, the EU was 
presented as a somewhat lesser evil than the Turkish secularist state. Accordingly, the `change' to which I 
refer above should be recognised as a multifaceted concept, as contemporary Islamist pro-Europeanism is, 
for some Islamists, a dramatic volte face on this matter, a transformation of outlook, and for others a 
moderate modification of perspective. 
' Such convictions have been made under Turkish Penal Code Article 312. 
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purges of people accused of being `reactionaries' (in reality, individuals with links to 
religious groups). For Turkish Islamists today then, the EU entails guarantees of relative 
religious freedom in general, and specifically the protection from banning of religious- 
oriented political parties, the protection of employment rights for Islamist civil servants, 
and enhanced freedom of speech. Furthermore, Turkish Islamists' contemporary rhetoric 
on the European Union includes praise of European and Anglo-Saxon models of 
secularism and true separation of church and state. 
The direction from which the Orthodox Church of Greece approaches the EU is 
quite different'2. The Church has historically played a powerful role as preserver of 
national identity, and has enjoyed an especially strong position vis-ä-vis the Greek state. 
Today, it finds challenges to both these facts in Greece's membership in the European 
Union. First, as member of this supra-national project, the Greek state is moving in the 
direction of de-nationalisation (or so many in the Church fear, at least) 13. Second, in its 
efforts to conform to European norms, the government is in the process of revising its 
relations with the Church, particularly through limitations of the latter's privileges over 
and against other faiths represented in Greece. This process entails changing the content 
of the mandatory religious courses in public schools (which are currently catechetical in 
nature and focused on Orthodoxy); changing the strict legal provisions for the building of 
non-Orthodox places of worship (the approval of the local Orthodox bishop is currently 
sought by the relevant Ministry), as well as the strict provisions against proselytism 
12 It is critical here to emphasise that the Greek Orthodox Church is not a monolith. My focus here is 
mainly on the Church hierarchy, but even here there are significant divisions. Within recent years 
especially, certain hierarchs have openly criticised policies pursued by the current Archbishop. 
13 Of course, the extent to which membership in the EU entails a degree of `de-nationalisation' is 
controversial. The term is used here with reference to public discussions in Greece on how membership has 
changed the nature of Greek government in recent years in the direction of significantly less emphasis on 
purely national interests in its policymaking and in conformity with EU-related objectives. 
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(which have led to numerous arrests of non-Orthodox citizens14); and easing the process 
through which conscientious objectors are allowed alternative service (a concession 
which the Church has vehemently opposed). These developments have led to an 
ambiguous, often subtle and indirect criticism of the EU on the part of the Church. My 
interview research suggests that current attitudes to the EU fluctuate in accordance with 
whether the EU or the Greek state is perceived as responsible for changes to the status 
quo in the Church's place in the Greek state and society. 
Asymmetries in the cases 
There are some obvious asymmetries to these two cases. First, one is a member 
of the European Union, and the other an aspiring member. But within my focus on how 
membership or potential membership may affect `church'-`state' relations, the 
asymmetries begin to fade, as the demands from the EU on both countries with regards to 
religion are quite similar today's. Furthermore, one might argue that the two countries 
are incomparable because they are at such different stages of modernisation 
16. This 
discrepancy, however, is a critical aspect of my broader argument, which is that 
14 In fact, the 1993 `Kokkinakis v. Greece' case at the European Court of Human Rights was the first case 
on proselytism in an international tribunal (See N. Lemer, `Proselytism, change of religion, and 
international human rights'). The number of arrests in Greece on the basis of proselytism is unclear. 
According to a report by the Greek Helsinki Monitor, `Thousands of Jehovah's Witnesses are said to have 
been arrested and to have served long prison sentences for proselytism' (see ` Minority Rights in Greece'). 
The number of such cases are said to have decreased since the Kokkinakis case, and the `Larissis v. 
Greece' case (which reached the ECHR in 1998); according to an OSCE Report, since December 2001 
(when 14 Pentecostals were tried in Greece for proselytism but were acquitted), there has been no case 
where representatives of minority religions have been prosecuted (see ` Problems of Religious Freedom 
and Tolerance in Selected OSCE States'; see also ` Human Rights in Greece: a snapshot of the cradle of 
democracy'). 
15 The reforms demanded of Turkey before accession talks begin were not preconditions for Greek 
accession, but are being applied now (particularly as a result of several convictions against the Greek state 
by the European Court of Human Rights). 
16 1 refer here specifically to economic development and political institutionalisation. 
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preconceptions of religious groups based on relative degrees of modernisation are 
arbitrary: as indicated above, this is evident in the comparison between Greek and 
Turkish religious groups' attitudes with regards to modern conceptions of religious 
freedoms and human rights. 
This fact heightens the importance of including a case like Turkey in a political- 
sociological study of religion. The case reminds us to be aware of the fact that, as Nikkie 
Keddie notes, there are significant differences between secularisation processes in 
western and non-western contexts 17. Namely, in the latter secularisation was often 
lacking the intellectual or philosophical base existent in western societies but was very 
much state-driven, on the basis of political or economic interests1ß. Thus, by examining 
cases which are at different stages of modernisation, we are better able, in theoretical 
terms, to consider assumptions about the relationship between modernisation and 
secularisation. 
There are also significant asymmetries in the way the two case studies are 
managed, due to the vast differences between the two cases. Accordingly, whereas in the 
case of Greece my focus is on the politicisation of the Orthodox Church of Greece, in 
Turkey it is on political Islam. This difference is due to the fact that these two 
`institutions', though not strictly comparable, are those most relevant in terms of 
religion's effect on national-EU relations. It is important to note here that, when 
considering the `Church' in Greece, I do not denote the Church as a body of Orthodox 
believers in Greece; I am focusing on the Church as an institutional body. But when 
17 See Nikki R. Keddie, `Secularism and the state: towards clarity and global comparison'. 
18 Likewise, the inclusion of the Turkish case entails a significant contribution to studies of the relationship 
between religion and nationalism, since in this case religion feeds into national identity in a very 
ambiguous manner. 
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addressing political Islam in Turkey, I also indicate its representation of Islamism which, 
in Turkey, is a very diffuse force. Thus, in the chapters devoted to the Turkish case I 
make a special effort to indicate differences between strands of Islamism. 
Clarification of scope 
My thesis is based on an internal perspective to the case studies. The question of 
whether a nation's religious identity affects the EU's attitudes and policies towards 
individual nations is a large and important issue, but it lies beyond the scope of this 
thesis19. Explicit attention to the European Union level is mainly limited to the Union's 
demands regarding religious rights and freedoms which are, at least formally, standard 
for all (applicant and member) countries with which it has relations. 
Furthermore, I do not examine the effect of the European Union or of Europe in 
general, on national identity as such, in each of these two cases. There is a great deal of 
literature devoted to the development of European identity in relation to the `other', 
including the religious other. The same applies to definitions of Turkish national identity 
and Greek national identity in accordance with, and/or in opposition to, `European 
identity' and the European `other'. Furthermore, both cases have in common a history of 
fluctuation and tension between two conceptions of their national identity as either 
`eastern' or `western'; this too is a subject about which much has been written and with 
which I do not deal explicitly in this thesis. Nor can I analyse the foundations of national 
19 For attention to the role of religion in shaping EU attitudes and policies, see Elizabeth Prodromou, 
`Toward an understanding of Eastern Orthodoxy and democracy building in the post-Cold War Balkans', 
and `Paradigms, power, and identity: Rediscovering Orthodoxy and regionalizing Europe'. Though these 
texts focus on Orthodoxy and, to a large extent, on the Greek case, many of the themes explored apply 
equally well to Islam in the case of Turkey. 
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identity in general (eg., culture, language, kinship, territory); rather, my study of national 
identity in each case is mainly limited to the relationship between religion and national 
identity. 
Again, my argument is that it is in the domain of institutional interests; rather than 
in theology or doctrine, that we mainly find religion influencing national-EU relations. 
Thus, attention to religion as doctrine or theology is not critical to this thesis, and space 
limitations do not allow for such an examination. It is true that in historical events as the 
Great Schism and the Crusades, theological differences were important to political 
developments in the countries studied in this thesis. In contemporary terms, though, it is 
simply worthy of note here that Islam and Eastern Orthodoxy are `total religions', 
indicating a `way of life' and not only formal doctrine and practice. The fluctuating 
effects of this fact on `religious' attitudes to the EU will become clear in my coverage of 
each case. 
Finally, my study examines the subjects at hand through the attitudes and actions 
of elites (political, religious and social) in each case. Mass opinion and the role of the 
public at large are only dealt with to the extent that these can be seen to influence 
attitudes and actions of national elites (only minor attention is devoted to mass surveys, 
where applicable)20. This focus on the elite level is in line with my argument that the role 
of religion in national-EU relations is not about religion in and of itself (and not about the 
belief systems of the masses) but about interaction between institutions and their 
respective interests. 
20 For a study of the role of religion in mass attitudes to the European Union, see B. Nelsen, J. Guth and 
C. Fraser `Does religion matter? '. For a general study of national identity as a factor in mass attitudes to the 
EU, see S. Carey, `Undivided loyalties: is national identity an obstacle to European integration? '. 
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Sources and methods 
The empirical research which undergirds this thesis comprises a series of 
interviews with religious, political, and academic elites in each country21. The interview 
questions were designed to glean information on attitudes to the EU and perceptions of 
the role of religion in national-EU relations. In my selection of interviewees I tried to 
cover a broad range of perspectives (from relatively conservative to relatively liberal, in 
both political and religious terms). A general balance was struck between the number of 
`secular-minded' and `religion-minded' elites consulted for this study. This balance was 
sought for the purpose of determining the extent to which there are tensions and 
contradictions between secular and religious leaders' perspectives. Such tensions and 
contradictions did indeed arise through the research, and they form a basis for an 
understanding of how these tensions and contradictions underlie trends in 'church state' 
relations which, in turn, affect national-EU relations. 
Furthermore the interview method, which entailed considerable time spent in both 
Greece and Turkey, allowed a much more in-depth and first hand understanding of the 
internal situation in these two countries. My interviews were conducted at a time when 
there were intense debates on the issues presented in this thesis. Thus, by following the 
local press carefully and through conversation with local elites, I was able to witness the 
intensity of the debates-the intensity itself being an important dimension of my study. 
21 In the case of Turkey, I also conducted extensive interview research with journalists, civil servants and 
businessmen. This imbalance was in part intentional, because of my knowledge of the Greek language and 
lack thereof in the case of Turkish: in order to secure my own thorough understanding of the Turkish case, I 
thought it constructive to conduct a wider, interview survey there. However, a further reason for the 
imbalance is addressed below. See Appendix for further information on the interview method as applied to 
my study. 
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Of course, there are significant limitations to the interview method. Mainly, the 
researcher is dependent on individuals' willingness to speak with him or her, and the 
researcher hears only what the interviewee wishes to tell him or her. There was a 
considerable discrepancy between the two cases in terms of the relative willingness of 
people to meet with me and to speak openly with me. Religious group representatives in 
Turkey were much less concerned with confidentiality than were their Greek 
counterparts, who were in general more guarded in their responses22. 
However, I find the interview method especially valuable in the sense that, as 
expressed by Andrew Davidson, `[it is] imperative to reflect on and communicate with 
those whose lives we seek to make authoritative claims about'; through the interview 
method, we are exposed to `the self-understandings of those whose political lives we seek 
to explain'23. And through attention to the rhetoric used by a broad range of 
interviewees, the researcher is better able to identify elements of coherence and 
inconsistency in the perspectives within and between particular target groups. The 
interview method also offers a propitious basis upon which to study institutions: it is 
`impossible to identify an institution except in terms of beliefs of those engaged in its 
practices 724. Accordingly, we must seek to understand institutions within the meanings 
they represent in a given context. Such an approach is critical to an understanding of 
both `church' and `state' in Greece and Turkey respectively. 
22 One can only guess at the reasons for this discrepancy, but I believe it has to do with the fact that the 
specific issues I was examining in the Greek case were more recent and, accordingly, more awkward, than 
those I examined in the Turkish case. 
23 A. Davidson, Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey, p. 4. 
24 See Davidson, ibid., p. 77. 
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Mark Juergensmeyer too employs the interview method in his study of religious 
nationalism25. My work is similar to his in spirit, as Juergensmeyer's intent is to address 
general assumptions westerners have (e. g., `that something is seriously wrong with 
religion in the non-Western world'), and to present these alongside the perspectives of 
religious activists in various contexts (from whose viewpoint, according to 
Juergensmeyer, it is secular nationalism that has gone wrong, and not religion). But the 
questions guiding his research, and his geographical scope, are completely different from 
mine26. Furthermore, Juergensmeyer essentially pits secular nationalism against religious 
nationalism; such a distinction is not helpful for the cases of Greece and Turkey. In the 
case of Turkey, Islamism and Turkish/Kemalist nationalism have often gone hand in 
hand, and Turkish Islamists share many of the fundamental principles of Turkish secular 
nationalism. Religious nationalism in Greece usually goes hand in hand with 
state/secular nationalism. The relevance of nationalism to the Greek case stems from the 
fact that the Church is able to use nationalism during periods of conflict with the state. 
But such conflict is sporadic, and is aimed at preservation of a certain status quo, rather 
than the replacement of the secular state. Also, perhaps due to the breadth of his 
geographical foci, Juergensmeyer's use of the interviews is somewhat lacking in 
historical depth. In general, I think my work complements that of Juergensmeyer, by 
covering cases outside his geographic scope, and cases which exhibit more complex 
relationships between secular and religious nationalism, and by offering thorough 
historical backgrounds for the issues which I address. 
25 M. Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War?. Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State. 
26 Juergensmeyer studies the Middle East, South Asia and formerly socialist countries, and does not address 
Turkey or Greece specifically. 
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Beyond seeking insight into attitudes to the EU and perceptions of the role of 
religion in national-EU relations, my interviews were focused on particular issues in each 
case. In the case of Greece, my focal point was the church-state conflict which arose 
around the `identity card issue', when the state decided to remove reference to religious 
identity from the national identity cards. In the case of Turkey, my focus was on 
Islamists' change to pro-Europeanism in the wake of the `February 28`h process' and 
what I have identified as its `legacies'-i. e., `state' measures through which Turkish 
Islamists were increasingly limited in their freedoms. Each `case within a case' was 
chosen as a fruitful basis upon which to examine the complex role played by religion in 
national-EU relations. 
As background information to the interview research, secondary sources were 
used to explain the relationship between religion and national identity, and between 
`church' and `state' in each case. In the case of Greece, the study is quite straight- 
forward and divided into sections on `religion and national identity' and `church-state 
relations'. In the case of Turkey, the same relationships are studied, but through the more 
relevant prisms of `Islam and Islamism' and `secularism and laicism'. 
Plan of thesis 
The above considerations help to explain the plan of my study. In the chapter 
which follows, I place my argument within the context of theories of nationalism and the 
sociology of religion in order to examine the relationships between religion, state and 
national identity. I explain here how relationships between religion and national identity 
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underlie developments in the relationships between church and state. The latter relies 
heavily on a thorough exploration of the concepts of secularism and secularisation and 
how they variously apply to my chosen cases. On the basis of the above, I then examine 
forms of religious mobilisation in theoretical and empirical terms. Finally, I introduce 
the concept of an EU norm in church-state relations, thus introducing an examination of 
the extent to which form of church-state relations may be a factor in national-EU relations 
for each of my case studies. 
Chapters three and four are devoted to the case of Greece. In the first I examine 
the historical development of the relationship between religion and national identity. 
Following this historical overview, church-state relations are studied through the prism of 
constitutional provisions relating to religion. I address here, in particular, aspects of 
church-state relations in Greece which represent problematic points in national-EU 
relations. Finally, I present a survey of expressions of anti-Europeanism within the 
Church and wider Greek Orthodox circles, including special attention to their 
manifestation in religious publications. Chapter five focuses on the `identity card issue'. 
I examine here state and church perspectives on the issue, and close with a consideration 
of the implications of this issue for domestic politics, for church-state relations, and for 
national-EU relations. 
Chapters five and six deal with the case of Turkey. In chapter five, I examine the 
historical development of Islam and Islamism in Turkey, with a special emphasis on the 
diversity of these in the Turkish context. A section on secularism and laicism explains 
the very specific meaning of these terms in the Turkish case. This section also explains 
fluctuations in secularist policies, and the erratic relationship between secularism and 
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Islamism in Turkey. The chapter closes with a consideration of Turkish Islamist anti- 
Europeanism, as presented in Islamist publications. Chapter six focuses on Turkish 
Islamists' `change' to pro-European stances in the light of the `February 28`" process'. 
The interview research on this subject presents a powerful debate in Turkey over whether 
Islamists' `change' can be considered sincere and over whether Islamism or the Turkish 
version of secularism represents the greater barrier to Turkey-EU relations. 
It is mainly with reference to the vast differences between the two cases that I 
turn, in my concluding chapter, to a thorough examination of how the place of religion in 
state and society plays a significant role in each nation's relations with the European 
Union. This examination is conducted under the broad themes of religion and national 
identity, `church'-`state' relations, and national-EU relations. I close with a consideration 
of future prospects with regards to the role of religion in Greek-EU relations, in Turkey- 
EU relations, and in the European Union itself. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Religion, state and national identity 
As explained in the first chapter, this thesis examines the role of religion in 
national-EU relations in the cases of Greece and Turkey. The central argument made is 
that this role is contingent on the place of religion in state and society, and on the relative 
institutional interests of `church' and `state' with regard to this place. I take an internal 
perspective to these two cases, studying religious groups' attitudes to the EU; forms of 
religious mobilisation in each case; and how religious groups affect domestic politics in 
ways which, in turn, affect each nation's relations with the European Union. In this 
chapter I shall explain how each of these above dimensions is subject to two interrelated 
factors: the relationship between religion and national identity, and the relationship 
between `church' and `state'. An interdisciplinary approach to this subject is thus 
necessary, drawing on theories from within the study of nationalism and the sociology of 
religion. The former offers analyses of religion in relation to national identity and 
nationalism; and the latter offers analyses of secularism, secularisation and church-state 
relations. 
The main terms used in this chapter are much-disputed in the respective fields of 
their study. It is thus important to set out working definitions for each at this stage, 
before revealing the specificities of their use in relation to my case studies. A basic 
definition of the `nation', as proposed by Anthony Smith, is `a named community 
occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a common 
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public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members'. 
However, there are often--within each named community--differing conceptions of `the 
nation', with some myths held as more relevant for parts of the community, and other 
myths for other parts of the community. `National identity' is also a debated concept, as 
there may be 'official' (i. e., state-promoted) conceptions of national identity which are 
different from `popular' conceptions of national identity. I offer as a working definition 
of national identity the following: `the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of the 
pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions that compose the distinctive 
heritage of nations, and the identifications of individuals with that pattern and heritage 
and with its cultural elements'2. By `nationalism' I mean `an ideological movement for 
attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its 
members deem to constitute an actual or potential "nation "'3. `Secularism' too may be 
considered an ideology, one which denotes `a negative evaluative attitude towards 
religion'4. `Secularisation', on the other hand, denotes `an aspect of processes of 
structural change in society's. A number of texts within the sociology of religion have 
addressed the `theory of secularisation', identifying a number of processes involved in 
the concept of `secularisation'6. My concern is mainly with the process of institutional 
See Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History, p. 13. 
2 Ibid, p. 18. 
3 Ibid, p. 9. 
4 See Bryan Wilson, "`Secularisation": religion in the modern world', p. 196. 
5 Ibid, p. 196. 
6 Meredith McGuire provides a useful, though limited, introduction to the intellectual debate on 
`secularism'. See M. McGuire, Religion: The Social Context, pp. 285-9. As McGuire points out, we should 
distinguish between our use of the term at the `macro-level', and at the individual level. I do not address 
secularisation at the individual level at all in this thesis, except where the subject was addressed by my 
interviewees. 
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differentiation-i. e., the separation of the religious and the secular spheres of activity. 
An understanding of both secularism and secularisation is critical to this thesis, as they 
entail ideologies and processes which variously shape the forms of `church'-`state' 
relations that develop in a given society. Finally, the term `religion' requires special 
attention. A functional rather than substantive definition best serves the purposes of this 
thesis8. In other words, this study is not concerned with the substance of religion (what 
religion is), but with its function in the societies under examination. The function with 
which I am concerned is that of religion as a definer of group identity. Accordingly, my 
focus is on public, institutionalised and, where applicable, politicised religion, as opposed 
to private religion. Such a focus allows an examination of the social location of religion 
and changes therein9. 
In this chapter I examine first the historical links between religion and national 
identity, and the changes to these links with the onset of liberalisation and secularisation. 
Special attention is given to the relationship between religion and nationalism. I then 
focus on `church'-`state' relations mainly through the prism of trends in secularism and 
secularisation as applicable to each case. The latter subject forms the basis upon which I 
examine forms of religious mobilisation in Greece and Turkey respectively. I close with 
an analysis of the extent to which religion-state relations in Greece and Turkey are 
compatible with European norms. 
Or, in other words, a separation of `church' and `state'. For an astute study of institutional differentiation, 
see James Beckford, Religion and Advanced Industrial Society (especially chapter five, on `Differentiation 
and its discontents', p. 108-128). 
a As McGuire explains, functional definitions of religion tend to be better for encompassing cross-cultural, 
trans-historical, and changing aspects of religion. See M. McGuire, Religion: the Social Context, p. 12. 
9 Adherents of both Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam claim that theirs is not only a religion but a `way of life'. 
Of course, I do not propose to understand religion according to the self-definitions of the societies under 
study. But it is important to emphasise that I am not studying religious belief, ritual, or experience, but 
religious community/ies. Thus, my focus is not on religion at the individual level but at the community 
level and, in particular, on religion as linked to the culture and identity of a given community of believers. 
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Religion and national identity 
A linkage between religion and national identity is the product of a long historical 
development. According to Rend Remond, there are three eras to the relationship between 
religion and nation: the era of holy nations, of modernity, and of liberalisation10. The era of 
holy nations is characterised by a close interdependence between religion and nation which 
reached a state of symbiosis. That development is attributed to the fact that, in Europe, the 
birth of a nation often coincided with the transition from paganism to Christianity: people 
simultaneously attained a consciousness of both religious and national identity". This era 
lasts from the early conversions to Christianity to a second phase of evangelisation of the 
continent around the year 1000 (i. e., the countries of northern, central and eastern Europe). 
The key feature of the second era-that of early modernity-is the division of territories 
along confessional lines. The partitioning of the continent into separate entities, from then 
on, had its counterpart in the religious domain. Characteristic of this era is the concomitant 
emergence of modern nations and national churches in the sixteenth century. According to 
Remond, the almost perfect simultaneity between religion and nation, `hallowed by the 
principle cuius regio, eius religio, increased national feeling and turned religious adherence 
into the criterion and foundation of political society' 12. Thus, the religious reference 
became a popular means of affirming national singularity and a particular identity within 
the European ensemble13 
10 R. Remond, Religion and Society in Modern Europe. See especially Chapter 7, `Religion and nation: two 
universal realities', pp. 107-123. 
1 Ibid, p. 109. Remond's reference to a sense of a specifically `national' identity in this early period is, of 
course, debatable. 
12 Ibid, p. 1 13-114. 
13 Ibid, p. 112. 
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This point about national singularity and particularity is also an important theme 
in Max Weber's writings on `the nation'. Weber posits that the nation's significance is 
usually rooted in the superiority or irreplaceability of a particular group's culture, 4. For 
Weber as well as for Durkheim (and many sociologists after them), religion functions as 
a major source of solidarity of a given group by marking its specific identity and culture. 
Liah Greenfeld too argues that nationalism is the most common and salient form of 
particularism in the modem world: `In a world divided into particular communities, 
national identity tends to be associated and confounded with a community's sense of 
uniqueness and the qualities contributing to it' 15. According to Greenfeld, these social, 
political, cultural and ethnic qualities (including religion) thus become important 
elements in the formation of every specific nationalism. Likewise, Anthony Smith 
identifies religion as amongst the fundamental elements of the nation-building process. 
For Smith, religion is part of the `designation, cultivation, and transmission of 
"authentic" elements of shared culture of the "people"' 16. With regard to the sense of 
irreplaceability of the nation's culture, Smith explains that this often stems from `a strong 
shared conviction of moral superiority, which can be traced back to the earlier cultivation 
of a myth of ethnic election by elites of pre-modern ethnies'. Such myths were generally 
religious in character in the past; it was in later periods that they translated into 
`secularised expressions' of national superiority". 
This brings us to Rdmond's third era of the relationship between religion and 
national identity: that of liberalisation. This was the period of European revolutions 
14 M. Weber, `The Nation', pp. 21-25. 
15 L. Greenfeld, `Types of European nationalism', pp. 166-7. 
16 Anthony D. Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, p. 89. 
17 Ibid, p. 98. Smith argues that even today, there is a religious content underlying the sense of superiority 
and exclusiveness of some nations. 
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which inaugurated a separation between religion and nation `that would not be completed 
until much later, and in some instances is not complete even today' 18. Confessional 
states began transforming themselves into religiously neutral states, and nation was often 
set in opposition to religion. Where previously associated in the minds of individuals, 
nation and religion became foes in the contest for peoples' loyalty. 
But, as Remond notes, entering into a new era does not mean an end to the 
relationships of previous epochs. Because the period of strong linkages between religion 
and national identity was long in duration, these linkages survived well after the causes of 
their appearance had vanished: `the long gone circumstances of their formation continued 
to live on in people's memory, imagination and conscience'19. Or, as David Martin puts 
it: `These relationships obtain in terms of the persistent "image" of a religion long after 
the actual events have taken place'20. Finally, Anthony Smith makes a similar argument, 
in stating that the role of religion in the past continues to shape many present national 
profiles. Smith cites Ireland, Poland, Serbia and Greece as obvious examples in Europe, 
but he further suggests that even Scandinavians' `cooler' response to the idea of a united 
Europe may be interpreted as a specifically Protestant suspicion of a Catholic-led 
proj ect21. 
My intention here is to understand how, in this era of liberalisation, the role of 
religion in the past continues to shape present Greek and Turkish national profiles. The 
influence of religion on these national profiles is quite different, and it is important that 
we understand the historical causes, and theoretical and empirical implications, of such 
'$ RRemond, Religion and Society in Modern Europe, p. 119. 
19 Ibid, p. 113. 
20 D. Martin, A General Theory of Secularisation, p. 7. 
21 A. D. Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, p. 166, footnote 21. 
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difference. To this end, I find Martin's perspective very useful for approaching these two 
cases22. Martin too sees religion as a particularly significant and powerful aspect of a 
given culture, but he emphatically rejects the assumption that religion constitutes `the 
active dynamic, causally prior element in society' [emphasis mine]23. He describes a 
number of `universal processes', but stresses that these processes are not `universal' in 
the sense that they `must happen'. Rather, the processes tend to occur all things being 
equal; `But things are not equal--ever--and it is central to [Martin's] argument that they 
are most conspicuously not equal with respect to the particular cultural... complex in 
which they operate'24. Indeed, crucial to our understanding of the role of religion in 
Turkey and Greece is identification of the different cultural complexes in which religion 
operates. 
For Martin, one of the main components of a given cultural complex is the 
relationship of religion to the growth of nationalism and cultural identity. As Adrian 
Hastings also notes, the more influential a religion was in the construction of nationhood, 
the more likely it is to influence every expression of nationalism25. The relationship of 
religion to the growth of nationalism is quite different for the cases of Greece and 
Turkey. In the case of Greece and from the establishment of the modern Greek nation, 
religion has been a fundamental aspect of Greek national identity. This almost to the 
extent that, for the wider public at least, `Greek' and `Orthodox' are coterminous26. 
Religion thus has a very positive relation to the growth of nationalism and cultural 
22 This is in spite of the fact that Martin's work (that cited here) is limited to Christianity. Martin justifies 
this with the explanation that secularisation occurred initially within Christian societies. Thus, his `general 
theory' is based on his study of secularisation in the Christian context. The theory can, he notes, be applied 
with modifications to contexts beyond the Christian ambit. 
23 D. Martin, A General Theory of Secularization, p. 1. 
24 ]bid, p. 3. 
25 A. Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism, p. 187. 
26 See V. Makrides, `The Orthodox Church and the post-war religious situation in Greece', p. 226. 
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identity (see chapter three)27. In the case of modem Turkey, the relationship between 
religion and nation identity is, at best, ambiguous. Mustafa Kemal's (Ataturk's) nation- 
building project was based on a more civic notion of national identity that tended to 
exclude religion. His reforms reflected the perception that religion was responsible for 
backwardness and was a major impediment to Turkey's westernisation and 
modernisation. But there is a great deal of debate over Mustafa Kemal's intentions, and 
the extent to which his policies were designed for separation of the religious and political 
domains, for control of the religious domain, or for a strict suppression of religion. It is 
clear that in the period just before and during the revolution, both Mustafa Kemal and his 
fellow revolutionaries relied heavily on Islam and on religious symbolism in order to 
unify and mobilise the peoples28. Critical to an understanding of the Turkish case is a 
distinction between `official' and `popular' narratives of national identity, and between 
conceptions of national identity at the time of the establishment of the modem Republic, 
on the one hand, and those following decades of fluctuations in secularist policies, on the 
other29: it is through attention to such distinctions that we can understand the ambiguity 
27 For more thorough attention on this subject, see also V. Georgiadou, `Greek Orthodoxy and the politics of 
nationalism'; N. Prevelakis, `The spirit of Greek nationalism: the Greek case in light of Greenfeld's 
conceptual framework'; M. Rinvolucri, `Religious nationalism and a broader view', in his Anatomy of a 
Church; N. Demertzis, 'Laplace de la religion dans la culture politique grecque'; A. Dutu, `Traditional 
toleration and modern pluralism : the case of "Orthodox Europe"'; G. Mavrogordatos, `Orthodoxy and 
nationalism in the Greek case'; and A. Koumandaraki, `The evolution of Greek national identity'. 
28 For an especially thorough discussion of the debate over Ataturk's policies, see Andrew Davidson, 
Secularism and revivalism in Turkey: a hermeneutic approach (see in particular chapter four). On the 
blending of ideals of secular nationalism and Islamic symbols, see U. C. Sakallioglu, `Parameters and 
strategies of Islam-state interaction in republican Turkey' (see esp. pp. 231-236). For more general 
discussion on Turkish secularism, see: B. Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey; S. Ayata, 
`Patronage, Party and the state: the politicization of Islam in Turkey'; A. Kadioglu, `The paradox of 
Turkish nationalism and the construction of official identity'; and N. Gole, `Laicite, modernisme et 
Islamisme en Turquie'. 
29 According to Sami Zubaida, 'Kemalist secularism, with its history of controlling religion, continues to 
influence the formation of Turkish national identities. Yet, a relaxation of the secularist stances of the state, 
during Turgut Ozal's leadership in the 1980's, has led to the admission that Islam, too, is an essential 
component of Turkish national identity. S. Zubaida, `Turkish Islam and national identity', p. 10. 
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of the relationship between religion and national identity in the case of Turkey (see 
chapter five). 
With reference to my above-cited definition of national identity as `the continuous 
reproduction and reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths and 
traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations"30, in the case of Greece, 
Orthodoxy and the Church and their surrounding myths, symbols and memories are 
continuously reproduced, both through the national education system and even, in many 
cases, by state leaders. In the case of Turkey, the corresponding symbols, memories and 
myths prevailing in the education system and reproduced through state rhetoric are those 
surrounding Kemalism and the army as a symbol of the state31. 
In any case, this divergence between the two cases leads to a completely different 
applicability of Weber et al's conception of religion as an element of national specificity. 
As a key aspect of Greek culture, religion is central to notions of Greek national 
specificity. And the Church in particular acts to reinforce such notions of the Greek 
nation as superior and irreplaceable because of the Greek Orthodox faith, traditions and 
`way of life'. In the case of Turkey, the nation's superiority and irreplaceability-as 
promulgated by the secularist elite-is located in notions of Turkey as a modern, western, 
and secular nation within an Islamic, non-western region. This fact relegates Turkish 
Islamists to a position of inferiority within dominant conceptions of Turkish national 
identity32. 
30 See A. D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History, p. 18. 
31 And as revealed through various general surveys conducted in Turkey, the army is the institution which 
generally receives highest votes of confidence by the Turkish population. See Ferhat Kentel, 'L'Islam, 
carrefour des identites sociales et culturelles en Turquie: Les cas de Parti de la Prosperite', p. 218. 
32 On this point, see Ayse Kadioglu, `The paradox of Turkish nationalism and the construction of Official 
Identity'. 
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David Martin argues that in the European context, the social power of religion is 
dependent on a positive relation to the national consciousness, `particularly as this is 
highlighted in a myth of national origins'33. If national myth and religion are 
contradictory, the social power of religion is restricted: `in most countries of 
contemporary Europe, it is of enormous importance that the existence of the nation and 
its heroic folk memory is either rooted directly in religion, or positively related to it'34 
Martin contends that the relationship between religion and nationhood remains strong 
across Europe, but in some cases the relationship is more direct, and in others more 
implicit or dormant. Factors which determine a strong relationship include the following: 
a significant role played by the church in defending the nationality against foreign 
domination35; the coincidence of the national struggle with the age of romantic 
nationalism; the dominated group's sharing of borders with another faith; and, finally, 
unions of faith and nation based on past glory36. This theme is echoed by Rene Remond, 
who posits that `[fjor a people who have been conquered, oppressed, subjected to foreign 
domination, especially if their faith is different from that of their oppressor, religion 
ensures the preservation of their personality and encourages awareness of their identity. 
The church becomes.. . the repository of the nation's soul'. 
From this point on, further 
events and circumstances conspire to render the church and its ministers guardians of the 
33 D. Martin, A General Theory of Secularization, p. 101. 
34 Ibid. See p. 104 for exceptions to this, such as the case of Yugoslavia. 
3s I would add to this, `even if symbolic, or historically inaccurate': in the Greek case, the role of the 
Church in the national revolution against the Ottomans is highly overstated and, many historians argue, 
simply mythical. However, what is important is the perception, amongst the Greek population, of such a 
role played by the Church. This point is further developed in chapter three. Furthermore, Martin contends 
that in those societies in which the Church has stood in for the state under conditions of external 
domination or external threat, any pluralism is usually associated with extraneous ethnic intrusions. See 
p. 55 of D. Martin, A General Theory of Secularization. This point is especially pertinent to the Greek case, 
and bears relevance to the discussion in chapter four on how the Greek Orthodox Church's resistance to 
pluralizing measures forms a problematic point in Greek-EU relations. 
36 D. Martin, A General Theory of Secularization, pp. 106-7. 
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national memory37. Finally, Adrian Hastings too emphasises the conflation of religion 
and national identity which arises out of conflict with a `religious other': `Whenever a 
people feels threatened in its distinct existence by the advance of a power committed to 
another religion, the political conflict is likely to have superimposed upon it a sense of 
religious conflict ... so that national 
identity becomes fused with religious identity'38. In 
such cases especially, the clergy have played an important role in the affirmation of 
nationhood, not least because they were often the only literate group in a particular 
society in whose hands education was entrusted39 
Here too, then, we find vast distinctions between the Greek and Turkish cases. 
The explanations of Martin, Remond and Hastings apply well to the modern Greek 
situation. In Greece, though historically inaccurate, the mere existence of the Greek state 
was widely attributed to the Church because of its role in preserving Greek national 
identity during the four centuries of Ottoman rule. Particularly the fact that the 
Ottomans' millet system allowed some `national' education to continue within the 
religiously-defined `nations', meant that the Church was the institution accredited with 
maintaining a continuity in Greek national identity40. Religion, since then, has been a 
fundamental aspect of prevailing conceptions of national identity. The role of religion in 
the establishment of the modem Turkish nation was nearly the opposite as, again, Islam 
was characterised by the new elites as a backward force responsible, in part, for the 
37 R. Remond, Religion and Society in Modern Europe, pp. 115-116. 
38 A. Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism, p. 190. 
39 Ibid, pp. 192-3. 
40 As Martin notes, `where religion is imposed from above by a conqueror it is thereby weakened; whereas 
when it is the focus of resistance to a conqueror it is thereby strengthened (unless the conqueror disposes of 
a total monopoly over education)'. D. Martin, A General Theory of Secularization, p. 9. This point is 
substantiated by Steve Bruce, who argues that `in European countries where religion remains popular it 
does so as part of an inherited and ascribed social identity, deeply embedded in painful struggles for ethnic 
and national autonomy'. See S. Bruce, `The supply-side model of religion: the Nordic and Baltic states', 
p. 44. 
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Ottoman Empire's downfall. Although religion was utilised in the Young Turks' 
revolution which established the Turkish Republic (a revolution which was described, at 
the time, in terms of jihad), Ataturk's strict and (at least outwardly) anti-religious 
reforms which soon followed dispelled any possible correlations between religion and the 
new nation's glory. Based on this comparison then, and with reference to Martin, 
Remond and Hastings, we might judge Greece as-historically at least-quite consistent 
with European developments, and Turkey as inconsistent. Can we, on the basis of this 
similarity with or difference to European historical trends, draw any conclusions about a 
country's place and performance in the European Union? A response to this question 
requires first an analysis of how the relationship between religion and national identity 
manifests itself in forms of nationalism, and second of how this relationship manifests 
itself in forms of `church'-`state' relations. 
Varieties of nationalism 
Theorists of nationalism describe a variety of nationalisms: eastern versus western 
nationalism41, civic versus ethnic, cultural versus political, religious versus secular. In 
general terms, western, civic, political, and secular nationalism tend to be aligned against 
their counterparts of eastern, ethnic, cultural, and religious. The intent here is to ascertain 
whether any theoretical conclusions may be reached regarding the influence that a 
particular form of nationalism (in terms of its relationship to religion) may have on 
national-EU relations. Introducing these distinctions is instructive for our Greek and 
41 Or, better yet, western and non-western. See A. D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, p. 113. 
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Turkish cases because, superficially at least, the dominant forms of nationalism in each 
case fall on opposite sides of the abovementioned dimensions. 
In both Greece and Turkey, in contemporary terms at least the picture is much 
more complex, thus pointing to problems in such strict distinctions and 
compartmentalisations of `types' of nationalism. These distinctions certainly present 
problems for a contextualisation of Turkish nationalism. Though Turkey is not treated as 
`western' in relevant texts on nationalism, its prevalent form of elite nationalism best fits 
descriptions of western, civic, secular and political nationalism. In his seminal work on 
Turkish nationalism, David Kushner indicates that: 
The relatively quick transformation of the Turks from imperial rulers, loyal 
primarily to Islam and to the Ottoman dynasty and state, into ardent nationalists 
has puzzled even the Turks themselves... It is one of the peculiarities of Turkish 
history that the people who were the first Muslims in our century to proclaim their 
adherence to the idea of the secular national state had in the past gone furthest in 
submerging their identity into the wider Islamic one.. 42 
This peculiarity is less puzzling when one considers Turkish nationalism as a 
multifaceted and changing conception. Kushner describes, on the one hand, the early 
effects of 19th c European nationalism on some members of Ottoman elite wishing to 
base the state on a new, non-Islamic, kind of national identity which could unite all ethnic 
and religious groups within the Empire (i. e., a territorial unity) and, on the other, the 
prevalence, amongst most Turks, of a more Eastern kind of nationalism influenced by 
romanticism and emphasising ethnicity and culture43. Furthermore, texts on Islamic 
nationalism do not apply well to the case of Turkish Islamists, because of Turkey's 
particular history of secularism and the relative concerns of Islamists specific to this 
42 David Kushner, The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908, preface and p. 1. 
43 See D. Kushner on `The Sources of Turkism', ibid, p. 7. 
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country. As Sami Zubaida notes, in spite of the strength of Kemalist secularism in 
contemporary conceptions of Turkish nationalism, `Turkish Islam is tied up with Turkish 
nationalism in a unique fashion... probably a majority of Turks do not perceive a 
contradiction between Islam and their attachment to Kemalist symbols, viewing both as 
integral to national identity'. Crucial to this seeming paradox is the specific historical 
development, in Turkey, of a nationalism which at times embraced, and at times rejected 
religion. 
As for Greek nationalism, Elie Kedourie, Anthony Smith and John Hutchinson 
capture well the complexity of this case. Greek nationalism, as Smith and Hutchinson 
describe, was `at once a "rational" and westernising movement of merchants and 
intelligentsia for a revived Hellas along the lines of ancient Athens, and a yearning for an 
ethno-religious revival of the Orthodox Byzantine empire in Constantinople among the 
clergy and peasant communitiesi45. Opposing conceptions of the Greek nation-eastern 
and western, Byzantine and Hellenic-did indeed exist in competition; but there were 
also simultaneous efforts, in both secular and religious circles, to reconcile the two 
dichotomous views. According to Kedourie, `there is little doubt that the appeal of 
modern.. . Greek nationalism derives the greater part of 
its strength from the existence of 
ancient communal and religious ties which have nothing to do with nationalist theory, 
and which may even be opposed to it'. And, indeed, though Greece too has witnessed an 
`oscillation' between Hellenistic and Byzantine/Orthodox nationalisms, Kedourie notes 
that the tension between the two has largely disappeared: `today, with the spread of 
44 Sami Zubaida, `Turkish Islam and national identity', p. 10. 
45 J. Hutchinson and A. D. Smith, `Introduction' (in eds. J. Hutchinson and A. D. Smith, Nationalism), p. 7. 
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nationalist doctrine, this opposition between Hellenism and Orthodoxy is itself rejected. 
Orthodoxy and Hellenism are thought to go together and imply one another... 46 
To a certain extent, the differences in types of nationalism (and their relation, or 
not, to religion) can be explained with reference to Liah Greenfeld's discussion of 
different circumstances under which nationalism infiltrated national contexts47. 
Greenfeld emphasises that when nationalism started to spread in the 18th century48, the 
emergence of new national ideas was not `new' at all, but entailed the importation of an 
already existing idea49. She explains that the adoption of nationalism must have been 
somehow in the interest of the groups which imported it, thus reflecting `a dissatisfaction 
of these groups with the identity they had previously, 50. Accordingly, nationalists in 
different contexts adapted ideas of national identity according to the changes they wished 
to achieve. However, the importation of a foreign idea suggests a sense of inferiority on 
the part of the `importer', who is portrayed as an imitator of things foreign. This often 
leads to ressentiment, a term which refers to a psychological state resulting from 
suppressed feelings of envy and hatred. Partha Chatterjee describes a similar 
phenomenon in his understanding of eastern nationalism as an attempt to combine both 
46 Elie Kedourie, `Nationalism and self-determination', pp. 51-2. 47 See Liah Greenfeld, `Types of European nationalism', pp. 165-171. Adrian Hastings takes this argument 
perhaps `further', by arguing that the nation and nationalism are characteristically `Christian things which, 
in so far as they have appeared elsewhere, have done so within a process of westernisation and of imitation 
of the Christian world, even if it was imitated as western rather than Christian'. (A. Hastings, The 
Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism, p. 186). The question of whether the 
nation and nationalism are essentially Christian in origin lies beyond the scope of this thesis. In my view, 
most important in the adaptation of conceptions of the nation and of nationalism (in Hastings' words, `as 
they have appeared elsewhere'), is how the adaptation took place in the context of westernisation 
specifically. 
48 It should be noted that Greenfeld assumes nationalism was `spreading' from England, the first nation and 
thus nationalism's original source. 
49 We see, then, a recurrent theme of adaptation, such at that described by Martin with reference to 
secularism born in Christian Europe but adapted with modifications outside that context. See Greenfeld, 
`Types of European nationalism', p. 168. 
so Ibid, p. 169. 
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French and German models of nationalism: `[this attempt] is both imitative and hostile to 
the model it imitates. It is imitative in that it accepts the value of the standards set by the 
alien culture. But it also involves a rejection.. . of ancestral ways which are seen as 
obstacles to progress and yet also cherished marks of identity' 51 . 
These concepts apply, to a certain extent, to both Greece and Turkey. In both 
cases, the modern nations were established as part of a westernisation project. According 
to Ayse Kadioglu, official Turkish nationalism represents a paradox by embracing a kind 
of eastern nationalism as described by Chatterjee, which attempts `to transform the nation 
culturally while at the same time retaining its distinctiveness i52. This, Kadioglu claims, 
is a leitmotiv in Turkish nationalism as it evolved alongside Turkish modernisation and 
westernisation. Expressions of resentment over imitation of the West were especially 
prevalent within religious circles in Turkey, where the new nationalism entailed stark 
contrasts to indigenous and traditional religious traits. Thus, efforts towards what 
Greenfeld describes as the `transvaluation of values' were more imperative in the Turkish 
case, in order to win popular support. Ataturk himself engaged in such efforts by 
asserting that many of the `importations' from the West actually entailed a return to 
indigenous aspects of Turkish (particularly pre-Islamic) culture53. For Greece, the 
westernisation project during the establishment of the modern Greek state constituted a 
break from the Ottoman Empire, a heightened emphasis on its ancient Hellenic culture 
and a concurrent suppression of its eastern, Byzantine (Orthodox) cultural elements. 
However, it did not entail a clear break from the link between religion and national 
51 P. Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: a Derivative Discourse, p. 2. 
52 A. Kadioglu, `The paradox of Turkish nationalism and the construction of official identity', p. 179. 
53 See M. Matossian, `Ideologies of delayed development', for specific examples to do with the language 
and dress code reforms. 
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identity because, again, in popular Greek conceptions, independence from the Ottomans 
was largely attributed to the Church and its maintenance of Greek national identity under 
Ottoman rule. Thus even the establishment of the national church, which ultimately 
served the state's interests of subordinating the Church to the state, simultaneously 
functioned to enhance national unity 54 
Can we ascertain whether the relationship between religion and nationalism in 
either the Greek or Turkish case is more liberal, or more compatible with European 
norms? Here I think we should take into consideration Anthony Smith's discussion on 
civic versus ethnic nationalisms55. As Smith notes, it is often assumed that ethnic 
nationalism-that which tends to bear religious elements-inevitably leads to 
exclusiveness and intolerance. Smith argues that this view fails to grasp the nature of 
civic nationalism: `From the standpoint of affected minorities, this kind of nationalism is 
neither as tolerant nor as unbiased as its self-image suggests. In fact, it can be every bit 
as severe and uncompromising as ethnic nationalisms'56. With reference to the example 
of how Jews and blacks were treated by French civic nationalism, Smith concludes that in 
both ethnic and civic nationalism (the one inclusive and the other exclusive of religion), 
minority cultures and heritages may be depreciated and suppressed. `Hence', he states, 
`not only ethnic but also civic nationalisms may demand the eradication of minority 
cultures and communities qua communities, on the common assumption, shared by 
Marxists and liberals, not just of equality through uniformity, but that "high cultures" and 
"great nations" are necessarily of greater value than "low" cultures and small nations or 
sa See A. Hastings for a discussion on the development of autocephalous state churches within the Orthodox 
tradition. The Construction of Nationhood. - Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism, p. 196. ss A. D. Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, pp. 100-1. 
56lbid, p. 101. 
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ethnies'57. In other words, it is important that one consider the consequences of a 
particular type of nationalism, rather than drawing judgements based on the type of 
nationalism. 
As to whether the one or the other form of nationalism is more compatible with 
European norms, Philip Schlesinger accurately observes that that it is often wrongly. 
assumed that the formation of a supranational European identity entails a rejection of 
nationalisms based on myths and grand narratives: `the supranationalising European 
Community [is] heavily dependent upon convincing us that tales of solidarity within 
bounded communities are both plausible and desirable'58. Although the new reality of 
global interdependence has ushered in a certain abandonment of `the old model of 
national sovereignty', this has not meant-even within the project of European 
integration-that we do not see the search for new identities based on ethnic, regional, 
religious or extreme nationalist perspectives. Thus, the project for developing a sense of 
`European identity' is largely geared toward the reconciliation, rather than rejection, of 
regional, religious and ethnic identities within a grand narrative of European identity. 
How are we to judge the Greek and Turkish cases in light of this reality? The two 
countries represent very different patterns of `reconciliation' and `rejection' of religious 
identities. It is important here to address"the question of whether such differences should 
be viewed in terms of a `time lag'. Rene Remond argues that the development of the 
relationship between religion and national identity, and the disassociation brought about 
by the process of secularisation, `spanned a period that varied from one country to 
57 Ibid, p. 101. 
58 P. Schlesinger, `Europeanness: a new cultural battlefield? ', p. 318. 
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another.. . even today 
it is not complete everywhere'59. He mentions `time lags' in such 
developments, but he warns that we must be cautious in speaking about `delays', as if 
there were some ideological a priori to the path of historical development, leading to 
expectations that all countries will eventually arrive at the same place. Yet many 
scholars, Remond included, maintain that there is a `general pattern' in religion-nation 
and church-state relations across Europe and, today, within the European Union6o 
It is to the subject of `church'-`state' relations that I now turn. My intent is to 
understand where Greece and Turkey stand in relation to European trends in religion- 
state relations. Such an understanding requires an evaluation of Greek and Turkish 
`church'-`state' traditions and relative forms of secularism and secularisation, as well as 
attention to forms of religious mobilisation in each case. Upon this basis, I shall then 
revisit the concepts of time lags' and `delays' with reference to what many theorists 
controversially describe as `evolutionary' European norms. 
`Church'- `state' relations 
Secularisation is a concept born in Europe: `Europe was, after all, the site of the 
original battle between Church and Enlightenment' 61. Furthermore, secularisation 
initially occurred within the ambit of Christian societies62. Hence our understanding of it, 
59 R. Remond, Religion and Society in Modern Europe, p. 127. 
60 Relevant works are discussed below. Remond, furthermore, cites Greece as the major exception within 
the European Union: `Of the current fifteen members of the European Union, Greece is the only one that 
still mentions religion on its citizens' identity card. This practice has already earned it reprimands and 
formal notices from Brussels; a proof that nowadays in Western Europe there is complete disassociation 
between religion and people's individual status, and it is acknowledged as a modern imperative of 
democracy'. See Remond, ibid, p. 138. . 61 D. Martin, `The secularization issue: prospect and retrospect', p. 468. 
62 D. Martin, A General Theory of Secularization, p. 2. 
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as noted by David Martin, requires attention to its development within the European 
context: a general theory can be developed with reference to societies influenced 
primarily by Christianity, and can then be qualified for cases outside its scope 
63 
The battle between the Church and Enlightenment, Martin explains, either 
entailed the nationalisation of the Church by an enlightened aristocracy, or its repression 
by an enlightened republic. Thus, religion was either made a buttress of power, or 
became a buttress of reaction. Most importantly, though, Martin emphasises that `these 
two processes of incorporation or repression... constitute specific historical conditions, 
not ineluctable components built into the social machinery of change'64. Applying 
Martin's concepts to Greece and Turkey we see that, in general terms, the first case- 
incorporation as a buttress for power-applies to Greece, and the second, that of 
repression leading to reaction, to Turkey. But neither of these circumstances was 
constant, stable, or linear, as religion-state relations have fluctuated in each case. Thus, 
as Martin argues, it is crucial that we understand the specific historical conditions 
underlying such fluctuations, if we are to understand the contemporary role of religion in 
these countries. 
Clearly secularism and secularisation are very much about power, and the struggle 
for it between secular and religious institutions 65. There are various types of 
63 As explained by Martin, such a theorising process is reasonable, considering the fact that secularisation 
itself was exported, with modifications, to other societies. Again, as noted earlier in this chapter (footnote 
47), Adrian Hastings views the nation and nationalism as not only originating in Christian societies but as 
essentially `Christian things'. A. Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and 
Nationalism, p. 186. 
64 D. Martin, `The secularization issue: prospect and retrospect', pp. 468-9. 
65 As Peter Berger notes, `Minimally, one must note that counter-secularisation is at least as important a 
phenomenon in the contemporary world as secularisation ... clearly, one of the most important topics for a 
sociology of contemporary religion is precisely this interplay of secularising and counter-secularising 
forces'. P. Berger, `Secularism in retreat', p. 42. 
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relationships of power66. First, a skewed balance set within agreed limits of tolerable 
fluctuation (or `diversity', in Martin's terminology). This type usually stems from a past 
in which each side (church and state) had to recognise that total victory was impossible 
and thus settled for limited bounds of tolerance. The balance, developed over such a long 
period of time, has become so institutionalised `as to seem normatively necessary'. 
Second, a confrontation of irreconcilables which attempt to skew the balance heavily in 
one way or the other. This type of power relations is shaped by a past in which `rival 
forces have had a taste of total authority and desire to taste it again'. And third, there are 
cases of overwhelming monopolies of power, following the victory of either one or the 
other side. The first case, that of a balance within agreed limits of tolerable diversity, is 
that which has generally prevailed in Europe67. And we can certainly place Greece in 
this category. The second and third cases apply to various stages in Turkish history. With 
regard to the third category, monopolies of power68, Martin notes that differentiation was 
imposed so rapidly that religion was thrown into that sector of social forces that would 
press for freedom, or its extensive cultural power was redeployed as a means to national 
unity in the face of external pressure. Accordingly either liberalism, or nationalism, 
became an ally of religion69. In contemporary Turkey we find Islam thrown into that 
sector pressing for freedom and psychic space, and thus allied with liberalism70. 
66 As David Martin notes, the relationship of religion to power arises because it is not only the bearer of 
identities but a source of legitimacy and of philosophies supporting legitimacy. A General Theory of 
Secularization, p. 108. 
67 D. Martin, A General Theory of Secularization, pp. 108-109. 
68 Examples of which Martin finds only in Catholicism and Marxism. 
69 D. Martin, A General Theory of Secularization, p. 238. 
70 Or, perhaps one should say `unofficial Islam', indicating expressions of religion outside the `official', 
state-sanctioned religion linked to the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs). See chapters five and six. 
Again, it was not always the case, historically, that religion was allied with liberalism against the state, and 
at several points in Turkish history Islam was allied with nationalistic causes. The periods of the Young 
Turks' revolution (1908-9) and of the `Turkish-Islamic synthesis' (1960's-1980's) are two cases in point. 
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In order to understand properly the nuances in these power relations, I will now 
consider more specifically the terms `secularisation' and `secularism' as they apply to 
Greece and Turkey. In Greece, we are dealing mainly with the term `secularisation'. The 
founders of the modem Greek state instigated secularisation as institutional 
differentiation, by transferring to the state legal and administrative powers which the 
Church had enjoyed under Ottoman rule. Through the establishment of the 
Autocephalous Church of Greece, the Church was subjugated to the state, but it 
continued to receive significant support from the state and privileges vis-ä-vis other 
faiths. Thus the `battle' to which Martin refers took place, and continues to take place, in 
the domain of institutional differentiation, as church and state struggle over the 
boundaries of power. Quite often though, religion has been used by the state as a buttress 
for its power. In general, the Church was not confronted with explicit anti-clericalism or 
direct rejection of its values, but by the state's efforts towards bureaucratic efficiency 
asserted in certain areas (e. g., in the sphere of education)71. Furthermore, in cases like 
that of the Church of Greece, where the Church has played the role of guardian of the 
culture and-at times-a substitute state, additional roles naturally accumulate and tend 
to continue even after the transition to independence. This accretion of roles simply 
fortifies the union between church and state and, particularly, the Church's bargaining 
position in relation to the state72. The state is required to reach compromises far more 
" D. Martin, The Dilemmas of Contemporary Religion, pp. 45-6. 
72 This point (made by D. Martin in A General Theory of Secularization, p. 55) can be related to that made 
by John Madeley on the strength of various Orthodox churches: `where religion finds other work to do 
beyond "its own" it often thrives mightily even where secularism would be expected to prevail'. See 
J. Madeley, `Towards an inclusive typology of church-state relations in Europe, north and south, east and 
west: a Rokkanian approach', p. 12. Madeley cites here the work of J. Haynes, Religion in Global Politics, 
1997. 
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favourable to the Church than is the case in other countries73. Furthermore, as David 
Martin points out, the Church experiences continued after-effects of standing against 
rather than standing for authority: it continually struggles to handle the state's move to 
diminish the Church's powers 74. 
In Turkey, we are dealing mainly with the term `secularism'. `Secularism' as a 
political concept which connotes a political sphere that is separated from and rejects the 
influence of religion does not strictly apply to the Turkish case. The form of secularism 
launched by Mustafa Kemal is more precisely called laicism 75: religious institutions were 
placed under the direct control of the state (rather than being separated from the state), 
with a view to limiting religion's political, legal and cultural hold over Turkish society. 
Yet such complete control was never maintained. Rather, as Martin notes, `the country 
oscillates between two versions of the sacred, one provided by Islam, the other by Kemal 
Ataturk'76. And this oscillation is reflected in fluctuations in Turkish secularist policies 
(see chapter five). But it is the `Kemalist version of the sacred' which has prevailed 
within Turkish power structures, and in this context all expressions of Islam beyond that 
promoted by the state have had to compromise to a great extent and conform to the status 
quo77. 
" For an examination of Greek church-state relations as compared to other European countries, see 
G. Mavrogordatos, `Orthodoxy and nationalism in the Greek case', and P. Foundedakis, `Religion and state 
in Europe: secularisation and functional differentiation'. 
74 D. Martin, A General Theory of Secularization, p. 55. 
75 See chapter five for a fuller explanation of the distinction between secularism and laicism. For purposes 
of convenience, the term `secularism' is often used throughout this text with reference to the Turkish case, 
but the reader should bear in mind that the term has a very particular meaning as applied to Turkey. 
76 D. Martin `The secularization issue: prospect and retrospect', p. 472. Furthermore, Martin notes, `the 
intelligensias in the van of movements against colonialism were susceptible to strong definitions of their 
native traditions which stressed Islamic purity and severity. They intended to modernise in their own way, 
and the only way sufficiently rooted in long-term history was Islamic'. 
77 According to Joseph Szyliowicz, when Kemal Ataturk entered the realm of Turkish politics, he faced 
`two kinds of Islam': the Islam of the state and a `parallel' or unofficial Islam consisting of religious orders, 
convents and sects; `Both of these, in [Ataturk's] view, were reactionary forces but he followed different 
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The religious response 
I examined above how `church'-`state' relations developed in Greece and Turkey 
variously in relation to secularism and secularisation. I now turn to a study of religious 
groups' attitudes and interests as they have arisen in relation to the above. A recurring 
theme in my coverage of each case is the particular relationship between religion and 
national identity in each country, as this relationship largely affects the types of religious 
mobilisation chosen by a given religious group. My scope is mainly limited to the 
activities of the Orthodox Church of Greece, for the Greek case, and on `Islamist' 
political parties, in the case of Turkey (although in the latter case I do give considerable 
attention to various religious groups as well). This focus, as explained in the 
Introduction, is due to the fact that these are the `institutions' whose interests and 
activities are most relevant to national-EU relations. I also explained in the introduction 
that my emphasis is on the leadership of these institutions, rather than on mass attitudes 
and perceptions. The latter are only dealt with to the extent that these can be seen to 
influence attitudes and actions of national elites. This emphasis is in line with my 
argument that the role of religion in national-EU relations is not about religion in and of 
itself (and not about the belief systems of the masses) but about interaction between 
institutions and their respective interests. 
Peter Berger argues that there exists an international, secular elite subculture of 
people with western-type education: `a purely secular view of reality has its principal 
social location in an elite culture that is resented by large numbers of people who are not 
policies towards each. He moved quickly to eliminate the latter whereas he adopted a policy in regard to the 
former that suggested that he wished to create a new, modern, official Islam'. J. Szyliowicz, `Religion, 
Politics and Democracy in Turkey', p. 194. 
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part of it but who feel its influence'. Accordingly, religious upsurges have a strongly 
populist character: `over and beyond the purely religious motives, these are movements 
of protest and resistance against a secular elite i78. David Martin describes a similar 
phenomenon, but in terms of tension between centre and periphery -- a universalistic, 
cosmopolitan, liberal centre, and a particularistic, nationalistic periphery centred on 
ethnicity and language79. 
In both cases of Greece and Turkey there is, indeed, a secular elite subculture 
which exists at the centre, and against which religious groups-at the periphery of 
power-protest. However, we cannot generalise about a distinction between a 
universalistic, cosmopolitan and liberal centre, and a particularistic and nationalistic 
periphery. In Turkey, the centre is often illiberal in its secularist policies, and religious 
groups at the periphery are not considered nationalistic in the dominant sense of the term 
in Turkey: there is in Turkey an `official nationalism' which is essentially the domain of 
the secular, Kemalist elite centre. And in both the Greek and Turkish cases there is a 
very active religious elite with which the secular state elite must contend. 
This brings us to Jose Casanova's argument that the public character of any 
religion is primarily determined by the particular structural location of that religion 
between state and society80. This certainly applies to the cases of Greece and Turkey., 
But Casanova's scope is limited to Western Christendom and to the two circumstances he 
finds there: religions which seek to remain compulsory (or, established) institutions, or 
those which--like the Catholic Church after Vatican Il--have conformed to 
'8 P. Berger, `Secularism in retreat', pp. 45-6. 
79 D. Martin, The Dilemmas of Contemporary Religion, p. 94. 
80 J. Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, p. 9, and p. 70. Please see below for Casanova's 
explanation of factors which have changed this phenomenon within Western Christian contexts. 
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disestablishment from the state and operate as part of a pluralistic civil society. The 
circumstances are quite different for public religion in both Turkey and Greece. It is thus 
necessary to examine the different ways that the position'of religion between state and 
society affects the public character of religion in these two cases. 
Much as I disagree with the conclusions of Stark and lannaccone's `supply-side 
interpretation of secularisation' (which posits that the secularisation or religiosity of a 
society hinges on the degree of competition in the religious market), some of its starting 
points are pertinent to the case of Greece81. Stark and lannaccone contend that to the 
degree that a religious `firm' (i. e., religious group) 82 achieves a monopoly, it will seek to 
exert its influence over other institutions and the society will thus be sacralised; that is, 
`the primary aspects of life, from family to politics, will be suffused with religious 
symbols, rhetoric, and ritual'. The examples of sacralisation provided by these scholars 
illustrate well the public place of Orthodoxy in Greece: they describe annual ceremonies 
when priests bless the fishing fleet, classrooms dominated by religious symbols, and 
religious ceremonies as intrinsic to the public, political spheres of life. Religious leaders 
are often central figures in political occasions; and politicians often conspicuously attend 
religious ceremonies. Accordingly, `sacralisation of the political sphere is the quid pro 
quo by which a particular religious firm enlists the coercive powers of the state against 
competing firms'83. 
" See R. Stark and L. N. Iannaccone, `A supply-side reinterpretation of the "secularization" of Europe'. See 
also Steve Bruce's astute critique of Stark and lannaccone's theory: S. Bruce, `The supply-side model of 
religion: the Nordic and Baltic states'. 
82 In line with their thesis in general, which interprets secularisation as a matter of `supply and demand', 
Stark and Iannaccone employ terminology from the field of economics and refer to religious groups as 
`firms'. See also Pierre Bourdieu's Raisons Pratiques, for a discussion of the functions of churches in 
business terms. 
83 Stark and lannaccone, `A supply-side reinterpretation of the "secularization" of Europe', p. 234. See also 
J. Madeley, `Towards an inclusive typology of church-state relations in Europe', p. 15. Here Madeley notes 
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But this quid pro quo is changing. The Greek state is currently under increasing 
pressure to provide enhanced religious rights to non-Orthodox citizens of Greece. The 
large number of convictions against the Greek state in the European Court of Human 
Rights has encouraged government efforts to alter the status quo in such domains as those 
mentioned above: education, freedoms of assembly and expression, and military 
service84. Such changes are perceived by the Church as threats to its privileged status 
within the state and vis-ä-vis other faiths in the country ß5. The European Union is 
resented by the Church hierarchy inasmuch as it is perceived to be the reason behind any 
changes to the status quo; where evidence arises that the Greek state, rather than the EU, 
is the driving force behind such changes, complaints are directed to the state. 
Meanwhile, the Church struggles to maintain its privileged status through all the forms of 
religious mobilisation described by George Moyser: by acting as a pressure group, 
lobbying, making contact with the executive apparatus, taking its causes to court, making 
links with political parties, and organising mass protests 86. 
The Church's main strength in its mobilisation efforts is the link between religion 
and national identity; it is on this basis that the Church manages to mobilise the Greek 
public to rally to its causes. This strength is what N. J. Demerath has termed `cultural 
power': even where religion lacks access to the political instruments of `structural 
power', it may have the capacity to use cultural resources to affect political outcomes. 
that `Insofar as the confessional monopoly in a particular territory is maintained by positive state support 
on the one hand and the repression of challenges on the other, established churches tend to become less 
vital as organisations. They no longer depended for their sustenance on mobilising support within civil 
society, looking instead to those in authority within the state to provide, pursuant to the bargain of mutual 
support between "Crown and Altar"'. 
84 Between 1999 and 2003, there were 102 ECHR cases against the Greek state (See Council of Europe 
website for details). 
Ss Again, as noted in chapter one, the Greek Orthodox Church is not a monolith; I refer here mainly to the 
Church hierarchy, but even here there are significant divisions. 
86 See G. Moyser, `Politics and religion in the modem world: an overview', pp. 6-8. 
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Symbols, ideologies, moral authority and cultural meanings can be employed to 
legitimate or delegitimate political outcomes or actors; to control whether issues become 
public or are kept out of the public eye; and to frame the terms with which issues are 
discussed when they are public. However, Demerath argues, religion is limited in the 
types of political outcomes it may yield: 
First, religion is less apt to manifest `positive power' than `negative power', 
where the former involves the ability to initiate action and create change, and the 
latter entails blocking or vetoing an impending course. Second, religion is less 
likely to engage in `primary power' than `secondary power', where the former 
involves the capacity to seize and carry through a policy-making transaction as 
the prime mover, whereas the latter engages in fine-tuning from the sidelines. 
Third, religion is less likely to wield `public power' than `private power', where 
the former refers to actions on the part of the government itself and the latter 
refers to the actions of the citizenry as individuals87. 
This description applies well to the Orthodox Church of Greece: the Church often 
succeeds in blocking or vetoing certain state policies; it tends to affect such policies 
`from the sidelines' (i. e., it is not a prime actor in policy-making); and in many cases it 
relies on the actions of individual citizens in support of the Church's causes at a given 
time. 
In Turkey, the situation is quite different. Returning to Casanova's position that 
the public form a religion may take is contingent on its place between state and society, 
the fact that Islam in Turkey has generally faced a hostile state and could not effectively 
engage nationalistic sensitivities has led to different types of religious mobilisation. The 
primary option available to Turkish Islamists has been to try to work within the 
democratic political system through the formation of Islamist political parties. After a 
succession of party closures, political Islamists have had to increasingly modify their 
87 N. J. Demerath III, `Religious capital and capital religions: cross-cultural and non-legal factors in the 
separation of church and state', pp. 31-2. 
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discourse, to the extent that the most recently formed religion-oriented party88, though 
comprised mostly of leaders of formerly banned Islamist political parties, has repeatedly 
denied the characterisation of an `Islamist' party. Contrary to the cultural power which 
Demerath describes, religion-oriented parties in Turkey must mobilise on issues other 
than culture and religion, particularly on platforms such as the struggle against 
corruption, dissatisfaction with other political parties' performance, and a strongly pro- 
EU stance which claims to be able to advance beyond the gridlock within other parties 
over EU reforms (a gridlock largely in the domain of human rights provisions). And 
contrary to Demerath's description of the types of political outcomes religion may have, 
Turkish Islamism is in a position to yield positive, primary, and public power. 
Perhaps more instructive for our understanding of religious mobilisation in 
Turkey are explanations of how religious groups conform to the changing power 
structures by modifying their rhetoric and activities. According to Talal Asad, 
the only option available for a deprivatised religion to appeal effectively to the 
consciences of those who do not accept its values is to act as secular politicians do 
in liberal democracy. Where the latter cannot persuade others to negotiate, they 
seek to manipulate the conditions in which they act or refrain from acting. And in 
order to win the votes of constituents they employ a variety of communicative 
devices to target their desires and anxieties89. 
This is a fitting description of political Islam in Turkey. Islamist political parties have 
had to carefully adjust themselves to the strictly secularist political system, on the one 
hand, and to campaign on the basis of desires and anxieties insufficiently addressed by 
other political parties. This point is substantiated by Lilian Voye's claim that, in order to 
be listened to, religious spokespersons modify their discourse and its presentation. 
88 The Justice and Development Party (or, AKP), led by Tayyip Erdogan and formed in 2001. 
39 T. Asad, `Religion, nation-state, secularism', p. 182. 
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Institutional survival is often contingent on the religious actor's demonstration of `a 
capacity to solve problems generated in other fields but not solved there' -in other words, 
a development of religion's `performances'90. 
As Casanova notes, explanations of the public character of religion tend to be of 
two types: utilitarian secularist explanations, which describe an instrumental 
mobilisation of available religious resources for non-religious purposes, or an 
instrumental adaptation of religious institutions to the new secular environment; or 
secular-humanist explanations, which refer to fundamentalist anti-modem reactions of 
hierocratic institutions unwilling to give up their privileges, or the reactionary 
mobilisation of traditionalist groups resisting modernisation91. At first glance, it seems 
that Turkey falls perfectly within the first category, and Greece within the second. 
Cavanova goes on to argue that such explanations are far too rigid `to deal with the 
historical "contingencies" of a yet unfinished modernity and of a not yet completed 
secularisation', and that they tend to ignore `the intrinsically religious character of the 
phenomenon'92. Such interpretations leave no room for a potentially positive role to be 
played by religion. Casanova contends that, in Western Christianity, two developments 
have paved the way for such positive potential: first, the emergence of the modern system 
of centralised absolutist states and of national territorial churches; and second, the 
emergence of the secular state with its claims of separation from the church and liberation 
from the religious-normative type of integration of the political community. Following 
these developments, according to Casanova, the public character of religion ceases to be 
necessarily or primarily determined by its institutional location in relation to the state; 
90 See Lillian Voye, `Secularisation in a context of advanced modernity', p. 276. 
91 J. Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, p. 214. 
92 J. Casanova, ibid, p. 38 and p. 216 respectively. 
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rather, official changes in the self-definitions of religious actors may significantly affect 
the structural location of a given church. Thus, religious institutions in Western Christian 
contexts have generally conformed to acting as part of civil society in their respective 
contexts. 
A European model of religion-state relations? 
To what extent are religion-state relations in Greece and Turkey compatible with 
European norms? In both cases, public religion is still largely determined by the 
institutional location of religion in relation to the state, and public religion does not 
operate as part of a pluralistic civil society (the two criteria of positive public religion set 
out by Casanova). In Turkey, the barrier to such a civil society seems to be the Kemalist 
tradition of laicism. And the European Parliament has suggested as much in a recent 
draft report on Turkey's application for EU membership93. Here Azzam Tamimi's words 
apply well: `The major challenge to [secularists] has been the Islamists' commitment to 
the values of democracy, pluralism, civil liberties and human rights, which 
contemporary ... secularists claim to 
hold but fail to respect'94. Turkish Islamists are more 
prone than `secularists' to support enhanced religious pluralism because the entailed 
religious freedom benefits them primarily. 
In the case of Greece, where anti-European expressions do arise within the 
Church they are often connected to any EU-related reforms which might increase 
religious pluralism in Greece-reforms which, in turn, might threaten both its 
93 See chapter six. 
94 A. Tamimi, `The origins of Arab secularism', p. 28. 
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institutional place vis-d-vis the state, and (in the long run) its traditional role as 
representative of Greek national identity. Here David Martin's observation is pertinent: 
`where Orthodoxy has stood in for the state [as was the case under Ottoman rule], any 
pluralism is usually associated with extraneous ethnic intrusions'95. And so, through its 
resistance to such reforms and by virtue of its influence on domestic politics, the Church 
seems to be a barrier to a religiously plural society in Greece96. 
An understanding of the extent to which public religion in Greece and Turkey is 
compatible with European norms requires us to consider the situation in Europe97. In an 
article entitled `Secularism in retreat', Peter Berger cites Western Europe as an exception 
to that trend. Indeed, much work within the field of the sociology of religion has ceased 
discussing the `American exception' to the secularisation thesis, and has turned to the 
`European exception' to the `desecularisation thesis' (i. e., that thesis which seeks to 
explain the `return of religion' in various contexts)98. 
95 D. Martin, A General Theory of Secularization, p. 55. 
96 For a general analysis of how the question of pluralism poses a challenge to churches and states, see eds. 
S. Monsma and J. C. Soper, The Challenge of Pluralism: church and state in five democracies. The editors' 
starting point in examining this `challenge' is `recognition of each nation's unique history and cultural 
assumptions about the proper place of religion in public life'. They argue that two major questions facing 
contemporary states are a) how far a polity can go in permitting behaviour contrary to societal welfare and 
norms that is nevertheless justified on the basis of religion?, and b) should the state encourage consensual 
religious beliefs and traditions in an attempt to support the common values and beliefs that bind a society 
together and make possible limited, democratic government? These are questions faced both by individual 
states and by the supranational state of the European Union. 
97 The reader is encouraged to consult Jean-Paul Willaime's study of `Religion, state and society in 
Germany and France', in order to draw interesting parallels between the cases of Greece and Germany, on 
the one hand, and Turkey and France, on the other. Willaime examines how the political and religious 
histories of Germany and France mark contemporary church-state relations in each case and, in turn, affect 
the compatibility of each country with developing European norms. 
98 For insight into the scholarly path from the `secularisation thesis' to the development of a `theory of 
desecularisation', see Peter Berger's The Sacred Canopy (1967) and his edited volume The 
Desecularization of the World:: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (1999). 
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Efforts to explain the European exception tend to hone in on the regulation of 
religious markets". John Francis and N. J. Demerath provide useful explanations of both 
state and church positions on religious regulationtoo Francis posits that the church's 
negotiation of support in exchange for some measure of regulation by the state appears to 
be the emerging norm of convergence in state-church policy throughout Europe. For 
their part, churches benefit from this situation in terms of tangible resources and a 
competitive advantage in dealing with other churches. Meanwhile, states have freed 
themselves from the complex business of becoming immersed in questions of doctrine 
and personal selection. Overregulation has been abandoned, not least as a result of 
lessons learned through the Eastern European experience of churches gaining in strength 
as a voice for more general opposition to the state101. Demerath describes the state's path 
to a minimum of regulation in terms of an effort to disentangle religion from politics 
(sacrificing short-term gains for fear of long-term losses): `Once religion is introduced 
into politics, it can be very difficult to pull it back. Not only do its absolute criteria clash 
with the politics of compromise, but religion tends to be emotionally "hot" and 
accompanied by its own experts who are frequently difficult to control.. . As a cultural 
wild card in the frequently fixed game of state politics, religion poses a threat to 
established policies and policy makers' 102. 
99 E. g., the aforementioned supply-side argument posits that Europe is not inherently more secular than 
other societies, but that the difference merely lies in the over-regulated and limited religious market. 
Although this body of theory is much debated, the focus on regulation of the religious market is indeed 
prominent in work on European secularisation. 
00 J . Francis, `The evolving regulatory structure of European Church-state relationships'; N. J. Demerath III, 
`Religious capital and capital religions: cross-cultural and non-legal factors in the separation of church and 
state'. 
101 J. Francis, `The evolving regulatory structure of European Church-state relationships', pp. 775-9. 
102 N. J. Demerath III, `Religious capital and capital religions', p. 30. 
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Francis also emphasises what he calls the evolutionary nature of the convergence 
within regulatory regimes in Europe, by tracing developments from the 19`h century until 
today, when religious leaders speak from insulated positions as moral authorities rather 
than as heads of broad-based movements which legitimate or delegitimate the state 103 
Thus there seems to be a trend towards a homogenisation of the religious situation of 
Europe, a trend seen less and less as a general secularisation of Europe but as a shift in 
the institutional location of religion. This theme is echoed by John Madeley, who 
suggests that what we see in Europe is not so much the disappearance of Christianity but 
`its return instead to the socially and politically marginal position it occupied before 
Constantine elevated it into the official religion of the Roman Empire one and a half 
millennia ago' 104. Religious individuals will continue to make a distinctive contribution 
to the political life of their respective societies, and perhaps more distinctive because of 
their marginality. But, Madeley argues, in so doing `they are likely to find themselves as 
only one among a number of different minority constituencies attempting to make their 
voice heard; the triumphalist days when the Christian church could claim the allegiance 
and obedience of men of power as well as their subjects are surely gone forever'los 
Finally, this concept is also a central part of Casanova's thesis in his Public 
Religions in the Modern World. His argument that contemporary religion may have a 
positive public role is based on the assumption that, at least in Western Europe, `this 
historical epoch, the "age" of reactive organicism, of secular-religious and clerical- 
anticlerical cultural and political warfare, of catholic action, or religious pillarisation, and 
103 J. Francis, `The evolving regulatory structure of European Church-state relationships', pp. 803-4. 104 J. Madeley, `Politics and religion in Western Europe', p. 64. 
tos Ibid, p. 64. 
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of Christian democracy has come to an end' 106 This is a modern structural trend which, 
according to Casanova, is of `providential' character for Western Christendom and its 
colonial outposts. And so, only public religions at the level of civil society are 
considered to be consistent with modern universalistic principles and with modem 
differentiated structures. The examples of the `caesaropapist' British monarch and the 
established Scandinavian churches are considered `rather residual anachronisms' which 
are compatible with the modem democratic public sphere 
107. Practically all other cases 
of mobilised public religion at the political society level are, according to Casanova, 
`transitional' types: they are either religious movements resisting secularisation and 
secularist movements (and, again, Casanova argues that the age of secular-religious 
cleavages has basically come to an end in the historical area of Western Christendom), or 
they are movements in defence of religious freedoms108. 
We have seen in this chapter, with reference to both the relationship between 
religion and national identity and between `church' and `state', the use of such terms as 
`time lags' and `delays', and descriptions such as `evolutionary' and `transitional'. As 
noted above, Rend Rdmond warns against use of such terms (although the concepts 
106 J . Casanova, Public 
Religions in the Modern World, p. 61. 
107 Ibid, p. 218. 
108 See Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, pp. 218-220. Also pertinent here is a discussion 
touched on by John Madeley. Madeley points to differences between East and West in terms of church- 
state relations: `in the Orthodox East "the heritage of Byzantium, taken up by Tzarist Russia practicing 
Caesaro-papism, partly explained the tradition of the eastern churches' submission to the will of the 
sovereign. In none of the nations in which orthodoxy was the religion did the churches ever enjoy true 
independence. To this specifically historical fact may perhaps be added a spiritual tradition turned more 
towards union with God than to sustaining the body of society, thereby implying a passive acceptance of 
temporal events". By contrast "[n]ot only did [the Roman Catholic church] expect the secular powers to 
recognise it as the perfect society, but it also made it their duty to support the faith in the exercise of its 
spiritual mission.. . 
for the Catholic Church relations between religion and society were especially close, 
and ran counter to the idea of a total separation between the two... Catholicism is always characterised in its 
relation with society by its attitude of maintaining an active presence"'. See p. 16 of J. Madeley, `Towards 
an inclusive typology of church-state relations in Europe' (Madeley refers here to R. Remond, Religion and 
Society in Modern Europe, pp. 24-6). 
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remain implicit in his work). In my view, such terms are not only somewhat contentious, 
but they are also unhelpful in understanding the role of religion in national-EU relations 
in the cases of Greece and Turkey. Far more constructive, I contend, is the approach 
offered by Nicos Mouzelis in his discussion of underdevelopment109. I have focused 
above on the importance of differences between my two cases in the relationships 
between religion and national identity and `church' and `state'. I submit that also 
critically important is these countries' similarity in terms of the form and effects of their 
westernisation process and how this has variously affected certain institutional interests 
and the means used to defend these interests. At the establishment of their modem states, 
both countries experienced a sudden `injection' of western culture and institutions which 
was vastly different from those which had developed during the previous decades. 
Neither Greece nor Turkey experienced the great socio-political transformations which 
had `completely changed the face of Western Europe', including the Enlightenment, the 
Renaissance, the Reformation, and the industrial revolution. Accordingly there was, in 
Mouzelis' terms, an insufficient organic connection (i. e. a disarticulation) between the 
new dominant culture and the live cultural traditions which had developed in the previous 
centuries. Mouzelis explains that where institutions did not develop endogenously but, 
together with advanced technologies, were introduced or imposed by the West, `the 
organic links between native and imported institutions are often lacking"10. The 
109 N. Mouzelis, Modern Greece: Facets of underdevelopment. See especially Chapter 8, `On Greek 
formalism: political and cultural aspects of underdevelopment', pp. 134-148. 
110 Ibid. p. 138. Antonis Liakos, writing on `the canon of European identity', echoes Mouzelis' assessments 
as applied to the Greek case (but with a focus on social, rather than economic, underdevelopment). Liakos 
describes a `negative consciousness' which has prevailed in Greece, which defines the 'self' ot as what it 
is but what it is not: `Greece was described [by 20th century scholars] as having a history of absences: the 
absence of Renaissance and Reformation, the lack of bourgeoisie and industrial revolution and liberalism- 
and all these absences distorted development'. See A. Liakos, `The canon of European identity: 
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imported institutions either play a purely decorative role or, when they take strong roots 
in the host country, they do not merge effectively with the older institutional structures. 
As a result, neither the old nor the new institutions function properly. One of the results 
of this disjunction is usually formalism on both the institutional and action levels, i. e., 
`political and cultural arrangements [develop] which ensure perpetuation of the 
infrastructural bottlenecks and contradictions. This precisely is the distinctive 
contribution of formalism to the maintenance of the status quo"". In Mouzelis' terms, 
political and cultural underdevelopment is `the process whereby the importation of 
western political and cultural institutions results in the mobilisation of ideological 
resources (political support, legitimation) for the maintenance of the status quo's 12 
Again, Mouzelis' work is mainly concerned with economic underdevelopment, 
but we may apply it to our subject to understand, in particular, the Greek Church's efforts 
to maintain a certain status quo in its position in the Greek state and society and, by the 
same token, the efforts of the Kemalist elite (not least, the military), to preserve their 
positions of dominance in Turkish state and society. Furthermore, Mouzelis' description 
of the various possible ways of perpetuating the status quo also applies well to the Greek 
and Turkish cases: for example, the use imported bourgeois parliamentary institutions in 
such a way that the masses are either kept outside active politics or are brought into the 
political process in a dependent, `safe' manner. The resulting `dependent integration' 
may involve, for instance, a restriction of parliamentary freedom to bourgeois parties 
only and using a variety of legal, quasi-legal or illegal techniques for excluding certain 
transmission and decomposition', p. 133. See also R. Panagiotopoulou, `Greeks in Europe: antinomies in 
national identities'. 
111 N. Mouzelis, Modern Greece, p. 138. 
112 Again, Mouzelis' primary interest in this text is economic underdevelopment, thus he means 
maintenance of the status quo in terms of `the development of economic underdevelopment'. 
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forces from the political process' 13 We see such developments in both the Greek and 
Turkish cases (see chapters three and five). 
The same point about preservation of the status quo is hinted at by David Martin 
(but specifically in relation to church interests): `the social a priori, chosen as an 
assumption and not accepted automatically as a frame of being, has to devise protective 
clauses.. . The break with the automatically given must restore part of the automatically 
given to survive. This is the underlying economy of society: to achieve change you must 
make heavy concessions to the status quo' 114. In the Greek case, the state is often forced 
to compromise, in favour of the Church and the status quo in terms of the Church's 
strength in Greek society and politics; in Turkey, political Islamists thus make 
concessions and conform-in rhetoric and policies/activities-to the Kemalist status quo 
and its strength in Turkish society and politics. 
Mouzelis' and Martin's perspectives, then, provide a critical link in my study. 
They offer insight into the relative interests of `church' and `state' in terms of preserving 
a certain status quo. Again, my argument is that the place of religion between state and 
society determine certain interests on the part of the `church' and the `state'. We see here 
that different institutions in each case have prevailed through maintenance of the status 
quo: in Greece, the Church, and in Turkey, the Kemalist elite structure. Membership (or 
potential membership) in the EU affects institutional interests in each case, as it 
challenges some of the effects of the Greek Orthodox Church's predominance in Greece, 
and the Kemalist elite's predominance in Turkey. 
113 N. Mouzelis, Modern Greece, p. 139. 
114 D. Martin, The Dilemmas in Contemporary Religion, p. 24. 
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Conclusion 
I have examined above the relationships between religion and national identity 
and forms of nationalism in the Greek and Turkish cases. This examination is important 
because, as explained in the introduction, the relationship between religion and national 
identity is largely the foundational principle upon which `church'-`state' relations are 
built. And, in the context of my broader argument, the latter is important because it is in 
the domain of `church'-`state' relations-specifically, in the contending interests of 
`church' and `state' over the place of religion in state and society-that religion plays a 
significant role in national-EU relations. 
Meanwhile, secularism and secularisation entail the ideologies, policies and 
processes through which `church'-`state' relations are formed. Thus, I also considered 
how `church'-`state' relations developed in Europe variously in relation to secularism and 
secularisation, and I examined the Greek and Turkish cases against this background. 
Special attention was given to religious groups' attitudes and interests as they have arisen 
in relation to religion-nation and `church'-`state' relations. Finally, I closed with an 
analysis of each case with reference to European and EU norms in religion-state relations. 
In this chapter I have indicated that the role of religion in national-EU relations 
(from an internal perspective to individual nations) has to do with the place of religion in 
state and society and the relative interests of `church' and `state' with regard to the place 
of religion in state and society. I have also introduced ways in which membership (or 
potential membership) in the European Union affect the relative interests of `church' and 
`state'. Again, my aim is to understand the implications that religion-nation and church- 
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state relations have on national-EU relations in each case. We have seen here that the 
place of religion in a given state and society is the product of two interrelated factors: the 
relationship between religion and national identity, and between `church' and `state'. 
Upon this basis I shall argue that differences in these relationships yield large 
differences in the way religion plays a role in national-EU relations. Elaboration of this 
argument requires a detailed study of the historical development of these relationships in 
each case. In the following chapter, I commence with such a study for the case of 
Greece. This is followed by an examination of a specific issue in chapter four: the 
`identity card issue', which exhibits the links between religion, national identity, 
`church'-`state' relations, and national-EU relations. A similar study for the case of 
Turkey follows, (with the `case within the case' focusing on the February 28th process 
and its `legacies'). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Religion and national identity, church and state in Greece 
This chapter is devoted to an examination of the relationships between religion 
and national identity, and between church and state, in Greece. Through this examination 
we shall come to understand how the Orthodox Church of Greece has historically played 
a powerful role as preserver of Greek national identity, and how this fact translated into 
close relations between church and state. Again, the main argument made in this thesis is 
that the role of religion in national-EU relations is to be located in the place of religion in 
state and society and in the contending institutional interests of the `church' and of the 
`state'. This chapter serves to locate historically our analysis of the contending church 
and state interests and the effects of these on Greek-EU relations. 
By religion in the case of Greece, I mean Greek Orthodoxy-the faith to which 
approximately 96% of the Greek population claims to belong. The church to which I 
refer is the Orthodox Church of Greece, headed by the Archbishopric of the 
Autocephalous Church of Greece, which is based in Athens'. The church administration 
`Orthodox Church of Greece' is the official title for the ecclesiastical body we examine here; it is, for 
simplicity's sake, usually referred to as `the Church' in this text. I use the term `church' to mean not a body 
of believers but an institutional body. Also for simplicity's sake, with reference to the Orthodox peoples the 
term `Orthodox' is often used; and, in the case of the faith, the term `Orthodoxy'. This must not, of course, 
be confused with other forms of religious orthodoxy. Finally, it should be noted that the Orthodox Church 
of Greece does not officially represent all of Orthodoxy in the country. Mount Athos (or, Agio Oros, a 
peninsula in Northern Greece, home to a number of monasteries) remains under the direct ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and is, according to Art. 105 of the Greek Constitution, a self- 
administering part of the Greek State. The Church of Crete is autonomous and has its own Charter: its 
archbishop is elected by the Synod of the Patriarchate, following the suggestions of the Minister of 
Education and Religious Affairs and three bishops of the Church of Crete. The churches of the Dodecanese 
also remain under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, since the annexation of the 
Dodecanese Islands to the Greek State in 1947. See P. Dimitropoulos, State and Church: a Dfcult 
Relationship, p. 85 [in Greek]. My use of such terms as `Greek Orthodoxy', `Official Church' and `the 
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throughout the country is divided into 81 Metropolises, each led by a Metropolitan 
bishop. Beyond the Official Church, there are also a number of religious brotherhoods, 
the most well-known of which are Zoe, Sotir, Stavros, and Paraklitos. Whilst there is 
some debate as to whether these groups should be considered as sects because of their 
historically critical stances towards the Official Church, it is generally agreed that the 
brotherhoods exist in dogmatic union with the Church2. Clearly outside the Official 
Church are the `Old Calendarists' (those Eastern Orthodox who did not conform to the 
adoption of the Western Christian calendar) and the Uniates (Christians who follow 
Orthodox traditions but profess loyalty to the Pope)3. Finally, beyond Greek Orthodoxy 
there are a number of other faiths represented in Greece, including Judaism, Roman 
Catholicism, Islam, and several Protestant sects4. 
Below I examine the historical development of a close relationship between 
Orthodoxy and Greek national identity through the prism of a selection of specific 
periods or events. I then consider the relationship between church and state with 
reference to the constitutional provisions relating to the Church, the privileges these 
Church' (with a capital `C') is always in reference to the `Orthodox Church of Greece' specifically, and not 
to the other Orthodox churches and institutions mentioned above. 
2 For a discussion of whether the Greek Orthodox brotherhoods fit into Ernst Troeltsch's typology of sects, 
and for information on the historical development of these brotherhoods, see B. Jioultsis, `Religious 
brotherhoods: a sociological view', and V. Makrides, `The brotherhoods of theologians in contemporary 
Greece'. 
' The recognition of the Uniate Church by the Roman Catholic Church remains a point of contention 
between the Orthodox Church of Greece and the Roman Catholic Church. See P. Dimitras, 'L'anti- 
occidentalisme grec', p. 351. The Uniate Church resulted from the 16`h century Venetian efforts to convert 
Greek Orthodox subjects to Catholicism. The Uniate Church was officially recognised by the sultan of the 
16th century and thus ended dialogue between the Orthodox and the Catholics. The Uniates are in full 
communion with the Roman Catholic Church, but they do not follow the Latin rite nor are they directly 
subject to the Pope. They are also called Eastern Catholics. These churches accept Catholic dogma, but 
retain their own hierarchies and liturgies, and follow some Eastern Orthodox doctrines and customs. 
° There are also, of course, followers of a multitude of other faiths living in Greece. The number of citizens 
belonging to these faiths, as well as the number of places of worship for these faiths, are unclear. This is a 
matter of controversy as many in Greece argue that the unavailability of such information is due to efforts 
to portray Greek society as religiously homogenous. 
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entail for the Greek Orthodox Church vis-ä-vis other faiths represented in Greece, and 
examples of church-state conflict. Finally, I present a spectrum of `Greek Orthodox's 
perspectives on Europe and the European Union, mainly through a selection of religious 
publications. 
Religion and national identity 
My study of the relationship between religion and national identity in Greece 
begins with the experience of the Orthodox Church under the Ottoman Empire and in the 
Greek national revolution. A second climactic period in this relationship is the 
establishment of the Autocephalous Church of Greece and its eventual recognition by the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate. Third, I examine Greek irredentism, particularly with reference 
to the Megali Idea. This selection is necessarily limited, but it serves our purposes by 
providing insight into how the relationship between religion and national identity 
translated into close church-state relations and the patterns, in the latter, of cooperation, 
conflict, and compromise. 
Ottoman rule and national revolution 
The fall of Constantinople in 1453 signalled the end of the Byzantine Empire and 
the inclusion of much of its territory under Ottoman rule. Under the Ottoman millet 
5 In inverted commas because I do not claim that the views presented represent the full spectrum of Greek 
Orthodox perspectives on Europe and the EU. 
6A full historical analysis of the relationship between religion and national identity in Greece would take 
us as far back in history as the Byzantine Empire and the Great Schism, but space limitations do not allow 
for such historical depth. 
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system, non-Muslim communities were divided into religious groups and given 
`protected' status: in exchange for the payment of a special tax, they were allowed to live 
within the Muslim state without converting but as second-class subjects. The millets 
enjoyed a measure of autonomy and were represented by their religious leaders in their 
dealings with the high porte8. By the decree of Sultan Mehmet II, the Patriarch of 
Constantinople was recognized as the highest religious and political leader (millet bashi) 
of all Orthodox peoples-regardless of ethnicity-living within the Ottoman Empire. 
The entailed privileges and responsibilities were immense: the Patriarch and higher 
clergy were themselves exempted from taxes, but they were responsible for collecting 
them from the Orthodox millet for the Islamic state and for guaranteeing their subjects' 
full obedience to the Sultan. The millet system also granted the Patriarchate full juridical 
authority over the Orthodox (on matters of marriage, dowry, property, inheritance, 
education, and social welfare)9. Thus, with this vast expanse of functions, the Church 
was legitimised by the Ottoman State as a religio-political institutionio 
Although the Orthodox millet was ecumenical and multinational in nature, in 
reality it was largely Greek-dominated: the succession of Patriarchs was Greek, and the 
social administration was almost exclusively in the hands of Greeks. This latter fact was 
due to the simple reality that the Greek population living in Constantinople, the 
Phanariots, were already the leaders of business there and had become directly involved 
See E. Zürcher, Turkey: a Modern History, p. 12. The millet system was in line with Islamic law traced 
back to the Prophet Mohammed: conquered people have the option either to convert to Islam or to retain 
their religion but be loyal and pay taxes to the Islamic political regime. See N. Kokosalakis, `Church and 
State in the Orthodox context with Special reference to Greece', p. 239. 
8 E. Ziircher, Turkey: a Modern History, p. 12. 
9 N. Kokosalakis, `Church and State in the Orthodox context with special reference to Greece', pp. 239-40. 
10 See V. Makrides, `Orthodoxy as a conditio sine qua non: religion and state/politics in Modern Greece 
from a socio-historical perspective', p. 284; see also P. Dimitropoulos, State and Church: a Difficult 
Relationship, p. 52. 
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in the administration of the Ottoman Empire itself. The Phanariots thus exercised special 
influence over the Patriarchate in terms of day-to-day affairs and in relation to the high 
porte11. According to Victor Roudometof, `the Ottomans... facilitated the legitimation of 
the Grecophone ecclesiastical elites over the Balkan ethnies... The conflation of Greek 
ethnic identity with that of the Rum millet as the Orthodox millet was called] was an 
indispensable component of the Ottoman social system' 12. Furthermore, with a Greek 
Patriarch carrying out secular and ecclesiastical functions, and a largely Greek hierarchy 
in control of the Orthodox millet, `Greek interests came to dominate a Church that 
became increasingly involved in the preservation and perpetuation of Hellenism and it 
became more and more difficult to separate Hellenism from Orthodoxy' 13. Indeed, the 
Church was the main institution which provided for national Greek education, by 
establishing schools, printing presses, scholarships, and food for school children. 
Accordingly, beyond the institutional role of the Church-in its economic, legal, and 
political dimensions-one must also note the important psychological function it had for 
the Greeks under Ottoman rule: the Church was seen as provider and protector of the 
people and preserver of their national identity. As Makrides explains, `the Church and - 
abstractly - Orthodoxy were of great importance to the Greeks and became an essential 
11 N. Kokosalakis, `Church and State in the Orthodox context with special reference to Greece', p. 240. 
12 V. Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the 
Balkans, pp. 53-4. See text for explanation of the extent of this conflation of `Greek' with `Orthodox' in the 
perceptions of Western Europeans as well as in merchants' circles within the Ottoman Empire and beyond. 
13 J. Rexine, `The Church in Contemporary Greek Society', p. 201. Rexine goes on to say that the Church 
expressed greater concern for the revival of the Greek nation rather than for the ideals of Christian 
Orthodoxy. (The question of the Church's interest in a 'revived Greek nation' is discussed below). 
Paschalis Kitromilides offers an opposing perspective. He argues that `the Orthodox church in the Balkans 
did contribute to the preservation of collective identity under Ottoman rule by institutionalising and 
safeguarding the distinction of the Christian subjects from their Muslim rulers. But the distinction was 
religious, not national, in content... . It was only the confusions arising from the coincidence that power in 
the Orthodox Church was wielded by a Greek-speaking hierarchy that created `ethnic' antagonisms within 
it before the age of nationalism. See Kitromilides, "`Imagined communities" and the Origins of the 
National Question in the Balkans', pp. 52-3. 
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part of their collective identity '4. Such facts naturally led to the widespread 
interpretation-later to prevail in Greek historical memory-expressed here by 
theologian Evangelos Theodorou: 
It was the Church which kept the Greeks spiritually free and 
revived their national conscience, by means of its deposit of 
tradition, and through the medium of the Greek language, Greek 
letters, and, above all, through the liturgical life of the Church. In 
the darkest period of the Turkish domination, the main cultural 
force which maintained the Greek national spirit was the liturgy 
and the whole of the worship of the Church' . 
However, it is important to distinguish between the Church's efforts to preserve 
Greek national identity, on the one hand, and its will to `revive the Greek nation', on the 
other-a distinction which leads us to question Theodorou's perspective. The Church 
was in a highly comfortable position under Ottoman rule. Besides the aforementioned 
power and privileges, the Church also became especially wealthy: many Christians 
transmitted their land to the Church and the Monasteries since, under the millet system, 
ecclesiastical property was protected from confiscation by the Turks 16. Therefore, the 
high clergy were not entirely supportive of revolutionary ideas which might threaten their 
relatively privileged positions 17. Likewise, as Roudometof notes, the wealth and power 
of the Phanariots rendered many of them also relatively negative towards a Greek 
1" V. Makrides, `Orthodoxy as a conditio sine qua non: religion and state/politics in Modem Greece from a 
socio-historical perspective', p. 285. 
15 E. Theodorou, The Church of Greece, p. 13. Charles Frazee argues that the bishops and clergy had almost 
unanimously supported the revolution (See C. Frazee, `The Orthodox Church of Greece: the last fifteen 
years', p. 89). The debatability of this point is addressed below. 
16 N. Kokosalakis, `Church and State in the Orthodox context with special reference to Greece', p. 240. 
17 See V. Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the 
Balkans, p. 56. Also, in 1821 Patriarch Grigorios denounced the revolt in the Danubian principalities and 
excommunicated the revolutionaries, but he was still hanged for not having maintained control over his 
flock. Greek Catholic islanders also did not support the revolt (pp. 64-5). 
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national revolution: `the Rum millet was not an oppressed people in need of liberation, 
rather, its progress could be achieved under the rule of the Phanariot and religious 
elites' 18. Thus, neither the Phanariots, the high clergy, nor the Orthodox peasantry fully 
advocated nationalist ideas or, by extension, plans for a Greek national revolution. 
This is arguably the case prior to the 1750's, when revolutionary ideology was 
limited to the religious-political division between the Ottoman privileged class of the 
askeri (which was almost entirely Muslim by the late 180' c), and the subordinate class of 
the reaya (which was mainly Greek Orthodox). However, as education and Grecophone 
secular literary production expanded in the post-1750 period, the reemergence of classical 
antiquity in the discourse of the western Enlightenment reached the Rum millet and 
strongly influenced its secularisation'9. The ecclesiastical establishment and many 
Phanariots opposed these new ideas since they correctly perceived that secularization 
would shift the religious foundation of solidarity among the members of the Rum millet 
and lead to the delegitimisation of the Church and the Phanariots. In the case of the 
clergy this is logical and evident in the Patriarchate's condemnation of the `godless 
Voltaires'20. Meanwhile, merchants, peddlers, intellectuals and other petit-bourgeoisie 
valued the new western ideas, and gave financial support for the importation of western- 
style education methods; but they were unwilling to risk their fortunes'in open revolt 
against the Porte. Thus a major ideological conflict developed between much of the 
18 V. Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the 
Balkans, p. 55. 
19 Ibid, pp. 56-8. He goes on to note: `the reception of the Enlightenment by the Orthodox Balkan society 
led to a growing trend toward secularisation and critical thinking.. . 
The central place of ancient Greece in 
the Western Enlightenment led to a reconstitution of the relationship between the modern `Greeks' (Greek 
Orthodox) and the ancient Greeks (Hellenes)' (p. 69). Accordingly, we see in this period the gradual 
development of Enlightenment thinkers' replacement of the term `Rum' or `Romeic' with Greek or 
Hellene, and use of the term nation (ethnos), reflecting a slow transformation from religious to secular 
identity (p. 60). 
20 Roudometof, ibid, p. 61. 
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hierarchy and Greek population, on the one hand, and the western-minded individuals 
seeking Greek national independence, on the other21. The French Revolution intensified 
this battle between conservative and liberal factions, with Church leaders denouncing 
`franco-masonic' ideas, while proponents of the `enlightened reason' accused the Church 
of `voluntary slavery 722. 
Yet many clerics did fight for Greek independence. According to Nicos 
Mouzelis, though originally hostile to the revolution, they jointed the revolution when 
they realised its irreversibility23. In any case, the symbolic importance of those clergy 
members who did fight for Greek independence remains embedded in the memories, and 
historical chronicles, of many. Kokosalakis summarizes well the reason why this is the 
case: `Although the role of the church during the Greek uprising has been at times 
exaggerated the fact remains that the Church's contribution was outstanding. This was 
not because the Church was or is a revolutionary Church but because she was and 
continues to be a Church tied to the ethnic identity of the Greeks'24. It is thus that one of 
the most renowned aspects of the revolution is the act of a Greek bishop, Germanos of 
Patra, who on the 25th of March, 1821, raised as the banner (lavaron) of revolution the 
curtain of the sanctuary of the Cathedral of Patras25. And it izi thus that the 25th of March 
is now celebrated as Greek national independence day. So in spite of conflicting 
perspectives on the attitudes and actions of the clergy throughout the national revolution, 
21 Such ideological conflict is a recurrent theme throughout the history of modern Greece: many future 
`national divisions' would later be interpreted through the same mould as that which developed in the 18th 
and 19th centuries. 
22 V. Roudomentof, Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the 
Balkans, p. 61. 
23 N. Mouzelis, Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment, p. 61. Mouzelis cites here the work of 
J. Kordatos, The social significance of the 1821 revolution (in Greek), Athens, 1972. 
24 N. Kokosalakis, `Religion and modernization in 19th century Greece', pp. 230-3 1. 
25 See J. Rexine, `The Church in contemporary Greek society', p. 203. 
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the prevailing interpretation in school books and in popular opinion is that the Church 
saved the Greek nation throughout the four centuries of Ottoman rule, and that there 
would have been no `nation' to rebel against the Ottomans had the Church not played this 
role. 
Establishment and recognition of the Autocephalous Church 
Newly independent Greece was ruled by the Regency of the young Bavarian King 
Otto, who was installed by the Great Powers (Britain, France and Russia). Georg von 
Mauer was the member of the regency responsible for issues of Church, Education and 
Justice. Mauer believed that complete political independence for Greece required a 
disentanglement of the Church from the Ecumenical Patriachate. Contact of the Church 
with foreign centres of decision-making was deemed contrary to the interests of the new 
political leadership. Mauer also proclaimed that the Church should be modernized and 
the educational standards of the clergy should be improved. Accordingly, he formed a 
Commission to discuss the problems facing the Church and to establish a Statutory 
Charter for the Church. The Commission decided that political independence required 
also ecclesiastical independence 26. Thus in spite of the Patriarch's staunch protests, the 
Autocephalous Church of Greece was proclaimed by royal decree in July of 183327. 
The declaration of autonomy from the Ecumenical Patriarchate entailed also 
legalisation of the Church's subordination to the state. The administrative leader of the 
26 See P. Dimitropoulos, State and Church: a Difficult Relationship, pp. 55-58. See also N. Kokosalakis, 
`Religion and modernization in 19'h century Greece', p235. 
27 See C. Papastathis. `State and church in Greece', pp. 75-6. See also J. Rexine, `The Church in contemporary 
Greek society', p. 204. 
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highest ecclesiastical power, a five-member Synod, was to be the King (though Roman 
Catholic). The latter was in accordance with the Bavarian prototype whereby the King 
was also the `supreme bishop'28. The members of the Synod were hired by the 
government, and a royal commissioner would represent civil power at each of its 
meetings. The layman's presence was required for the drafting of Synodal decisions, 
which were then subject to government approval29. Thus, the 1833 decree of `The 
Independence of the Church of Greece' made the state the exclusive legislative ruler and 
declared the Church subject to the Monarch30. The situation was, as one scholar 
describes it, a cultural and political anomaly: not only was the head of the Greek 
(Orthodox) nation a Catholic and foreigner, but the three-man regency council was 
Bavarian and Protestant31 
As Nikos Kokosalakis notes, `despite its declared intention to modernise the 
church and to improve the educational standard of the clergy, the Bavarian administration 
adopted in fact antiquated and even reactionary policies towards the church'32. The most 
vivid example of this consists in the second wave of church subjugation by the state: an 
attack on the monasteries and their properties. By an 1833 royal decree, all monasteries 
with less than 6 monks were closed; with a second decree, a few months later, almost all 
the female monasteries were also shut down. Of 593 monasteries, 412 were closed, and 
their properties were confiscated by the monarchy33. In some cases the consolidation of 
28 N. Kokosalakis, `Religion and modernization in 19th century Greece', p235. 
29 P. Dimitropoulos, State and Church: a Difficult Relationship, p. 59. 
3" This was later institutionalised in the Constitution of 1844, Article 105, stipulating that Church 
administration matters would be regulated by the state. C. Papastathis, `State and church in Greece', p. 76. 
31 N. Kokosalakis, `Church and State in the Orthodox context with special reference to Greece', p. 241. 
32 N. Kokosalakis, `Religion and modernization in 19th century Greece', p. 236. 
33 See P. Dimitropoulos, State and Church :a Difficult Relationship, p. 60; T. Stavrou, `The Orthodox 
Church and political culture in Greece', pp. 43-4; and N. Kokosalakis, `Religion and modernization in 19th 
century Greece', p. 236. 
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the monasteries took violent form, with the Bavarian Army forcefully expelling the 
monks for placement in the remaining monasteries34. Finally, a royal decree also forbade 
any future gifts of land estate to the Church. The strict measures were, according to 
Dimitropoulos, an effort to dissolve important sources of power which could become 
centres of resistance to state policy35. But of course these developments incited a great 
deal of discontent, both within the clergy and amongst the wider population. 
A number of other circumstances during this period further pressed on Greek 
Orthodox sensitivities. For example, Protestant and Catholic missionaries in the country 
were increasingly active on several fronts. Plans had been made for the foundation of a 
Protestant university in Athens. Over one hundred Protestant publications had been 
approved as adjunct schoolbooks. The British Bible Society trod on especially sensitive 
ground in 1834 by publishing a translation of the Old Testament into modern Greek. The 
translation was considered inaccurate by many Orthodox who insisted that the Greek 
version was the only legitimate one. But the deeper source of controversy was over the 
concept of providing `unmediated' access to the Bible, and the differing Orthodox and 
Protestant views on this. The practice of translating the Bible into the local vernacular 
was interpreted by some as an attempt to convert Greeks to Protestantism. Furthermore, 
when a personal letter of a Protestant missionary in Greece, which announced the 
conversion of a number of Greek school girls, was leaked to Greek press, debate over the 
missionaries' activities became explosive. Henceforth popular discontent was expressed 
over a number of related issues, such as the exemption offered to the Greek Catholic 
34 V. Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the 
Balkans, p. 103. 
35 P. Dimitropoulos, State and Church :a Difficult Relationship, p. 60. 
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monasteries which remained unaffected by the consolidation; the fact that the regency 
and the king were not Orthodox; and the harsh suppression of local bandits 36 
Thus, under a widespread impression of an attack on Orthodox traditions, many 
began to interpret the separation of the Greek Church from the Patriarchate as a 
conspiracy aiming to convert the people to Protestantism and Catholicism. Between 
1833 and 1852 there were fourteen peasant revolts. As Roudometof carefully notes, most 
of these actually reflected popular discontent over the intensive power centralisation and 
burdensome taxation under Otto, or-were goaded by local overlords hoping to exact 
financial rewards from the state. Nonetheless, the revolutions were expressed in terms of 
a struggle against an `infidel' (i. e., non-Orthodox) administration in favour of the 
protection of local religion and custom. And they took place within the context of a 
broader debate between spokesmen of western trends and of Eastern Orthodox 
conservatism which was, in many ways, simply a continuation of the ideological conflict 
which existed before and during the Revolution of 182137. We also see here a mixture of 
undercurrents behind conflicting ideologies, including power struggles and financial 
interests. 
Assessing the significance of the establishment of the Autocephalous Church is 
difficult. Scholars' interpretations conflict over whether it was primarily an act of 
Europeanisation, modernisation, and secularisation, in conformity with the patterns of 
state-building in Europe, or if it was an arbitrary subjugation of the Church by the state 
36 V. Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the 
Balkans pp. 103-4. 
37 Ibid, p. 104. 
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for the purpose of manipulating it on the part of the state38. Though the initial intentions 
of the state remain unclear, two points are certain. First, the literal creation of the 
Autocephalous Church by the state clearly signals the radical beginning of Church 
subordination to state interests. Second, the consequent relationship between Church and 
state is complex: while the right of the state to interfere in ecclesiastical matters was 
legalised, ecclesiastical issues were recognised as public issues39. In other words, as 
Dimitropoulos points out, the autocephaly did entail subjugation of the Church and thus 
the affirmation and institutionalisation of liberal ideas, but it also entailed the paradox 
that `as political power became disentangled from religion, the Church became bound to 
the State'40. A final certain effect of the establishment of the autocephaly is the enhanced 
ethnic character of the Church: the newly independent Church became a symbol of 
national identity. Particularly the fact that its establishment was a revolutionary act-i. e. 
a split from the Patriarchate without the latter's consent-meant for most Greeks that the 
autocephaly was the attainment of the fullest extent of national independence and 
national identity41. 
38 The establishment of the autocephaly was, according to Vasilios Makrides, an attempt to limit the 
influence and jurisdiction of the Church solely to the religious domain, as was the prevailing pattern of 
centralised administration and state-building in Europe. Makrides emphasises that the aforementioned 
secularisation process was effective solely at the `surface' of Greek society: `both the popular sentiment 
and the official state ideology the Church still remained inextricably interwoven with the historical 
struggles and social values of Greece'. See V. Makrides, `Orthodoxy as a conditio sine qua non: religion 
and state/politics in Modern Greece from a socio-historical perspective', p. 287. 
J9 Antonis Manitakis, `The Autocephalous Church of Greece between State and Nation', pp. 328-331 [in 
Greek]. By emphasising the extension of Church influence into the realm of public policy, Manitakis' view 
is in clear contrast with Makrides' aforementioned perspective (on the limitation of Church influence, see 
footnote 38). 
40 P. Dimitropoulos, State and Church: a Difficult Relationship, p. 61. This theme is repeated with reference 
to the acting Archbishop Christodoulos: the state moving in a non-national direction while the Church is 
becoming increasingly `ethnicised'. 
4' According to Sia Anagnostopoulou, the subjugation in the autocephaly of the Church to the state did not 
mean, in that period, a programmatic slavery of the Church to the aims of the state; it meant first the 
Church's subjugation to the secularisation of politics and of the public space. Thus, with autocephaly the 
state does not accept cooperation with, but the submission of the Church on two levels: the practical and the 
symbolic. The autocephaly of the Church of Greece thus constitutes, in her opinion, the ultimate 
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Following the establishment of the Autocephalous Church, the next climactic 
point in our historical overview is the repairing of relations with the Patriarchate, with the 
latter's official recognition of the Autocephalous Church of Greece. Unease over the 
state's extensive control over the Church, its ensuing attacks on monasteries and its 
failure to `protect' the Church and nation from `threats' of other faiths, led many clergy 
and lay people to call för renewed relations with the Patriarchate42. Conservatives sought 
a reunion with the Church of Constantinople and security against proselytizing efforts of 
other faiths, whilst liberals sought the constitutional substantiation of the Autocephalous 
Church and the separation of Church and state. The ideological debate between the two 
factions initially resulted in the Constitutional recognition of the Orthodox Church as the 
`prevailing' church, which `existed' in dogmatic union with the Church of 
Constantinople. In the context of common compromise, the King ceased to be the head 
of the Church and its administration was left to a Synod of hierarchs. The Church 
remained under the control of the state and its holy canons were applied to the extent that 
they were not contrary to the canons of the state. And finally, all acts of proselytism 
committed `against' Orthodoxy were strictly prohibited. 
Conservative factions of society remained unsatisfied, however, and the clergy in 
particular continued to request normalisation of relations with the Patriarchate in hopes 
that this would also entail an enhancement of their wages. Thus, as a further concession, 
the Greek government issued a formal request to the Patriarchate for its recognition of the 
justification of the Greek revolution of 1821. Sia Anagnostopoulou, `The historicity of the "national role" 
of the Church of Greece', pp. 349-352 [in Greek]. See text for her effective reference to texts of that period 
in support of her argument. 
42 See P. Dimitropoulos, State and Church: a Difficult Relationship, p. 62. 
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Church of Greece as Autocephalous43. The Patriarchate, for its part, was favourable 
towards anything that might strengthen its role: the gradual proliferation of national 
churches across the Balkans had threatened to render it powerless. Hence in 1850, the 
Patriarchate officially recognised the Autocephalous Church of Greece44. The 
recognition was greeted with great enthusiasm by political and ecclesiastical circles. 
Beyond repairing relations of both the Greek Church and state with the Patriarchate, the 
move also normalised church and state relations internally to Greece. Thus, the official 
recognition of the Autocephalous Church clearly added ideological strength to the 
national aspirations and ethnic ideology of the Greek state45. According to Roudometof, 
the 1850 recognition of autocephaly ended the conflict between Orthodox conservatives 
and western liberals: `the conservatives succeeded in uniting the national church with the 
Patriarchate even if only in form and not in substance; the liberals preserved the 
substance of the 1833 Church constitution. Even if at first glance the conservatives 
appear to have won only a hollow victory, the true losers were the liberals'46 
This view is expanded upon by Sia Anagnostopoulou. She argues that the 
recognition of the Autocephalous Church, rooted as it was in the ideological conflict 
I 
which followed its establishment in the first place, signifies a clear reversal of the 
revolutionary policy which led to its establishment: 
Through a paradoxical road, [the autocephaly] becomes the link in 
the chain for the development of the ideology of Greek = 
Orthodox. The meanings of nation and religion acquire a new 
43 N. Kokosalakis, `Religion and modernization in 19`h century Greece', p. 239. 
44 P. Dimitropoulos, State and Church: a Dcult Relationship, p. 63. In ecclesiastical terms this means that 
the Greek Orthodox Church was in communion with the other Orthodox churches, and that matters relating 
to dogma or faith must be referred to the Patriarchate. See also J. Rexine, `The Church in contemporary 
Greek society', pp. 204-5. 
45 N. Kokosalakis, `Religion and modernization in 19`s century Greece', p. 239. 
46 V. Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the 
Balkans, p. 106. 
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functionalism in Balkan history in the latter half of the 19th 
century.. . The religionisation of the national and the identification 
of the public with spirituality--with the mediation of the national-- 
takes place definitively in 1850, with the issue of the Synodal 
Tomos, with which the Patriarchate not only recognises the 
Autocephaly of the Greek Church, but.. . signals the beginning of a 
new era under which the revolutionary nature of 1833 is nullified: 
the autocephaly no longer represents the will of the independent 
Greek nation, as expressed in its political leadership, but the will of 
the timeless Greek Orthodox nation47. 
Thus, we are cautioned to `be careful to distinguish between periods, to understand why 
that which in 1833 was revolutionary, came in 1850 and afterwards, to satisfy the 
ideology of those who fought the autocephaly'48. 
Greek irredentism and the Megali Idea 
The reason is, in short, the consolidation of religious and nationalist aspirations in 
Greek irredentism-in particular, in the Megali Idea ('Grand Idea'). Here then the aims 
of the state for its expansion coincided with the visions of religious nationalists for 
`redemption' of Orthodox peoples-visions which were expressed with reference to 
Byzantine glory. In 1844 John Kolettis, a politician favoured by the King, first 
articulated the doctrine of the Megali Idea, a romantic vision of re-establishing modem 
Greece with its pre-Ottoman occupation boundaries49. The speech with which Kolletis 
introduced the concept `blended millenarian hopes of a restored Christian Empire with 
secular Greek state-sponsored nationalism; it gave the masses a clearly understandable 
4' S. Anagnostopoulou, `The historicity of the "national role" of the Church of Greece', p. 353. The term used 
here for `Greek Orthodox' is `Ellinorthodoksia' (or, Greco-orthodoxy), a term which indicates an 
especially close blending of `Orthodox' and `Greek'. 
48 S. Anagnostopoulou, ibid, p. 349. 
49 N. Kokosalakis, `Religion and modernization in 19th century Greece', pp. 238-9. 
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vision while it transformed millenarianism into modern nationalism'50. The King became 
an ardent supporter of the vision as did most of the Greek people. According to Richard 
Clogg, `almost all Greeks subscribed to this vision, the only argument being as to how it 
might be best implemented 'S1. The manifestation of this idea in government policy, and 
its tragic termination in 1922, are well-documented in historical texts5`. Our intent here 
is simply to emphasise that the vision revived the historical connections between 
Orthodoxy and Hellenism in a fusion which became the basic cultural orientation of 
modem Greece. This tendency, as Nikos Kokosalakis notes, was strengthened in the face 
of such `threats' as represented by Jacob Fallmerayer, who openly doubted the historical 
continuity of Greece's cultural identity from the classical to the modem period. Hence 
also Spyridon Zampelios' coining of the term `hellenochristianos' in 1852, to emphasise 
the unbroken continuity between ancient Greece, Byzantium and Modem Greece's 
Whereas there is much disagreement amongst scholars, as noted above, with 
regard to the relationship between church, state, and national identity throughout 
Ottoman rule, the revolution, and the establishment of autocephaly, there is general 
agreement that the Megali Idea acted as a an ultimate synthesis of church, state and 
national identity. Thus, in Dimitropoulos' interpretation, the place of the Church in the 
state structure did not differ significantly from that of other churches in Europe before the 
period of the Megali Idea: as the `prevailing' Church, it had a number of privileges and 
511 V. Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the 
Balkans, p. 105. 
51 Clogg is cited by N. Kokosalakis, in `Religion and modernization in 19th century Greece', p. 238. 
52 For one English-language study, see Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States, pp. 110-117 (on `The 
Greeks and the `Great Idea'). 
53 N. Kokosalakis, `Religion and modernization in 19'h century Greece', pp. 238-9. See also Michael Herzfeld, 
`Past glories, present politics'; `National character, national consciousness'; and `Attack and reaction', in 
Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideolog , and the Making of Modern Greece; and Loring Danforth, `The 
ideological context of the search for continuities in Greek Culture'. 
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responsibilities. However, he continues, in beginning to operate as a public authority in a 
state with `unredeemed dreams', though submitted to the state, the Church began to be 
`politicised' with the intention to serve the interests of state policy; `the process of its 
ethnicisation would lead to the "religionisation" of the nation, and to the elevation of the 
ideology of identification of orthodoxy with Greekness'54. Likewise, Manitakis argues 
that Orthodoxy as an element of national identity was only discovered and developed by 
the leaders of the revolutionary Greek state when they began to cultivate ideas of national 
completion and the Megali Idea 55. And finally, Anagnostopoulou maintains that. in the 
context of irredentism, state and Church become interdependent: the Church, as daughter 
of the Patriarchate, as heir of the past of the genos, simultaneously legitimises the 
identification of Greek with Orthodox; the Greek state, though, is that which legitimises 
the inheritance of the Church'56. The three historical facts of the establishment of the 
Autocephalous Church, its recognition by the Patriarchate, and the development of the 
Megali Idea-particularly in relation to one another-carry a great deal of importance in 
terms of understanding certain trends which we see repeated later: first, the tendency of 
the state to compromise in the face of church demands; second, the tendency of the state 
to see the Church and Orthodoxy as expedient factors of national unity and to use the 
Church and faith for its purposes; and third, the tendency of the Church to identify itself 
with such national causes57. 
54 P. Dimitropoulos, State and Church: a Difficult Relationship, p. 65. 
55 A. Manitakis, `The Autocephalous Church of Greece between State and Nation', p. 336. 
56 S. Anagnostopoulou, `The historicity of the "national role" of the Church of Greece', p. 356. 
57 Again, this is a necessarily selective overview of periods in Greek history which shaped a close 
relationship between religion and national identity. One further historical period which has had a powerful, 
ambiguous affect on the relationship between Orthodoxy and Greek national identity is the military 
dictatorship of 1967-74. This period represents perhaps the most intense identification of church and state 
which, because of the particularly violent character of that military regime, left negative marks on the 
relationship between religion and national identity in Greece. The manipulation of religion by military 
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Church-state relations 
We have seen above how the relationship between religion and national identity 
led to close relations between church and state in Greece. I now turn to a more in-depth 
examination of church-state relations. Through a special focus on constitutional 
provisions dictating the place of the Church in the Greek state, I indicate a number of 
privileges enjoyed by the Church vis-ä-vis the state and, most importantly, vis-ä-vis other 
faiths represented in Greece. I then examine particular problems arising from these 
privileges, in terms of religious freedoms and equality for the non-Orthodox in Greece. 
Here we are introduced to ways in which privileges afforded the Church pose some 
potential, and some real, problems in Greek-EU relations. As we shall see, it is not 
necessarily legislation which is at issue here, but practices which derive from both the 
historical relationship between Orthodoxy and national identity and the constitutionally- 
informed church-state link. Finally, I close with a few examples of church-state conflict, 
thus introducing us to certain implications of conflicting interests on the part of the 
Church and on the part of the state. 
leaders during the 1967-74 junta (the slogan of which was `A Greece of Christian Greeks') bears 
similarities with the `Turkish-Islamic synthesis' during the Turkish military dictatorship of the early 1980's 
(see chapter five). In both cases, military leaders used religion as a buttress against communism. For a 
thorough study of the Church under the 1967-74 military dictatorship in Greece, see G. D. Kent, The 
political influence of the Orthodox Church of Greece (a PhD thesis written during this period). See also 
N. Kokosalakis, `Church and state in the Orthodox context with special reference to Greece', pp. 248-9; 
E. Prodromou, `Toward an understanding of Eastern Orthodoxy and Democracy Building in the Post-Cold 
War Balkans, pp. 132-4; and C. Yiannaras, Chapters of Political Theology, pp. 116-7 and 132-139 [in 
Greek]. 
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Constitutional provisions 
Constitutional provisions for church-state relations evolved considerably during 
the time period covered above58. Prior to the 1975 Constitution (which is in force today), 
the President of the Republic was required to be Orthodox and to take an oath before 
Parliament promising to `protect' the Greek Orthodox faith, and proselytism perpetrated 
against Orthodoxy (only) was prohibited. According to the 1975 Constitution, the 
president is no longer required to be Orthodox nor to take such an oath59. ' Furthermore, 
with the new constitution the clause forbidding proselytism was moved from Article 3 
(where the subject of proselytism was treated as a matter of protecting solely the 
Orthodox Church) to Article 13 on human rights (thus prohibiting proselytism 
perpetrated against any faith)60. The articles of the 1975 Constitution in force today 
which determine Church-state relations are mainly Articles 3,13 and 16. The first 
affirms recognition of Orthodoxy as the `prevailing' faith; the second guarantees 
58 Space limitations do not allow for a thorough historical examination; see P. Dimitropoulos, State and 
Church: a Difficult Relationship, and Antonis Manitakis, The Relations of the Church with the Nation-State 
[in Greek]. 
59 The president's oath no longer pledges protection of the Orthodox faith, but it does make reference to the 
deity. There is no alternative oath, as is provided for members of Parliament in Article 59 of the 1975 
Constitution (See Dimitropoulos, State and Church: a Difficult Relationship, p. 67). According to 
Papastathis, `this is an indirect way of promoting the election of a Christian president only and does not 
conform to the principle of equality (as set out in Article 4 of the Greek Constitution)'. C. Papastathis, `State 
and church in Greece', p. 84. 
60 There was also, in previous constitutions, a provision prohibiting any activity aimed against the Greek 
Orthodox faith (this clause was aimed to limit conversions from Orthodoxy to other faiths). This too was 
omitted from the 1975 Constitution. Likewise, according to the 1975 Constitution, confiscation of 
newspapers and other publications upon their distribution is allowed in cases where any `known' religion 
(not only Christianity) is offended. (For an explanation of the term `known', see below). P. Dimitropoulos, 
State and Church: a Difficult Relationship, pp. 133-5. 
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religious freedoms of conscience and of worship61; and the third sets out `development 
of religious conscience of youth' as one of the aims of national education. 
Many of the changes in the 1975 Constitution were designed to extend religious 
freedoms to other faiths as well, and to limit the extent to which the Orthodox Church has 
a privileged and protected status. However, these aims have not been fully met. This is 
due, in part, to the wording of Article 3 of the Constitution, which indicates that Greek 
Orthodoxy is the `prevailing' faith: it is unclear whether the term `prevailing' indicates a 
statement of fact (i. e., reflecting the predominance of the faith, representing 
approximately 97% of the population in Greece), or whether the term entails a nonnative 
statement (i. e., that Orthodoxy ought to be the prevailing religion, and is thus deserving 
of protective privileges)62. The former is the predominant view amongst constitutional 
specialists and within Greek courts63. However, there is a great deal of debate over 
whether, regardless of constitutional terminology and predominant interpretations, in 
practice the faith is treated as if it ought to prevail in Greece, thus granting the Orthodox 
Church of Greece privileges vis-ä-vis the state and over other faiths represented in the 
country. 
In terms of privileges vis-ä-vis the state, the clergy of the Orthodox Church of 
Greece are remunerated and pensioned by the state: the state pays the salaries and 
61 Paragraphs 1 and 2, respectively, of Article 13. According to Paragraph 2, `known' religions are 
protected by this provision. To be `known' the religion must not have a secret dogma or a hidden cult; it 
must apply to the Greek state for recognition; and the cult should not offend public order and moral 
principles. The latter includes the whole set of civil, moral, social and economic principles and beliefs 
prevailing in Greek society at a given period. The above conditions are enforced by the public 
administration and, ultimately, by the courts. See C. Papastathis, `State and church in Greece', p. 84. 
62 Nicos C. Alivizatos, `A new role for the Greek Church? ', p. 25. 
63 According to specialist in Ecclesiastical Law, loannis Konidaris, the concept of `prevailing religion' is 
not to be construed as the right to dominate other religious communities; it now has no normative content. 
Instead, it has a mainly declaratory sense: namely, it denotes that the overwhelming majority of Greeks 
belong to this Church and that state occasions are only celebrated according to the rites of this Church. See 
I. Konidaris, `The legal parameters of Church and State relations in Greece', p. 226. 
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pensions of the clergy, preachers and lay employees of the Orthodox Church, and the 
Church is exempted from taxation64. Furthermore, Metropolitans are given a role in the 
issuance of licenses for the building of places of worship for minority faiths. The lessons 
of religion in public schools reflect official Orthodox positions. State holidays are based 
on the religious calendar, so that the holidays of the Greek Orthodox Church are 
acknowledged as official national holidays65. Also significant is the fact that the 
Statutory Charter of the Church must be passed by the Plenary Session of Parliament 66 
Meanwhile, the Archbishop presides over each opening session of Parliament and blesses 
with Holy Water each of the Parliamentarians. Of especially symbolic impact is the fact 
that Church and state leaders often jointly preside over state functions and national 
holiday celebrations 67. Finally, one cannot underestimate the role of politicians 
themselves in entrenching such church-state links through their own presence and 
contributions to religious functions68. Each of these facts, in varying degrees, entails an 
especially close relationship between church and state in Greece. 
64 I. Konidaris, ibid, pp. 227-228. As Papastathis notes, the state also receives 35% of all parish revenues. 
Furthermore, certain tax exemptions apply to other faiths as well. C. Papastathis, `State and church in 
Greece', p. 86. 
65 As Konidaris explains, this is the case significantly beyond the celebration, in other European states, of 
Christmas and Easter as public holidays. 
66 I. Konidaris, `The legal parameters of Church and State relations in Greece', pp. 227-228. 
67 A small but telling example is that National Independence Day, 25th of March, is also a major religious 
holiday (the annunciation of Mary), and the celebrations across the country are jointly presided over by 
Church and state leaders. It is interesting to note that, during one of the most intense church-state conflicts 
in history (over ecclesiastical property; see below), one of the Church's most severe reprisals was refusal to 
be present at the 25 March celebrations. 
68 This is a tremendous topic for which space does not allow full attention. The subject is, however, more 
thoroughly addressed in the following chapter on the national identity card issue. For further information 
about politicians' emphasis on church-state links with regard to other matters, see N. Kokosalakis, `Greek 
Orthodoxy and modem socio-economic change' (especially the sections on `The functions of religion in Greek 
society', and `Religion and recent socio-economic change', pp. 257-265); 'Orthodoxie grecque, modemite et 
politique'; and `Orthodoxy and social change in modern Greek society'. See also T. Stavrou, `The Orthodox 
Church and political culture in Greece', pp. 35-54; N. Demertzis `La place de la religion dans la culture politique 
grecque'; V. Georgiadou, `Greek Orthodoxy and the politics of nationalism' (especially pp. 307-310); and 
A. Paparizos, `Du caractere religieux de I'etat grec moderne'. 
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Problems of religious freedoms and equality 
Of particular importance to us here is how some of the privileges of the Orthodox 
Church vis-ä-vis the state entail restrictions on religious freedoms of heterodox citizens 
and limitations on the principle of equality. These restrictions raise problems with regard 
to Greece's status as a signatory to the European Charter for Human Rights. Thus, we 
will now focus on specific privileges afforded to the Orthodox Church of Greece over 
and at the cost of other faiths. Again, it is not so much the formal constitutional 
establishment of the Orthodox Church of Greece as `prevailing' which is problematic, but 
the advantages to the Orthodox Church which exist in practice. These privileges, as we 
shall see, continue to exist due to the complex interaction between the religion-national 
identity link, historical trends in Church-state relations, and the political impact which 
results from both of these factors. We identify here three domains of the Orthodox 
Church's privileges in particular: the building and operation of places of worship for non- 
Orthodox peoples in Greece; the application of legal provisions against proselytism; and 
the aim and content of the religious courses in public schools. A fourth issue, that of the 
inclusion of religious persuasion on the national identity cards, will be discussed at length 
in the following chapter69. 
It is a 1939 law, enacted under the Metaxas dictatorship, which remains in force 
as determinant of the rights of minority faiths to construct churches and operate places of 
worship. According to this law, beyond the usual building permit, the construction of 
69 For more analyses of each of the aforementioned issues from both legal and sociological perspectives, 
see A. Pollis, `Greek national identity: religious minorities, rights and European norms'; M. Stathopoulos, 
State and Church Relations [in Greek]; M. Stathopoulos, `The constitutional provision of religious freedom 
and state-church relations' [in Greek]; and N. Alivizatos, The Uncertain Modernisation [in Greek], 
especially pp. 260-67, and 299-324. 
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any church or place of worship requires an application for permission submitted to the 
Minister of Education and Religious Affairs who, in turn, seeks the approval of the 
competent (relative to the district) Greek Orthodox bishop70. If a church is built without 
license, this is punishable with jail and the local Metropolitan has the right to call for the 
tearing down of the building. It is important to note, however, that this is one of the most 
misinterpreted aspects of Greek legislation. For instance, Alivizatos states that the 
approval of the local bishop is required. The approval of the local bishop is actually, in 
legal terms, an `opinion' which the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs is 
required to hear, but not to obey, in deciding on issuance of the permits71. What remains 
especially problematic, however, is that this whole legalistic process of permit 
authorisation gives the sense that all members of minority faith communities are, from 
the start, suspect and likely to act in ways which are antithetical to public order and 
70 The application must be signed by 50 families residing in the area. The local bishop is to forward his 
opinion to the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs on the `necessity' of such a building (the law 
states that, for the license, there must be a real need for worship which cannot be satisfied due to the lack of 
other churches/houses of worship of the same dogma in the geographical area). See N. Alivizatos, `A new 
role for the Greek Church? ', p. 31. 
71 The Metropolitan's permission is only a recommendation which does not bind the Ministry; but if the 
Ministry did permit the establishment against the Metropolitan's recommendation, it would have to justify 
its decision. In practice, the Metropolitans are almost always against such developments and the Ministry 
does not as a rule oppose them. Therefore, the interested party has to appeal to the Council of State; such 
appeals are usually accepted. See C. Papastathis, `State and church in Greece', p. 85. Furthermore, 
Alivizatos writes that the faith must be `known' in order to receive approval, and he declares that only two 
non-Orthodox faiths are `known': Judaism and Islam. Indeed, the Constitution only makes reference to 
these two `known' faiths; this because, at the time of its drafting, only those two faiths had official presence 
in Greece in terms of formal administration of their places of worship. However, the legal provision which, 
in practice, determines `known' faiths today includes any sect whose initiation process does not include 
secret rituals. The Ministry of Education, and the Official Church, `recognise' a far larger number of faiths. 
Also, the relative significance of the `known' clause, in practical terms, is exhibited by the fact that far 
more openly problematic has been approval of the building of a mosque in Athens (with Islam as a known 
faith), than of places of worship of other, `unknown' faiths. Furthermore, one should note that there is an 
alternative, much less strict process for the building and/or operation of places of worship, but which would 
legally come into existence as `religious meeting places'. In this case, the interested party, without needing 
some minimal number of co-signatories, submits an application to the Ministry of Education, simply stating 
his/her address for confirmation that a `meeting place' for the same dogma does not exist in the same area. 
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upright morals72. Also, the discriminatory enforcement of this legislation by Greek 
authorities has been the subject matter of the only case leading to unreserved 
condemnation of Greece by the European Court of Human Rights for practices against 
religious minorities73. Thus, in reality, the prevailing tendency today still gives priority 
to the safeguarding of the prevailing religion over true religious freedom74. 
The second problematic issue relates to legislation against proselytism. Although 
the 1975 Constitution extended the law against proselytism to protect all faiths and not 
solely Orthodoxy, the prevalent tendency is use of this legislation mainly to defend the 
Orthodox Church against the spread of other faiths in Greece75. This also has led to 
several indictments against the Greek state in the ECHR76. As in the case of licenses for 
the building and running of places of worship, the operative legislation on proselytism 
goes back to the time of the Metaxas dictatorship. In specific terms, the definition of 
proselytism is set out in a 1939 law as: `the attempt to intrude on the religious beliefs of a 
person of a different religious persuasion... by taking advantage of his inexperience, trust, 
need, low intellect, or naivetd'77. Especially problematic here is the vague wording of the 
clause, which has allowed for extremely strict interpretation of specifically non-Orthodox 
actions. As Alivizatos notes, the mere distribution of pamphlets and brochures, and the 
mailing of books and periodicals, have led to prosecution and even to prison sentences78. 
72 P. Dimitropoulos, State and Church: a Difficult Relationship, p. 139. 
73 N. Alivizatos, `A new role for the Greek Church? ', p. 32. 
74 P. Dimitropoulos, State and Church: a Difficult Relationship, p. 144. 
75 Or, perhaps more precisely, against the threat of conversions from Orthodoxy to other faiths. 
76 See pp. 134-5 of Dimitropoulos, State and Church: a Difficult Relationship, for details of individual cases. 
77 Law 1672/1939. See N. Alivizatos, `A new role for the Greek Church? ', p. 30. See text for the full 
operative definition of proselytism (the above quotation is only part of the definition), and for an analysis 
of problematic aspects of the definition. See also Introduction (chapter one), footnote 14, for further details. 
78 Alivizatos also notes, however (p. 30), that the ECHR missed an opportunity to change this state of affairs 
through its ruling on the Kokkinakis case, which reached the ECHR. It condemned Greece for unmotivated 
enforcement of the anti-proselytism provision, but ruled that member states have a legitimate interest to 
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Finally, the religion courses in public schools are problematic on two fronts. 
Again, Article 16 (Paragraph 2) of the 1975 Constitution sets out that the intention of 
education is, amongst other things, `the development of religious conscience of the 
Greeks'. This decree does not explicitly call for a mandatory lesson in religion, nor does 
it state that the development of religious conscience must be one-denominational and 
catechetical in character79. But the implementation of this decree puts into question 
guarantees of freedom of conscience (set out in Article 13 of the same Constitution). In 
primary and secondary education the mandatory lesson80 is of catechetical character: 
according to law 1566/1985, the intention of the course is, amongst others, to `help the 
students possess faith towards the fatherland and towards the genuine elements of the 
Orthodox Christian tradition'. In the case of tertiary education, the intention of the 
programme includes development of the students' `awareness of the deeper importance 
of the Orthodox Christian ethos'81. According to Dimitropoulos, the purpose of this 
religious education is neither to acquire knowledge about religious phenomena nor to 
understand the religious and cultural environment in which students live, but to make 
students good Christians, faithful members of the dominant religious community and 
prosecute `improper proselytism'. The ECHR did not provide its own definition of the term `proselytism' 
or explain what it interprets to be `improper proselytism'. 
79 P. Dimitropoulos, State and Church: a Dijficult Relationship, p. 145. 
80 Mandatory for Orthodox Christians, that is; other-denominational students may be excused from the 
course upon provision of proof of other denominational status. 
81 This is a matter of open debate, with the StE (Council of State, ie. Supreme Court of Greece) having 
issued an `opinion' that a. the religion courses should have a thriskeiologiko (of the history of religions), 
not catechetical, character-an opinion which, of course, has received great criticism from the Church. 
Furthermore, both the StE and the Data Protection Authority expressed the opinion (in November 2002) 
that the current process by which one may be exempted from the course-requiring proclamation of 
another faith-should also be amended. See `History of religions, not catechism',. Ta Nea, 12 November 
2002, p. 27 [in Greek]. Finally, the current character of the religious courses may also be considered to be 
in conflict with the operating laws against proselytism (that is, under the aforementioned loose definition of 
the term, the religious courses in public schools could also be interpreted as proselytism). 
93 
supportive of the perspectives of the Official Church82. Furthermore, the religion course 
also raises questions concerning the principle of equality provided for in Article 4 of the 
Constitution. A 1949 decision of the Council of State ruled that only Orthodox 
individuals could teach the course. Accordingly in primary schools, where there is only 
one teacher for all the subjects taught, a non-Orthodox teacher could not be hired83. In 
secondary schools, the exclusion of non-Orthodox teachers only applied to teachers of the 
religion course. In practice though, the administration has resisted hiring heterodox 
teachers even for the teaching of courses which have nothing to do with religion: `the 
non-Orthodox teacher was seen as suspect for proselytism... since he was not enlightened 
by the `truth of faith'84. Against the staunch resistance of the Church, the law was 
changed in 1988 so as to allow for heterodox teachers to be able to teach all subjects but 
the lesson of religion. Now a non-Orthodox may be appointed as teacher in a primary 
school with at least two posts, in which case the religion course is taught by his/her 
Orthodox colleague ß5. The latter fact effectively means that non-Orthodox teachers still 
may not be hired at schools with posts for only one teacher86. 
82 P. Dimitropoulos, State and Church: a Difficult Relationship, p. 146. 
83 C. Papastathis, `State and church in Greece', pp. 83-4. 
84 P. Dimitropoulos, State and Church: a Difficult Relationship, p. 147. 
85 C. Papastathis, `State and church in Greece', p. 83-4. Teaching of the religion courses is carried out by 
teachers in primary schools and graduates of theology in secondary schools; both are considered civil 
servants and receive a salary from the state, while their appointment and the subject-matter taught are not 
controlled by the Church. Each religious denomination can have its own schools in Greece. The state is 
also in charge of schools for the Muslim minority in Western Thrace as well as of an academy for future 
teachers in these schools (Papastathis, p. 89). 
86 Some schools hire two teachers for each class, so that the courses are shared between two teachers, one 
of which must be Orthodox so that he/she can teach the course on religion. This too is currently under 
discussion at the StE, which issued its opinion (in November 2002) that non-Orthodox teachers should be 
allowed to teach even the course on religion (this opinion was issued at the same time with the 
aforementioned judgement on the content of the courses). This also received harsh criticism from the 
Church. See `History of religions, not catechism', Ta Nea, 12 November 2002, p. 27; M. Antoniadou, `The 
battle over the religion courses', To Vima, 8 December 2002, p. A50; and V. Fotopoulou, `Heterodox 
teachers also in the schools', Eleutherotypia, 13 November 2002, p. 55. The human rights issues examined 
above have generated a great deal of debate in political and academic circles in Greece (for one excellent 
overview, see G. Sotirelis, `The separation of church and state: the revision which did not happen'). 
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Church-state conflict 
All of the above explanation of close links between church and state should make 
it clear that the Church is a powerful force to be reckoned with in Greek politics and 
society. Our focus below, and in the following chapter, is on the national identity card 
issue. But we will give brief attention to its most important precursors in terms of 
church-state conflict. With such background information we will be able to identify 
some common patterns in church-state conflict, and some important distinctions with- 
regard to the identity card issue. The first major conflict between church and state 
following Greece's 1974 return to democratic governance reveals some important 
patterns which deserve special attention: in particular, staunch, defensive battles waged 
by the Church, and the tendency of the state to compromise its stances87. In 1985 a 
PASOK88 government came to power after an intense campaign including the revision of 
church-state relations. Arguing that the state's covering of the whole of the Church's 
functional expenses was a large burden on the state budget, the government proposed 
reform in the management of Church estate and the yielding of part of the vast Church 
property to the state89. The then Minister of Education and Religious Affairs Antonis 
Tritsis introduced laws 1700/1988 on `the regulation of issue of church estate', and 
1811/1988 on `the yielding of forest and agricultural estates of the monasteries of the 
Internally to the Orthodox Church, however, the most substantial approach to human rights issues is offered 
by Anastasios Yannoulatos (Archbishop of Albania). See, for example, his papers `Social co-existence in 
religious pluralism' and `Eastern Orthodoxy and human rights'. 
87 Both tendencies are reminiscent of the conflict over the `attack' on monastery properties under King 
Otto. 
88 Panhellenic Socialist Movement. 
89 This was also seen as legally justifiable since much of the church estate was informally given (i. e., 
without legal titles of ownership) to the Church during the time of the Ottoman occupation, simply because 
only thus could Greeks ensure that the property would not be claimed by the Ottoman state. 
95 
Church of Greece to the public'. The plan provoked acute reactions from the Church, 
which argued that the provisions were unlawful in their lack of provision of an exchange 
in favour of the Church90. A counter-proposal was offered to the state, whereby 4/5ths of 
the church estate would be transferred to the state, and rights would be given to the 
Church for the development of the remaining land for construction or tourism. This was 
not accepted, and the hierarchs heightened their reactions to the state's proposals by 
boycotting the 25`h March national independence day celebrations and by organising a 
mass demonstration in Constitution Square (Syntagma Square). The Church took the 
case to the Greek Supreme Court ('Council of State', StE), which ruled in favour of the 
state. Finally, following threats from the Archbishop that the Church would publicly 
declare itself as `under prosecution', a series of personal meetings between the 
Archbishop and the Prime Minister yielded a `temporary' impasse which continues until 
today91 
Under the same government there was also considerable tension over the state's 
`progressive' efforts to reform the civil code. The government introduced legislative 
change towards equality of the sexes, decriminalisation of adultery, end of the dowry 
system, etc. One such proposed change was to make civil marriage required; this became 
a central point of intense struggle between church and state. It is merely significant to 
note that again, in this case, the state compromised under pressure from the Church, and 
civil marriage was simply made an option and legally equal to religious marriage. This 
too remains a sore issue, with repeated calls on the part of certain scholars and politicians 
90 The argument was made with reference to Constitutional Article 17, which states that no one may be 
stripped of his/her rights to ownership without proper compensation. 
9' The 1988 law were never fully applied; Minister Tristis resigned in personal protest; and certain 
monasteries took their cases to the ECHR. 
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for reform of marriage laws, and defensive expressions of fear, on the part of the Church, 
that the state might try again to `get its way' on the matter92. 
In the following chapter I examine one particular incidence of church-state conflict: 
that over the removal of religion from the national identity cards. This issue is 
particularly important for our purposes because it illustrates a clash between church and 
state interests which was intricately linked to the European Union. A thorough 
understanding of this complex subject, however, requires a grasp of `traditional' attitudes 
to Europe and the EU prevailing within Orthodox circles in Greece. 
Greek Orthodoxy and Europe 
My focus here is on attitudes towards Europe and the EU specifically, as 
expressed both by the Church and within wider Greek Orthodox circles. I aim to present 
a range of perspectives, though I emphasise expressions of anti-Europeanism. Thus, 
what follows should not be understood as a `general view' of Greek Orthodox attitudes to 
Europe: within both Greek Orthodoxy and Eastern Orthodoxy in general, there are (and 
always have been) strong trends of pro-Europeanism. However, negative attitudes to 
European integration, Europe in general and the West are common within most 
expressions of Greek Orthodoxy, and were especially prevalent in previous decades. 
Scrutiny of attitudes is useful as background information for our understanding of the 
Church's stance on the identity card issue (chapter four). Because a certain negative 
92 See E. Prodromou, `Democracy, Religion and Identity in Socialist Greece: Church-State Relations under 
PASOK, 1981-1989', pp. 227,249 and 283. See also A. Pollis, `Greece, a problematic secular state', 
pp. 157-159. Again, our focus in this section is on post-1974 events. For a thorough analysis of church-state 
conflicts before this period, see G. D. Kent, The political influence of the Orthodox Church of Greece, 
pp. 333-383. 
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attitude to (Western) Europe is rooted in history, I will begin with a brief historical 
overview of this stance within the Church. I will then examine attitudes to Europe and 
the European Union as expressed in a selection of religious publications. Finally, I will 
give special attention to the so-called `Neo-Orthodox' movement in Greece, which has 
traditionally highlighted distinctions between Orthodoxy and Europe/the West. 
A careful examination reveals Orthodox attitudes to the West and to the EU as 
multi-dimensional, and shaped by particular time-periods, events, and people. Thus, it is 
impossible to make valid generalisations. One general point, however, must be made: the 
fact that there is a confusion in Greece between the terms `Europe' and `the West'93. As 
we shall see in our consideration of expressions of `religious anti-Europeanism', this 
confusion extends to the European integration project in general (from the ECSC, the 
EEC, and the EC to the EU). 
According to Vasilios Makrides, a sense of Greek exclusivity and superiority 
towards others dates back to Greek antiquity and was strengthened during the Byzantine 
Period. This sense of cultural superiority over the Western Roman Empire took on 
religious dimensions when Charlemagne was consecrated `Emperor of the Romans' by 
Pope Leo III. Religious tension between East and West was clear from the 9`h century, 
and it culminated in the Great Schism between the Eastern and Western Christian 
Churches in 1054. The fall of Constantinople in 1204 under the 4t' Crusade, in 
particular, marks the time from which `the West began to represent a region full of perils 
for Orthodoxy and Byzantium'94. It is after the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman 
93 This is a tendency which dates back to the 18th c. See V. Makrides, `Aspects of Greek Orthodox 
fundamentalism', p. 54. 
94 V. Makrides, `Le Role de l'Orthodoxie dans la formation de I'antieuropeanisme et l'occidentalisme 
grecs', p. 107. 
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Empire, in 1453, that `the West' begins to be identified with `Europe' in Greek Orthodox 
rhetoric. As we saw earlier in this chapter, a hostility towards Europe developed during 
the 18th century, in opposition to Enlightenment ideals emanating from Europe. The 
Europeanisation of Greece was considered by many conservatives and Greek Orthodox 
clergy as a threat to Orthodoxy. This sentiment existed throughout the Greek Revolution, 
and was strengthened during the rule of Bavarian King Otto, as European influence over 
Greece began to be negatively associated with the rule of a European king who seemed to 
be instigating the `Protestantisation' of the newly independent country and the 
suppression of the influence of Greek Orthodoxy (through subjugation of the Church to 
the state). Certain socio-political and historical developments, then, served to forge 
disapproving attitudes to Europe, particularly within religious circles. 
In recent times, we see negativity towards Europe as sporadic and specific to 
certain groups or certain clerics. A notable example is the vehement hostility expressed 
within Orthodox circles towards the EU because of the Schengen Agreement. The 
agreement called for the registration of all citizens of the European Union by means of a 
census requiring divulgence of personal information which, for many in the Church, 
constituted an infringement on individual liberty. Most alarming for ecclesiastical 
circles95, was the fact that the census foreseen by the Schengen Agreement involved a 
computer system which somehow hinged on use of the number 666 (which, according to 
the Book of Revelation, is a number symbolising Satan). During the 1997 Easter season, 
the Church issued a 3-page encyclical warning the congregation of EU developments, 
including the Schengen Agreement, which `pose a threat to the freedom of the individual 
95 But especially for Greek Orthodox `fundamentalists'; Old Calendarists in particular rallied against the 
implementation of the Schengen Agreement because of its use of the number 666. 
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Greek'96 . The bulletin communicated sharp indignation over this European system which 
offended Orthodox Christianity by the use of the number symbolising Satan. 
A further example is the reaction of some Orthodox to the EEC funding of a film 
which advocated the abolition of frontiers within Europe. The bishop of the diocese in 
which the production was filmed-Bishop Kantiotis of Florina97-led a mass protest 
against the film, excommunicated the film's director (Theo Angelopoulos), proclaimed 
the film a danger for Orthodoxy and Greece itself, and condemned what he considered 
`the interference of the European Union in Greek internal affairs'. Bishop Kantiotis 
denounced Angelopoulos as an'agent of the European Union', and argued that the 
enemies of the Greek people are the'EEC, anarchism, and internationalismi98. The 
bishop had opposed Greek membership in the European Economic Community even 
from the 1980's, arguing that the EEC would impose decisions contrary to the Orthodox 
tradition 99 
Finally, the words of the then Metropolitan (now Archbishop) Christodoulos are 
also a powerful example of negativity towards the European Union: 
The problem is very old. Directly after our liberation from the 
Turkish yoke the governing political and intellectual order in 
Greece became trapped in the perception that Hellenism could 
survive if it neglected its eastern mentality and if Greeks were to 
walk uninhibited in their course toward the West ... I do not want 
to say that the integration of the EU is wrong. But it is 
dangerous... Today Hellenism is in danger of being absorbed into 
the European crucible.. . The Church should not isolate the Greek from Europe, nor though should it surrender him to Europetoo 
96 The bulletin is Circulation No. 2626 of the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, 7 April 1997. For 
further discussion of this bulletin, see K. Kotsiopoulos, Orthodoxy and Europe, p. 73. 
97 A city in Northwestern Thrace, with a large population of Turkish Muslims and traditionally a strong 
centre of religious nationalism. 
98 V. Makrides, 'Le Role de l'Orthodoxie dans la formation de l'antieuropdanisme et 1'occidentalisme 
grecs', pp. 111-12. 
991bid, p. 111. 
100 Christodoulos, `Hellenism and Europe', To Vima, 19 January 1997, p. A17. [in Greek]. 
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I turn now to an overview of attitudes, often negative, to Europe as revealed in a 
selection of religious publications101. One representative example of these attitudes is the 
publication of cleric Ierotheos Vlachou, Orthodoxy and the Western Way of Life102. The 
book was published in 1994, under the pretext of `the critical condition of our 
times-since today with the vision and the reality of the European Union Orthodoxy 
meets more closely with the West'103. Vlachou begins this text by emphasising that 
`East' and `West' are not simply geographical areas, nor intellectual or abstract terms, but 
indicative of specific `ways of life' 104. The text, according to its author, is devoted to 
showing the significance and magnitude of the Orthodox way of life as `the more 
authentic' way'°5 Chapter One of the book begins with the declaration that `we are at 
the threshold of our full integration into the European Community and everyone is 
talking about this issue. It is serious, because it has many consequences for the life of our 
Ethnos'. According to Vlachou, most discussion is on the economic consequences for 
Greece but `the problem is more serious from the spiritual side', because `the European 
countries are under the spiritual dominance and influence of Papism and Protestantism', 
which he sees as the embodiment of power-seeking and intellectualism respectively. 
101 Due to space limitations, this overview is necessarily selective. The Church, individual clerics and 
theologians have produced a number of pamphlets and monographs which offer Greek Orthodox 
perspectives on the EU. See, for example, Metropolitan Anthimos (ed. ), Our Orthodox Church in the 
Accession of Greece to the EEC; K. Kotsiopoulos, Orthodoxy and Europe; K. Mouratidou, Orthodoxy in 
United Europe; G. Tsetsi, European Unity and Church; G. Metallinos, Orthodoxy and Hellenism in the 
Contemporary World; Metropolitan Ierotheos, The European Union and our Cultural Tradition; 
Metropolitan lerotheos, Identity and Identities. For more general Orthodox perspectives beyond the Greek 
context, see Metropolitan Damaskinos, Orthodoxy and United Europe [all of the above texts are in Greek]; 
O. Clement, Conversations with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I (especially chapter nine, `On 
Europe'); and G. Papathomas, `Internal Orthodox Mission' (especially section on `Prejudice against 
European integration'). 
102 I. Vlachou, Orthodoxy and the Western Way of Life. [in Greek] 
103lbid, p. 19. 
104 This he defines as `a specific stance of life towards all issues which have to do with God, man and 
creation'. 
105 I. Vlachou, ibid., p. 19. 
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Though this has been the case mainly in historical terms, Vlachou continues, in 
contemporary terms it translates into a climate of prosperity and individualism prevailing 
in Europe106 
Vlachou suggests that there are two main possibilities as to how EU membership 
will affect Orthodox Greeks: either `we will be changed by the climate of prosperity and 
individualism which prevails in Europe, thus alienating ourselves from Orthodox 
Tradition', or `we may change and metamorphose Europe with the whole Tradition 
which we have to offer'. The latter, Vlachou argues, is especially difficult today for two 
reasons: first, because contemporary Greeks (and particularly politicians who `come into 
contact with the large European centres') are already, to a large extent, alienated from the 
Orthodox tradition; and second because today the unification of Europe is sought not on 
the basis of spiritual criteria, but economic interests107. Accordingly, the Church itself is 
called to stand in opposition to Europeanising trends. 
Vlachou then goes on to enumerate the differences between `Orthodox' and 
`western' `ways of life'. One of these is the fact that in the Orthodox East the centre was 
always the village, the small city, the island (what he calls decentralization), whilst in the 
West, the centre was the bourgeois society and the industrialised city. The Church, the 
diocese, and the monastery were also always at the centre of Orthodox societies; in the 
West, the centre of social life became the factory and science. Vlachou also sees a 
fundamental difference between the Orthodox and western peoples in their professional 
contexts: in the East, these are characterised by cooperation and guilds, whilst in the 
West, syndicates prevail within a climate of class struggles. There, the syndicates and 
'06lbid, p. 23. 
107 Ibid, pp. 24-25. 
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different occupational groups are interested more in prosperity and the increase of gross 
domestic product, all within a focus on individualism. 
This theme of fundamental differences between Orthodoxy and the West 
(described in the context of discussions on Europe) is echoed in the periodical of the 
oldest and best-known religious brotherhood, Zoe (the publication bears the title of the 
group). In Zoe we find frequent references to `the material mentality which rules the 
western world today' 10ß. The journal calls upon European citizens to demand from their 
leaders a new balance not only between politics and economics, but a new balance 
between economics and spiritual values (which, the journal's authors consider, is 
completely lacking in the European integration project). We see that the EU is 
approached from a particularly conservative lens. For example, one article noting the 
Amsterdam Treaty's condemnation of capital punishment, complains of the Treaty's 
failure to comment on the abolition of the capital punishment of innocent unborn life, and 
questions whether, for the EU, `the life of the atrocious murderers is more precious than 
that of the hopeful life of the embryo'. It goes on to cite the Treaty's promise of greater 
transparency of EU mechanisms for the benefit of its citizens, and suggests that this is 
simply to `sweeten the dangerous pill of the Schengen Agreement' 
109 
The subject of the Schengen Agreement is frequently visited in the pages of Zoe. 
We see here in particular the preoccupation with the use of the number 666 in Schengen's 
consensus mechanism: `it seems paradoxical on the one hand for our country to be 
branded by the stamp of Christ and the Holy Trinity, in the Name of Which its 
Constitution has been voted in and devoted, and the holy Cross which literally adorns its 
108 Zoe, Issue 3918,8 January 1997. [This and all other Zoe issues cited below are in Greek] 
109 Zoe, Issue 3902,19 June 1997. 
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flag, and on the other hand for us to accept as a government and as a community to 
implement laws which presuppose the compliance of the Greek State with an electronic 
system, the basic element of which is the code number 666"10. The EU in general is seen 
through this particular prism: `for the vision of the United Europe to become a reality, the 
unethical principles of self-interest and unclean diplomacy must be laid aside, and the 
human values of justice, freedom, and respect of the individuality of all citizens must be 
applied. With suspect electronic filing [i. e., the Schengen Agreement] they are building 
on sand' lll 
In general, the EU is portrayed as a negative influence on Greece in a range of 
domains. With reference to family values, a Zoe article declares `Europe is in danger': 
`With what materials is this grandiose structure being built? Is it being built strongly or 
simply with impressive materials? ' The evidence, the article suggests, is not at all 
encouraging: explaining that the institution of the family is facing a big crisis, the article 
notes that approximately one of four marriages ends in divorce in the EU and that there 
are fewer and fewer weddings taking place in the member countries. `It is', the article's 
author declares, `truly an issue of life or death for the society -- either the progress or the 
collapse of the family. Without constructive families there are not constructive 
societies... The institution of the family is rooted in strong spiritual bases-i. e., in Christ. 
Accordingly, Europe will either become consciously Christian or it will disappear. 
Without Christian values the per capita income cannot save it' 112. 
Conscientious objection is another domain in which the EU is seen to influence 
Greece negatively: 
110 Zoe, Issue 3897,15 May 1997. See also Issue 3882,27 January 1997. 
111 Zoe, Issue 3898,22 May 1997. 
112 Zoe, Issue 3940,10 December 1998. 
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The government is compliant with our European partners and introduced 
the so-called `alternative social service'. And already, according to 
journalistic sources, the first evaders of responsibility to the Fatherland 
have begun to offer their services in other community-natured services. 
But their demands don't stop here. Now they ask for social service to be 
in institutions independent of the Ministry of Defence; for the lessening 
of the length of service; for an increase in their wages.. . until finally they 
will ask for complete exemption. And this because they declare that, in 
the European countries, if you are a `conscientious objector' you are 
without responsibilities. Of course from people whose souls were not 
warmed by the holy sentiments and the grandeur of patriotism, what else 
could one expect? Our questions are: is Greece in the same position as 
Belgium, Holland, Denmark and the other European countries which use 
the army only in parades? Do they have neighbours, like we Turkey, 
who constantly threaten our Fatherland? ' 13 
Finally, in the domain of education as well Europe is considered a harmful 
influence: 
We find ourselves these days in front of an especially worrisome 
phenomenon: the brushing aside of spiritual values in general and 
specifically the education of the youth. Obvious proof is the 
downgrading of the religious lesson even in secondary education... it is 
thus that some try to educate and shape a new generation, in accordance 
with the measures and demands of Europe, a freakish construction which 
will support gigantic heads on liliputian ethical shoulders. We do not 
want to believe that this is happening consciously. Probably rather from 
mimicry and thoughtlessness. So they won't seem inferior to our 
European partners. And they forget the specificity of the Greek. His 
history. His cultural roots. The treasure of his orthodox [sic] faith... If 
we do not arm the new generation with spiritual and ethical equipment, 
1we risk the future of the Ethnos to 
113 Zoe, Issue 3940,10 December 1998. 
114 Zoe, Issue 3914,13 November 1997. The issue of patriotism itself is much-discussed in Zoe. In one 
issue critics of primary school students' expression of patriotism are referred to as `people whose soul was 
not warmed by the grandeur and the holy sentiments of love towards the Fatherland' (Issue 3921,19 
February 1998); and two issues later (19 March), after singing the praises of the Greek ethnos and its heroic 
figures, an article states that `[t]hat which we must proclaim today, towards every direction, is that an 
Ethnos which wants to live and grow does not attend only to the "per capita income" or for the Maastricht 
Treaty. It gives at least the same priority also to the spiritual values. And one such value is true patriotism' 
(Issue 3923,19 March 1998). 
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The European Union is also presented, in the pages of Zoe, through the prism of 
policies on Cyprus, Turkey and Serbia. The journal's authors frequently express dismay 
over the EU's turning a blind eye to certain developments in Cyprus in order `not to 
displease Ankara'. For instance, when the EU failed to act on southern Cypriots' 
complaints over the transformation of a monastery in northern Cyprus into a casino, a 
Zoe article identifies `Western self-deceit' as a greater problem than `Turkish 
barbarism' 1 is The critique is even sharper in the following journal issue:, `unfortunately 
in our times human rights, freedom, democracy and national dignity are exchanged for 
business, oil, and military bases. Spinelessness and caesaropapism control the fate of 
Europe, those which support the barbarian Asiatic and want him as their "partner" for 
reasons of cheap expediency; is it possible to expect of them [European leaders] a 
struggle for man and for humanity, for the ideals which distinguish the human 
community from the jungle? ' With reference to Kosovo, the article goes on to ask why 
the West did not intervene in favour of the 6.5 million Kurds in Turkey by threatening 
Ankara with bombardment: `Why are the massacres and persecutions perpetrated by the 
Turks accepted, such as those in the occupation of Cyprus? ' The lack of EU justice on 
this front is considered evidence that the EU is not being built on solid ground116. 
Likewise, EU policy on Serbia is offered as evidence of `the misery of United Europe': 
`sometime, in its beginning, United Europe was an idea. It was not soulless funding 
schemes and the cold Euro. The `Eurocrats' were the vanguards of the ambitious project 
of the building of a new Europe, which was buttressed on the foundation of ethical and 
spiritual values. Today, they have become political machines, without souls, without 
115 Zoe, Issue 3944,4 February 1999. 
116 Zoe, Issue 3948,1 April 1999. 
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vision, without ethnical values. When Serbia was burning. . . the European Commission 
had closed their ears to the wailings of the innocent victims' 117. ' 
Particularly interesting is the attitude to Europe expressed within the `Neo- 
Orthodox movement' in Greece' 18. The movement is difficult to define precisely: the 
term has been used informally in Greece as a designation for certain intellectuals and 
artists-many of whom themselves deny the identification for themselves, 19. In general, 
Neo-Orthodoxy denotes a group of intellectuals who, beginning in the 1980's, engaged in 
a dialogue with a new generation of theologians, with the intention to `rediscover the 
Greek Orthodox identity and to defend the Greek culture against western influences' 120 
Rather than a direct criticism of the West and of Europe, the movement entails opposition 
to the `way of life' of the West, which is considered diametrically opposed to that of 
Eastern, Greek Orthodoxy. The representatives of this current of thought often single out 
the EU, and Greece's membership therein, as a threat to Greece's cultural specificity 121. 
The emergence in the 1980's of the publication Synaksi (or, `meeting') is widely 
117 Zoe, Issue 3949,15 April 1999. 
118 The 'Neo-Orthodox' movement in Greece should not be confused with other forms of neo-orthodoxy (as 
prevalent, for instance, within Protestant traditions). Interesting parallels could perhaps be drawn between 
these, but space limitations do not allow for this. See V. Makrides, `Conflicting views on Byzantium in 
contemporary Greece: Romeic/Neoorthodox vs. Hellenic/Neopagan', for a fuller definition of the 
movement. 
119 Many describe the Neo-Orthodox movement as the latest manifestation of `revivals' of Orthodoxy in the 
1930's and 1950's, which was carried by a number of Greek theologians and intellectuals. These earlier 
trends were rooted in a quest for Hellenicity and efforts to cleanse Greek culture of Western trends, and an 
attempt to fill a spiritual vacuum created by the internal crisis of various pietistic movements, respectively. 
See V. Makrides, `Conflicting views on Byzantium in contemporary Greece', pp. 7-8. The Neo-Orthodox 
trend has been most visible, in Greece, within intellectual and artists' circles: beyond some music and 
poetry, I would not say that their work has reached the popular level. However, though the `popular level' 
may not be aware of or interested in the thorough research behind the `neo-Orthodox' intellectuals' work, 
the acute awareness of and emphasis on differences between Greek and Westem/European culture and 
identity certainly resonates with a large sector of society, far beyond religious circles (particularly as many 
of the leading intellectuals in this trend come from the left of the political spectrum, some of them even 
having formal links to the two communist parties in Greece). 
120 V. Makrides, `Le Role de I'Orthodoxie dans la formation de I'antieuropeanisme et l'occidentalisme grecs', 
p. 113. 
121 Ibid, p. 112. See also N. Mouzelis, `Enlightenment and neo-Orthodoxy', Civil Society, Issue 7,2001, 
pp. 28-32. [in Greek] - 
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considered a part of the Neo-Orthodox movement122. Its contributors are mostly 
theologians, and the texts are devoted to the subjects of theology, society, and politics, 
with several issues focusing on such matters as religious education in public schools, 
church-state relations, and the European Union. One of the journal's first issues is 
entitled `Europe: a critical view' and includes Orthodox perspectives on the relationship 
between Orthodoxy and the idea of Europe 123. The volume is introduced by Sotiris 
Gounelas as follows: `it is certain that if we cannot identify the differences between 
Orthodoxy and the newer Christian dogmas, we cannot identify even the value of that 
which we call tradition, [nor can we understand] what and why the difference with 
Europe' 124. Gounelas observes that since the Greek revolution, Greeks seem to be 
resigning themselves to the `new values and new commands which are forced upon them 
from outside'. Every modern Greek, he declares, faces an inner struggle ('in his soul') 
between the traditional elements which make up his character and the `novel' 
characteristics `which, however, do not seek to befriend or merge with the old, but to take 
their place and to expel them' 125. Gounelas feels that Greece is so deluged with a 
plethora of foreign ideas, perspectives, impulses, feelings, theories and demands which 
strip modern Greek society of consciousness of its specific identity. He defines this 
specific identity as `tradition, which is none other than that which we call Orthodoxy, 
which was maintained completely alive during the period of Turkish Occupation, and 
through which was saved that which after the Revolution became Greece, and which after 
122 However, the journal covers a broad range of perspectives; the authors cited below are not necessarily 
part of the Neo-Orthodox movement. 
123 Synaksi, Issue 5,1983. [This and all other Synaksi issues referenced below are in Greek] 
124 S. Gounelas, `Europe and Us', Synaksi, Issue 5,1983, pp. 9-11. 
125 This statement echoes the point made by Mouzelis (see chapter two) on the difficulties involved in late 
modernisation in terms of the transposition of new, foreign modes of activity upon old ones with which the 
new are not compatible. This, he argues, leads to formalism within society. 
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Independence was persecuted, was distorted, was silenced and was limited by the 
incursion of a foreign incoherence which flowed throughout Europe in the last centuries 
and the waters of which overflowed and flooded reborn Greece' 126. 
In another Synaksi issue (Issue 29,1989), an article by Kostas Ganotis reveals an 
interesting mixture of positive and negative attitudes to Europe 127. Ganotis begins his 
article by declaring that the most honourable thing Orthodox Greeks can do is to not 
condemn the efforts of the Europeans for unity and cooperation, but to remember that 
those trying to unite now had once `filled the valleys of Europe with blood' 128. Every 
Greek, he claims, has the responsibility to endow today's Europe with Orthodoxy's 
contributions in the form of united countries and cultures walking together 
129: `we, as 
honourable Greeks who are the godparents of Europe (who at least gave it its name) and 
also as Christian brothers, must "search ourselves", to see what we have this moment to 
offer to today's Europe. Personally I find nothing more valuable and useful to offer to 
Europe than Orthodoxy' 130 But in explaining the importance of such a contribution, he 
proceeds to level sharp criticism at Europe: `Europeans, in the drunkenness of the 
Renaissance, took from Plato dualism and with this dualism they misconstrued and 
falsified Christianity. They saw as a value the idea.. . and in the name of the logic they 
embraced the material.... [thus] driving Europe to materialism and from there to the final 
cataclysm of materialism, nihilism' 13 1. Thus, he believes that Orthodoxy must show to 
today's Europe that the problems which it tried to solve are pseudo-problems and that, in 
126 S. Gounelas, `Europe and Us', Synaksi, Issue 5,1983, p. 10. 
127 K. Ganotis, `The contribution of Orthodoxy in the united Europe', Synaksi, Issue 29,1989, pp. 43-46. 
128 Aid, p. 43. 
129 He also notes that `those of us who worry about the future of our culture, should be comforted by the 
undeniable evidence that there is large quest for Greek culture today in Europe'. 
13° K. Ganotis, `The contribution of Orthodoxy in the united Europe', p. 44. 
131 Ibid, p. 44. 
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order to progress to something good, Europe must deny itself. Europeans, he suggests, 
have begun to sense this fact, because they have finally `become enriched with the 
privilege of despair', through which they are able to learn the lesson132. 
The next full Synaksi issue devoted to the subject of Europe is that entitled `What 
does Europe mean for the Greeks? '133. The question is addressed by a number of Greek 
intellectuals and theologians. According to Gounelas' introduction, there exists a 
tendency in Greece to gaze-spiritually or physically-outward, so that the view is 
`always or almost always dependent upon the winds which blow periodically in 
Europe' 134 He declares that today's Greeks are called neither to share the perspectives of 
Europeans nor to `walk with them', but to show to them, through the Orthodox Church 
and Greek history, the `dead end of their culture: a culture which is going to be founded 
on an ECONOMIC COMMUNITY is finished'. Instead, Greeks should offer opposition 
to `the deluge', and `seek perhaps dialogue with the deep European roots which existed 
before the newer culture developed'. It is only in such roots, Gounelas claims, that a 
common ground can be found between Orthodox Greeks and Europeans' 
35 
. 
In the same issue, Apostolos Apostolidis registers his concern that Greece's 
membership in the EU will, in the short term, lead to a further limitation on the social 
influence of Greek Orthodoxy and, in the long term, intensify the `crisis in Greek 
society' 136 Because Greece is inundated with western influence, it is especially 
important that `we supersede this western challenge with our spiritual chapters [of our 
history] and the rejuvenation of our tradition'. And this, he contends, would entail a 
132 Ibid, p. 46. 
133 Synaksi, Issue 34,1990. 
134 S. Gounelas, `Introduction to the issue of Greek and European afflictions', Synaksi, Issue 34,1990, p. 15. 
135 Ibid, p. 15. 
136 A. Apostolides, `Greece, Orthodox tradition and western world', in Synaksi, Issue 34,1990, p. 101. 
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positive influence on Europe. `Europe needs us not as consumers', he proclaims, `we are 
few for it to need us for this-but it need us as inheritors of another proposition for life'. 
At the same time, Orthodoxy needs Europe in order to reveal the catholicity of truth. 
Europe thus acts as an `invitation for us to find our true selves'. Apostolidis further 
proposes that Greeks must resist blind nationalism and faceless internationalism, leaving 
them with only one alternative: `the realisation of our specificity'. The mission of 
Greeks, then, is not to support Europe as an Economic community which levels peoples, 
but `to reveal Europe as a spiritual community, in which the national and the ecumenical 
are not in opposition' 37. 
The views expressed in subsequent pages reveal a comparatively greater focus on 
the national and ethnic dimensions of what Europe means for the Greeks. According to 
Metropolitan Irinaios, Europe took its name from Greece and was `stamped by the Greek 
Spirit', and the cultures of classical, Hellenic, and Byzantine Greece have likewise 
marked the spirit of Europe and have become the foundations and roots of its culture, `but 
no one can deny the contribution of modern Europe and modern and contemporary 
Hellenicity in terms of democracy, scholarship and technology'. With the accession of 
Greece to the European Community, he explains, there have developed new ties and new 
opportunities for cooperation with its peoples. He proclaims his support for membership 
in the European Community, but says that membership raises two critical questions: will 
Greeks be able to maintain their identity? And what will be their contribution to the EC? 
Metropolitan Irinaios declares, `our first and most basic goal in living with other 
European peoples must be the maintenance of our Greek identity. And this maintenance 
of our identity will be supported, as always, on two foundations: our Greek language and 
137 Ib; d, p. 101. 
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our Greco-orthodox tradition'. With these two elements, he declares, Greeks are able to 
offer `a new historical contribution to today's and tomorrow's Europe'. Europe has, for 
three centuries, been poisoned by rationalism, materialism, and nihilism and their 
resulting wars and revolutions; it needs a new Rebirth and a deeper spiritual renovation. 
And Orthodoxy, the Metropolitan declares, can help Europe in this, because it `knows the 
metaphysical element better"38. 
Father George Metallinos offers a relatively grimmer picture, by focusing readers' 
attention on the EU's History of Europe text book funded by the European Commission 
(a project undertaken by Jean-Baptiste Duroselle)139. Metallinos raises the point that the 
text contains no mention of Greece `as cultural and spiritual provider of Europe', either 
through its ancient or Byzantine past or through its contemporary contribution. 
Metallinos also notes that the text was translated into eight languages, excluding Greek. 
This fact, he explains, `rightfully heightened the [Greek] sensitivities towards this anti- 
Hellenic venture on the part of the EEC, indicative of its stance towards our country'. `In 
this European conception of Europe', he declares, and `even in the united Europe, 
Orthodox Greece, but also the other Orthodox peoples... have no place. In this Duroselle 
is honest' 140. Metallinos thus concludes that Greeks should be grateful to their European 
partners for forcing a consciousness of the specificity of their identity (spiritual, 
civilisational and cultural). The European integration project will, he maintains, be 
revealed as a true European union when Greeks fulfil their mission of revealing 
themselves to Europe as representative of the authentically Hellenic Europe of their 
Romaic Fathers (the vision of which Europeans lost at the end, of the first Christian 
138 Metropolitan Irinaios, `Europe and us Greeks', Synaksi, Issue 34,1990, pp. 80-82. 
139 Fr. George Metallinos, `Greece and Europe', Synaksi, Issue 34,1990, pp. 83-88. 
140 Ibid, p. 86. 
112 
century) 141 This theme is echoed by Christos Vakalopoulou who states in the simplest of 
terms: `I have the sense that we will fail as Europeans, and this will save us' 142. 
The perspective of Nikos Makris, expressed in the pages of the same Synaksi 
issue, are relatively more critical of ethnicity-focused pride which sees only superiority 
over Europeans 143. He declares that there are differences between the Orthodox and the 
Europeans but also common starting points and common theological and philosophical 
theses which Greeks would do well to always bear in mind. In this context, Orthodoxy is 
called to witness its spirit and not to condemn heretics, heterodoxy, etc... Orthodoxy is 
not Greek, as it is neither Russian, Byzantine, or Slavic, and contemporary Greece, in 
spite of its Orthodox tradition, is not more Christian than any European ethnos; 
`unfortunately', he declares, `the opposite is true'. This perspective is, of course, quite 
different from the majority of those presented above. The importance of this perspective 
should not be underestimated, as it is shared by a number of Orthodox theologians and 
clerics. On the whole, though, such self-critical views remain in the minority (at least, in 
terms of public, and published, expressions). 
Conclusion 
Thus, we see a great deal of divergence within `Orthodox' attitudes to the EU. 
We find in these texts the recurrent themes of conservatism, traditionalism, and anti- 
westernism, but also specific reference to threats posed by Europe to Greek cultural and 
national identity. It is clear through the above citations that these attitudes are largely 
141 Ibid, p. 87. 
142 C. Vakalopoulou, `Delusion or disguise? ', Synaksi, Issue 34,1990, p. 96. 
143 N. Makris, `Horizons of European tradition and Orthodoxy', Synaksi, Issue 34,1990, pp. 43-48. 
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shaped by the historical relationship between religion and national identity in Greece. 
Earlier in this chapter we examined how the Church developed a role as representative 
and protector of Greek national identity. Historically, this role has been buttressed by the 
Church's close relation to the state. Constitutional provisions afford the Church a great 
number of privileges, vis-ä-vis both the state and other faiths represented in Greece. The 
constitutional provisions in themselves are not as important as the reasons why such 
Church privileges remain in place. This reason is, in short, that the privileges enjoyed by 
the Church represent-well beyond articles of the constitution-the traditionally 
powerful place of religion in Greek state and society. This place, as we have seen, is 
based mainly on the relationship between religion and national identity, a relationship 
which affords the Church a great deal of leverage in its dealings with-and conflicts 
with-the Greek state. We see clearly the Church's interests in preserving both the links 
between religion and national identity and the status quo in church-state relations. 
This background information provides the necessary basis upon which to 
examine, in chapter four, one particular church-state conflict which illustrates the 
complex relationships between Orthodoxy and Greek national identity, between church 
and state, and between Greece and the European Union. This is the issue of national 
identity cards, which created such a furore in Greece recently and which revealed the 
conflicts and tensions in Greek society and culture when confronted with certain aspects 
of European society and culture. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The European identity (card) crisis 
Our focal point here is the church-state conflict which arose when the Greek state 
decided, in May of 2000, to remove reference to religious identity from the national 
identity cards'. Our historical overview in chapter three is helpful for understanding this 
issue: the Church's perspective on the identity cards is intricately linked with its 
historical functions as protector of national identity and as affiliate of the state. The 
identity card issue challenged both these functions. The removal of religion from the 
national identity cards was interpreted by the Church as an affront to the relationship 
between Orthodoxy and national identity. And the state's decision to introduce such a 
change, without consulting the Church on the matter, was considered an affront to 
traditional church-state relations. 
The identity card issue is a particularly useful basis for our examination of the 
role of religion in Greek-EU relations. European legislation and pressures concerning 
religious rights and freedoms were the pretexts upon which the Greek government based 
its decision. The conflict which arose between church and state on this issue offers 
insight into the European Union's influence on relative church and state interests, and the 
Church's influence on national-EU relations. 
In the paragraphs which follow, I give a brief introduction to the `identity card 
crisis'. This overview is followed by special attention to the context in which the identity 
The national identity cards are issued by the Greek police, on behalf of the Ministry of Public Order. They 
are used for the purposes of official identification, and in such public transactions as banking, employment 
appointments, and national and international (within Schengen member countries) travel. 
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card issue arose, in terms of the relative church and state interests at the time of the 
issue's appearance on the national scene. The perspectives of national political, religious, 
and scholarly elites are then addressed for a more thorough understanding of these 
interests and of the extent to which they are shaped by the European Union. Finally, I 
close with a consideration of conflicting views on the role of religion in Greek-EU 
relations and on what the EU means in terms of the place of religion in Greek state and 
society. 
The `identity card crisis' 
The church-state conflict under examination here began in early May of 2000, 
when the then Minister of Justice Michalis Stathopoulos (appointed by the newly re- 
elected PASOK government) gave an interview in which he listed a number of religion- 
related legal reforms that he considered important, including the removal of religion from 
the national identity cards2. When the issue of religion on the identity cards reached 
Constantinos Dafermos, President of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority3, the 
Authority's council produced the judgement that religious belief is an aspect of `sensitive 
personal data' which should be excluded from national identity cards4. A few days later 
2 K. Marda, 'Our religion is over-protected: Interview with Michalis Stathopoulos', 8 May 2000, pp. 6-7. 
[This and all newspaper coverage cited below is in Greek, as noted in the Bibliography (the few exceptions 
of English-language articles are also noted in the Bibliography). Where page numbers are not indicated, 
this is because the newspaper was accessed online]. 
3 An independent agency with an advisory role to the Greek State. The institution was established by law 
2472/1997, which also sets out `sensitive personal information' which the state should protect in the name 
of its citizens. 
a The matter reached the Authority through a letter sent to its president by Stefanos Manos, the leader of the 
Liberal Party (personal interview with Michalis Stathopoulos, 10.12.02; the letter was originally sent to 
Stathopoulos, who then forwarded it to Dafermos, as the issue was in his domain of work). The Council of 
the Data Protection Authority convened to discuss the matter on 15 May 2000. Together with the 
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the question was raised in parliament, and the Prime Minister confirmed then that the 
government would implement the Data Protection Authority decision: information 
regarding citizens' religious identity would not appear on national identity cards printed 
in the futures. 
This issue came to dominate the national press for the remainder of 2000 and 
much of 2001. A political battle ensued between church and state, with protagonists 
Archbishop Christodoulos and Prime Minister Simitis (and, in the early stages, Minister 
of Justice Stathopoulos)6. Christodoulos reacted by warning that everyone, including the 
Prime Minister, should rally against the implementation of Stathopoulos' suggestion on 
the identity cards, for fear that other measures `against religion' would soon follow (such 
as the lessening of the role of religious education in schools, the removal of religious 
icons and crosses from public spaces, the cancelling of the religious oath, and the 
requirement of civil, in additional to religious, marriage). He characteristically 
complained: `no one from the government has formally declared that, "for better or for 
worse, the measure regarding identity cards has been taken by the government, but [the 
government] has no intention to progress to the other measures"''. Several hierarchs 
demanded that the government `take a stance' on Stathopoulos' statements, on the 
`cutting off of relations between church and state' at the constitutional level, and on the 
aforementioned decision, the Authority also listed a number of other national public documents from which 
reference to religion should be excluded (such as school and university certificates). Furthermore, the 
Council decided that fingerprints, marital status and profession were unnecessarily included in the identity 
cards; but the inclusion of religion was deemed unconstitutional. 
5 The parliamentary meeting took place on 24 May 2000. 
6 More precisely, in the beginning the Church treated as antagonists Stathopoulos and Dafermos. Simitis 
himself only became a target of criticism following the 24 May statement in Parliament. 
7 N. Garantziotis, `The Prime Minister should also sign', 6 November 2000. Archbishop Christodoulos' 
concern for the preservation of the status quo in church-state relations is made clear in a speech he made 
(ironically on the same day of Stathopoulos' interview in which he proposed the removal of religion from 
the identity cards), declaring that the separation of church and state would be 'a crime against the History 
of the land and against the Greek people'. See "`Crime" the separation of Church and state', Ethnos, 8 May 
2000, p. 20. 
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inclusion of religious affiliation on the identity cards. One Metropolitan in particular 
characterised the whole issue as an `underhanded attack on Orthodoxy and Hellenism'8. 
A newspaper article entitled `Holy war over the identity cards', reported that the 
prevailing opinion then within ecclesiastical circles was that a `methodical move' was 
underway: it could not be coincidental that, in the month following the formation of the 
new government, three of the Prime Minister's appointees (to non-elected posts) 
supported the removal of religion from identity cards9. 
For the government's part, its then Press Minister Dimitris Reppas initially 
declared that Stathopoulos had expressed `personal opinions' in the 8 May interview, but 
within days he stated that Minister Stathopoulos `does not act autonomously"0. This was 
interpreted by the press to mean that `[Stathopoulos] expressed the government stance on 
the identity card issue'11. In the meantime, through a subsequent interview with a 
newspaper journalist, Stathopoulos explained that his statements should not be 
considered as introducing legal changes to church-state relations, but as calling for 
implementation of the law, voted in by Parliament in 1997, which was to guarantee the 
protection of personal data 12. 
Indeed, in terms of the issue's legal parameters, there is a great deal of 
complexity. The inclusion of religion on the identity cards has a volatile history. It dates 
back to the dictatorship of Metaxas, when identity cards including religion were issued: 
the official reason was the `strengthening of national religious convictions', and the 
s G. Kalokairinos, `The state distances itself... ', Kathimerini, 9 May 2000, p. 7. 
9 G. N. Papathanosopoulou, `Holy war over the identity cards', Eleutheros Typos, 13 May 2000, p. 3. The 
reference here is to Dafermos, Stathopoulos, and Greek Ombudsman Nikiforos Diamandouros. 
10 `Church annoyed at proposals for civil funerals, oath', 
Kathimerini, 9 May 2000, p. 1, and 'Government 
message towards Church', Eleutherotypia, 16 May 2000. 
" 'Government message towards Church', Eleutherotypia, 16 May 2000. 
'Z G. Kalokairinos, `The state distances itself... ', Kathimerini, 9 May 2000, p. 7. 
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unofficial reason to ascertain who were the atheist communists in the country' 3. Later, 
under the Papadopoulos dictatorship, details which were to be included in national 
identity cards were officially set out in the legal decree 127/1969. In 1986, discussion of 
the constitutionality of inclusion of religious affiliation or belief on a public document 
such as the national identity card led to the drafting of law 1599/1986, which made the 
inclusion voluntary. The Church conducted a strong campaign then for mandatory 
inclusion of religion. Its wishes were implemented with the change in government, and 
in 1991 a new law (1988/1991) reintroduced mandatory inclusion of religion on each 
citizen's identity card 14. Though voted in, neither of these laws was ever actually put into 
practice: Papadopoulos' original 1969 decree remained implemented by the Ministry of 
Public Order (which governs the police's issuance of the cards). The final legal measure 
relating to the issue is that of 2472/1997, which sets out religion amongst `sensitive 
personal information' which the state should protect in the name of its citizens: the use of 
such information by the state should be `relative to the aim' of its use' 5. Following the 
government's decision in 2000, discussion amongst specialists in constitutional law 
revealed a great deal of uncertainty as to the relevant legal provisions. Some argued that 
law 2472/1997 grants each citizen the right to decide whether certain elements of his or 
13 Or, furthermore, to force those who were afraid to admit this, to carry identity cards revealing them as 
Orthodox Christians. The Metaxas dictatorship lasted from 1936-1940. See G. Kalokairinos, "`Tough" 
Christodoulos;. correction from the Patriarchate', Kathimerini, 30 May 2000, p. 3. 
14 See P. Dimitropoulos, State and Church: a Difficult Relationship, p. 152. According to Metropolitan 
Xrysostomos of Zakynthos, in 1993 also the then ruling ND party proposed the removal of religion from 
identity cards, but `under pressure', the government compromised and made it a voluntary matter. See 
G. Kiouzis, `Night tet-a-tet Christodoulos-Stefanopoulos', Eleutherotypia, 26 May 2000, pp. 18/47. 
is P. Dimitropoulos, State and Church: a Difficult Relationship, p. 153. 
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her `personal data' may be revealed, thus making it unconstitutional to forbid citizens 
from revealing their religious identity on the national identity card 16. 
The Church's official stance was that at least voluntary inclusion of religion on 
one's identity card should be allowed (though its traditional position had been strictly for 
mandatory inclusion of religion on the identity cards) 17. The Archbishop criticised the 
`progressives' who `fall on the church like savage dogs', and declared: `We will not 
become grave-diggers of our ethnos. We are more than they who want to destroy the 
country. The People endorses [sic] what I say. Let there then be a referendum' 18. The 
repeated argument for a national referendum was that `the minority cannot force its terms 
on the majority'19. While the government was maintaining that `it does not intend to lead 
to a rift in church-state relations', that `the issue of the identity cards consists of a 
practice of harmonisation with European regulations and the protection of personal data', 
and that `in no case does [the government] wish to lessen the role of Orthodoxy', 
ecclesiastical officials were declaring that `Mr. Simitis, without realizing it, placed 
himself, the government, and his party within the ropes of the ring'20. 
16 This argument was made on the basis also of Article 13 on freedom of conscience and Article 9 of the 
European Treaty on Human Rights. See especially the opinion of constitutional law specialist Georgios 
Krippas, cited in G. N. Papathanasopoulou, `Holy War over the identity cards', Eleutheros Typos, 13 May 
2000, p. 3. Also in question were whether the decisions of the Data Protection Authority are binding on the 
government, and whether law 2472/1997 automatically cancelled law 1988/1991. See V. Fotopoulou, `What 
the StE [Constitutional Court] will examine in the case of an appeal', Eleutherotypia, 27 May 2000, 
pp. 18/47. 
17 It should be emphasised that the Holy Synod was quite divided on the issue, and this division was made 
quite public through press coverage. For a detailed presentation of the division within the Holy Synod over 
the issue of the identity cards, see especially P. Bailis, `Church of three speeds', Ta Nea, 26 May 2000, p. 9. 
18 M. Antoniadou, `Christodoulos from the pulpit: let there be a referendum for the new identity cards', To 
Vima, 15 May 2000, p. A3. 
19 `Referendum for the people to judge', Ethnos, 15 May 2000, p. 18. 
20 K. P. Papadioxou, `Government hopes to avoid rift with the Church', Kathimerini, 26 May 2000, p. 5. 
Final quotation from Father Eustathios Kollas, President of the Clergy. Father Kollas stated further: `the 
Holy Synod does not care if religion is legally written on the identity cards or not, because either way it 
will be written, and with capital letters. I am considering proposing that citizens precede their signatures 
with the capital letters XO [i. e., Orthodox Christian]'. 
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Following the Prime Minister's statement in Parliament that the decision of the 
Data Protection Service on the matter would be implemented21, the Archbishop called for 
an extraordinary meeting of the Holy Synod for discussion of the Church's stance on the 
matter. Two demonstrations were planned, one to take place in Athens and one in 
Thessaloniki22. Meanwhile, the Archbishop met with the President of the Republic, 
Constantine Stephanopoulos, and requested the latter's intervention in the matter. 
Following the President's negative response23, plans were made to take the case to the 
Council of State (StE)24. Finally, at the demonstrations (attended by thousands25), the 
Archbishop announced that the Church would begin a collection of signatures in appeal 
for a referendum on the government identity card decision '16. The aim, the Archbishop 
21 The issue was raised during Prime Minister's questions by Maria Damanaki of SYN. Simitis responded: 
`The inclusion of religion on the identity cards limits and offends the independence of the citizen. The 
citizen can and should be free to believe and not reveal what he/she believes. Therefore the inclusion of 
religion... can neither be required nor voluntary'. See F. Kalliagopoulou and N. Tsioutsia, `With the stamp 
of Simitis religion off the identity cards', Kathimerini, 25 May 2000, p. 5. 
22 That in Thessaloniki was to take place on 14 June 2000 and that in Athens, one week later. See 
G. Kalokairinos, `Hierarchs' fury and demonstrations', Kathimerini, 7 June 2000, p. 3, and M. Antoniadou 
and I. Tsibidis, `Invitation to demonstrations by the faithful in Athens and Thessaloniki', To Vima, 7 June 
2000, p. A7. 
23 The meeting took place on 25 May 2000. Stephanopoulos stated that the Constitution does not give him 
(Stefanopoulos) the right to intervene in institutional matters. See `Christodoulos' move', Kathimerini, 26 
May 2000, p. 1. 
24 The Council of State (Symbouleio tis Epikrateias, or StE) is the highest administrative court. See 
B. Chiotis, `Church plans recourse to justice', To Vima, 25 May 2000, p. A. 7, and `Hierarchs in search of a 
way out', Kathimerini, 23 August 2000, for information on the planning of the case, which reached the court 
1.12.00. The case was actually taken to the StE by a group called the `Orthodox Movement of 
Constitutional Legality', but for most observers it was clear that this group acted on behalf of the Church. 
Their argument was that `the government decision to remove religion from the identity cards is 
unconstitutional, because of the constitutional provision which declares that "the prevailing religion in 
Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church"'. See `No meeting under conditions of coercion', 
Eleutherotypia, 6 June 2000, pp. 18/48. The case did not reach the court until December 2000. The court 
decided by majority that both the voluntary and mandatory inclusion of religion on the national identity 
cards are in antithesis with Article 13, Paragraph I of the Constitution, in which freedom of religious 
conscience is set out. For a thorough analysis of the StE decision, see P. Dimitropoulos, State and Church: a 
Difficult Relationship, pp. 154-7. 
25 Police estimated 100,000 demonstrators at the 21 June Athens demonstration; the Church estimated over 
500,000. 
26 The petition began on 14 September 2000 and was scheduled to end on 25 March 2001. But on 28 March 
(by which point the Church claimed to have collected 2.5 million signatures), the Church announced that 
the signature collection would continue until the end of April (2001), with the aim to match the number of 
votes with which the PASOK government had been elected in the April 2000 elections. There was much 
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eventually announced, was to gather more signatures than the number of votes with 
which the Simitis government came to power in the previous elections. 
This declared aim set the scene for the role played by the identity card issue in 
domestic politics in Greece. First, it became a focal point for the opposition party's (New 
Democracy, ND) politics 227. The party was strongly in support of the Church's stance on 
the issue, and its leader-Constantinos Karamanlis-was amongst the first to sign the 
Church's petition. Karamanlis accused the government of embarking on a `suspicious 
and dangerous' conflict with the Church, whilst the party's former leader (Constantinos 
Mitsotakis) publicly demanded that the Prime Minister meet with the Archbishop, as per 
the latter's repeated requests2ß. Prime Minister Simitis faced a great deal of criticism 
over his refusal to meet with Archbishop Christodoulos to discuss the matter of the 
identity cards. But, according to PASOK spokespersons, Simitis felt that the Archbishop 
had `crossed the borderline', particularly with the hierarch's declaration that `the will of 
the people is above the Constitution and the laws '229. The resultant heightened tension 
between the Church and the government provoked division within the ruling PASOK 
party. As one journalist explained, `in reality, for most PASOK MPs, the greatest source 
of worry is the crisis in relations between the government and the Church... though 
generally they do not disagree with the removal or religion from the identity cards, they 
controversy surrounding the Church's signature collection: besides the questioned constitutionality of this 
method of seeking a referendum (see below), there was considerable debate over who should be allowed to 
add their signatures in favour of the Church. The Church had extended its campaign to include Greek 
Orthodox citizens in those parts of Greece where the Church jurisdiction falls under the Patriarchate, rather 
than the Church of Greece (e. g., Crete, and the Dodecanese. See chapter three, footnote 1), and also 
considered including signatures of Greek diaspora. 
27 See `The New Theocracy', Eleutherotypia, 28 August 2001, p. 8. 
28 M. Antoniadou, `The Prime Minister and Archbishop should meet', To Vima, 1 June 2000, p. A8, and 
G. Kalokairinos, `Cries and whispers of the Metropolitans', Kathimerini, 13 August 2000, p. 5. 
29 `No meeting under conditions of coercion', Eleutherotypia, 6 June 2000, pp. 18/48. 
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think that the whole handling of the issue provoked unnecessary political costs'30. This 
much is evident in the statement made by one PASOK politician: `it is foolish to place 
obstacles to ourselves... Whether we like it or not, the Church has a large network of 
influence in the country and it can cause us decisive damage'31. 
The Archbishop too faced dissension within his ranks, as some hierarchs pressed 
for a more active fight against the government, whilst others criticised the Archbishop for 
involvement in what was clearly a governmental matter32. This dissension was only the 
beginning of many challenges facing the Archbishop's campaign. In December of 2000, 
the Church's argument against the state finally reached the StE, and the court ruled in 
favour of the government on this issue. But the Church continued its efforts through its 
signature-collection campaign: in August 2001 the Church announced that it had 
collected over three million signatures against the government decision on the identity 
cards33. The Archbishop then met again with the President of the Republic, Constantine 
Stephanopoulos, formally requesting a referendum on the issue. The President declared 
that no amount of signatures can override the constitutional provisions for the calling of 
30 S. Ligeros, `If there were not a crisis in ND... ', Kathimerini, 4 June 2000, p. 10. 
31 The politician goes on to say that `Stathopoulos et al. have never gathered votes from the people and 
think that elections are won only with rhetoric about modemisation'. See S. Ligeros, `If there were not a 
crisis in ND... ', Kathimerini, 4 June 2000, p. 10. 
32 See M. Antoniadou, "`Crows" and "doves" pressure the Archbishop', To Vima, 4 June 2000, p. A. 48. See 
also M. Antoniadou, 'leronymos [Metropolitan of Thiva], the anti-Christodoulos against the 
demonstrations', To Vima, 8 June 2000, p. A6, and M. Antoniadou, 'lerotheos: the "Benjamin" of the 
hierarchy in a balancing role over the identity cards', To Vima, 24 August 2000, p. A14. The Archbishop 
also faced dissentions from lay people who had served as advisors to the Church: loannis Konidaris, who 
had served on a number of the Church's committees, resigned from all of these in June 2000, declaring that 
`the decision of the Hierarchy on the issue of the identity cards does not leave me room to offer, in the 
current phase at least, my services for the good of the Church'. See M. Antoniadou, `Ieronymos: the anti- 
Christodoulos... ', and T. Tstatsi, `This is how we are going to organise the guerrilla fight on the identity 
cards', Eleutherotypia, 8 June 2000, pp. 18/63. 
33 See T. Tsatsi, `They are not talking politics, but... "the people has spoken"', Eleutherotypia, 28 August 
2001, pp. 18/47. It should be noted that this announcement came over one year after the government had 
emphatically declared that the identity card issue was closed. See K, P. Papadiochou, `The government 
doesn't back down', Kathimerini, 13 August 2000, p. 5. 
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referendums: a referendum on this issue could not take place, as it would be 
unconstitutional34. A final legal effort to overrule the government's decision was made 
by one cleric and two laypersons who challenged the StE's decision in the European 
Court of Human Rights. The ECHR decided, without conducting a full trial, in favour of 
the Greek State 35 . 
In spite of these setbacks to the Church's campaign, the identity card issue again 
rose to the forefront of political debate in the context of the October 2002 municipal and 
prefectural elections. This fact was due, not least, to the Archbishop's own efforts to 
remind the public, and the politicians, of the issue36. `It is not possible', the Archbishop 
declared, `for the parties to ask for the votes of the people when they ignore the will of 
three million voters.. . If the people want 
it, they can change the state's decision'37. 
Accordingly, the Archbishop maintained that the elections would be held `in the shadow 
of the identity card issue'38, and he called on all political parties to `honestly inform the 
electorate what they will do after the elections on the identity card issue'39. Such 
34 T. Tsatsi, `Presidential rod [of discipline]', Eleutherotypia, 30 August 2001, p. 18. See also p. 47, 
`Commission: Forget religion on the identity cards', for a discussion on the European Commission's 
disapproval of inclusion of religion on national identity cards: following a question posed by Greek MEP 
Alekos Alavanos, the Commission declared that according to directive 95/46, `the member-states prohibit 
the use of facts of a personal nature, including ethnic or national background, political stances, 
philosophical or religious orientation, membership in syndicates, health or sexual life'. 
35 See `He [Christodoulos] revealed again his political identity', Eleutherotypia, 26 March 2002, p. 54. 
See also ECHR Decision, `Sofianopoulos and Others v. Greece', 20 December 2001. 
36 In March of 2002, the Archbishop stated that not only has the identity card issue not closed, but `by its 
nature becomes an issue in the forthcoming municipal and prefectural elections'. See `He [Christodoulos] 
revealed again his political identity', Eleutherotypia, 26 March 2002, p. 54. 
37 It should be noted that the Archbishop did not consider these efforts on the part of the Church as an 
intermixing of the Church in politics: he declared that disrespect for the constitutional separation of the 
roles of the Church and the state would provoke problems. Yet, as one journalist notes, this statement came 
one week after the Archbishop's assertion that `the institution of the church is higher than all other 
institutions'. See `He [Christodoulos] revealed again his political identity', Eleutherotypia, 26 March 2002, 
p. 54. 
38 `The identity cards again poison Church-State relations', To Vima, 27 March 2002, p. 6. 
39 There was division within the Church over this development as well. One Metropolitan, for example, 
stated: `I am completely against [this] development of a role of the Church during the pre-electoral period'. 
See `The identity cards again poison Church-State relations', To Vima, 27 March 2002, p. 6. 
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statements -and their broad coverage in the daily print media-provoked anxiety within 
the ruling PASOK party. It also provoked difficulties, however, for the ND party. The 
party had chosen to put forward loannis Tzannetakos-one of the few ND delegates who 
openly opposed the Church's stance on the identity cards-as its candidate for the 
Athens-Piraeus `super-prefecture'. This political move triggered, as one newspaper put 
it, `[t]he schism between the Church and Rigillis [ND party headquarters]'40. Mr. 
Tzannetakos had tried on several occasions to ease this rift (and of course to increase his 
electoral appeal), by seeking the opportunity to meet with the Archbishop41. According 
to one source, Church hierarchs debated extensively over whether the Archbishop should 
meet with Mr. Tzannetakos, and whether the Church should call its faithful to vote 
against the latter in the forthcoming elections. The hierarchs decided that no such 
meeting should take place, and no political attack would be made against Tzannetakos42. 
However, the Archbishop did preach in apublicly disseminated sermon that `the People 
should support those who support their faith'43. Furthermore, the Archbishop was also 
40 V. Chiotis, `The schism between Church and Rigillis', To Vima, 22 September 2002, p. A20. According to 
one report, the Church hierarchy was also critical towards the then Minister of Education and Religious 
Affairs, Mr. Souflias, once it became known that the latter had proposed Tzannetakos for the candidacy. 
See M. Antoniadou, `The calamitous relations of Mr. Souflia with the Church', To Vima, 17 October 2002. 
41 The latter's initial refusal troubled New Democracy, as many of its supporters were amongst those who 
signed the Church's petition. Whilst one newspaper reported that `Mr. Christodoulos does not forgive' 
(M. Antoniadou, To Vima, 22 September 2002, p. A21), one ND leader expressed his disappointment by 
declaring `is it possible for God to forgive and not the Archbishop, in spite of sincere repentance [on the 
part of Tzannetakos]? ' (See V. Chiotis, `The schism between Church and Rigillis', To Vima, 22 September 
2002, p. A20). 
42 According to one source, the Archbishop did eventually agree to meet with Mr. Tzannetakos, but the date 
and place of this meeting would likely be kept quiet. See V. Chiotis, `The meeting of Tzannetakos with 
Christodoulos has been set', To Vima, 29 September 2002, p. A. 20. According to Chiotis, this fact `closed a 
chapter of tension between ND and the Church which-almost brought definitive rupture in their until now 
warm relations'. Chiotis also addresses here the subject of how Christodoulos' agreement to meet with 
Tzannetakos negatively affected his opponent's (Mr. Karatzaferis') chances in the upcoming elections. 
"See M. Antoniadou, `Mr. Christodoulos does not forgive', To Vima, 22 September 2002, p. A21. 
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cited as stating that those who voted for Tzannetakos' opponent in the first round of 
elections (Mr. Karatzaferis), are `good Christians' 44 
Although the Archbishop repeatedly declared that the Church does not involve 
itself in political issues, politicians at least engaged in serious efforts to ameliorate their 
relations with the Church in the pre and post-electoral phases. For instance, just before 
the second round of elections, the ND candidates for Mayor of Athens and Piraeus visited 
the Archbishop (i. e., the prefectures in which Tzannetakos was running for parliament), 
seeking the hierarch's blessing for their campaigns45. In the end, the ND candidates lost 
the elections in these prefectures. According to one ND spokesperson, `It is clear. The 
elections in [Athens and Piraeus] took place on the basis of the identity card issue', and 
the Archbishop used the conflict with the ND party in order to manage better its relations 
with PASOK. Many in the ND party explained this development with reference to the 
fact that the ruling PASOK government was, at the time, in the process of deciding how 
to distribute the funds of the latest EU funding package: they claimed that the Church 
was trying to secure as much as possible of that funding package for itself46. The 
44 It should be noted that Mr. Karatzaferis is the leader of an independent, religion-oriented political party, 
has especially close ties with the Church, and strongly supported the Church's position on the identity 
cards. He was one of two opponents to Tzannetakos in the race (the other was the PASOK candidate, Fofi 
Gennimata). This particular pronouncement by the Archbishop generated a great deal of debate in Greece, 
as its source was questioned by the Church: Christodoulos denied making the exact statement attributed to 
him. See T. Tsatsi, `He "buries" Tzannetakos, blesses the mayors', Eleutherotypia, 16 October 2002. A few 
days later, however, the newspaper Kathimerini reported the release of a tape which confirmed that the 
Archbishop had referred to Karatzaferis' voters as `good Christians'. See `Archbishop is caught out by 
tape', Kathimerini, 25 October 2002. Following this declaration by the Archbishop, ND leaders openly 
expressed their dismay, stating that "`they did not expect such interference from the Church, since ND had 
supported the Church in its conflict with the government over the identity card issue"'. One New 
Democracy MP in particular suggested, in no uncertain terms, that the Church should remain outside of 
politics. See I. Pantelakis, `Blessings and damnations in the... hell of ND', Eleutherorypia, 16 October 2002. 
45 See S. Yiannaka, `Rigillis [ND headquarters] supplicant to the Archbishop', To Vima, 16 October 2002, 
p. A3. 
46 Some ND delegates considered this `crisis' of relations between ND and the Church as a good 
opportunity for ND to cease being identified with the Church and with its conservative views, thus making 
ND a more `central', rather than conservative party. See `Lesson from misfortune', Eleutherotypia, 3 
November 2002, p. 10. 
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decision of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, to visit the Archbishop 
and to present the latter with the government's stance on the Annan Plan for Cyprus, was 
also seen by many as a pointed effort on the part of the state to improve its relations with 
the Church47. According to one journalist, these developments signalled that 
`Christodoulos [was] the winner of the elections': `although Christodoulos' counteraction 
on the identity card issue did not succeed in its goal [to change the government's 
decision], it succeeded in something else -- to cut the government's "appetite" for anti- 
church measures'48. The decision of Prime Minister Simitis to remove Michalis 
Stathopoulos from the Ministry of Justice was also considered by many as clear evidence 
of the Church's success 49 
Through this brief introduction to the identity card issue we see certain recurrent 
themes50. First, the tendency of the Church to play the role of `protector of national 
identity'. Second, its tendency to put up a strong fight in relation to the state and, by 
extension, to become politicised. And third, from the pre-history of the `identity card 
crisis', the tendency of the state to compromise its stance in the face of Church pressure. 
One factor which is perhaps unique to the identity card issue is the fact that the state 
47 See M. Antoniadou, `Objections to the Annan plan from Mr. Christodoulos in the Synodal meeting', To 
Vima, 20 November 2002, p. A6. 
48 See N. Papadimitriou, 'Christodoulos the winner of the elections', Avgi, 20 October 2002, p. 10. It should 
perhaps be noted that this newspaper is a left-wing paper. 
49 Stathopoulos was replaced in the government reshuffle which took place in October 2001. See S. Ligeros, 
`Simitis' tailor-made cabinet', Kathimerini, 25 October 2001. According to Ligeros, the removal of 
Stathopoulos from this post was `only to be expected'. 
50 For an overview of the identity card issue from a discourse analysis perspective, see Y. Stavrakakis, 
`Religion and populism: reflections on the "politicised" discourse of the Greek Church', and from a press 
analysis perspective, L. Molokotos-Liederman, `Identity crisis: Greece, Orthodoxy, and the European 
Union'. See also Nikos Alivazatos' discussion of the identity card issue in The Uncertain Modernisation, 
pp. 311-320 [in Greek]. Finally, see A. Anastassiadis, `Religion and politics in Greece: the Greek Church's 
"conservative modernisation" in the 1990's', for a critique of discourse analysis as applied to the case of the 
Greek Orthodox Church. Anastassiadis' proposal that `discourse analysis need not consider discourses 
either as automatically informative, or performative, but rather as responses to specific social demands' 
(p. 14), is helpful for our understanding of fluctuations in the Church's discourse on the European Union. 
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chose not to compromise with the Church (as, in the end, it did not overturn its May 2000 
decision). In order to fully understand the way the identity card issue plays a part in 
Greek-EU relations, we must examine the particular context in which the identity card 
issue arose and the factors shaping the relative interests of the Church and of the state 
over the issue. 
The context: church and state interests 
One important element of the context in which this issue arose is the presence of 
Christodoulos in the archbishopric. Many scholars have noted a significant change in the 
role of the Church in Greek state and society with the advent of Archbishop 
Christodoulos in 1998. His populist discourse and the increased involvement of the 
Church in secular issues under his leadership were addressed thoroughly in the press and 
by a number of academic publications even before the identity card conflict developed. 
The Church under Christodoulos, especially throughout the identity card issue, may 
indeed be claiming a `new role', in terms of its ever-public activity in the social and 
political domains. Beyond the factor of church leadership, though, the crucial 
determinants of the context in which the identity card issue arose are particular perceived 
threats to national identity and to church-state relations-threats which are linked with 
Greek membership in the European Union. I address these perceived threats below, 
largely with reference to the Archbishop's discourse on the required role of the Church. 
In terms of threats to national identity, the Church perceives a general trend 
towards denationalisation in the Greek state's increasing identification with the 
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supranational European Union. The Church thus claims an imperative function of 
maintaining a national identity which, it argues, is no longer adequately protected by the 
state. The Church's sensitivities over the preservation of national identity are heightened 
by the fact that Greek society is increasingly multiethnic (an estimated 10% of the 
population is comprised of immigrants). Thus, in the light of the EU's demand for 
enhanced religious freedoms and equality for non-Orthodox citizens, the Church feels a 
heightened threat to the cultural, linguistic and religious homogeneity of Greece-all 
elements which are central to conceptions of Greek national identity. 
We see in the rhetoric of Archbishop Christodoulos evidence of the Church's 
concerns that national identity is being compromised through EU membership. One 
example will suffice to show that, while his language is not anti-European, he portrays 
the EU as a reason for the critical need to rely on Orthodoxy for the preservation of 
Greek national identity. In a speech delivered in 1999, he explains the crimes committed 
by the West against Greek Orthodoxy after the Greek revolution, and the fact that the 
roots of the European integration project were Roman Catholic, and he declares: 
We are in a crisis in the evolution of Hellenism... if we want not only to 
re-establish our spiritual identity, but to play a role as Greeks [emphasis 
mine] in the EU, we have but one recourse: to re-load ourselves with our 
historical baggage, which is our Greco-Orthodoxy. 
And because, as indicated above, the state is thought to have abdicated its role as 
protector of the nation, the Church demands a continued strong position in relation to the 
state, so that it will be able to carry out its public duty of representing the interests of `the 
51 `The Europe of spiritual values and the role of the Greek Orthodox and of Education', address to a crowd 
of teachers at the National Theatre, 21 January 1999. [in Greek] 
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People'52. Accordingly, efforts to change the balance of church-state relations are 
especially frowned upon. In a speech delivered soon after his election in 1998, 
Archbishop Christodoulos referred to those who wish to change the status quo in church- 
state relations as graeculi, which means those who are servile toward everything foreign 
and are thus undeserving of Greek identity and cause the decay of national identity: such 
people wish to reduce the Church's role "`because they know that the nation owes its 
survival to the Church"'53. Through the Archbishop's rhetoric we can observe how the 
EU is blamed, albeit indirectly, for threatening the close relationship between the Church 
and the Greek state: 
We call this relationship an invaluable heritage... our Church 
today asks of the politicians to understand the significance of the 
embers of the ethnos [amongst which he notes religion] and to not 
destroy them by mimickingforeign prototypes ... as a bishop I 
grieve and pray, as a Greek I ask you to understand personally 
what is our struggle today, for what reason the Church is obliged to 
interfere and to ask of the politicians to understand with what 
navigation we came thus far... to feel our Hellenicity, the blood of 
our ancestors which beats in our breasts54. 
The above paragraphs help us to contextualise the Church's interests around the 
time of the identity card crisis55. As for the state's interests, both the state and the media 
52 As Nikos Demertzis writes, because the Church is, since the establishment of the Autocephaly, a `legal 
face of public justice', and because `public representatives, even those of the Church, do not have rights, 
but responsibilities', the Church argues that it has a responsibility to act in the interests of `the People'. It 
was on this basis that the Church explained its collection of signatures for the inclusion of religion on the 
identity cards. See N. Demertzis, `Politics and communication: facets of the secularisation of Orthodoxy', 
p. 150. [in Greek] 
53 Cited in N. Alivizatos, `A new role for the Greek Church? ', p. 23. 
54 'Church and People: an unbreakable relationship', speech delivered to the Maritime Club of Piraeus, 19 
June 2001. [in Greek; emphasis mine]. It should be noted that this speech was delivered at a time when, for 
the Church at least, the identity card issue was still `open'. 
55 It is debatable whether the Church has a sincere anxiety to preserve Greek national identity or whether 
this concern simply serves as an effective platform from which to justify its role in Greek society (in other 
words, a successful utilisation of the Greek population's sensitivities). For conflicting views on whether 
the Church is, in itself, nationalistic, see Y. Stavrakakis, `Religion and populism: reflections on the 
"politicised" discourse of the Greek Church', and P. Kitromilides, "`Imagined communities" and the origins of 
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presented these as directly linked to the European Union; the Church was (initially at 
least) ambivalent on whether the state's motivation was harmonisation with the EU. All 
throughout this church-state struggle `Europe' was presented -in a notably haphazard 
way- as a key figure in the equation. A few examples will suffice for our present 
purposes. Early on in the debate Data Protection Authority president Constantine 
Dafermos was reported as saying `in Europe they laugh at our identity cards with religion 
on them'56. Meanwhile, following Church research on the extent to which the EU was 
directly involved in the affair, Metropolitan Kallinikos argued that `the EU does not 
oblige Greek legislation on identity cards'. Yet, for his part, Christodoulos made the 
classic statement that `Europe may fill our pockets, but it can empty our souls'57. The 
main opposition party also picked up the cue, voiced here by New Democracy MP 
G. Alogoskoufis: `the question is to what extent as a country we will maintain certain 
religious, social and national traditions that we have, or if we will surrender every time, 
without any resistance, to the powers of the European Union'58. Meanwhile, foreign and 
English-language press reported the issue with headlines such as `Church bashes Europe', 
the National Question in the Balkans'. Furthermore, it should be noted that after the research was conducted 
for this study, an intense conflict developed between the Patriarchate and the Orthodox Church of Greece. 
The central matter of dispute was the election of new bishops in Metropolises which are under the 
Patriarch's jurisdiction, and the Orthodox Church of Greece's refusal to submit the list of candidates to the 
Patriarch for the latter's approval. According to A. Anastassiades ('Religion and politics in Greece: the 
Greek Church's "conservative modernisation" in the 1990's'), the Greek Church's relations with the 
Patriarchate have been a source of anxiety for the Greek hierarchy since the end of the Cold War: 'as long 
as the majority of orthodox countries remained under socialist rule, the Partiarchate's aura was limited. The 
center of gravity of [Orthodoxy] was located in Greece' (p. 20). Accordingly, perhaps another important 
dimension of the context in which the identity card issue arose is the heightened vulnerability felt by the 
Church on an international scale as well, considering the increasing influence of the Patriarchate and the 
resultant decreased influence of the Church of Greece. The establishment of an office by the Orthodox 
Church of Greece in Brussels, alongside that of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, is considered by many to be 
an antagonistic (towards the Patriarchate) move on the part of the Orthodox Church of Greece. 
56 V. Fotopoulou, `The Civil Code is being "defrocked"', Eleutherotypia, 13 May 2000, pp. 18/47. 
57 G. Kalokairinos, "`Tough" Christodoulos; correction from the Patriarchate', Kathimerini, 30 May 2000, 
p. 3. 
58 V. Fotopoulou, `Stathopoulos: Holy "no" to dialogue six months ago', Eleutherotypia, 26 May 2000, 
p. 17. 
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and `Greek Church stirs holy war over ID cards'-59. The Observer in particular noted that 
`the Greek Orthodox Church is calling it a "wild war", the Greek State a long overdue 
move to make all Hellenes "more European"'-- thus prompting the reporter's own 
question: `Does Greece, the EU's only Orthodox nation, belong to the East or the 
West? '60 
The immediate precursor of the identity card issue and its publicity was the more 
significant and little noted indication of the EU's influence over the state's interests in the 
matter. Six months prior to the Stathopoulos interview, Foreign Minister George 
Papandreou had called for the formation of a committee to study issues of religious 
freedom. Amongst the subjects to be considered was the inclusion of religion on the 
national identity cards61. The reason for this action was the Foreign Minister's wish to 
address `the problems arising from the guilty verdicts against the country for violations of 
the European Treaty of Human Rights', and to discuss what legal measures should be 
taken to address the problem. Thus, the issue of the identity cards was placed within the 
framework of the Foreign Ministry's efforts to deal with matters that negatively affected 
Greece's place in Europe62. According to one source, when the Church was invited to 
participate and share its views on the issues under consideration, it showed `no will for 
dialogue'. The three members who `are known to be well-disposed towards the Church' 
59 `Church bashes Europe', The Hellenic Star, Vol. 2, No. 69,1-7 June 2000, pp. 1-2; and H. Smith, `Greek 
Church stirs holy war over ID cards', The Observer, 28 May 2000, p. 26. 
60 H. Smith, `Greek Church stirs holy war over ID cards'. 
61 Other issues to be discussed were proselytism, conscientious objection, and religious education in 
schools-all of which have led to complaints against the Greek state by citizens of minority faiths. 
62 See V. Fotopoulou, `Stathopoulos: Holy "no" to dialogue six months ago', Eleutherotypia, 26 May 2000, 
p. 17. See also T. Tsatsi, `Christodoulos proclaimed an unyielding struggle', Eleutherotypia, 27 May 2000, 
pp. 18/47. Of course, the ECHR is officially linked to the Council of Europe, and not directly to the EU. 
However, a. the EU does make it clear that the ECHR record of individual countries is especially important 
to the EU; and b. in Greece, there is little distinction made (even in the press, but especially within Church 
circles), between the domains of the ECHR, Council of Europe and the EU. 
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withdrew from the committee, stating that the issues under discussion did not belong in . 
the domain of the Foreign Ministry. They also expressed their disapproval for the 
Minister's choice of president for the committee: Michalis Stathopoulos. According to 
constitutional law specialist Nicos Alivizatos (one of the committee members), the 
Church effectively `blew up' the committee, with the result that it remains, until today, 
ineffective63. From this we see that the most recent church-state conflict over the identity 
cards (prior to that beginning in 2000) arose in the context of a Foreign Ministry initiative 
to improve Greece's standing within the European Union. 
Most significant, however, is the clear link between EU policies and the more 
recent Greek legislation on the national identity cards. In 1991 the Convention of the 
Council of Europe drafted an article for the protection of the individual from the 
automated processing of information of a personal nature64. The Convention article was 
subsequently adopted by the European Parliament, through the directive 95/46/EP65. In 
order to conform to these European legislative developments, in 1997 the Greek 
government passed law 2472/1997, which sets out `sensitive personal information' which 
the state should protect in the name of its citizens, including religious affiliation. 
According to this law, the use of such information by the state should be `relative to the 
aim of its use'66. The law also foresaw the establishment of the Hellenic Data Protection 
Authority, the advice of which Prime Minister Simitis followed in introducing the 
changes to the national identity card. 
63 Alivizatos also reveals that Christodoulos had sent a letter to Papandreou that September, prior to the 
start of the committee's work, asking that Alivizatos be excluded from the committee because he had 
expressed `anti-ecclesiastical opinions rejected by the overwhelming majority of the Greek people'. See 
V. Fotopoulou, `Stathopoulos: Holy "no" to dialogue six months ago', Eleuthterotypia, 26 May 2000, p. 17. 
64 This translated into Greek legislation as law 2068/1991. See L. Papadopoulou , 'On the issue of the identity cards', in The Constitution [To Syntagma], Vols. 4-5., 2000, p. 678. 
65 Ibid, p. 678. 
66 P. Dimitropoulos, State and Church: a Difficult Relationship, p. 153. 
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In spite of such clear EU-related precursors to the 2000 government decision on 
the identity cards, the extent to which the issue was directly related to the EU was, and 
remains, an ambiguous matter in Greece. Again, the government claimed that its 
decision was a matter of harmonisation with European regulations and the protection of 
personal data. But the Church judged that the government decision had less to do with 
the EU than with the government's intention to change the balance in church-state 
relations (more specifically, to limit the role of the Church in both state and society)67. 
Archbishop Christodoulos expressed his view by questioning why Greeks must mimic all 
that happens in other European countries, when the EU itself did not formally demand the 
removal of religion from the identity cards. He declared that if religion was, in the end, 
removed from the identity cards, `then the people will be disconnected from 
Orthodoxy... which especially for us Greeks entails a fundamental element of our 
identity'. Accordingly, he concluded that `this whole move [by the government] is 
suspect; it is not simply an issue of observance of certain human rights'68. Thus we see a 
critical divergence in perspectives on the factors motivating the state on the identity card 
issue. There is also an important lack of consensus on the factors motivating the Church 
on this matter69. 
For these reasons, I decided to explore a broad range of perspectives, through 
interviews conducted with Greek political, religious and academic elites (including major 
actors in the identity card conflict). This examination is important within the broader 
67 In the earliest phases of the identity card debate (i. e., Spring/Summer 2000), hierarchs did make 
comments against the European Union, but these phased out with time and the government increasingly 
became the focal point of Church complaints. 
68 `Christodoulos: Voluntary the inscription of religion', Ethnos, 15 May 2000, p. 19. 
69 See especially A. Anastassiadis, `Religion and politics in Greece: the Greek Church's "conservative 
modernisation" in the 1990's', for a discussion of various factors motivating the Church in its conflicts with the 
state beyond that conflict over the identity cards. 
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context of this study because it reveals, in depth, an ambiguity over the role of religion in 
Greek-EU relations and the influence of the EU on the place of religion in Greek state 
and society. I begin by addressing the opinions of those in support of the government 
decision, including certain major actors in the identity card issue, as well as a number of 
scholars. These individuals offer their opinions on why and how the government 
forwarded its decision, and why the Church reacted in the way that it did. These `secular- 
minded' opinions give us a sense of these individuals' general perspectives on the Church 
and the factors which motivate it. I will then consider the perspectives of a number of 
clerics and theologians on the nature of and reasons behind the government decision, and 
their explanations of the Church response to the decision. Finally, I conclude with an 
analysis of the wider implications of the identity card issue, and of the Church's general 
attitudes to the European Union in light of this particular issue. 
The state perspective 
Perspectives on why the Simitis government chose to remove reference to religion 
from the national identity cards vary considerably, even amongst those scholars and 
practitioners who supported the government decision. Interviewees' explanations of the 
government decision include reference to EU standards to which Greece must conform; 
national legislation which was pending implementation, and a general trend towards 
modernisation, Europeanisation, and secularisation of Greece. Some interviewees also 
focused on the `personal' dimension of the issue, in terms of tensions between Michalis 
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Stathopoulos70 and Archbishop Christodoulos, on the one hand, and Prime Minister 
Simitis and the Archbishop on the other. 
According to Stathopoulos, the government decision clearly arose from the 
government's will to implement Greek legislation which was drawn up in accordance 
with relevant EU directives71. He emphasises the need of the Greek state both to 
conform to EU legislation and norms in human rights provision and, as a matter of rule of 
law, to implement Greek legislation which had already been voted in by Parliament but 
had not been put into effect. For Alekos Alavanos (the MEP who raised the issue in the 
European Parliament), the government decision was based on the more general need for 
Greece to align itself with the rest of EU member countries. In this sense, the removal of 
religion from national identity cards was a matter of harmonisation with norms existent in 
the European Union. Nikiforos Diamandouros (who, at the time of the interview, was the 
Greek Ombudsman72) considers the decision a realistic and proper action for a modern, 
democratic government in an age in which Greek society is becoming increasingly 
diverse. Reform to the identity cards was thus necessary because the cards are state 
documents which are used by individuals in basic transactions with public administration, 
and `declarations of one's inner thoughts and beliefs have no place in such basic 
transactions'. 
According to loannis Konidaris (General Secretary of Religious Affairs, in the 
Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs), one can only speculate on the intentions of 
the state and the extent to which they were shaped by efforts towards Europeanisation, 
modernisation and secularisation. In his opinion though, `they had in their minds that this 
70 The former Minister of Justice, who gave the newspaper interview which set off the entire debate. 
71 Details of this interview and those to follow may be found in the Appendix. 
72 Today Professor Diamandouros is European Ombudsman. 
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way, they could kill two birds with one stone': the identity cards are correctly adjusted, 
and a mark is set as to the direction in which the state is moving in its relations with the 
Church. The extent to which the decision was directly related to the European Union is 
an `ambiguous' matter: `I don't think the government said that the EU was obliging it to 
take the decision, but it claimed to be acting in the direction of a modernisation of 
legislation and harmonisation with that of other European countries'73. Indeed there is a 
great deal of ambiguity surrounding the matter, perhaps because of how suddenly it 
became such a public issue. For instance, in Professor Nicos Mouzelis' view, the 
government decision was not premeditated or ideologically-driven: Simitis did not 
expect the question to be raised in Parliament at that time and, when faced with the 
question, simply took the decision which he considered correct. Mouzelis strongly 
believes that it was not a pre-meditated decision because the change to the identity cards 
could have been brought about in a more gradual way. After all, he notes, the relevant 
European legislation is not rigid; Greece could have adapted to it flexibly and gradually. 
Nor, in his view, was the decision part of a modernisation process. In the long run yes, 
that would be an effect. But, considering how the decision was taken, Mouzelis believes 
that it had less to do with modernisation and more to do with lack of preparation on the 
issue. He rightly notes that, due to his staunchly secular orientation, Simitis has clearly 
avoided involvement in religious affairs. 
In fact, many interviewees gave emphasis to the way in which the government 
decision was carried out. For Stathopoulos, only one element of the whole identity card 
73 This, he notes, is similar to the long process of implementing legislation on conscientious objection: `the 
government was not directly forced by the EU, but it did not want to be exceptional in terms of things that 
happen in other countries of the EU, in which we are an equal member. We can't ignore the other countries. 
This does not mean that we are obliged to conform to all of them [the countries]: in many there is no 
identity card at all'. 
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issue should have been different: Simitis should not have refused to meet with 
Christodoulos, as the latter repeatedly requested. According to both him and two other 
interviewees74, Simitis' refusal was probably related to his annoyance with 
Christodoulos' actions and statements: the latter had not only chosen to take serious 
measures against the government, but had also voiced derogatory statements against the 
Prime Minister. Thus, inherent in the way in which the Simitis government handled the 
issue was an element of stubbornness (an attitude of `we're going to get our way'), and a 
message of `you stick to your domain, and I'll deal with mine'. Another scholar also 
contends that the government's decision was, in part, related specifically to Simitis' 
inflexible character. But, this interviewee emphasises, in this particular case Simitis' 
attitudes were strongly influenced by Christodoulos' own `very stupid mistakes' and anti- 
democratic actions75. 
Interviewees also noted important political dimensions to the issue. For 
Alavanos, the fact that the government introduced the change immediately after 
elections, without mentioning it beforehand, was especially problematic in that it exposed 
the government to the Church's criticism that it and the voters were somehow `tricked'. 
He contends that the issue could have been managed better by the state, but `regardless of 
how the change was introduced, the Church would have reacted negatively'. According 
to Professor Thanos Lipowatz, one significant problem was the fact that Simitis did not 
even prepare his own government on the matter: there was so much intra-party division 
over the issue that, in the end, Simitis faced opposition within the party as well. 
74 These wished to remain unnamed. Where names are not indicated, this means the interviewee(s) wished 
to remain anonymous (whether in general or with reference to a particular statement). 
75 This interviewee wished to remain unnamed. 
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Secular-minded views of the Church in light of the identity card issue reveal a 
variety of opinion. Responses include reference to the historical place of the Church in 
Greek society and politics, on the one hand, and factors specific to the Christodoulos-led 
Church, on the other. We begin here by addressing interviewees' interpretations of the 
Church's reaction to the identity card changes, followed by their general perspectives on 
the Church and its motivating factors. 
For Konidaris, the Church reaction has to do with the fact that `it fears a lot of 
things, and it feels that it must maintain a defensive position'. Thus, in his view, the 
Church is not anti-European, but it is insecure; it fears that, through increasing 
homogeneity of EU countries, Orthodoxy will lose its value (as it is currently such a 
small minority in Europe). But, he emphasises, in the Treaty of Amsterdam it is clear 
that each country will arrange its own religious affairs. Thus there is no danger of change 
to legislation if the countries themselves do not want this: `The EU does not force us to 
change our relations with the Orthodox Church. If the government decides on such 
change, this does not mean that the EU forces us'. Thus, as a representative of the 
government himself, he intimates that it may be in the government's own interests, quite 
apart from the EU, to introduce changes in church-state relations. 
Diamandouros too interprets the Church reaction as a matter of self-defence. 
According to Diamandouros, the Church, in its current manifestation and led by the 
current Archbishop, is trying to defend its rights in a very dynamic way. But, he notes, 
The perception of this dynamic defence of its rights is the other side of 
the same coin: I know for a fact that the state is gradually beginning to 
assert the rights emanating out of both its international obligations and 
the rule of law under a democratic society. So it's difficult, in fact, to 
say: it's a kind of chicken-and-egg game. 
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He notes that Greece is becoming increasingly more diverse, a society of immigrants 
rather than a society of emigrants. In this context, he contends that as Greek democracy 
deepens, and as the obligation to respect the right to differ becomes increasingly 
embedded in the Greek legal culture, there will be a growing number of cases that 
challenge the traditional cultural, and in several ways practical, application of the pre- 
eminence of the Orthodox Church. Religious minorities will increasingly assert their 
rights within the spirit and the letter of the law, and `that is where the state has to come in 
and precisely help promote diversity and, within the rule of law, to defend their rights'. 
In Diamandouros' perspective, the Church is groping for ways to understand the reality 
created by the very sudden change in the composition of Greek society resulting from the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the great wave of immigration that became manifest in 
Greece in the 1990's. In the context of this change, Greece ceased being the culturally, 
linguistically, religiously and ethnically highly homogeneous society that it was before, 
and this created much of turbulence and anxiety and xenophobia. The Church found 
itself at the helm of those social strata that felt most ambivalent and threatened by the 
rapid changes to society (part of which was the influx of all these newcomers). 
Diamandouros thus interprets the Church's reaction as an attempt to carve a role for itself 
and preserve its own traditional pre-eminence in Greece within this rapidly changing 
Greek society. 
This theme is echoed by Nicos Mouzelis, who contends that the new Church 
leadership reacted as it did due to its feeling that the Church was peripheral and did not 
play any role in social life-'it was completely ossified'. According to Mouzelis, 
Christodoulos thought that the way to lead the Church out of such isolation would be to 
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intervene actively in public life. Thus, apart from various nationalistic causes motivating 
the Church, the identity card issue was considered an excellent way of mobilising the 
people, and thereby placing the Church at the centre not only of social life, but of 
political life. From Mouzelis' perspective, the Church leaders were afraid that, 
particularly as European integration continued, there would be a threat of the Church 
becoming gradually disconnected from the state. Accordingly, taking a stand on the 
identity card issue was a means to counteract these secularising tendencies: 
I think it's a combination of the type of leadership plus all these 
subterranean movements going on among the people, which have to do 
with fears about European integration and so forth, and the 
peripheralisation that this type of European modernisation brings to a lot 
of social strata.. . 
Thus you have this favourable situation for 
mobilisation at the base, and a [Church] leadership prepared to profit 
from this type of dissatisfaction that you have among peripheral social 
strata. 
Mouzelis thus interprets the Church reaction to the identity card decision as a. 
combination of two things: the type of leadership in the Church, and a social base which 
feels threatened by modernisation. 
Alekos Alavanos also emphasises the particular role played by the Church 
leadership: `the problems rise with the current form of the Church; the presence of 
Christodoulos in the archbishopric has a character of "offensive defence" of its status and 
its influence within the state'. And, through its defensive activities, the Church directly 
mixes into politics and in a way that is very different from that which prevailed under the 
previous Archbishop (Seraphim). For Alavanos, two words are key to our understanding 
of the Church's perspectives on the identity cards -- fear and power: 
There is a fear within the Church that it is being expelled, 
peripheralised-a fear which has a large historical depth, beginning 
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during Byzantine times and continuing after Ottoman rule. The other 
key word is power: considering that X. O. [initials for Christian 
Orthodox, in Greek] is a green light on your identity card which the Jew 
does not have, nor the Catholic, nor he who chooses not to write his 
religion, the Church's loss of that green light is considered a weakening 
of its power. 
Many interviewees point to historical factors which shape current Church 
attitudes and activities. For Nicos Mouzelis, a significant root of the Church's reaction to 
the identity card change is its historically reactive, defensive attitude towards the West. 
Referring to a study of the different ways in which eastern and Western Europe evolved 
sociologically and theologically 76, he notes that there is an intense emphasis, within the 
Church, on the negative developments in the West: there are efforts on the part of the 
Church to maintain its differences from the West and, at the same time, there is a feeling 
of having been `left out' of the major developments. According to Mouzelis, there is 
some theological content to this anti-European feeling in the sense that many in the 
Church find in the West a rationalistic, logocentric77 theology and a type of individualism 
which is very egoistic and which is somehow linked with the pathologies of modern life 
(divorce, drugs, suicide, etc). They thus try to maintain their differences with Europe for 
fear that somehow Europeanisation will undermine what is specific about eastern 
Christianity. And those who act defensively think that we should turn our backs to the 
opening of Europe, to somehow close as much as possible the boundaries, in order to 
maintain our autonomy. However, Mouzelis believes that the most relevant fact is that 
the Church is afraid of losing its privileges, the dominant position it has over the 
minorities, etc. 
76 By Stelios Ramphos, The Individual's Yearning. [in Greek] 
77 In other words, a theology which is based more on reason; logocentric in this context may be considered 
as the opposite of theocentric (God-centred). 
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In Lipowatz' view as well, the Church is struggling to keep its privilege of 
`prevailing' in Greece, but he sees no theological content to the Church's reaction on the 
identity card issue: `Let's not forget that they have huge estates, and they are afraid of 
losing these. In the past the state has said you have more than you need, use that estate to 
pay your own wages. But the Church is not in a position to do that it is not organised. 
Also, they have a hand in all the schools. If they lose this, it will be a big problem'. 
According to Lipowatz, the Church relies on religious nationalism in its battles with the 
state. Such nationalism is not new to Greece, but it exists in a `new form', since the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union: `from that point in time we discovered 
"our brother". Russians and Serbs.. . the worst nationalists'. He also believes that the 
Macedonian issue introduced a new form of nationalism within the Church. Other 
qualms within the Church against Western Europe and the western faiths, he claims, 
existed of old, as an element of conservatism `within an Orthodox Church which did not 
want to modernise or change anything"'. He contends, however, that the differences 
with Western Christianity are not at the level of dogma, but at the level of history, a 
history dating back one thousand years. Most relevant to the Church's stance and 
activities on the identity card issue, though, is the fact that `the Church wants to have 
spiritual power, but it links this spiritual power with the right to interfere in politics. Pure 
spiritual power is not enough for the Church; it also wants simultaneous political power'. 
Professor Paparizos echoes the view that `It's an issue of power-Christodoulos 
wants to be able to practice power, and he wants to be an ethnarch'. Clerics in general, 
he contends, want to maintain their status in Greek society; they want people to stand in 
78 He emphasises, however, that such conservatism is, of course, not unique to Orthodoxy in Greece; it also 
exists within Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. 
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their presence; they want to be respected and invited to all public ceremonies, `and they 
use the ethnos as a card in politics; if they drop the "ethnos" attention, their argument is 
weakened'. He believes that clerics are especially afraid that Greece will lose its cultural 
specificity. They basically support a helleno-Christian culture, claims Paparizos; 
This has to do both with the role of particular groups who cultivate these 
fears, and with the fact that religion has always been closely linked to 
state ideology. So, taking on the state ideology, church leaders 
developed certain fears that if our state and our politicians change, we 
[the Church] will lose our place in a space which we manipulate-. 
The Church perspective 
In order to gain insight into the Church's perspective on the identity card issue, 
the opinions of a number of clerics, theologians, and Church representatives were sought. 
I present here their general views on the government decision on the identity cards, their 
opinions on why the government took that decision, and their explanations of why the 
Church reacted in the way that it did. 
Many religion-minded interviewees characterise the government's decision as 
undemocratic. According to Metropolitan Anthimos of Alexandroupoli, as the majority 
of the population, Orthodox Greeks are being oppressed with this decision. Or, in the 
words of Father George Metallinos79, the decision creates a `minority rule' which strips 
the majority of the Greek public of the right to self-determination and self-designation. 
79 Professor of Theology at the University of Athens, and well-known in Greece for his many appearances 
in the mass media and his public voice on social and church-related issues. Also, Fr. Metallinos was one of 
three individuals who took the matter of the identity cards to the European Court of Human Rights in a case 
against the Greek State. See ECHR Decision, Sofianopoulos and Others v. Greece, 20 December 2001 (the 
ECHR decided, without conducting a full trial, in favour of the Greek State). 
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Constantinos Cholevas (General Editor of the journals published by the Church of 
Greece) too considers the decision undemocratic, in the sense that the non-Orthodox 
citizens will continue to enjoy privileges by declaring their faith to public officials: the 
Jehovah's Witness has the right to go and declare his faith in order to get out of military 
service, and Muslims of Thrace have the right to declare their faith in order to get their 
children into university without having to pass the national exams. Thus, according to 
Cholevas, the decision disproportionately favours minority groups in Greece. One 
Metropolitan, however, firmly rebukes clerics for their verbal attacks against the 
government: `I think no such governmental decision should be considered anti- 
democratic, in the context of our always democratic system of government, which is 
expressed through the majority in the taking of various decisions'80. 
As for why the government chose to remove religion from the identity cards, there 
is marked ambivalence amongst religion-minded interviewees on this matter. In 
explaining the reasons behind the decision, the most extreme response was the belief that 
it was the result of a `Jewish plot', and that the government was pressured by a Jewish- 
American lobby (a perspective which prevailed, at least for a time, within the Holy Synod 
as well)81. Certain interviewees argue that the government is antithetical to Christianity 
in general. Most interviewees, however, indicate a desire on the part of the government 
80 The cleric wished to remain anonymous. 
81 The `history' of the Jewish-American lobbying efforts on the identity cards was explained in depth to me 
by Stelios Papathemelis (who was, at the time, a PASOK MP). He is neither a theologian nor a 
representative of the Church, but is included in this section because he is considered by many to be a 
`political voice' for the Church. Of the other interviewees covered in this section, Papathemelis gave most 
emphasis to this particular debate, but certain clerics also referred to it in their explanations of the factors 
motivating the government. For foreign press coverage of this `Jewish plot', see `Web-surfing Church 
discovers Jewish plot', Kathimerini, 16 March 2001 (which refers to the fact that the Church had found, on 
the website of the Jewish American Committee, a statement declaring that the Jewish-American lobby had 
met with Greek diplomats visiting the US in 1996 and had asked them to press the government for removal 
of religion from the national identity cards). For foreign press coverage of this issue, see J. Little, `Religious 
row blazes over Greek identity', BBC News Europe, 15 March 2001, and M. Henry, `ID card religion labels 
spark controversy in Greece', The Jerusalem Post, 23 July 2000. 
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to weaken the role of religion in Greek society or, specifically, the role of the Church 
(most clerics, it should be noted, use these two concepts interchangeably). According to 
Metropolitan Anthimos, 
There is a rejection, amongst the new enlightenersß2, of the presence of 
the Church, which is indeed strong in our lives. But it [the Church 
presence] is beneficial, and not binding or constraining. What will 
remain, I say, if we leave all these things-Easter traditions, lighting 
candles in little churches, feast days-what will remain in our lives to 
give us a bit of freshness, a hope, and a rejuvenation and a delight? 
They want to dull the conscience of the Greek, claims another Metropolitan: `no crosses, 
no icons ... a slavery to all things 
foreign'83. Metropolitan Ignatios emphasises that the 
identity card `does not determine our conscience nor our national course', but he 
contends that the government action `contains a symbolism: it consists, in practice, of a 
denial of religiosity as an element of Greek specificity'. For him, the inclusion of 
religion on the identity cards symbolises history, tradition, and `all that gave freedom to 
our people. .. Our people 
had and has its faith as a public element of its life. And this was 
tried to be harmed, with the pretext of the identity cards'. 
There is also, amongst religion-minded interviewees, a great deal of ambivalence 
over whether the government decision was aimed at a full separation of church and state. 
According to Cholevas, it was an effort to weaken the role of the Church in Greek 
society, and not a matter of separation of church and state. Yet, at the same time, he 
claims that `Stathopoulos said that after the identity cards we will abolish the religious 
82 The word used by the Metropolitan is `diafotistes'; the term it is alternatively used to mean `enlightener', 
or, sarcastically, 'propagandist'-someone who seeks to `enlighten' people by propagandising Western 
values or norms. 
83 Interviewee wished to remain anonymous. The interviewee says, furthermore, `evidently [the removal of 
religion from the identity cards] was due to the line followed by all member states before 11 September', 
thus laying emphasis on the fact that after II September, there was discussion within the EU of introducing 
identity cards which would identify the holder's religious orientation. 
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courses. Then we will lower Christ [icons] from the schools. He said then then 
then.. . that the civil wedding would become mandatory, etc. '. Thus Cholevas sees the 
identity card change as a `first step' in a series of measures; and all of the measures to 
which he refers lie at the heart of church-state relations in Greece. Metropolitan 
Anthimos emphatically declares that `the separation of church and state they won't dare 
to try. For the sake of our peoples, these relations must be maintained, in the form of 
"distinct roles and mutual support", as we call it. They can't try [to change this] because 
the people don't want it'. Father George Metallinos rejects the use of the term `church- 
state separation': `what we have today, and what is correct, is a distinction between the 
roles of church and state (as is constitutionally established); what they [the government] 
are trying is the detachment of Orthodoxy from every state structure and engagement'. 
This, he contends, is the program currently being implemented in Greece'. These views 
reveal an interesting nuance: while, generally speaking, Church representatives do not 
conceive of the government decision as aimed towards church-state separation, they do 
feel that the decision, in effect, changes the status quo of church-state relations. In other 
words, regardless on the government's intentions, its decision on the identity cards 
resulted in a change to the status of church-state relations in terms of the place accorded 
to the Church (and to Orthodoxy) in the Greek state and society. It is thus that the 
Church sees the identity card'issue as a matter to be dealt with by the Church and by the 
state, rather than, e. g., the EU. 
There is a great deal of ambivalence, in particular, over the extent to which the 
EU is at fault for the changes to the identity card. In fact, there is often an element of 
contradiction in religion-minded interviewees' perspectives. For instance, Metropolitan 
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Anthimos contends that `there were strong pressures [on the government] from the 
European lobby', but the decision was `not because of the EU. Most interviewees refer 
to the pressures applied by the EU for an enhancement of the rights of religious 
minorities, and contend that the EU thereby seeks to limit Greece's right to `protect itself' 
from proselytism practiced by other faiths (see below for an elaboration on this view). 
But, on the whole, interviewees place the blame for the identity card change on the Greek 
government and on certain intellectuals in Greece who are `more European than the 
Europeans'84. One notable exception is the perspective of Father George Metallinos. 
When asked why the government took the decision on the identity cards, his simple 
response was: `the recent decision of the European Court shows how the circuit operates 
and from where the directions are given... OUR MASTER'S VOICE'85. He believes that 
the decision was aimed at a spiritual division within Greece and, directing a somewhat 
cryptic accusation against the EU, he declares that `this [division] serves the interests of 
those who want Hellenism to dissolve in two decades86. This is where we are going, 
unfortunately. But the only thing that never dissolves is Orthodoxy and the Hellenicity 
which is united with it. We proved this historically many times'. He states his 
enthusiasm, however, over the fact that at least now Greeks have become aware of `who 
we have against us! '. 
No interviewee, however, explained the Church's reaction to the identity card 
change by reference to the EU. The Greek state was the clear object of Church 
statements and activities on the issue. Reiterating his assertion that Stathopoulos 
84 Clerics' perceptions of the EU's role in the identity card issue are addressed more thoroughly in the 
following section. 
85 Father Metallinos refers here to the case which he took, together with two other individuals and against 
the Greek state, to the ECHR (20 December 2001). See footnote 79. 
86 One may assume he means the two decades of Greek membership in the EU, since 1981. 
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conceived of the identity card change as a first step in a series of measures, Cholevas 
declares: `we reacted against the identity cards mainly so other measures wouldn't be 
taken'. The Church-led demonstrations, he contends, `gave a response and I think the 
effort will stop here'. The main argument for the Church's activities on the identity card 
issue, however, was that the Church was representing the will of the people-protecting 
Greek citizens from a government acting against their interests. As Cholevas explains, 
the Church is a spiritual organ which does not depend on the believer's profession of 
religion on the identity card: the Church founds itself on the confession of the believer in 
his coming to church, in the fact that all but 2% of the population chooses to have a 
religious wedding only, and in the respect the believer shows for the Church in the 
polls87. Accordingly, `the Church is not threatened by the government ... but it is 
bothered, and it involves itself in the problem of its flock'. The pride of the Greek is 
damaged, he contends, when a handful of judges decide on such a sensitive issue: `I think 
the Greek wants Orthodoxy to be an element of his national identity. Beyond this, the 
Greek has learned that today we have democracy, and each person has the right not to be 
Orthodox'. He does not see any discrimination in Greece on the basis of faith, and 
declares that he is `afraid we'll soon reach the point where the Orthodox feels the 
discrimination'. 
In the same vein, Metropolitan Anthimos explains that perhaps the minority in 
Greece wanted this change to the identity cards ('though it lived here so many years and 
there are no such problems'); but should not the wish and opinion of the majority be 
taken into consideration? `The minority doesn't want [religion on the identity cards], and 
87 Cholevas is referring here to opinion polls which show the Greek population's respect for the Church as 
an institution. 
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the majority, for reasons of confession and witness, as taught by the Bible that we must 
confess that we are Christian, and because for so many years we had it on our identity 
cards, says, I want it'; accordingly, he maintains that `it was a 'big problem which upset 
everyone'. But it also upset the clergy in particular whose work, according to 
Metropolitan Anthimos, is now made more difficult: `how are we to know, in a wedding 
or in Holy Communion, if the person is Orthodox? '. He admits this is a technical 
argument, since priests do not ask people to show their identity cards as proof of faith; 
`but the most important is that the soul and the conscience of the Greek citizens for whom 
it will no longer be written, they have a problem. For some, they don't want to go 
anywhere without wearing a cross. That's how it is with our identity cards'. This is why 
the Church reacted so strongly against the government decision and this is why, he 
contends, the issue is not over for the Church$$. 
However, many religion-minded interviewees opposed the official line taken by 
the Church and its interference in the realm of politics. The perspective of Metropolitan 
Chrysostomos of Zakynthos is characteristic of a relatively small but vocal group of 
clerics who were critical of the Church: 
As citizens of a new borderless world we Orthodox Greeks are 
sometimes afraid of the exchange of ideas, peoples, cultures and dogmas 
which the EU entails. But no one can harm us, if we keep unaltered 
inside us the realities of history, faith, and our specificity. And this, 
without an attitude of nationalism or parochialism. How will we 
maintain our specificity? Only with the folkloric view of the `Hellenic' 
and `Orthodox' and only with the formal recording of religion, e. g., on 
our state identity cards? Will we wait for the state to identify what we 
are? For the state to `baptize' us? 
88 When asked what he meant by that statement, he explained that `the Church's plans could not yet be 
revealed'. 
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Or, in the words of another Metropolitan, `almost until the eve of this issue, hierarchs, 
preachers etc., were telling people to be strong Christians and not Christians of the 
identity cards! ' Accordingly, he declares, `the noise [demonstrations, etc] was not worth 
it; obviously the inclusion of religion on the identity cards proves nothing about the life 
of a Christian 89. According to Christos Yiannaras90, the Church's reaction was `very 
unfortunate', but, he continues, the state did not `leave it much room' to act otherwise, 
since Simitis refused to meet with Christodoulos to discuss the matter. However, he 
emphatically believes that the government decision was, in substance, correct: religion 
has no place on the state-issued national identity cards. 
Professor of theology Savvas Agouridis is also critical of the Church's position on 
the identity cards. He maintains that such stances have no theological content and are, 
rather, remnants of Byzantine `political theology': `there are sleeping groups of citizens 
which, when someone shows up with a programme of awakening, are awakened'. He 
explains the attitudes of both the Church and its supporters on the identity card issue by 
reference to the fact that `we have not yet matured. And for this reason you see leaders, 
even the intellectuals, use apocalyptic theology... we haven't matured psychologically in 
order to understand the facts of a crisis and to result in some objective conclusions'. 
Such `psychological crisis' leads Greeks to the past, `and that's why we always go back'. 
Accordingly, he feels that, in Greece, problems are rarely handled `in and of themselves', 
and are, instead, burdened by history and fears to do with the ethnos, and `our race'. 
s9 He wished to remain anonymous. 
90 Christos Yiannaras is professor of philosophy at Panteion University, Athens. He cannot be accurately 
described as representative of, or supportive of, either the `Church' or the `state perspective'. His 
promotion as professor of philosophy was, itself, a much-debated issue in Greece, because his work is 
mostly devoted to Orthodox theology, history and sociology, and because he is considered a foremost 
representative of the `Neo-Orthodox movement' (see chapter three). 
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People mainly fear change and the Church, he contends, simply wants to maintain the 
status quo (for economic, political, and social reasons). Furthermore, he explains, the 
politicians compromise in the end and conform to church demands because `at the end of 
the day, they are politicians. And the EU played a role in why they didn't compromise in 
the end on the identity cards'. In Agourides' view, the Church's activities were not 
directed only at the state but also at the EU's influence over Greece: `we can't stop it, but 
we can make it difficult. How? By emphasising traditional factors. The others are 
strong, and we are weak here. We should not submit, we should emphasise our character 
because we are in danger of being absorbed'. Agouridis sees, in such a mentality, an 
ignorance of the fact that people will not only remain Orthodox but may become more 
Orthodox if they learn to think of faith outside the bounds of ethnicity and tradition: `it is 
therefore not an issue of religion, but of historical psychology, and estimation of reality 
by the simple person that Europe is a hyper-power, it has the historical political strength, 
and we are the small ones trying to stand on our feet'. 
But as an Orthodox theologian, Agouridis is in the minority with this perspective. 
Again, the opinions addressed above show that most clerics and theologians approach the 
identity card issue through the prism of the Greek state's intentions for the place of 
religion and the Church in the Greek state and society. Meanwhile, the majority of 
secular-minded interviewees interpret the issue as a matter of modernisation, 
Europeanisation, and obedience to the principle of the rule of law. 
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Church, state and the European Union 
Against this backdrop of divergent perspectives, I now close with a consideration 
of the Church's influence on national-EU relations, and the EU's influence on the place 
of religion in Greek state and society. I begin by examining secular-minded 
interviewees' perspectives on the implications of this identity card issue. These 
implications may be divided into three interrelated domains: domestic policy, church- 
state relations, and Greek-EU relations. Here we see that the role of the Church in 
national-EU relations is intricately linked with the activities of the Church in domestic 
politics. In terms of domestic politics, a first notable factor is the number of signatures 
collected by the Church in its petition for a referendum on the issue. The fact that the 
Archbishop declared the Church's intent to collect more signatures than the number of 
votes which the ruling party won in the previous national elections is a clear signal of the 
Church's involvement in politics. The fact that it succeeded in this intent, by gathering 
over 3 million votes, is indicative of the Church's potential influence on domestic 
politics. As loannis Konidaris indicates, the political power of this number cannot be 
overlooked: `with those numbers, I say the Church has approximately 70,000 votes in its 
hands, which means this must be taken into consideration in relation to elections. It 
would not be wise for any politician to go into elections against the Archbishop'. As a 
member of the Simitis government, he admits that many of the party's MP's were 
disappointed with Simitis' decision, because they could expect to lose much of their local 
support. Alekos Alavanos also emphasises that the Church's influence over the 
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electorate significantly affects many politicians' stances on issues even remotely related 
to the Church, because of their fear of the consequences in terms of electoral support. 
Further evidence of the effect of the Church on domestic politics is the very 
intense way in which the identity card issue became a main platform of the conservative 
opposition party, the `New Democracy' (ND). Its leader, Constantinos Karamanlis, was 
one of the first to sign the petition for a referendum, thus emphasising the traditional 
close ties between the party and the Church. The party's manipulation of the issue for 
electoral purposes was so obvious that the press began ridiculing it as the `New 
Theocracy'. 
The influence of the Church in domestic politics became even more explicit in the 
municipal and prefectural elections which took place in October 2002. Though by that 
point the church-run petition had been completed (with no effect on the government 
decision), the Archbishop repeatedly declared that the issue was not closed. By 
reminding politicians of the three million voters who had signed the Church's petition 
and by publicly calling on all parties to make their positions on the identity card clear 
prior to elections, the Archbishop took the opportunity of the elections to make one last 
ditch effort in the Church's campaign. His broadly disseminated statement that the voters 
of George Karatzaferis are `good Christians' is thought to have negatively affected the 
electoral prospects of the latter's opponent in the race (ND candidate I. Tzannetakos, who 
had taken the government's position against the Church in the identity card dispute). 
Karatzaferis, who had no basis in a mainstream political party and no strong political 
platform, but had the advantage of church support (not least because he championed its 
cause in the identity card issue), shocked politicians, journalists, and the Greek public in 
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general by receiving a substantial percentage of the vote in the ensuing elections91. 
Furthermore, the widely publicised visits to the Archbishop by a number of candidates 
seeking his blessing, prior to the elections and in the wake of his aforementioned 
statement (on `good Christian' voters), could be interpreted as nothing but recognition of 
the Church's strong influence over domestic politics. Finally, even the fact that Foreign 
Minister George Papandreou henceforth made a point of personally informing92 the 
Archbishop on significant government policies (such as that on the UN proposal for 
solution to the Cyprus issue) was considered by many to be a direct effect of `lessons 
learned' by the government through the church-state conflict over the identity cards. 
In terms of the implications of the identity card issue for church-state relations, 
many Greek bureaucrats and politicians note with regret that the numerous aspects of 
church-state relations which urgently require revision were necessarily shelved in the 
aftermath of this conflict. `The Church', Konidaris declares, `is in a state of self-defence 
following the identity card issue. Any slightly religion-related issues addressed by the 
government are viewed with intense suspicion: they're afraid that we're preparing 
something against them'. In the short run, according to many, the Church was the winner 
of this conflict with the state. Minister of Justice Stathopoulos was replaced in the 
subsequent government reshuffle, and his replacement has notably better relations with 
the Church hierarchy. Meanwhile, in a widely publicised interview Prime Minister 
Simitis pointedly declared that the government had no more plans for policies related to 
the Church-a declaration which received little criticism from the press and the public, 
due to the widespread perception that `it was not possible for more to be done' in the 
91 Tzannetakos received 2% of the vote, whilst Karatzaferis received 12% of the vote. 
92 Or, consulting, depending on the perspective taken. 
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short term (in other words, it was not possible for more religion-related reforms to be 
pursued) 93 
However, in terms of long-term effects on church-state relations, significantly the 
government did not back down on this particular policy, in spite of the extreme 
opposition it faced from the Church. This fact sets an important precedent for, in all 
previous intense conflicts between Church and state in the history of modern Greece, 
significant concessions on particular policies were always made by the state. Finally, as 
one scholar notes, `the Church reaction on this issue probably hurt the Church: it will not 
be able to easily mobilise people again, as the public understood that it was a wasted 
effort'. 
In terms of the impact of the `identity card crisis' on Greek-EU relations, an oft- 
cited effect is that it served to `blacken the image' of Greece within the European Union. 
As one Greek MEP notes, the whole issue was far too reminiscent of the reactionary 
tactics of the Church during the crisis over the naming of Macedonia in the 1990's. 
Much more consequential, though, are the effects related to the above-mentioned 
domains of domestic politics and church-state relations. First, the identity card issue 
illustrates a special vulnerability in the Greek political system to the influences of the 
Church. When, under the threat of electoral losses, we see politicians more attentive to 
opinions emanating from the archbishopric than from Brussels, we are obliged to 
recognise the Church as a significant factor in national-EU relations. Of course, the 
politicians' own responsibility in this must be highlighted: rather than counteract the 
Church's successful deployment of the national sensitivities of the Greek population by 
93 See Greek press coverage of the Thessaloniki Trade Fair (the context in which the interview was given), 
8-9 September, 2001. 
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emphasising the virtues of political and social equality, most politicians either fell silent 
or fed the intra- and inter-party conflict that arose over the identity card issue. 
Second, the identity card issue illustrates a problematic intersection between 
church-state and Greek-EU relations. Several governmental reforms are pending which 
are either necessary for conformity with EU standards or have been explicitly demanded 
by the European Court of Human Rights94, but which press on the sensitivities of the 
Church. For instance, enhanced provision of freedom of conscience by changing the 
nature of the mandatory religious education courses; guaranteed freedom of religious 
practice by removing the difficult barriers to the building of mosques or Protestant 
churches in Greece; simplification of the process through which conscientious objectors 
(who are mainly Jehovah's Witnesses) may be placed in social rather than military 
service95; and legislation allowing for cremation as an alternative to religious burial 
96 
These are but a few examples of reforms which the Church of Greece has staunchly 
resisted. And, in light of the difficulty the government faced in implementing the identity 
card reform, we can expect significant delays in the implementation of such related 
measures. 
Within Church circles we find radically different perceptions of the implications 
of the identity card issue on Greek-EU relations and on church-state relations. I examine 
these perceptions with reference to current attitudes to the EU and to the state, 
respectively. The most common phrase used by clerics and representatives of the Church 
94 Which, of course, falls under the domain of the Council of Europe, but the opinions of which are 
certainly important to the European Union as a whole. 
9s Many of the cases against the Greek state in the ECHR are related to conscientious objection. Beyond 
the challenges heterodox citizens face in gaining the right to alternative service, they sometimes face 
further problems when assigned to Church-run welfare services. 
96 See T. Morgan, `Crematoria plan outrages Greek church', for a report on the Church's resistance to 
legislation providing for the practice of cremation in Greece. BBC Europe, 11 April 2002. 
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to describe their current attitudes to the EU is `nai men, alla' (or, `yes, but'). Yes to the 
EU, but no to two things in particular: cultural levelling (i. e., homogenisation across 
Europe), and threats to Greek national specificity. Cultural pride is strong amongst the 
Greeks, states Constantinos Cholevas, `and if Europe makes the mistake of trampling on 
the pride of Greeks, or acts so as to harm Orthodoxy or our language, we'll have a 
problem'97. As long as there is respect on the part of the EU for the specificities of each 
religious identity and no pressure to conform, then the Church is positive towards the 
European Union. If at the economic level the UK can say `no' to the Euro, Metropolitan 
Anthimos declares, then at the spiritual and cultural level Greece can also resist certain 
developments. 
Such resistance, most religion-minded interviewees explain, should not be 
considered `anti-Europeanism'; there is simply disagreement with certain opinions and 
trends, `and this is democratic'. One cleric, however, does admit to anti-European trends 
within the Church98. He explains this with reference to the fact that the EU is an 
unknown territory for most elder hierarchs who cannot easily understand and absorb the 
socio-political changes entailed by membership in the EU. Many such clerics (who are in 
the majority) were brought up within a climate of conservatism mixed with nationalistic 
ideals. He claims, furthermore, that the election of Christodoulos to the archbishopric 
played a catalytic role in the shaping of such a climate within the hierarchy. Negative 
attitudes to Europe also increased in certain circumstances, such as condemnations of 
Greece in the ECHR. And, in general, all Greeks felt like second-class citizens of Europe 
in the 1980's, largely as a result of Greek foreign policy at the time: `our European 
97 However, he continues, `If [the EU] does what it says in its texts, to respect the different traditions, we'll 
be ok'. 
98 He wished to remain anonymous. 
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partners treated us as inhabitants of the 3`d world'. He claims that younger hierarchs, 
however, `understand the importance of a politico-economic union, from which the 
Greek Church has much to gain'99 
Yet two particular factors do stand out as problematic. even to the most pro- 
European of religion-minded respondents. First, the EU is considered as overly focused 
on economic matters and does not attend enough to cultural and spiritual matters. The 
resistance to any mention of the EU's Christian roots in its Constitutional Treaty is 
considered indicative of the spirit of materialism which prevails in Europe10°. A second 
oft-expressed concern is that the European Union is overly liberal. Clerics repeatedly 
declare that if the EU tries to force such things as the legalisation of gay marriage, to 
regulate laws on employment on Sundays, to encourage abortion or to change the all- 
male tradition of Mount Athos, then the Church will resist. Most complaints, however, 
are aimed at the EU's liberal approach to human rights policies, where these have to do 
with religious rights and freedoms. Constantinos Cholevas asserts that a compromise on 
this issue must be found: `on the one hand, freedom of expression is a European right; on 
the other, the insecurity of parents and children should be respected and so the Church 
should work with the state so that where these heresies [religious sects] violate laws and 
the freedom of opinion of people and stupefy them, these groups will be punished'. Or, 
as expressed by Fr. Metallinos, `[w]hat does the EU do, when is says that it protects the 
rights of the minorities. Don't we have rights? '. The resistance, within the EU, to 
99 This is, I should note, a debatable point, as several elder hierarchs are strongly pro-EU. The respondent 
goes on to say that `There is no theological basis for anti-Europeanism. The Christian message is 
pananthropic. Whoever claims theological reasons for the polemic against the EU simply destroys, 
adulterates and does injustice to the Christian message'. 
100 As Metropolitan Anthimos puts it, `you can't form a Constitution of Europe, and not to refer to 
Christianity. You can't ignore the influence of Christianity in Europe, because wherever you look in 
European culture, even in the reactions against religion, you find the Christian religion'. 
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mention of religion in the Preamble to the EU's Constitutional Treaty is also seen as 
evidence of an EU so biased towards immigrants and minorities that it effectively 
`abolishes' European culture ('the root of which is Christianity')'0' 
Furthermore, many within the Church perceive `anti-Orthodox trends' within the 
European Union. Examples of this which are cited include the EU's stance on the 
naming of Macedonia and the absence of attention to Greece (ancient, Byzantine or 
modern) in the Museum of Europe and in the EU-funded book by Jean-Baptise Durocelle 
on the history of Europe. Another example of `the undermining' of Orthodoxy is `the 
hundreds of Western [Catholic], and especially Protestant groups which practice 
proselytism' and which are `guided by foreign decision-making centres' 102 
Yet, in spite of the above, religion-minded interviewees generally emphasise their 
endorsement of the EU and of Greek participation therein. Many explain, in great detail, 
all the facts which make Greece European (including the origin of Europe's naming). 
But most focus on the positive contribution to be made by Orthodoxy to the EU by 
emphasising that Orthodox culture can enrich European culture. Furthermore, Europe 
needs this contribution, because Christianity is weak within the EU and materialism is 
rampant; Orthodoxy, these respondents maintain, proposes a healthier `way of life'. 
Many also note that in recent years especially, `we find allies in Europe, rather than 
enemies'. This statement is repeatedly made with reference to such issues as cloning and 
euthanasia but, most importantly, the matter of reference to the deity in the Preamble to 
the Constitutional Treaty. 
101 It should be noted that the Church has been especially committed to the campaign for including 
reference to Christianity in the Preamble to the Constitutional Treaty, as evinced by its hosting of an 
international conference to discuss the issue in May 2003. 
102 These specific citations are from Fr. George Metallinos, but other interviewees mentioned these 
examples as well. 
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Finally, and most importantly, clerics and church representatives emphasise that 
`the EU doesn't want to change us': it is clear in its treaties that the EU `must respect the 
cultural and national identity of the people which it comprises', and religious matters are 
to be regulated by the individual states. Accordingly, Cholevas explains, `Greece is not 
afraid of the EU; it is afraid of the decisions taken in Greece supposedly because of 
Europe. If someone says we have to change the Constitution of Greece because the EU 
asks for it, it will be a big lie, because Europe says issues of Church are issues of each 
country's Constitution, which each country regulates'. The main concerns of the Church 
with regard to the EU, Cholevas notes, are clear and were sent in a letter to Giscard 
d'Estaing: `1. The Christian roots of Europe should remain; 2. The national identity of 
each country should be respected; and 3. Church and religious matters should be arranged 
by the Constitution of each state-there shouldn't be a decree from Brussels saying that 
the Orthodox Church loses its rights. We want the Constitution of each country to decide 
church issues'. Accordingly, `the problem is in SOME Greeks, some who are super- 
modern, who supposedly in order to make us good Europeans, want to change us 
completely'. And this fact, Cholevas continues, `causes harm to Europe. Those who are 
fanatic supporters-of Europe cause it harm, becausethey say to the simple Greeks that to 
become Europeans we can't have the religious courses, to become Europeans we must 
abolish faith' 103 In short, the problem is not the European Union, but the Greek state. 
By contrast, a very small minority of religion-minded interviewees argues, 
instead, that the problem is the status quo in church-state relations. For instance, Christos 
Yiannaras emphasises that a separation of church and state is imperative, and `should 
have been the Church's constant plea'. Savvas Agouridis notes that a presidential decree 
103 I assume that Cholevas means this with reference to the identity cards. 
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is a prerequisite for the appointment of a Metropolitan and that each Metropolitan must 
take his own in the presence of a prefect: `I do not consider it honourable towards Jesus 
Christ that His representatives have to go through the state to do their jobs'. But, as 
Yiannaras explains, `in Greece, church-state conjunction is a precondition for social 
cohesion; here, social cohesion is based mainly on a common tradition, a common faith, a 
common ethos, and not on a social contract. It is a difficult political problem to change 
this: with what will the state replace these bases of social cohesion? ' 
Conclusion 
The identity card issue is the most poignant example, in contemporary Greek 
reality, of the Church's intense efforts to play a role as protector of national identity and 
to maintain its strong position in relation to the state. At the heart of this issue lies a clear 
ambiguity about how the EU influences (or, seeks to influence) the place of religion in 
state and society. It is on the basis of this lack of clarity that the Church fought the state 
in the way that it did over the identity card issue. The Church's stated interests were 
primarily to represent the Greek public and to maintain religion as a part of Greek 
national identity. It was able to wage a strong war (i. e., was able to mobilise people on 
this basis) on the basis of the historical relationship between Orthodoxy and national 
identity, and because of its relatively strong position vis-ä-vis the state. Again, as pointed 
out in chapter two, religion wields considerable strength when linked to the national 
myth; the Greek Orthodox Church was able to mobilise Greeks against unfavourable state 
policies through its appeals to the national sensitivities of Greeks. 
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Considering `religious' attitudes to the EU in light of the identity card issue 
against the background of those examined in chapter three, we see many parallels as well 
as differences. Religion-minded interviewees echo certain age-old Greek Orthodox 
complaints against Europe, but in general they express positive attitudes towards Greek 
membership in the EU. With their common phrase `yes, but', they convey certain clear 
reservations which are mainly to do with religion, culture and national identity. But 
above all, they register their approval of the fact that the European Union leaves religious 
matters in the hands of individual states. Accordingly, their attention is overwhelmingly 
focused on the Church's relations with the Greek state. Any qualms about the EU's over- 
liberal stances on religious freedoms are to be dealt with-as we see-at the national 
level. The fact that the Church fought the battle at the national level (in spite of clear and 
relevant EU legislation in support of the state) indicates that a primary interest of the 
Church was to preserve the status quo in church-state relations. At the same time, the 
fact that the EU's official policy on religious matters is based on the subsidiarity principle 
supported, in effect, the Church's decision to wage its battle directly with the state rather 
than the EU. 
Yet ultimately, the European Union itself influenced both church and state 
interests in this matter: its policies on religious rights and freedoms require certain 
measures to be taken by the Greek state, and these measures press on the sensitivities of 
the Church, the interests of which arise from its historical role as preserver of Greek 
national identity and its historical place of strength in relation to the state. Thus, the 
identity card issue reveals a kind of vicious circle: the EU affects the church-state balance 
and this, in turn, has a clear potential to affect Greece's conformity with EU norms. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Islamism and Secularism in Turkey 
My second case study, that of Turkey, affords interesting parallels and contrasts 
with that of Greece. Understanding the role of religion in Turkey-EU relations requires a 
study of the historical relationship between Islamism and secularism in Turkey. Through 
this study we will come to understand the much-contended place of religion in Turkish 
state and society, and the respective interests of `Islamists' and `secularists' with regard 
to this place. Careful attention must be paid to the specificities of Turkish Islamism and 
secularism, as these are crucial to the ways religion plays a part in Turkey-EU relations. 
I thus begin with a consideration of Islam and Islamism in Turkish historical 
context. This is followed by an overview of the development of Turkish secularism and 
fluctuations in secularist policies over time. Finally, I present a spectrum of Turkish 
Islamist perspectives on Europe and the European Union, as recorded in a selection of 
religious publications. The views expressed in these publications are largely critical of 
Europe and the EU. This chapter thus serves as a background for the study, in chapter 
six, of the `change' to a pro-European stance amongst contemporary Turkish Islamists. 
The following pages will help us to understand the extent to which this `change' results 
from the historically complex relationship between Islamism and secularism. We will 
also come to understand the contending interests of Islamists and secularists and how 
these affect and are affected by Turkey's potential membership to the EU. 
As noted in the Introduction, there are significant nuances to contemporary Islamist pro-Europeanism. I 
use the word `change' for simplicity's sake, but the term should be recognised as indicating, for some 
Islamists, a complete reversal of former attitudes on Europe, for others a moderate modification of 
perspective, and for others still, part of a more general transformation of perspectives on Islam in 
contemporary Turkey. The question of whether any `change' at all has taken place is addressed below. 
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Islam and Islamism 
Critical for our study is awareness of the differences between Islam and Islamism, 
as well as those within each, in the Turkish context. Islamism indicates the re- 
appropriation of a Muslim identity and values as a basis for an alternative social and 
political agenda to that of the state. Muslim is not synonymous with Islamist, in the sense 
that the first expresses a religious identity, the latter, political consciousness? One might 
also distinguish between radical, moderate, and ultra-national Islamists, though the 
boundaries between them often merge3. 
Our focus here is primarily on Islamism, rather than Islam, as it is in the realm of 
Islamism that we find the importance of religious identity in national-EU relations (as 
evinced in the following chapter). However, in order to properly understand Turkish 
Islamism and relative attitudes towards EU membership, we must address two specific 
aspects of the history of Islam in Turkey: first, the uniqueness of Turkish Islam in the 
early nomads' conversion to the faith; and second, the historical (and contemporary) 
diversity of Islam in Turkey. 
Historical development of Islam in Turkey 
The early Turks who came from Central Asia practiced shamanism: holy men 
called shamans led people in worship of elemental forces of nature; they believed that 
spirits lived among them in the earth and the skies, and that there was one supreme God 
2 See Nilufer Gole, `Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: the making of elites and counter-elites', p. 47. See 
also Daniel Pipes, `Islam and Islamism. Faith and Ideology', pp. 87-93. 
3 See Nilufer Narli, `Turkey's cultural identity and its integration with the European Community: common 
and divergent dimensions', pp. 54-56. 
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above all gods and natural forces. Their conversion to Islam was facilitated by two 
factors. First, Turks were largely influenced by communication with the Arab Muslims 
and the Persians who had converted to Islam. Second, shamanism did focus on one 
supreme God over others. Also, Turks had already had considerable exposure to 
monotheism, as many Turks had converted to Christianity through missionaries, some 
had become Buddhists, and Judaism was the official religion of a large group of Turks 
called Khazars. Whilst Turks converted to Islam, as a nomadic people with an emphasis 
on mysticism they were naturally adverse to the strict focus in Islam on rules. 
Furthermore, those Muslims who converted the Turks to Islam were not themselves 
orthodox, and were thus fairly open and tolerant of the nomads' own beliefs. 
Accordingly, the new converts enjoyed considerable freedom in their religious beliefs 
and maintained many elements of shamanistic practice, as well as their mystical 
orientation. They did not emphasise questions of theology, and full Islamic law was only 
gradually applied to them4. 
Our second important lesson from the history of Islam in Turkey is its diversity: 
the country's religious landscape is far from homogenous. Sunni Islam came to be 
considered the `official' religion of the early Ottoman dynasties5. This standard 
continued throughout Turkish history, and is currently embodied in the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs (Diyanet), the state organ which administers mosques, religious 
education, and foundations and charities in accordance with Sunni Islam6. Today the vast 
° Justin McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks: an Introductory History to 1923, p. 6. 
5 Under the Ummayad and the Abbasid caliphates in particular, Sunni Muslims were considered the 
`orthodox' group supported by the Caliph, and they in turn lent their support to the Caliph. See McCarthy, 
ibid, p. 9. 
6 Diyanet (thus called from its Turkish title, Diyanet Isleri Mudurlugu) was established in 1923, received 
confirmation of its status after the military intervention of 1960, and appears in the 1982 Turkish 
Constitution. For further explanation of its structure and activities, see David Shankland, Islam and Society 
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majority of Turks is Sunni Muslim, a minority Shiites. Meanwhile Sufism, dating from 
the conversion to Islam of Turkic peoples by mystics, persists through tarikats (religious 
orders) 7. We pay special attention to tarikats because of their significant role in Turkish 
politics and society. 
The religious brotherhoods 
Both historically and currently, tarikats represent an alternative to the `Official' 
Islam. In Ottoman times, they were often centres of rebellion and assault on the `centre' 
of the ulema who, through their proximity to the governing powers, tried to standardise 
and control all aspects of religious life8. In contemporary times, the Sufi religious orders 
became engaged in a continual struggle to alter the relationship between Islam and the 
nation-state project by promoting Islam as the central element of national unity in 
opposition to Kemalist secularism9. Tarikats were outlawed in 1925 as part of Kemalist 
secularist measures (see below). The target of the ban was the intense loyalty of their 
members to tarikat leaders: tarikats were considered threatening to the authority of the 
new government and contrary to the individualist, scientific spirit of the modern age. Yet 
tarikats remain a powerful force for organised religion in Turkey10. Two facts especially 
explain this phenomenon: firstly, the enforcement of the ban has weakened in 
accordance with periods of relaxed secularist policy; and second, tarikats tend to carry 
in Turkey; Adil Ozdemir and Kenneth Frank, Visible Islam in Modern Turkey; and Sami Zubaida, `Turkish 
Islam and national identity', p. 12. 
`Tarikats' is an Anglicisation of the Turkish plural of tarikat: tarikatlar. 
$ See Yildiz Atasoy, `Islamic Revivalism and the Nation-State Project: Competing claims for modernity' 
[accessed online]. The ulema are a community of religious scholars. 
9 This applies to tarikats in general, but particularly to the Naksibendi and the Nurcus. [accessed online] 
10 See A. Ozdemir and K. Frank, Visible Islam in Modern Turkey, p. 68. 
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out much of their activity through legally constituted foundations or individuals (derneks 
or, associations, and vakifs, trusts, are especially common means through which tarikats 
organize themselves nationally and internationally). Furthermore, certain groups deny 
the term `tarikat' altogether, though they are widely recognised as such''. 
Religious groups vary substantially in their organizational principles, traditions, 
and degree of politicisation. Some reflect traditional forms of Sufi mysticism more 
clearly, and are best known for their particular rituals which become tourist attractions 
during their festival seasons (the Bektashi for instance, and the Mevlevi with their 
`whirling dervishes' 12). The Alevi, (or, Alawites), are an especially important religious 
order in Turkey. In their comparatively liberal interpretation of Islam, they are different 
enough from many Muslims to be considered outside orthodox Islam. This difference 
has historically placed them in social and political tension against the majority Sunni 
Muslims. It has also led them to call for a more radical secularism in Turkey, as under 
the current policy Sunni Muslims are favoured. Alevis are thus politically opposed to the 
Islamist political parties, which also primarily reflect Sunni Muslim interests. Rather, 
Alevis have stood out for their tendency towards socialism and communism. Besides 
their tensions with Sunni Muslims, much debate surrounds the Alevis in terms of their 
relations with the state: Alevis complain that they are not adequately represented under 
11 See D. Shankland, Islam and Society in Turkey, p. 63. 
12 Both the Bektashi and the Mevlevi do, however, have a history of politicisation. The Bektashi order, 
according to Eric Ztircher's historical study, seems to have supported the revolutionary and secularist 
Committee of Union and Progress of the Young Turks, as well as the Anatolian resistance movement. 
Meanwhile, the Mevlevi had contributed forces during the First World War. See E. Zürcher, Turkey: a 
Modern History, p. 200. 
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the current secularist policy, which places organised religion under the direction of the 
state 13 
The Naksibendis are one of the largest and most politicised of tarikats. Members 
of the Naskibendi order had led both the anti-constitutionalist uprising in 1909, and the 
Kurdish rebellion of 1925. While there have certainly been periods of intense tension 
between the Kemalist elite and tarikats in general, a close cooperation between the 
Naksibendis and the state-albeit with preservation of their differences-has persisted 
throughout Turkish history. For instance, the Naksibendi religious orders have promoted 
national economic development strategies with reference to Islamic ideology, continually 
trying to find a balance between economic and political modernisation, on the one hand, 
and adoption of policies contrary to their religious principles, on the other. Sheik 
Mehmet Zaid Kotku is an example of a Naksibendi leader who, motivated by a 
disapproval of western-imposed economic development strategy based on mass 
consumerism, actively strove for the development of a nationalized industrial sector. As 
a result, his followers in the State Planning Organisation began to formulate strategies for 
heavy industrialization in Turkey. With close ties to Necmettin Erbakan14, Kotku's 
encouraging of the latter to establish a model Islamic industrial plant led to the founding 
13 See A. Ozdemir and K. Frank, Visible Islam in Modern Turkey, p. 71. The efforts of Alevis to 
communicate with EU officials about their status in Turkey drew a great deal of national media attention 
and criticism from the secular state. Their cultural, social and religious differences from mainstream 
Turkey make Alevis a minority group, but the intense sensitivity in Turkey over the question of `minority 
status' precludes the state from granting Alevis special treatment. This sensitivity is often discussed with 
reference to the `Sevres Syndrome'. The Sevres Treaty of 1920 divided much of what is now Turkey 
among European powers, and remains high in contemporary Turkish consciousness as a humiliating treaty 
and a symbol of `external threats' to Turkish national unity and sovereignty. Thus, the term `Sevres 
Syndrome' refers to a prevalent fear in Turkey of any perceived threats to national unity and sovereignty. 
The Treaty of Lausanne, signed in July 1923, reconfigured Turkey's borders and cancelled the Sevres 
Treaty. See Hakan Yavuz, `Towards an Islamic liberalism: the Nurcu movement and Fethullah Gulen', for 
references to Turkish-language analyses of how the state uses the memory of the Sevres Treaty. 
14 A leader in Turkish political Islam, to whom we will pay considerable attention below and in chapter six. 
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of a national irrigation pump factory's. A more visible link between the Turkish State 
and the Naksibendi order, however, lies in the group's public affiliations with former 
Prime Minister Turgut Ozal and his family. The symbol of his political party 
(Motherland Party, ANAP) -- the bee -- was taken from the Mormons, whom they held as 
an example of maintaining faith in a secular world. One of the most frequently cited 
examples of Ozal's closeness to the Naksibendi brotherhood is his issuance of a decree to 
re-open the cemetery of the historic Sulemaniye Mosque, so that his mother could be 
buried next to a renowned Naksibendi leader. 
The Nurcu are a large set of tarikats in Turkey today16. The name comes from 
their doctrine of Nur (Light), but they often refer to themselves as followers, readers, or 
the disciples of the writings of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi17. Nursi was a member of the 
modernist wing of the Naksibendi order in the early 1900's, and founded the Nurcu 
movement in the 1930s18. He devoted his teachings to the interpretation of Koranic 
revelation, aiming to reconcile Islam with modernity by demonstrating that knowledge 
generated by the natural sciences is present in the Koran. Nursi was highly critical of 
15 The political history of the Naksibendi is drawn from Atasoy's study, `Islamic revivalism and the nation- 
state project: competing claims for modernity' [accessed online]. 
16 They claim not to be a tarikat, however, and have no initiation process or formal relationship between 
sheik and follower. These characteristics help them avoid the condemnation of the state on the one hand, 
and the possible accusations of heresy from orthodox believers on the other. They also help Nurcus remain 
closer to everyday social life as a sort of midpoint between the traditional tarikat and the broader Islamic 
community. See D. Shankland, Islam and Society in Turkey, p. 68. 
17 Serif Mardin's Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: the case of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, is 
one of the most authoritative accounts of the Nursi's life and principles. See also Jacob Landau, Politics 
and Islam: the National Salvation Party in Turkey, p. 8; and A. Ozdemir and K. Frank, Visible Islam in 
Modern Turkey, p. 69. Alternative spellings of the name include `Sait' and `Sayyid'; Nursi was called 
`Bediuzzaman', which means `Marvel of the Times'. See E. Zurcher, Turkey: a Modern History, p. 201. 
IS Nursi was active in the counter-revolution of the Young Turks in 1909, and supported the national 
resistance movement in 1923, though warning against its secularist tendencies. Nursi was arrested and 
tried several times for alleged political use of religion (though he was not directly involved in political 
activity). His writings were banned during the Kemalist period, but were hand-copied by his followers, 
thus securing the movement's continuation to the present day. See E. Zurcher, Turkey: a Modern History, 
p. 201. 
170 
Western civilization, but did not reject the concept of modernity per se, as a nation-state 
and an economic development project. Rather, the Nurcu movement developed into a 
political protest against the specifically Kemalist modernity project. The aims set out by 
Nursi for the Muslim believer, according to one interpretation, are as follows: 1) people 
must lead their lives in such a way as to strengthen faith; 2) when they become 
sufficiently strong, they must apply the sharia (or, Islamic law); and 3) they should aim 
eventually for the unification of the Islamic world. The second principle is especially 
crucial, in terms of tensions between Islamists and the secular state: the gradualness 
implied is significant in that `it permits [Nursi's] supporters to pursue the conventional 
outlets of Islamic activity, to deny that they are advocating the implementation of the 
sharia now, whilst at the same time hoping that ultimately success will be 
forthcoming"9. Much of the contemporary strict secularist trend is based upon reference 
to this principle. That is, a belief that regardless of the recent pro-western and pro- 
democracy pronouncements and activities of such groups, their final aims are to render 
Turkey an Islamic state and to implement the sharia. These aims, it is feared, will be 
realised if and when such groups rise to political power. 
Of the dozen or so Nurcu groups, the most widespread is that headed by Fethullah 
Gulen (or, the Fethullanci). Gulen, like Nursi, is very prolific, and in his works seeks to 
reconcile modernity with tradition, and science with religion. Unlike the Nurcu 
movement however, Gulen's community stresses the state-centric Turkish nationalism, 
the free market, and education. The Fethullah Gulen community involves a complex web 
of educational institutions and business and media networks, and has founded more than 
19 See D. Shankland, Islam and Society in Turkey, p. 70. The Sharia is the body of rules regulating the 
conduct of the Muslim. The Turks came to spell the word as Seriat. See N. Berkes, The Development of 
Secularism in Turkey, p. 9 
171 
300 schools and seven universities in Turkey and abroad. The group owns a scientific 
monthly, an environment-related magazine, a theological journal, a weekly magazine, a 
daily newspaper, an English-language religious publication, a television channel and a 
radio station. The community also controls one of the fastest growing financial 
institutions in Turkey, and its educational activities are supported by ISHAD, an 
influential businessmen's group 20 
In the 1990's Gulen's influence grew considerably, with his activities in the 
financial sector yielding contact with political figures to such a degree that one specialist 
on Islamism in Turkey identifies Gulen as an unofficial part of a government-inspired 
initiative to expand Turkish influence in the Turkic states (because the government aided 
Gulen in his establishment of a chain of high schools in those countries)21. A close 
relationship between Gulen and the state also has to do with the latter's open criticism of 
political Islam in general, and of the Refah and Fazilet political parties in particular22. It 
may be the relatively positive attitude of certain ranks within the Turkish government 
towards Gulen which led to what many see as an infiltration by Gulen's followers of 
segments of the Turkish bureaucracy. Harsh judgments by secular elites that Gulen's 
activities within the Turkish state and abroad are `reactionary' and aimed at `undermining 
the secular state' culminated in a campaign launched against Gulen by the state- 
dominated media on 21st June 1999, and eventually to his warrant for arrest in August of 
200023. The charge against Gulen was for `inciting his followers to overthrow the secular 
20 See H. Yavuz, `Towards an Islamic liberalism: the Nurcu movement and Fetullah Gulen', pp. 595-598. 
21 D. Shankland, Islam and Society in Turkey, p. 84. 
22 `Welfare' and `Virtue' parties, respectively. See below for more information on each of these parties. 
23 See H. Yavuz, `Towards an Islamic liberalism', p. 604-605 for criticism from other Nurcu groups as well. 
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government' (in legal terms, violations of Turkish Penal Code Articles 312 and 313)24. 
This move coincided with the NSC-led efforts to purge the bureaucracy of 
`reactionaries', and is often treated as a `continuation of the February 28th process' (see 
below) 25. 
Again, the aforementioned tarikats vary in degree of politicisation, as do even 
sects and individuals within each tarikat. Accordingly, some may be viewed as 
expressions of Islam, and others more explicitly of Islamism. In turning our attention to 
political Islam in Turkey, however, we narrow our focus specifically to Islamism. 
According to one interpretation, the succession of four Islamist political parties in 
Turkey-centred for the most part on the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan-can be 
considered `quasi-tarikat': many of the parties' members have displayed the `tarikat 
mentality' toward the leader26. However, the Islamist political parties pitched their 
appeal to citizens at large and not to the religious orders as such; several tarikats have 
supported political parties that are explicitly secular in their programs27. (These political 
formations will be discussed thoroughly in the next section and in the following chapter). 
24 See Douglas Frantz, `Turkey assails a revered Islamic moderate'. 
25 For more on Gulen, see B. Aras and O. Caha, `Fethullah Gulen and his liberal "Turkish Islam" 
movement'. 
26 A. Ozdemir and K. Frank, Visible Islam in Modern Turkey, p. 74. 
27 According to Ozdemir and Frank (ibid), this is `likely because they saw their survival in compromising 
with the ruling powers'. In general, Alevis and Bektashis have tended to back the secular-left parties as 
better means to support their own existence, and the religious orders closer to Sunni Islam have tended to 
support the secular-right parties to further their own aims. `It could also be put the other way around', these 
scholars argue: `the secular-left politicians have bargained with, or needed, or used the Bektashi-Alevi 
groups to gain votes or stay in power, and the secular-right have done the same mainly with the Sunni 
religious orders' (p. 75). Exceptions include the `Community of Iskender Pasa', the principal branch of the 
Naksibendi, which constituted Refah's (see below) largest electoral support (see Rusen Cakir, `Les 
movements islamistes Turcs et l'Europe', p. 19) ; also, both the Naksibendi and the Nurcu formed a large 
part of the support base of the Islamist National Salvation Party (NSP; see below). 
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Today, in addition to the political level, a wide range of religious activity exists in 
the social and economic spheres as well28. The cemaat (Islamic communities formed 
around various sects) provide a strong social base for practicing Muslims. A prominent 
group of Muslim intellectuals act as influential opinion-leaders for Turkish Muslims, with 
their publications' adoption of western trends of thought, and their contributions to 
Islamist journals and newspapers. Meanwhile, religious orders in Turkey run schools, 
radio and TV stations, they publish newspapers, stage rallies and conferences, and 
actively recruit among university students. Politicians now openly attend public meetings 
organized by the tarikats, court their leaders and members for support and votes, and 
appear in their media29. Islamic businesses have thrived, and MUSIAD (Independent 
Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association) now acts as a network for many small and 
medium-sized enterprises30. There are also several Islamist trade unions, professional 
associations, and chambers of commerce. 
Secularism and laicism 
Secularism in Turkey has a distinctive and chequered history. As noted in chapter 
two, secularism may be considered an ideology, or a doctrine denoting a negative attitude 
to religion. The form of secularism launched by Mustafa Kemal is more precisely called 
28 For a thorough analysis of early expansion of Islamist activities, see Jacob Landau, Politics and Islam: 
the National Salvation Party in Turkey, especially pp. 7-8. See also M. Heper, `Islam, polity and society in 
Turkey: a Middle Eastern Perspective'. 
29 See A. Ozdemir and K. Frank, Visible Islam in Modern Turkey, p. 69. 
30 MUSIAD is widely considered a Muslim equivalent of TUSIAD, the Turkish Industrialists' and 
Businessmen's Association. The 'M' in the title is often assumed to mean `Muslim', but actually stands for 
`Independent'. MUSIAD was founded in May 1990, with the aim to create an `Islamic economic system' 
as an alternative to the existing `capitalist system' in Turkey. See Nilufer Narli, `The rise of the Islamist 
movement in Turkey'. 
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laicism and, as Andrew Davidson notes, `a limited, inconsistent, and ambivalent form of 
laicism'31. Attention to the etymology of these terms helps us to understand the 
distinction between them. The word secular is derived from the Latin saeculum or 
temporal world, in contra-distinction to laicism, from the Greek laos or popular, 
demarcating the temporal from the clerical32 . Turkish secularism is inspired by the 
French laicite, but there are critical differences between the French and Turkish versions 
of secularism33. In Turkey, the emphasis has been less on the creation of a temporal, 
worldly society and more on the popular or lay, as opposed to clerical, leadership. 
Religious affairs in Turkey are regulated by, rather than separated from, the state, and the 
state is not impartial towards all confessional groups (as is claimed to be the case, at least, 
in France): Sunni Islam remains implicitly the state religion 34 
As Niyazi Berkes explains in his highly acclaimed study The Development of 
Secularism in Turkey, in non-Christian contexts the tension surrounding secularism is not 
necessarily between religious and temporal spheres (as in Christendom), but between 
traditional and progressive forces35. Mustafa Kemal's vision was one of progress, and he 
sought to achieve progress through the domination of religious institutions by the state 
(rather than a disengagement of religious and state institutions). Progress would be 
31 A. Davidson, `Turkey, a "secular" state? The challenge of description', p. 332. The term for laicism in 
Turkish is laiklik. Davidson argues that, because in Turkey laiklik did not remove religion from the state, it 
should be considered `a form of laicism, not secularism' (p. 336). 
32 N. Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, p. 5. 
33 For more on the distinctions between secularism in Turkey and France, see J-P. Burdy and J. Marcou, 
'Laicite/Laiklik: Introduction' (the article is an introduction to a Cemoti volume entitled 'LaYcitd(s): 
Actualitd et problemes de la lalcitd en France et en Turquie'). 
34 See N. Gole, `Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: the making of elites and counter-elites', pp. 48-9. 
According to Gole, `It is only on the issue of taking religion out of the public sphere that French and 
Turkish secularism are similar'. She also raises the example of debates in both Turkey and France over the 
`headscarf issue' (the wearing of the headscarf by Muslim women in public places, particularly in schools) 
as a significant point in common between the two countries in terms of their versions of secularism. For 
more on the headscarf issue, see E. Ozdalga, The Veiling Issue, Official Secularism and Popular Islam in 
Modern Turkey. 
35 N. Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, pp. 3-4. 
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achieved through a reform of the religious institutions. However, Kemalist secularist 
policy (particularly as pursued after his death) comprised anti-Islamic features and 
prescribed the administration of religious institutions by the state36. Thus, the conflict 
between tradition and the forces of change centred not on a division between the religious 
and temporal spheres, but on a reaction to domination of the former by the latter. 
It is important to note the pre-history to the Kemalist secularist reforms. Though 
our focus begins with those introduced by the Kemalist elite, substantial secularist 
reforms had been initiated under the Ottoman Empire during the 18th and 19`" centuries37. 
Thus, the aforementioned conflict between tradition and forces of change has roots in the 
Ottoman period-roots which yielded significant legacies in contemporary Turkish 
society. The Tanzimat period especially (1839-1876) ushered in significant reforms 
which limited religious traditions. The sharia was not abolished completely but was 
replaced by secular law in all domains save family law; between 1865 and 1888, the legal 
system was codified along European lines. There also took place, in this period, an 
overhaul of the educational system in terms of its secularisation and the introduction of 
explicitly secular schools modelled on the French lycees. According to Erik Zurcher, the 
tanzimat reforms can be viewed as a result of both external pressure and `internal desire 
for reform and genuine belief that the empire could only be saved through European-style 
36 See Metin Heper, `Islam, polity and society in Turkey: a Middle Eastern perspective', p. 352. There is a 
great deal of intellectual debate over the true intentions of Mustafa Kemal's secularist policies and the 
extent to which they were actually `anti-religious'. This debate is addressed most thoroughly in the work of 
Andrew Davidson (e. g., Secularism and revivalism in Turkey, and `Turkey, a "secular" state? The 
challenge of description'). Davidson basically argues that Mustafa Kemal's focus was more on reforming 
Islam rather than controlling or suppressing it; but he concedes that the implementation of Kemalist 
secularist policies in subsequent decades took anti-religious dimensions. 
37 The limited scope of this chapter does not allow for a thorough history of secularist reforms under the 
Ottoman Empire. See Justin McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks: an Introductory History to 1923, for full 
accounts of the Nizam-I Cedid reforms of 1789 and of the Tanzimat reforms beginning in 1839, in 
particular. 
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reform'38. Many of the reforms had to do with the position of the Christian minorities of 
the Empire and were prompted by pressure applied by European powers for 
improvements in the position of these communities39. For those supporting traditional 
(religious) institutions, the secularist reforms were identified with external or foreign 
pressure and were considered particularly hostile to religion. Thus, we have as legacies 
of this period the development of a grassroots-level antagonism between secularist and 
religious tendencies, and a correlation of secularism with foreign (especially western) 
influence, and threats to religious identity. (The latter can especially be understood as a 
precursor to anti-western and anti-European sentiment amongst Turkish Islamists. ) 
These antagonistic tendencies continued with the Kemalist reforms. Although 
Mustafa Kemal's westernisation project was embraced by the urban elite, Islam remained 
the dominant rural force. The radical secularism he introduced significantly affected the 
polity: first, it gave rise to violent reactionary movements particularly during the early 
years of the Republic; second, it increased the gap between elite and popular culturesao 
Meanwhile the inconsistencies in secularist policy in the decades following Mustafa 
Kemal's death paved the way for the growth of Islamism. 
What follows here is not so much a history of Turkish secularism, per se, but of 
the fluctuating relationship between secularism and Islamism resulting from the 
aforementioned inconsistencies in secularist policy. We may identify four watershed 
periods in this relationship: Mustafa Kemal's secularist reforms; the transition to 
democracy and politicisation of Islam; the post-1980 military coup and the `Turkish- 
Islamic Synthesis'; and the February 28th process. Closely intertwined with these 
38 See E. Zurcher, Turkey: a Modern History, p. 59. 
391bid, pp. 58-65. 
40 See N. Gole, `Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: the making of elites and counter-elites', p. 52. 
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political developments are other dimensions crucial to the relationship between Islamism 
and secularism: changes in education policies; transformations related to globalisation, 
particularly in the field of economics; and migration trends in Turkey. 
Mustafa Kemal's secularist reforms 
The most definitive secularist measures in Turkish history are those advanced by 
Mustafa Kemal, revolutionary in their vastness and abruptness. The Sultanate was 
abolished in 1922, and the Turkish Republic was declared in 1923. Under Mustafa 
Kemal's direction, the Caliphate was eradicated in 1924. That same year religious courts 
were closed, and the ministry of sharia and of religious foundations was shut down and 
replaced by the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet)41. Diyanet assumed authority 
over a broad range of religious activity in Turkey, including the strict preparation of the 
sermon read at the Friday prayer in mosques across Turkey; it grew to be one of the 
largest and best-financed government departments42. In 1928 the constitutional provision 
which declared `The religion of the Turkish State is Islam' was deleted. Finally, in 1937, 
`secularism' entered the constitution through an amendment declaring the state to be 
laik43. 
41 It should be noted that the creation and continued existence of the Diyanet, and the forced imposition of 
an `official' Turkish Islam which it represents, are the focus of intense debate over the `secular' nature of 
Turkey. Many liberal-minded elites and Islamists argue that Diyanet's existence and activities indicate that 
there is, in fact, no separation of religion from the state, but only domination of the former by the latter. 
42 See H. Yavuz, `Cleansing Islam from the public sphere'. According to Baskin Oran, in 1990 the Diyanet 
budget exceeded that of five combined ministries, and was 1.5 times larger than that of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. See B. Oran, `From nation to where in globalising Turkey? ', unpublished paper. 
43 See D. Shankland, Islam and Society in Turkey, p. 19, and N. Berkes, The Development of Secularism in 
Turkey, p. 479. 
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Religious education was especially targeted by Kemalist reforms. Religious 
schools (medresseh) were closed, and all schools became formally attached to the 
Ministry of National Education44. The Ministry was to oversee compulsory Lessons in 
Religion and Morals in public schools, and was ceded supervision over Imam-Hatip 
schools (religious high schools training mosque prayer leaders and preachers)45. There 
were twenty-nine Imam-Hatip schools in 1924; this number was reduced to two in 1932 
and the schools were closed in the same year 46 
Mustafa Kemal's regime also introduced the radical change of not using religion 
to mobilise the masses, as was the tendency during the War of Independence (1919-1923) 
to legitimise the national struggle carried out against the wishes of the sultan47. And, in 
spite of the active role of some tarikats in the national revolution, all religious 
brotherhoods were dissolved and banned. As Bernard Lewis notes, the great secularising 
reforms of that period were directed against the ulema (community of religious scholars), 
and not the tarikats, `but it soon became apparent that it was from the [tarikat leaders], 
not the ulema, that the most dangerous resistance to laicism would come'48. For, while 
the ulema were long accustomed to identifying their interests with those of the state, the 
tarikats were a much more diffuse force, often reflecting local particularism in opposition 
to a homogenising state49. The Kemalist intent was to replace the force of Islam with 
44 N. Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, p. 477. 
45 There is a great deal of debate surrounding Imam-Hatip schools, as their establishment and operation has 
variously been outlawed, encouraged, and limited. 
46 See B. Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey, p. 49 and B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern 
Turkey, p. 415. 
47 Mustafa Kemal sought and received the help of the clerics during the war of independence in an effort to 
mobilise the masses around the nationalists' goals, but this was a short-term tactical alliance. See 
B. Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey, p. 39. 
48 B. Lewis The Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 409-411. 
49 The ban on tarikats came in the same year of the Seyh Said Rebellion (a Kurdish revolt, named after its 
Naksibendi leader). 
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nationalism,, and this required a suppression of even `folk' Islam. In line with this 
objective, all religious personnel became part of the civil bureaucracy, religious literature 
was translated from Arabic into Turkish, and the use of Arabic in public acts such as the 
call to prayer (ezan) was forbidden. Further, public displays of religious observance were 
discouragedso 
Clearly, a crucial element in these reforms was `westernisation'. According to 
Binnaz Toprak, the Kemalist attack on Islam was rooted in an antagonism towards 
religious conservatism which, as defined by the Kemalist elite, equalled anti- 
westernisation: to secularise thus meant to westernise. Even the concept of nationalism 
was understood not in a national but in a western context: `the Turkish nation would exist 
not as a group of people shari ng a common past but as a group of people sharing a 
common future among the civilised nations of the West'51. The Kemalist regime thus 
sought to combat the only competing ideological source for mass mobilisation: Islam. 
This project entailed not only containment of Islam, but efforts to reform the faith. 
National progress required rationalisation; accordingly, Islamic teaching was to be 
rendered compatible with western norms and institutions52. Implementation of this idea 
included such widespread changes as the replacing of the Arabic alphabet by the Latin 53 
A new Civil Code, based on the Swiss Civil Code, was adopted in place of the sharia in 
192654. The westernisation project extended even to the Turkish populations' dress: the 
fez (the traditional Ottoman headgear) was prohibited and replaced by the western-style 
50 M. Heper, `Islam, polity and society in Turkey: a Middle Eastern Perspective', p. 351. 
51 B. Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey, p. 38. 
52 S. Ayata, `Patronage, party and state: the politicisation of Islam in Turkey', p. 42. 
53 On November 3 1928, Mustafa Kemal passed a law which prohibited the use of the Arabic script in all 
public affairs after December 1 of the same year. See N. Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 
p. 476, and pp. 474-476 for popular reactions against this change. 
54 See E. Zurcher, Turkey: a Modern History, p. 195. 
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hat or cap55. Furthermore, the decree of 1935 established Sunday, instead of Friday, as 
the official day of rest 56 
The legacy of Kemalist reforms evolved into an ideology in its own right. As 
Metin Heper puts it, `Ataturkism itself became a transcendent goal. Ataturk's message 
was "bureaucratised"'57. Again, Kemalist policy after Ataturk carried especially anti- 
religious features: reforms were aimed specifically to weaken the power of religious 
functionaries, leaders and communities. Toprak argues that the reforms had little to do 
with modernisation per se: rather, `they were considered essential... because they gave 
momentum to the basic aim of the revolution, i. e. to transform Turkish society from an 
Islamic into a Western setting'58. Meanwhile, the promotion of new values, manners, and 
lifestyles widened the cultural gap between the masses and the newly westernized urban 
classes. 
Writing in 1952, Lewis Thomas observes that `Ataturk's militant laicism had 
much less effect upon peasant Islam, upon the aggregate way of life of the large majority 
of the population which he tried to transform into a modern nation, than is usually 
supposed or was ever officially admitted'59. According to Lewis, the programme of 
rapid, wholesale, and forced westernisation was, in reality, only secondarily concerned 
with the `peasant' mass: `peasant Islam was thus allowed to continue quietly very much 
as it always had'60. Likewise, Fuat Keyman notes that, whilst Islam was excluded as the 
55 The prohibition of the wearing of the fez met with marked resistance, as the western-style hat was 
considered a symbol of Christian Europe. Nearly 7,500 Turks were arrested and 660 executed for 
resistance to this reform and to the closing of religious shrines and dervish convents. See E. Zurcher, 
Turkey: a Modern History, pp. 180-81. 
56 See E. Zurcher, ibid, p. 195. 
57 M. Heper, `Islam, polity and society in Turkey: a Middle Eastern Perspective', p. 352. 
58 B. Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey, p. 39. 
59 See L. Thomas, `Recent developments in Turkish Islam', p. 26. 
60 Ibid, p. 26. 
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`Other' of the national identity in formation, it remained a `symbolic' system which 
provided meaning to human existence and thus continued to form the bases of both 
individual and community identity61. 
The transition to democracy 
The transition to democracy and to a multi-party system in 1946, however, 
ushered in new dimensions in the country's secularisation process. The novel 
competition of political parties brought religion to the fore, as rival candidates began to 
tailor their platforms to attract the religious vote: `Small-town politicians discovered that 
yielding to and even provoking the religious demands of the masses was most 
rewarding'62. For nearly four decades to follow, a succession of governments introduced 
extensive changes to the relationship between religion and the state. This trend was 
visible in policy modifications with regards to Islam. For instance, the ezan (call to 
prayer) in Arabic was reinstated (and adopted overnight in every mosque in Turkey)63. In 
1948 Imam-Hatip courses started again in ten cities, and by 1951, seven-year Imam-Hatip 
schools were reopened with four years of grammar school and three years secondary 
school64. For the first time in Turkish history, the schools ceased to be categorized as 
`vocational schools' so that its graduates could enter all branches of university. This 
move, according to Baskin Oran, was to prove to be the most important in time, because 
61 See F. Keyman, `On the relation between global modernity and nationalism: the crisis of hegemony and 
the rise of (Islamic) identity in Turkey', pp. 106-7. 
62 Baskin Oran, `From nation to where in globalising Turkey? ', unpublished paper. See also Howard Reed, 
`The revival of Islam in secular Turkey'. 
63 This change took place in 1950, and continues to the present day. See E. Zurcher, Turkey: a Modern 
History, p. 244. 
64 By 1960 there were twenty Iman-Hatip schools, and seventy by 1970. See B. Oran, `From nation to 
where in globalising Turkey? ', unpublished paper. 
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it marked the beginning of the re-creation of the religious `counter-elite'. The role played 
by changes in education policy cannot be overemphasized: many graduates of religious 
schools later entered politics in the 1980's and 1990's6s 
In addition to relaxation of secularist policies in appeals to religiously-inclined 
voters, we have, since the transition to democracy and the multi-party system, the 
opening of the political sphere to a vast network of Islamic organisations: `the [ruling 
parties'] relations with organised religious groups... included symbiotic relations, 
temporary alliances, and long-term affiliations'66. Islamist groups formed covert and 
overt alliances with the ruling centre-ri ght Democratic Party in particular (1950-60), led 
by Adrian Menderes. The party made no change to the functions of Diyanet (i. e., to the 
regulation of religious institutions by the state), but it did accept the existence of such 
religious organisations as the brotherhoods, and effectively legitimised them by receiving 
the support of the Nurcu movement in elections. Competition between the Democratic 
Party (DP) and the Kemalist Republican People's Party (RPP) was intense, and in the 
context of the 1954 elections, Menderes' vulnerability yielded a tightening of government 
control over the press and universities and increased appeal to religious sentiment. This 
laid the victorious DP open to the accusation that it had used religion for political 
purposes and thus jeopardized the secularist principles of the state. Many Turkish 
intellectuals interpreted the increased prominence of Islam in everyday life as a 
dangerous resurgence of Islam, and the Kemalist elite perceived a threat to the cultural 
hegemony which had been established on the basis of secularist principles. Tension 
between Menderes and the military in particular was heightened when, in 1958, nine 
65 Tayyip Erdogan, the current leader of AKP, is a prime example. 
66 S, Ayata, `Patronage, party and state: the politicisation of Islam in Turkey', p. 44. 
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army officers were arrested for plotting against the government. Furthermore, in April of 
1960 Menderes established a committee to investigate the activities of the opposition, 
including possible links between the RPP and the army. The following month, one week 
after Menderes announced that the investigation committee would report its findings 
shortly, the military staged a coup which toppled the Democratic Party government. The 
majority of its MPs were imprisoned, and Menderes, together with his two close 
companions, was executed67. 
A military-led `National Unity Committee' governed the country for one year 
before the return to democratic politics68. The most significant political formation in this 
period was the Justice Party which, led by Suleyman Demirel, was in power between 
1965 and 1971. The Justice Party, even more so than the Democratic party, established 
direct and lasting relationships with various Islamic groups, communities and leaders69 
Since the institution of the multi-party system, Islamists had either formed conservative 
factions in a centre-right party or had remained underground. But in 1970 Necmettin 
Erbakan defected from the Justice Party and formed the first openly Islamic political 
party -- the National Order Party (NOP)70. The party was closed in the military coup of 
May 1971, on the grounds that it violated the principles of laicism. The party's closure 
was part of a broader military intervention designed especially to combat terrorism and 
67 See E. Zurcher, Turkey: a Modern History, pp. 231-252, for a thorough history of the Democratic Party's 
rule. 
68 The NUP was originally led by General Cemal Gursel but effectively run by Colonel Alpaslan Turkes. 
Turkes later became leader of the National Action Party (MHP), which is currently led by Devlet Bahceli 
and forms part of the governing coalition of Turkey. 
69 See S. Ayata, `Patronage, party and state: the politicisation of Islam in Turkey', p. 44. 
70 The NOP's support base was comprised of religiously conservative Sunnis in Anatolian cities, small 
traders and artisans (esnaf) of the frustrated periphery and religiously conservative people who were 
informal members of outlawed religious orders. 
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rising leftist tendencies in the country (in April martial law had been declared in 11 
provinces and all big cities, and was continually renewed for the following two years)71. 
The Islamist National Salvation Party (NSP) was then formed in October 1972. 
The party fared surprisingly well in the 1973 general elections, not least because of the 
support it enjoyed from the covert network of the Naksibendi and the Nurcu. The party 
became a coalition partner in successive governments. This trend of political Islamist 
growth was interrupted, however, by the rising antagonism between radical right and 
radical left factions in the late 1970's. Violent clashes verging on civil war provoked the 
12 September 1980 `bloodless coup' of the armed forces, led by General Kenan Evren. 
The leading parties, including the NSP, were banned from political activity72. A new 
constitution was drafted by the military and approved by referendum in 1982. 
The growth of Islamic political activity since the introduction of the multi-party 
system caused uneasiness amongst secularist elites in Turkey. As early as 1952, Lewis 
Thomas made the following observation: 
the lower-class voter-the peasant-has begun to make his voice more 
heard. He now must be appealed to directly by candidates as never was 
true before.. . This is 
fairly to be called a ticklish matter... [but] it is 
unfounded. to assume that Anatolia's lower classes are moving back 
toward traditional Islam.. . Peasant Islam 
is a vital component in the lives 
of the backward majority of Turkey's citizens, but it is not therefore a 
danger to the Turkish Republic73. 
Likewise, two years later Howard Reed writes that 
[s]ince they assumed power in 1950, [political] leaders have appeared 
uncertain how to deal with the resurgence of popular Islam, particularly 
among the peasants, where the decisive voting power lies. Their most 
consistent policy has been to encourage a straightforward, liberal program 
71 See E. Zurcher, Turkey: a Modern History, p. 272. 
72 N. Narli, `The rise of the Islamist movement in Turkey'. [accessed online] 
73 L. Thomas, `Recent developments in Turkish Islam', pp. 26-7,31. 
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of religious education. Since mid-1952, there has been a gradual 
hardening in their attitude toward Islamic manifestations at variance with 
their interpretation of republican Turkish laws and enlightened public 
opinion. This trend has been supported by business and army leaders who 
have expressed concern over the reactionary Muslim undertow74. 
We have seen in this period (1946-1980), a `double discourse' transmitted by the Turkish 
state elites: on the one hand, an effort to sustain a secularist ideology (mainly through the 
education system), and on the other an effort to win short-term political gains by 
accommodating Islamic interests75. Joseph Szyliowicz interprets this discourse as mainly 
a matter of utilisation of Islam for the advancement of specific goals, which necessarily 
entailed making various concessions to the devout voter. These concessions, he 
contends, did much to promote democratic processes by permitting the integration of 
peripheral groups into the polity. But, Szyliowicz notes, `At the same time, they created 
an environment wherein Islamist ideologues could thrive... '76. 
The Turkish-Islamic synthesis 
It is in the post-1980 coup period that we have our next phase of extreme 
fluctuation in secularist policy. Central to this fluctuation is the `Turkish-Islamic 
synthesis', which became a fundamental aspect of military-led state ideology in the 80's. 
The Turkish-Islamic synthesis was first developed in the 1960's by a group of Turkish 
intellectuals -- `the Intellectual's Hearth'. The group was established in reaction to the 
1968 student movement and as an effort to unite the Turkish right and thus to integrate 
74 The political leaders to which he refers are those of the Democratic Party, in power at that time. See 
H. Reed, `The Revival of Islam in secular Turkey', p. 281. 
75 U. C. Sakallioglu, `Parameters and strategies of Islam-State interaction in Republican Turkey', p. 231. 
761bid, p. 231. 
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the Islamists and the nationalists against, in particular, communism. The Hearth's first 
success was in developing dialogue between the rightist parties, which led to the 
`National Front' governments of the 1970's. The cure for social unrest and political 
instability, according to this ideology, was the strengthening of the `national culture', the 
essence of which was religion. The promotion of the `national culture' thus required a 
recreation of the Islamic umma, a community of believers united by the same faith, with 
the aim of a renewed sense of community to consolidate social unity and thus eliminate 
the conflict of opposing ideology. The idea involved a return to cultural roots based on 
unity in a faith providing common moral principles, including respect of state authority. 
Though the group began as a forum for discussion without political ambitions, members 
of the Intellectual's Hearth began to hold positions within the government and state 
bourgeoisie and were thus able to translate their ideals into the official state ideology and, 
eventually, into legislation and policies of the post-1980 governments77. 
We see then, under the influence of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, an even more 
radical reversal of secularist policies. Article 124 of the generals' 1982 Constitution 
transformed the Turkish Historical Agency and the Turkish Linguistic Society into 
official agencies to propagate the ideology of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Article 24 
made religious lessons compulsory throughout high school (for the first time in Turkish 
history). Mosques were opened in nearly every state institution, as well as in the Grand 
National Assembly. Meanwhile, General Kenan Evren (who eventually became 
President), recited several verses of the Koran in his public speeches. Pamphlets 
containing Koranic verses or sayings of Prophet Mohammad (hadith) which 
77 Information on the `Turkish-Islamic synthesis' is drawn mainly from Binnaz Toprak's, `Religion as state 
ideology in a secular setting: the Turkish-Islamic synthesis'. 
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recommended obedience to public authority were dropped from military planes in 
Kurdish-populated areas; they were also frequently broadcast from radio and television 
channels. Even more controversially, in their fight against the PKK78, military leaders 
backed the religious fundamentalist Kurdish organisation, Hezbollah79. 
Islam was considered by the military leaders as a means to integrate society and 
as a source of morality and ethical behaviour which would protect Turks (and the youth 
especially) from such trends and communism and Khomeinism, as well as the anarchy 
which prevailed in Turkey in the 1970's80. The new emphasis on national religion was 
also to buttress official Islam against the teachings of the tarikats. As Szyliowicz notes, 
however, the post-1980 period should not be viewed as a radical change to the state's 
secular orientation: whilst the secularist policies did change significantly, the military 
leaders remained committed to Kemalist principles: he emphasises that the state simply 
used Islam for its specific needs during that period. For example, whilst religious 
education was given greater emphasis, the school courses introduced by the military 
focused on Mustafa Kemal far more than before and explicitly drew links between his 
policies and Islamic precepts81. According to Fuat Keyman, however, this military effort 
to maintain a prevalence of secularist principles whilst utilising Islam was not, in the end, 
successful: `by incorporating Islamic discourse and implicitly taking the umma as its 
model of social organisation, and also by abandoning the radical secularism of the early 
republic to secure its popular support ... the post-1980 military regime weakened the 
'$ Kurdistan Workers' Party. 
79 See B. Oran, `From nation to where in globalising Turkey? ', unpublished paper. 
80 J. Szyliowicz, `Religion, politics and democracy in Turkey', p. 197. 
81 Ibid., p. 205. Szyliowicz also suggests that even the courses in the religious schools were aimed, during 
this period, at a socialisation of the students into the principles of secular nationalism. But he concedes that 
there has not been sufficient research conducted on this subject. 
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very conditions of existence of Kemalist nationalism and the republican state'82. In other 
words, though the use of Islam was considered by the regime to be a short-term strategy, 
it led to `unintended consequences' such as a new prevalence of Islamic organisations 
within both state and society (i. e., the formation of political Islam and the strengthening 
of tarikats through the latter's support of political Islam). 
Indeed, the post-1980 coup period and the Turkish-Islamic synthesis left lingering 
effects on Turkish politics. The first elections held after the junta were in 1983, when 
Turgut Ozal and his Motherland Party (ANAP) came to power. ANAP was a perhaps 
strange, but successful mixture of ideological currents: Ozal's party represented for its 
members both a serious focus on liberal economic policy (Ozal had been a successful 
manager in private industry in the 70's) and an open-mindedness towards Islamism 
(considering his close connections with the Naksibendi order, and the fact that his brother 
had been a leading member of the Islamist National Salvation Party)83. Both identities 
served him well in a period during which the fight against communism was a primary 
national and international concern. 
ANAP stands out as the only case in which Islamist elements became a major 
wing of a mainstream party 84. Ozal deliberately and almost alone chose each MP 
candidate from parliament before the 1983 general election, seeking a platform that 
would include politicians of diverse ideological persuasions. His alliances with religious 
groups enabled ANAP to establish a virtual monopoly on the religious vote. Thus during 
this period, the Naksibendis emerged as the single most important lobbying group in 
82 Fuat Keyman, `On the relation between global modernity and nationalism: the crisis of hegemony and 
the rise of (Islamic) identity in Turkey', pp. 111-112. 
83 E. Zurcher, Turkey: a Modern History, p. 297. 
84 S. Ayata, `Patronage, party and the state: the politicization of Islam in Turkey', p. 44. 
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politics. Ozal's export-led growth strategy necessitated an aggressive search for foreign 
customers who, in the 1980's, were found mainly in the Middle East. The Naksibendis, 
with links to the Gulf States, were expected to play a significant role in promoting 
Turkish exports to the region and maintaining steady oil supplies. Control over key 
positions in government and the bureaucracy enabled the well-organised Islamic 
networks to recruit their own members into civil service jobs, to divert public resources 
to Islamic activities and business, and to advance Islamic education and the training of 
new members and cadres. The Islamist faction within the party came to be called the 
`Holy Alliance'85. 
In addition to Ozal's influence on the increased politicisation of Islam, also 
deserving of attention is his influence on the rise of `Islamic Capital' in Turkey during 
and after his reign. `Islamic Capital' first rose to the fore in 1969 when Professor 
Necmettin Erbakan, also a staunch Naksibendi, made his entry into politics as the 
President of the Union of Chambers (the stronghold of small and medium business). 
Erbakan promoted a nationalistic `heavy industrial leap forward', and championed small 
and medium business against the internationalist discourse of Istanbul-based big 
business. `Islamic. Capital' flourished under Ozal's economic reforms. Banks from Iran 
and Saudi Arabia were allowed to operate in Turkey, and were endowed with certain 
privileges vis-ä-vis Turkish banks (these foreign banks were later accused of financing 
Islamist organisations). Also, businessmen from small and medium Anatolian towns 
began to increase in strength and number and subsequently entered the realm of foreign 
trade (which, until then, was limited to the large holding companies of Istanbul). These 
`Anatolian Tigers', as they came to be called, not only exerted an important pressure on 
S5 S. Ayata, ibid, pp. 44-45. 
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national politics through their organisation (MUSIAD; see above), but also began to 
finance Islamist organisations and student hostels, on condition that students staying there 
live a `true Islamic life'86. MUSIAD came to be considered a rival to the secular and 
politically influential TUSIAD, from which it differed through its principle that economic 
activity ought to conform to Islamic practice (such as refraining from profiting from 
interest, which is condemned in Islam)87. 
As with the role played by changes in education and economic policy, migration 
trends within Turkey are also closely intertwined with the rise in Islamism during this 
period. As Islamist supporters moved from provincial towns and villages to urban 
centres, they were more likely to gain access to formal education and opportunities for 
upward social mobility. Islamist groups catered to the needs of these migrants by 
providing food to the poor, scholarships and hostels to university students, a network to 
young graduates looking for jobs, and credit to shopkeepers, industrialists and merchants. 
Thus the late 1980's saw the emergence of a new urban middle class and business elite 
whose identities were strongly defined by their roots in comparatively religious, 
provincial towns. This new elite actively sought to assert their provincial identity and to 
preserve their values and traditions88. 
The effects of such migration trends on the rise of Islamism ought to be seen as 
interrelated with Ozal's influence through his economic and social policies. Together, 
these developments also encouraged the advance of the most powerful Islamist political 
party in Turkish history. The Refah Party was established in 1983 by Ali Turkmen, but 
86 B. Oran, `From nation to where in globalising Turkey? ', unpublished paper. 
87 See N. Narli, `The Tension between the center and peripheral economy and the rise of a counter business 
elite in Turkey'. TUSIAD stands for Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association. 
88 N. Narli, `The rise of the Islamist movement in Turkey'. [accessed online] 
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Erbakan became its leader after Ozal's lifting of the military-instituted ban on former 
politicians89. Refah's main slogan, `Just Order', proved to be very successful in the 
ongoing economic, social and political chaos of the 80's and 90's. Defined in Erbakan's 
green book, lust Economic Order, the slogan heralded a Turkey shaped by religious, and 
especially Islamic, civilisation. According to Baskin Oran, impoverished masses 
expected in Refah `a regime that would bring them both economic ease and peace of 
mind of the "Golden Past" that never was'90. The pitch was successful: in the 1987 
election, Refah gained 7.2% of the vote; 9.8% in the 1989 local elections; and, in alliance 
with the ultranationalist party (MHP), drew 16.7% of the votes in the 1991 national 
elections 91 
The February 28`h Process 
The rise of Refah to the premiership in the mid-1990's is discussed at length in 
the following chapter. Here we will address, rather, the dissolution of Refah, and the 
final watershed period in Islamist-secularist relations: the February 28th process of 1997. 
Tension had mounted between the secularist elite and Erbakan since the beginning of the 
latter's term in office in 1996, specifically because of his attempts to grant Islam a greater 
role in public life. Erbakan had proposed to lift the ban on the wearing of headscarves by 
female civil, servants in government offices. He also called for the building of mosques 
89 Ozal put the decision to a referendum in 1987, which lifted the ban by a narrow margin. See E. Zurcher, 
Turkey: a Modern History, p. 299. . 90 See B. Oran, `From nation to where in globalising Turkey? ', unpublished paper. 
9' N. Narli, `The rise of the Islamist movement in Turkey'. [accessed online] 
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in central Ankara and Istanbul in locations widely viewed as symbols of secularism92, 
and for changing working hours in government offices during the month of Ramadan93. 
Also, Erbakan's party openly called for a redefinition of secularism in Turkey- 
interpreted by many as an aim to reverse the policy of secularism altogether 94 . 
Refah's undemocratic stance on many issues began to upset secular public 
opinion. One form of reaction was in a manifest renaissance of Kemalist activity which 
had been practically dormant until around 1995. A great majority of educated people in 
large cities started to wear Ataturk badges, stick Kemalist slogans on their cars, organise 
large public demonstrations, and work in Kemalist associations95. Also, `secular civil 
society' groups began to wage a war against the rise of political Islam and to enlighten 
the public about the possible dangers involved in what they described as the `Iranisation 
of Turkey'. Secular women, who had established a number of associations and promoted 
informal networks to defend the advancement of equality among sexes, felt that Islamic 
fundamentalism placed their interests at risk. Likewise, members of the Alevi sect 
perceived the Islamist encroachment as a fundamental threat to their communal existence 
and identity. One highly innovative form of protest was the `Minute of Darkness for 
Enlightenment' campaign which lasted for several weeks: during this period, millions of 
families switched off their home lights every evening as a sign of protest against 
mounting religious reaction and corruption in government. With the so-called `Civilian 
Initiative', the country's trade union, small enterprise and business confederations 
92 J. Dorsey, `Turkish military "advice" reigns in Islamist Erbakan government'. [accessed online] 
93 K. Osman, `Turkish army dictates policy over role of Islam in society'. [accessed online] 
94 See A. Makovsky, `Fehim Adak: Erbakan seeks cooperation in America', an interview with Fehim Adak 
(Minister of State in Erbakan's ruling coalition), in which Adak stated that the aim of the Refah Party was 
to redefine secularism according to European models. [accessed online] 
95 B. Oran, `From nation to where in globalising Turkey? ', unpublished paper. 
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established a platform to adopt a common strategy of opposition against the rising 
fundamentalist threat96. Perhaps more politically consequential, though, was TUSIAD's 
publication of a very critical report in January 1997--called `Turkey's Democratisation 
Perspectives'--which demanded radical liberal reforms, including in particular the closing 
of the first three years of Imam Hatip schools97. 
But the most powerful response to the rise in Islamism represented in Refah came 
from the National Security Council (NSC). On February 28,1997, the NSC introduced a 
bill comprised of eighteen specific measures designed to curb Islamic `reactionaryism'. 
The NSC compelled a reluctant Erbakan to sign the bill, thus granting it force of law. In 
the `28 February 1997 Declaration', the NSC severely criticised the anti-secular 
atmosphere and asked the Refah government to take measures to stop the proliferation of 
Islamist cadres. Following Erbakan's signing of the document, the military gave a series 
of press briefings in which religious fundamentalism was declared the most dangerous 
enemy facing Turkey98. 
The eighteen measures mandated by the NSC may be seen to have cut at the heart 
of Refah's electoral support. The most important of these included the closing down of 
many of the country's 688 publicly run religious seminaries and Koranic courses (Refah 
officials conceded that it recruited many of its cadres and grassroots activists from these 
seminaries)99. The measures demanded that the government ensure all privately run 
religious courses were placed under the direct control of the Education Ministry. The 
96 S. Ayata, `Islam, civil society and the West', draft paper. 
9' B. Oran, `From nation to where in globalising Turkey? ', unpublished paper. 
98 B. Oran, ibid. 
99 Among the 14,000 seminary graduates active in Refah were prominent officials, including former 
Istanbul Mayor and current leader of the Justice and Development Party, Tayyip Erdogan. See Dorsey, 
`Turkish military "advice" reigns in Islamist Erbakan government'. [accessed online] 
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NSC asserted that, besides the 6,000 private religious courses running under the approval 
of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, there were thousands of other unlicensed courses 
being run. According to the NSC, the religious seminaries which were initially created to 
educate state employees for the operation of mosques had been turned into a political tool 
in the hands of successive right-wing governments seeking the backing of more 
conservative and religious rural voters. 
The most severe blow to Islamist religious education was in the National Security 
Council's demand that compulsory primary education be raised from five to eight years. 
The three-tier education system in effect until that time entailed five years of compulsory 
primary education followed by a non-compulsory three years of secondary schooling and 
another three years of high school. At the secondary school level, parents could choose 
between placing their children in vocational schools, general schools or religious 
seminaries. An eight-year system effectively denied them that choice, so that children 
could not attend religious seminaries for their secondary education. 
The National Security Council was especially sensitive to what seemed to be a 
strategic infiltration of government posts by Islamists. Refah ministers had replaced 
some 400 senior officials in their ministries with party sympathizers. Party officials were 
reportedly lobbying the foreign ministry to admit more graduates of the religious schools 
to the diplomatic corps. One Refah parliamentarian even went so far as to advocate that 
the military academies be opened to Imam-Hatip graduates (the military is the only 
institution which strictly bars these religious schools' graduates). A regularly scheduled 
rotation of over one thousand judges that autumn, implemented by the Refah-controlled 
Justice Ministry, was initially structured to move a disproportionate number of Turkey's 
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leading committed secularist judges out of major cities; only resistance by the Turkish 
Bar Association forced the Ministry to abandon this plan10°. Furthermore, in 1995 
Erbakan's parliamentary delegation sought to delete the constitutional article that 
proscribes legislation based on Islamic law101. These developments led to the belief that, 
were Erbakan and his party to form a government without coalition partners, they would 
surely move aggressively to implement such policies to achieve their vision of Islamic 
society. 
The NSC initiative was justified by its assessment that Islamic fundamentalism 
was the greatest threat to Turkey. Of course, when similarly the military had declared 
communism to be the single greatest threat to the Turkish Republic, the military had 
openly promoted Islam in efforts to combat communist tendencies in the country. What 
is clear is that by 1997, the rise of a powerful Islamist movement seemed to challenge 
both concepts for which the military had always cherished responsibility: 
The Turkish Nation--unified and sovereign, and Westernisation-- 
Mustafa Kemal's most important legacy. The military's position as the 
foremost defender of these two concepts had always been the very basis 
of their superiority in Turkish politics. Furthermore, Islamists were 
challenging the most fundamental concept of all the militaries of the 
world: discipline. One army officer accused of and discharged for 
religious fundamentalism reportedly declared: `I'll obey my own Imam 
' ioz and not my commander! 
The February 28t process, then, can be seen as a radical break from the `neorepublican' 
policies which prevailed in the post-1980 coup period and which allowed space for 
negotiation, compromise and reconciliation between Islamists and the secular state. 
100 See Alan Makovksy, `How to deal with Erbakan'. [accessed online] 
101 Again, as noted above, Refah's Minister of State at the time argued that the aim was to restructure 
Turkish secularism along the lines of European models. See A. Makovsky, `Fehim Adak: Erbakan seeks 
cooperation in America'. [accessed online] 
102 B. Oran, `From nation to where in globalising Turkey? ', unpublished paper. 
196 
Instead, February 28th represented a return to the republic's radical secularism; it 
represented, more specifically, `the need to both stabilize the rule of the original Kemalist 
project and revive the myth of a homogenous nation and society' 103. Meanwhile, as one 
might surmise from the earlier account of civilian initiatives against the rise of Islamism 
represented in Refah, the February 28th process was greeted with considerable public 
support at the time. 
`Legacies' of the February 28`h' process 
The February 28th process has come to be seen as a `post-modern coup' 104 The 
initial `February 280' Declaration' signalled the beginning of the end of Refah and 
Erbakan. More significantly, however, it marked the beginning of a long-term effort to 
quell the political and social strength of Islamism in Turkey. The first main stage of this 
was the forced closure of Refah Party and the ousting of Erbakan from political activity. 
Refah was brought to court in May 1997, and in January 1998 the Constitutional Court 
outlawed the party on the grounds that it violated the principles of secularism and the law 
of the political parties. Meanwhile, Erbakan was charged under Turkish Penal Code 
Article 312 (for inciting the public to hatred and separatism), and was banned from 
politics'os 
103 U. Cizre and M. Cinar, `Kemalism, Islamism, and politics in the light of the February 281h Process', 
p. 312. 
ioa In fact, a heated debate broke out in January of 2001 when retired General Erol Ozkasnak (the former 
General Staff Secretary-General) made a statement-which he later retracted-referring to February 28`h as 
a 'post-modern coup'. See M. Birand, `February 28 Syndrome'. [accessed online] 
105 See N. Narli, `The rise of the Islamist movement in Turkey'. [accessed online] 
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The February 28th process may be considered to have continued under the 
government formed after the ensuing elections. The new government was led by Mesut 
Yilmaz of ANAP, in coalition with two other parties106 With the strong backing of 
(and/or pressure from) Kemalist elites and the military, the government embarked on a 
series of anti-fundamentalist measures. It began to actively investigate the Islamists; 
inspect student dormitories of Islamic orders; transfer Islamists holding key government 
posts (such as at the Ministry of National Education) to posts less significant; question 
the Islamist tendencies of some provincial and district governors; and assert control over 
religious foundations (the number of which had grown to 8,000 by 1997)107. 
Meanwhile, the Virtue, or Fazilet, Party had been formed by Recai Kutan on the 
ashes of the Refah Party108. Fazilet embodied a concerted effort to reform political Islam. 
First, it promoted itself as pro-democratic, and conspicuously implemented this by 
declaring support for Turkish membership in the EU. There was no mention of an 
`Islamic mission' for the party. Instead, Fazilet leaders focused on the relationship 
between `millet' and `devlet' (nation and state), arguing that the state should be in service 
of the people rather than far above the people. Fazilet pledged to create a humanitarian 
state that met the nation's needs without totally dominating it--a more democratic rather 
than authoritarian state. Second, Fazilet tried to change the chauvinistic image of 
political Islam by recruiting a number of highly educated, upper-middle class modern 
106 Ecevit's Social Democrat Party (DSP) and the conservative Democratic Turkey Party (DTP) of Mr. 
Cindoruk. 
107 B. Oran, `From nation to where in globalising Turkey? ' (unpublished paper). However, it is important to 
note that by 1998, Yilmaz had begun to take a critical stance against the military-provoked fight against 
`reactionaryism', stating that only in the case of a clear rebellion of the Islamists should the military be 
involved in suppressing Islamism. See U. Cizre and M. Cinar, `Kemalism, Islamism, and politics in the light 
of the February 28th Process', p. 313. 
108 The party was formed by Kutan in December of 1997; with strong behind-the-scenes support of 
Erbakan, however, the party was considered to be more or less led by Erbakan. See N. Narli, `The rise of 
the Islamist movement in Turkey'. [accessed online] 
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women. The party also appointed two women to the central decision-making board, 
neither of whom wore headscarves. Unlike Refah, Fazilet downplayed the headscarf 
issue altogether, and treated it as a matter of democracy, human rights, and personal 
liberty rather than as a matter of religion'09. 
Whether the party was sincere in its embrace of democracy and of gender 
equality, or simply trying to preserve its right to existence, is a matter of intense debate 
(see chapter six). One indication that genuine changes were taking place within political 
Islam is the split which developed in the party, between the `traditionalists' led by Kutan, 
and the `reformists' whose voice was Abdullah Gull 10. In spite of such developments, 
however, the party was closed by the Constitutional Court in 2001, on the grounds that it 
11' was a continuation of the Refah Party 
As in the case of Fazilet's closure, other NSC-led actions designed to limit 
Islamism came to be treated, in the Turkish press, as further extensions of the February 
28th process 112. A prime example is the liberal use of Article 312 of the Turkish Penal 
Code to convict people suspected of `reactionaryism'. The Article prohibits incitement 
of the public to hatred, enmity or division based on racial, ethnic, religious, sect, regional 
or class lines. The list of those convicted for religion-related offences includes such 
prominent political figures as Erkaban and Tayyip Erdogan (the popular mayor of 
Istanbul, whose conviction under the article ousted him from the position); and 
influential social and religious leaders, such as the immensely popular journalist, Fehmi 
109 N. Narli, `The rise of the Islamist movement in Turkey'. [accessed online] 
110 This split evolved into the creation of two separate `religion-oriented' political parties after Fazilet's 
closure: the Saadet, or Contentment Party, led by Kutan, and the Justice and Development Party, led by 
Tayyip Ergodan. 
111 For a closer look at the Virtue Party and its policies, see B. Yesilada, `The Virtue Party'. 
112 Attention to such issues is important in order to provide a wider picture of what may have led to a 
change in Islamists' perspectives on Europe. 
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Koru, and Fethullah Gulen (for plotting to subvert the secular Republic). This article has 
been a centre of political debate, especially since Erbakan's conviction under it. In 
Erbakan's case, the offence was in a speech delivered in Bingol on February 280' 1994 
(though efforts to prosecute him for violation of Article 312 only began during his term 
in office, in 1997)13. After this and many such cases had been referred to the European 
Court of Human Rights 114 , there was increasingly open discussion in Turkey of Article 
312 as a barrier to Turkish membership in the European Union: both within journalistic 
and political circles, reform of the Article was being considered necessary for adaptation 
to the European Convention of Human Rights and for compliance with the Copenhagen 
Criteria' s Debate over the article's reform became a major sticking point for the leading 
three-way coalition in 2001-2002, with the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) vehemently 
resisting proposed changes. Amendments to the article were approved in February 2002, 
following the intense efforts of the coalition-member Motherland Party to include a 
reformed Article 312 as part of the Democratisation Package presented to the European 
Union' 16. However, considerable controversy ensued with regard to the quality of the 
113 See `Crisis in the government... but why? ', Briefing, Issue 1300,10 July 2000, p. 3. Erbakan's speech 
included criticism of the state for replacing the traditional phrase recited by students at the start of classes 
('In the name of Allah, the merciful... '), with Mustafa Kemal's words, `I am Turk, I am right, I am 
industrious... '. In this fateful speech Erbakan also accused the state of inciting the public to division based 
on ethnic lines (with reference to the Kurdish issue), and proposed that the only solution to this division 
was Islam. 
114 In February 2003, The European Court of Human Rights produced a unanimous judgment in favour of 
Turkey in the 'Refah Party and others v. Turkey' case (application nos. 41340/98,41342/98,41343/98, and 
41344/98). See the court's internet site for further details (http: //www. echr. coe. int). 
115 See Turkish Daily News, 24 January 2002 for a number of news and opinion articles on this subject. See 
also `Reform package hurdle finally over', Turkish Daily News, 8 February 2002, and `Mini-reform 
package goes into effect', Turkish Daily News, 20 February 2002 [all of the above were accessed online]. 
`Copenhagen Criteria' refers to the criteria for EU membership established at the Copenhagen European 
Council in 1993. Beyond certain financial criteria (a functioning market economy), the Copenhagen 
Criteria include the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities. 
116 The former version of the article stated that `The person who would openly incites people to hate and 
hostility by underlining class, racial, religious, sectarian or regional differences will be given a prison 
sentence in the one to three years range... '; the amended article states that `The person who publicly incites 
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amendments: the changes to the article were considered by many to be simply tactical. 
Regardless of the changes, however, many analysts agree that the problem is not in the 
law itself, but in its application: similar laws exist in the legal traditions of other 
European countries. Thus, as is evident through the difficulties in its reform, Article 312 
represents deeper problematic aspects of Turkish political culture beyond the problem of 
poor legal policy. 
Another crucial part of the legacy of the February 28th process is the Civil 
Servant's Decree (or KHK). This controversial decree, advanced by the National 
Security Council in August of 2000, was designed to purge the Turkish bureaucracy of 
religious `reactionaries'. According to one interpretation, `the decree comes as part of a 
massive crackdown led by the powerful army since 1997 to eliminate political Islam, 
which the country's generals deem the major threat to the country's secular order' 
17. 
The bill was similar to the purge, two years prior, of more than 160 military personnel for 
allegedly sympathising with Islamic militants' 18. The NSC requested the Turkish 
President's signature on the bill, which would result in the sacking of thousands of civil 
servants suspected of sympathising with political Islam or Kurdish separatism. The bill 
became the centre of a heated national debate as the then new President Ahmet Sezer 
refused -- three times -- the NSC's mandate. To the NSC's great annoyance, Sezer 
insisted that the rule of law requires a parliamentary vote on such a bill. The government 
people to harbor hate or enmity against one another by underlining the social class, racial, religious, 
factional or regional differences in a way that would create the possibility of disrupting the public order, 
would be punished with a prison sentence in the one to three years range... '. See M. Birand, `These cannot 
be called adaptation laws', in Turkish Daily News, 24 January 2002. [accessed online] 
117 See `Coalition leaders meet over controversial decree', Turkishpress. com, 22 August 2000. 
118 `Islamist purge in Turkish military', BBC News Europe, 16 June 1998. There is no right to appeal for 
expulsion from the Turkish military. [accessed online] 
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responded by accusing the president of `hindering the fight against radical Islam' H9 , and 
Turkish media sources suggested that the government might seek to impeach the newly- 
elected president120. Under increased pressure to reveal the reason behind the decree, 
Prime Minister Ecevit declared that the KHK was `a legislative effort in accordance with 
the February 28th decisions' 121. The bill was finally passed in parliament in June 2001122 
The challenges facing Tayyip Erdogan in his leadership of the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP, formed following the closure of Fazilet Party in 2001), may be 
considered as one further manifestation of the February 28th process. In legal terms, 
Erdogan's status as a party leader was certainly complex. At the time of the party's 
formation, Article 76 of the Turkish Constitution stipulated that people convicted of 
ideological crimes may not run for office, whilst Article 109 stipulated that the prime 
minister must be a member of the parliament 123. In spite of these challenges, the AKP 
won a clear majority of the votes in the November 2002 national elections. It thus 
became the first political party, since 1991, to enjoy single party rule 124. Abdullah Gul 
was initially sworn in as prime minister; this was meant to be a temporary situation, until 
Erdogan could be cleared of his criminal charges and allowed to run for office. 
19 `Turkey moves against Islamists', BBC News Europe, 23 August 2000. [accessed online] 
120 `Turkish president defies government', BBC News Europe, 21 August 2000. [accessed online] 
121 According to one Ankara-based news source, `Quite likely, the possibility that Sezer would reject the 
KHK never even crossed the government's mind, especially as it had been pounded on over and over again 
that this KHK was a "continuation of the February 28th process" and therefore an "undeclinable request" 
from the National Security Council'. See `Not sorry for Erbakan, but for Turkish law', Briefing, Issue 1305, 
14 August 2000, p. 3. 
122 See `Parliament accepts civil servants decree', Turkish Daily News, 29 June 2001. [accessed online] 
123 Article 109 of the Turkish Constitution stipulates that the prime minister must be a member of the 
parliament, and Article 76, prior to its amendment in December 2002, stipulated that people convicted of 
ideological crimes were banned from running for office. See S. Cagaptay, `The November 2002 elections and 
Turkey's new political era'. [accessed online] 
124 See A. Carkoglu, `Turkey's November 2002 Elections: a new beginning? '. [accessed online] 
202 
But Erdogan and the AKP faced significant mistrust on the domestic front and, in 
particular, from the Kemalist elite. According to Rusen Cakir, there has been a real 
transformation in Erdogan, `but the problem is that that is not enough. The question is 
whether they (the establishment, the army) believe it or want to believe it. I think here 
there's no chance for him' 125. Indeed, the tremendous challenges facing Erdogan in his 
rise to the premiership may be viewed as indications that `they do not want to believe it'. 
The AKP's Party Program declares that the party `considers religion as one of the most 
important institutions of humanity, and secularism as a pre-requisite of democracy, and 
an assurance of the freedom of religion and conscience... Our Party refuses to take 
advantage of sacred religious values and ethnicity and to use them for political purposes'. 
Furthermore, Erdogan explicitly stated that `In Turkey, each institution has its own role. 
The Turkish army is the apple of our eyes. No one is going to interfere between us and 
our army' 126. Yet such statements did not suffice as assurance to a skeptical secularist 
establishment. In this context, the Court of Cassation Chief Prosecutor brought a number 
of cases against Erdogan, calling for his ban from party leadership and from participation 
in parliamentary elections; challenging a Diyarbakir State Court ruling clearing 
Erdogan's criminal record; demanding the AKP's closure; and pursuing corruption 
charges against Erdogan127. Limitations on Erdogan also came from President of the 
Republic Ahmet Necdet Sezer, through his initial refusal to allow constitutional 
amendments which would pave the way for Erdogan's official leadership of the party. In 
125 'PM candidate Erdogan rejects Islamist mantle', Turkish Daily News, 14 September 2002. [accessed 
online] 
126 `En Turquie, 1'arrivee au pouvoir des islamistes moderes de 1'AKP est accueille dans le calme', Le 
Monde, 6 November 2002, p. 4. 
127 See E. Erduran; `Erdogan's throne at AKP under dual threat', Turkish Daily News, 25 March 2002; 
`Erbakan down, Erdogan on the way', Turkish Daily News, 19 September 2002; `This week in perspective', 
Turkish Daily News: Turkish Probe, 15 September 2002; and `Chief prosecutor demands the closure of 
AKP', Turkish Daily News, 24 October 2002, respectively [all of the above were accessed online]. 
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the end, the Diyarbakir Court's ruling held: Erdogan was cleared of the Article 312 
charges, and Constitutional Article 76 was amended by the Turkish parliament (thus 
allowing Erdogan to become a member of parliament). Following his victory in bi- 
elections in Siirt in March 2002, Erdogan was sworn in as prime minister. 
Our historical overviews of Islamism and secularism in Turkey reveal an intense 
struggle over the place of religion in Turkish state and society. Mustafa Kemal's 
secularising reforms aimed at the modernisation and westernisation of Turkish society. 
The reforms were, as noted above, very sudden and in some cases absolute. Such sudden 
`injection' of institutions and values is, as described by Nicos Mouzelis (see chapter two), 
bound to face difficulties, because of a great disarticulation between the new culture and 
the live cultural traditions which preceded them. In the words of Joseph Szyliowicz, 
`Ataturk had eliminated Islam from public life but the "parallel" Islam [or, unofficial 
Islam of the religious orders, convents and sects] continued to thrive within society': 
while the state elites were positivist and secular in orientation, the majority of the 
population continued to view Islam as a central source of self-identity 128. This fact 
became even more evident after the transition to a multi-party political system in Turkey, 
as politicians began to openly compete for the Islamic vote. We see here what David 
Martin describes as an `oscillation' between two versions of the sacred, the one provided 
by Islam and the other by Kemal Ataturk (see chapter two)129. But it was the military 
coup of 1980 which introduced the most extreme fluctuation in Turkish secularist 
policies. The fact that these changes were introduced by the military in particular, 
128 J. Szyliowicz, `Religion, politics and democracy in Turkey', p. 194. 
129 See M. Ahiska, 'Occidentalism: the historical fantasy of the modern', p. 366. 
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traditionally the guardians of Turkish secularism, seems ironic. However, as Szyliowicz 
argues, whilst at first glance there seems to be a contradiction between ideology and 
practice, a closer examination suggests that the military's moves reflected a mere 
continuation of a policy whereby the state `tried to control Islam and harness it to its own 
goals'. Thus, the underlying motive for the military's actions was essentially the same as 
that of previous regimes13o What changed was not the Kemalist elite's secular 
orientation, but certain events and developments within and beyond Turkey (internal 
division, communism, Khomeneism) which produced, for these elites, a greater need to 
use Islam as an integrating force. What can be considered ironic, however, are the 
unintended consequences of these policies, in terms of the growth of the kinds of Islamic 
activities which the Kemalist elites had always sought to suppress. 
In other words, Turkish secularism fluctuated in accordance with a variety of 
short-term and long-term interests of political and military elites 131. Amongst these 
Nilifer Gole places the establishment of their hegemonic power. Laicism, she argues, is 
not a neutral term, but rather `defines and sustains ... the political and cultural power of 
the modernist elites' 132. The intense emphasis of secular elites on education reforms- 
limitations on religious education and socialisation into secular ideology-certainly 
helped to achieve this goal. For their part, the military elites wished to secure their 
positions as guardians of Kemalist principles. Due in part to the historically symbolic 
role of Mustafa Kemal's army in paving the way for the establishment of the modern 
130 J. Szyliowicz, `Religion, politics and democracy in Turkey', pp. 196-7. 
131 Of course, one should distinguish between the various elites: some politicians, e. g., Turgut Ozal, showed 
a relatively sincere intention to incorporate Islamists into the Turkish state and society in a democratic 
fashion. 
132 N. Gole, 'La? cite, modemisme et Islamisme en Turquie', p. 87. Meltem Ahiska makes a similar argument 
in `Occidentalism: the historical fantasy of the modern', pp. 351-379. 
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Turkish Republic, the military in Turkey carries symbolic importance as the defender of 
Mustafa Kemal's values: democracy, secularism, and national unity. The military's 
suppression of the intense social struggles between left-wing and right-wing factions in 
the 1970's, and its struggle against communism and the PKK in the 80s, and against 
political Islam in the 1990's, were widely appreciated. As Nilufer Narli notes, even 
today there is a high degree of respect in Turkey for the military's presence. Surely this 
goes a long way to explaining why even after undemocratic moves by the military, 
perpetrated in the name of secularism, national unity and, in general, Kemalist ideology, 
there is continued support for the military's watchdog role. The military enjoys a great 
deal of power through its dominant position in the National Security Council, but also a 
great deal of autonomy, as it is not officially a part of the Ministry of Defence. Clearly, 
then, active defence of secularism is one platform upon which the military continues to 
justify its role in Turkey 133. And the Turkish public is continually reminded, often by the 
military itself, of the persistent threats to the secular state: `Radical Islam may appear 
gone one day to re-emerge the next day... it is not possible to say that the danger has 
vanished' 134 
Secularisation in Turkey, according to Gole, is considered to be the prerequisite of 
westernisation rather than democratisation and, because secularism is often implemented 
by authoritarian elites, there is a potential conflict of interest between democracy and 
secularism 13s This conflict arises, in the Turkish case, because the Kemalist elites 
deemed westernisation to require a cultural homogenisation which would solidify the 
133 N. Narli, `Civil-Military relations in Turkey', pp. 116-118. See also G. Karabelias, `The evolution of 
civil-military relations in post-war Turkey, 1980-95'. 
134 Former Chief of General Staff General Huseyin Kivrikoglu, speaking in 2001. Cited by U. Cizre and 
M. Cinar, 'Kemal ism, Islamism, and politics in the light of the February 28th Process', p. 312. 135 N. Gole, `Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: the making of elites and counter-elites', pp. 48-49. 
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nation. The project was thus based on populism rather than on liberalism. According to 
Fuat Keyman, `secularism and reformism from above served to construct a national 
identity compatible with republicanism, nationalism, and etatism, and at the same time to 
concretize populism and its appeal to organic unity into the identity of the individual 
subject. -Hence, the national identity was meant to be an organic unity of the secular 
non-class based identity which necessarily involved the subjugation of its Other, i. e. the 
Muslim identity' 136 Caglar Ceyer sees Turkish secularism not only as defining a certain 
place for religion in state and society, but as a separation of state and society: `The 
militant secularism of the state amounted to a repudiation of what used to be its principal 
ideological apparatus. The consequence of this repudiation was a separation between 
state and society, for which Islam continued to be the popular cohesive principle' 137 
And, of course, we can question the extent to which Turkish secularism meets its aims of 
secularisation at all: according to Andrew Davidson, because laicism entails a close 
relationship between religion and state, it can be considered as an obstacle to 
secularisation' 38 . 
The above historical overview also reveals Turkish Islamism as largely shaped by 
Turkish secularism-a situation, as described by Jose Casanova (see chapter two), in 
which the state determines the place of religion. This is true of the place of religion in 
the Turkish state as of its place in society, as a result of intense socialisation of all Turks 
in secular, Kemalist ideals through the education system. As Metin Heper notes, this 
socialisation effort was largely successful: his research provides evidence of very little 
136 Fuat Keyman, `On the relation between global modernity and nationalism: the crisis of hegemony and 
the rise of (Islamic) identity in Turkey', pp. 104-105. 
137 C. Keyder, State and Class in Turkey: a Study in Capitalist Development, p. 88. 138 A . Davidson, `Turkey, a "secular" state? The challenge of description', p. 344. 
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support for a Turkish state based on Islam (less than I% of the population), 3'. The 
relationship between Turkish Islamism and secularism may be viewed as contingent: the 
Islamist movement clearly developed in a context in which the state dominated society 140 
In this context, the Islamists' actions were of course also influential, and involved an 
element of manipulation of the state's fluctuating secularist policies in order to achieve a 
place in the political scene. As Tanil Bora points out, beyond their Muslim nationalist 
discourse (emphasising a Muslim brotherhood with their Arab neighbours), Islamists also 
employed the discourse of `official' nationalism, stressing the importance of national 
unity and national sovereignty 141. This fact is particularly clear in their rhetoric on the 
European Union. It is to the subject of Islamist perspectives on the EU that we turn 
below, for an in-depth analysis of the roots of the Islamist anti-Europeanism which 
prevailed in Turkey prior to the period examined in the following chapter. 
Islamism and Europe 
In the following chapter we discuss the extent to which the current pro-European 
feeling amongst Turkish Islamists is directly related to such affronts to religion in 
Turkey. Our intent here is to focus on the substance of Islamist anti-Europeanism as 
139 Heper's research was conducted in the 1990's. See M. Heper, `The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish 
Politics', pp. 63-83. 
140 U. C. Sakallioglu, `Parameters and strategies of Islam-State interaction in Republican Turkey', pp. 245. 
141 See T. Bora, `Nationalist discourses in Turkey', p. 432. See also Birol Akgun, `Twins or enemies: 
comparing nationalism and Islamist traditions in Turkish politics'. Here Akgun explains the sporadic close 
relationship between political Islamists and the National Action Party. The same theme is explored by 
Sultan Tepe, in `A Kemalist-Islamist Movement? The Nationalist Action Party'. 
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prevailed in the past 142. The time frame for this focus is the 1980's and 90's, at the 
height of the rise of political Islam in Turkey. 
With the exception of certain groups-particularly some Nurcu sects143, the 
Alevis, and radical Islamists 144 Turkish Islamic attitudes towards Europe and Turkish 
participation in European integration have, in the past, been largely negative. Writing in 
1990, Rusen Cakir (journalist and specialist on Turkish Islamism), deems that the only 
considerable objection to Turkey's participation in the European integration project 
emanated from the Islamist movements. Cakir emphasizes the diversity in expressions of 
this movement, stating that their principles of organization, political attitudes and socio- 
cultural points of view were not only very different from one another, but also sometimes 
contradictory. In fact, Turkish Islamists were not exclusively against the EU, and even 
those who were, employed different arguments for their stances. An exhaustive study of 
Turkish Islamist anti-Europeanism in the past is beyond the scope of this chapter. It is 
useful, however, to draw a picture revealing the aforementioned differences and 
indicating fluctuations over time. This focus will serve as the background for our 
assessment of the current pro-Europeanism amongst Turkish Islamists in the following 
chapter. 
142 We shall, at the outset and in line with prevailing perspective, divide between Turkish Islamists' 
`before' and `after' attitudes to Europe roughly at the time of the `February 28th process'; the possible 
arbitrariness of this division will be discussed in the following chapter. This section on 'religious' 
perspectives is relatively short compared to that for the Greek case study; this discrepancy is due to my lack 
of knowledge of the Turkish language (as explained in the Introduction), and my reliance on English and 
French-language texts and an English translation of one Turkish-language text. 
143 For Nurcus' exceptionalism, see Kazim Gulecguz, 'The European Union, Turkey and Islam in light of 
Bediuzzaman Said Nursi's views' (a paper presented at a panel entitled 'The European Union and Turkey 
from the point of view of Democracy, the Law, and Human Rights'). 
144 All of which have different reasons for their indifferent or positive attitudes toward Europe. See Rusen 
Cakir, 'Les Mouvements Islamistes Turcs et l'Europe'. 
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According to Rusen Cakir, the most extensive and influential criticism of the 
European Community in the past emanated from the `Milli Gorus Har' (or, the `National 
Perspective Movement'), which took institutional form first in 1969 as the `Bag Harek' 
movement ('Movement of Independence'), and then continued in form through 
successive Islamist political parties145. Political Islamist anti-Europeanism will be 
discussed at depth in the following chapter. Our focus here is on views expressed in 
publications representing certain religious groups (Islamist journals and newspapers). 
Nearly all Islamist groups have their own publications, which serve as an 
influential aspect of their cultural lives. These are a useful source of information 
regarding their attitudes toward Europe. We shall refer here to a selection of Islamist 
journals and newspapers from the 1980's and 1990's146. According to Cakir's study of 
such journals, the subject of the European Community was treated regularly, at least in 
one article per issue 147. The journals characteristically offer much information on the 
evolution of European integration and treat this as an historical inevitability. 
When it comes to the question of Turkey's accession to the European 
Community, however, the subject of antagonism between Islam and Christianity is a 
point of common reference. The key word in these journals is without a doubt `common 
culture'; in Cakir's estimation, none of the Islamists in Turkey perceive themselves as 
sharing a common culture with the Europeans148. Cakir presents the opinions expressed 
in the journal Islam as representative of Islamist attitudes toward the EC: 
145 R. Cakir, `The Westernisation process of the Islamists'. [in Turkish] 
146 These publications are classified as `Islamist' on the basis of the definition of the term provided above. 
147 Rusen Cakir, `Les Mouvements Islamistes Tures et I'Europe'. (The journals, as referenced by Cakir, are 
cited in footnotes below). 
148 Ibid, p. 16. 
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The EC is above all a social phenomenon ... A phenomenon which crosses frontiers, and which embraces people of one same civilization and of one 
same culture. It is a continental movement. A movement of unification 
and of change. It quickens the change of culture. It is an event which 
realizes fully the fusion of human beings and of culture149 
Thus other aspects of integration (economic and political) are neglected, and the picture 
drawn is rather of `a unity economic in appearance, but Christian in origin' 150. In the 
journal Ogut ('The Opinion'), published by the strongest branch of the Turkish 
brotherhood `Kadiriye', the question is posed in the following manner: `In the club of 
rich Christian European countries, a poor, Muslim, -Asian Turkey? "51. According to 
Ogut, the decision to create the EC `was taken before the Pact of Rome, during the 
Catholic Council of Rome, in the presence of Schumann, of de Gasperi and Adenauer'. 
Ogut encourages, instead of Turkish membership in this European unification project, the 
formation of an Islamic Common Market. 
Islam is published by the principal branch of the Naksibendi, the `community of 
Iskender Pasa' 152, and has a readership of approximately 100,000. This journal often 
addresses issues related to the European Community. In August of 1986, it carried the 
cover title: `EC: Is it a community of crosses? '. Later that year, the journal's title read 
`What is our place during the discussion on the EC? ', alongside a picture of the 
Community's flag, with a cross just in the middle, and next to it a priest addressing the 
crowd from the height of a throne decorated with a cross 153 In the same issue, the 
journal draws attention to the fact that the competition for the design of the EC building 
149 From Islam, Issue 36,1986. 
150 R. Cakir, `Les Mouvements Islamistes Turcs et l'Europe', p. 16. 
151 Ogut, Issue 13,1986. 
152 This group comprised the largest electoral support of Refah and is, according to Cakir's estimation, 
perhaps the most important Islamic group in Turkey. 
153 Islam, Issue 47,1987. 
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in Brussels was won by a project symbolizing a cross. The journal also deals extensively 
with the subject of Christian missionary activity in Turkey. Another issue with the cover 
title, `The new objective of the Papacy: Turkey', contains an article entitled `The 
adhesion of Turkey to the EU will be decided by the Vatican' 154 One of the main 
contributors to the journal, Dr. Ersin Gurdogan, summarizes the `danger' that the EU 
represents for Turkey: `The integration of the EC means the refusal of our Muslim 
identity' us In the same issue, another warning comes from Ismet Ozel, the poet 
converted from Marxism and a widely read Muslim intellectual: `If Turkey integrates into 
the EU, one can say she risks quitting her proper life of development. In so doing, she 
prevents the emergence of an alternative independent Muslim and has sabotaged in this 
manner the fundamental dynamic of this development [of an independent Muslim}"56 
Finally, in a section of his study entitled `Those who do not fear the European 
Community', Cakir also addresses publications of the Nurcus. The journal Kopru (or, 
`The Bridge') carries an article entitled `A Muslim State in Europe' in which the idea that 
the EC is an `alliance of crosses' is criticised, and the advantages of membership 
highlighted. The journal's focus is clearly on religious identity, but with a positive hope 
of `a Turkey which finds a place, with its Muslim identity, in the EC, and which can 
initiate a global dialogue between Europe and the Muslim world' 157. For its part, Sur 
('The Wall') poses the question `Why do we fear the EU? '. The journal draws readers' 
attention to the fact that, based on the example of Turks already living in Europe, `We 
154 Islam, Issue 55,1988. 
155 Islam, Issue 47,1987. 
156 Ibid 
157 Kopru, Issue 100,1987. Published by the Yeni Asya Nurcu group. 
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will be able to practice our religion better. There is neither intervention nor repression, 
but help and facilities' 158 
Sencer Ayata's study of Islamist newspapers reveals anti-Europeanism as a 
`subheading' of anti-westernism: `the West' is presented as a system opposed to Islam (a 
rival culture and rival religion); a source of foreign domination; and an alien economic 
system coupled with a controversial form of social organisation159. Four main 
characteri stics of the West are identified. First, the West is associated with Christianity 
which, in turn, is considered a contemporary materialistic culture. The historical rivalry 
and antagonism between Islam and Christianity is a common point of reference of all 
these papers. Christianity itself, as a religion, is rarely criticized in the Islamic press; the 
underlying idea here is that every manifestation of religion in social life is beneficial for 
social well-being. Thus, the principal distinction drawn is less between Christianity and 
Islam, than between religion, on the one hand, and absence of religion, atheism and 
secularity, on the other. The Christian experience is considered to be marked by 
injustice, oppression, misery and ignorance. The secularism of the western world has 
engendered a spiritually and morally bankrupt way of life. Furthermore, western culture 
has sparked a major moral collapse of the western world itself, a danger which threatens 
158 Sur, Issue 158,1989. 
159 Sencer Ayata, `Une approach de la politique etrangere'. The study was published in 1999 but is based 
on research of such publications in 1997, and focuses on three newspapers in particular: Akit, Yeni Safak, 
and Milli Gazette. Yeni Safak has a readership of 20,000, and is considered a more intellectual journal, 
devoting much attention to commentaries and information analysis by specialists or authorities on 
particular subjects, research and documentaries, and translations of foreign press. Milli Gazette has a 
readership of 15,000, and gives priority to the Refah Party (at the time this research was conducted), and to 
the declarations of its readers. Both Yeni Safak and Milli Gazette generally align themselves with the 
Refah Party. Akit has a readership of 45,000, and is considered more sensationalist, emotional and 
ideological, and takes a more radical approach in concentrating on the Middle East and on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 
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the Islamic world as well through the West's `colonial' export of modernity and 
secularism. 
Second, colonialism and imperialism are treated as specifically western forms of 
political, economic and cultural domination. The western imperialist considers non- 
western people irrational and incapable of governing themselves. The international 
system is thus profoundly marked by structures of domination, economic exploitation, 
and cultural exclusion. The poor, the less privileged, the exploited, the subordinated and 
the excluded are called upon to rise and resist imperialism through the adoption of Islam. 
Third, the West is identified with capitalism, an economic system characterized by an 
exploitation without pity, an extreme disparity of revenues, social inequality and the 
subordination of all human relations to the laws of the market economy. 
Finally, the most severe attack directed against the West concerns its social and 
cultural forms. The individual is the basic element of western society, and is condemned 
to alienation, rootlessness, and the absence of personal and community identity. The 
resulting individual is egoistic, greedy, and fundamentally a-sociable. Western society is 
essentially hedonistic and in a state of moral crisis, which is evident in its social ills: a 
growing crime rate, the breakdown of family values, illicit sexual relations, alcohol 
abuse, drugs and aids. The tendency observed in Yeni Safak and Akit is to reject a 
compromise which would result at least in a rejection of the Islamic values and 
principles. Furthermore, Islam is a system which can compete with and replace the 
western system, but cannot mix with it. According to Ayata's estimation, based upon the 
papers' tendency to defend the poor and `disfavoured' in society especially, the anti- 
western sentiments expressed stem from acute awareness of social inequalities at the 
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global and local levels. However, particularly since the beginning of mounting tensions 
between Refah and the military-dominated National Security Council, certain aspects of 
western society began to be evaluated positively. Relations between civilians and the 
military and the concept of a government of consensus became central themes treated in 
the Islamist papers. The western world is commended for its `true democracy', marked 
by the supremacy of civil authorities over the military and that of an elected government 
over the bureaucracy. 
In these newspapers, Europe tends to be treated as a single, homogenous entity, 
both because of the historical and geographical proximity of its countries, and because of 
high levels of interaction between them in various domains. in terms of Turkey's 
relations with Europe, two particularly sensitive issues are frequently addressed. The 
first concerns the Muslim populations, and especially the Turks, living in Europe: the 
Islamist papers under consideration tend to criticize European governments for attitudes 
of intolerance toward Muslim collective identity, the maintenance of a specifically 
Islamic way of life and the rights of Islamic groups. The European orientation is 
described as racist, xenophobic, ethnocentric, and exclusive. The papers contain frequent 
coverage of incidents of ethnic violence and crime directed against the Turks and 
Muslims, and reports of attacks on persons and private property are emotionally charged. 
Second, we find in these papers nationalistic, defensive attitudes towards the EU for its 
continued rejections of Turkey. The tendency of Yeni Safak and Milli Gazette is to 
approve certain economic aspects of integration, but to oppose what are considered 
restrictions on national sovereignty and growing cultural homogenisation. Akit, for its 
part, categorically rejects the idea that Turkey is a part of Europe. The most frequently 
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penned argument in Akit is that the result of Turkey's westernisation, since the beginning 
of the 19th c., has been erosion of national pride and confidence in its people. 
Furthermore, the prevalent opinion communicated in Akit is that Turkey has no chance to 
be integrated into Europe because of the fundamental differences of civilization, based on 
religion. 
Yeni Safak has a relatively sophisticated conception of Turkey's relations with the 
EU. The journal develops in detail subjects such as the Customs Union's effects on the 
Turkish economy, the circulation of the workforce, conditions of trade with Europe, and 
the implications of the Common Agricultural Policy for Turkish agriculture. The 
differences of revenue between Turkey and Europe, Turkey's demographic upsurge, and 
the regional economic differences in Turkey are also taken into consideration. 
Furthermore, European objections to Turkey's past in terms of human rights, government 
corruption, and the errors of political and economic management are considered serious 
handicaps to Turkish prospects for EU membership. 
The pro-Refah press at the time of the party's rule considered Europe favourably 
on two counts. First, the commentaries and declarations of European leaders which 
indicated good will towards Refah were presented with enthusiasm and hope. 
Meanwhile, European journals were frequently cited in Islamist papers for their 
arguments against the military intervention and for their appeals for a civil and 
democratic power in Turkey. Secondly, while tension was mounting between the 
military and Erbakan, even Akit praised European secularism for its guarantees of 
liberties of conscience and of religion. Somewhat ironically, the paper began to discuss 
the important role played by religion in European countries. 
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Conclusion 
This brief overview of the relationship between Islamism and secularism in 
Turkey provides important insights into Islamist anti-Europeanism and possible reasons 
for current pro-European sentiment amongst Turkish Islamists. Upon the basis of this 
historical information I argue that Turkish Islamist attitudes towards Europe have little to 
do with religion per se: they are not firm expressions of theological considerations. 
Rather, the diversity in Islamist opinions on Turkish membership in the European Union, 
and the fluctuations in these opinions in accordance with changing internal and external 
political circumstances, point to other factors which influence `religious' perspectives on 
Turkish membership in the European Union. 
We have identified three main elements of past Islamist anti-Europeanism. First, 
the stance on Europe has largely been related to anti-western feeling. It is instructive to 
understand this in relation to the link between Turkish secularist policy and pro- 
westernisation: suppression of religion in Turkey has, historically, gone hand-in-hand 
with westernisation policies. Second, Islamist anti-European feeling has been rooted in 
conservatism which viewed Europe and `the West' in general as embodiments of 
irreligiosity. Such conservatism is certainly in line with theories of modernity, which 
point to the dangers perceived by traditional sectors of any society facing sudden 
exposure to more progressive and modern societies. Third, Turkish Islamist anti- 
Europeanism in the past was largely a defensive and nationalistic reaction to European 
rejections of Turkey, especially after the Luxembourg Summ. Such defensive anti- 
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Europeanism has been an element of both religious and civic nationalism in Turkey, as in 
other nations during periods of tense relations with the European Union. 
Considering these sources of anti-Europeanism, it is not difficult to understand the 
altered Islamist perspectives on Europe. With increased suppression of religion within 
Turkey, and as the threat to Turkish religiosity seemed to be greater within Turkey than 
that imagined in Europe, it is logical that Turkish Islamist attitudes towards Europe 
would be increasingly favourable. Thus, the fear of encounters with a modem, culturally 
different and irreligious or Christian Europe (depending on the perspective) could be 
overridden by local social concerns stemming from the suppression of Islam in Turkey. 
An explicit example of this is the altered perspectives expressed in Islamist publications 
on the issue of Turkish Muslims living in Europe: complaints about the way Turkish 
Muslims were treated in European host countries were replaced with assessments of the 
relative freedom religious Turks enjoyed abroad in comparison with the restrictions on 
religious life in Turkey. Certainly the experience of political Islam has had an effect on 
Islamist perspectives on Europe. But the fact that suppression of Turkish Islamism goes 
beyond just the political realm -- as in the prosecution of non-political religious leaders -- 
suggests that the change to pro-Europeanism may go beyond political opportunism. 
Furthermore, the defensive anti-Europeanism which is rooted in perceived 
rejections from Europe changed considerably between the Luxembourg and the Helsinki 
Summits. But more importantly, this particular anti-Europeanism has existed and 
continues to exist, both amongst religious and secular-minded Turks, in waves and in 
reaction to particular messages received from the European Union. Complaints launched 
against the European Union have resurfaced in Turkish media across the board during 
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periods of tension between Turkey and the EU (particularly at times when the 
Copenhagen Criteria seemed to be placing comparatively larger pressures on Turkey than 
on other applicant countries). Such anti-European sentiment is in no way indicative of 
rigid ideological perspectives on membership in the European Union. 
Indeed, even this brief historical overview reveals that neither secularism in 
Turkey nor Islamism can be described as unchanging ideologies. Rather, each has 
fluctuated in accordance with national and external developments, and under the 
influence of particular leaders. Accordingly, the role of religion in national-EU relations 
may be most accurately located in the tension between secularist and Islamist forces in 
Turkey and in the pursuit of their contending interests with regard to Turkish membership 
in the EU. This tension will be studied in the next chapter specifically through the prism 
of Turkish Islamists' `change' to pro-Europeanism. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Political Islamism and pro-Europeanism 
In the previous chapter we saw a fairly clear dichotomy between a secular, pro- 
European Turkish elite and public, and an Islamist, anti-European elite and public. The 
current situation in Turkey reveals a significantly different and complex picture. Today, 
Turkish Islamists are among the most vocal pro-European forces in Turkish society. 
Leaders of political Islamist movements, the largest tarikats and other Islamic 
communities, the Islamist businessmen's association, etc., now publicly declare their 
support for Turkish membership in the EU and, in many cases, set this as a primary 
objective for Turkey. 
This situation begs two crucial questions. First, what brought about this change'? 
Most date the change to February 28th, 1997, which marks the beginning of the process 
through which the military-dominated National Security Council gradually forced the 
closure of Erbakan's Islamist Refah Party, and led to Erbakan's ban from future political 
activity. The new Islamist pro-Europeanism, then, is widely regarded as a direct effect of 
what John Esposito has termed `militant secular fundamentalism'2. The second question, 
related to the first and perhaps more important for our purposes, is, can the Islamist 
change in perspective on Europe be considered sincere? Many secularist elites in Turkey 
interpret this modification as part of Islamists' broader efforts to hide their true identity in 
order to preserve themselves; they argue that Islamists are presenting themselves as pro- 
European and defenders of democracy in order to protect their right to existence in the 
The reader should recall that `change' is meant to cover a wide spectrum of terms (see chapter five, footnote 1). 
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political sphere which, once in power, will enable them to fulfil their true aim for an 
Islamic state3. More muted versions of this mistrust indicate a fear that Islamists will use 
freedoms provided by the EU to implement religion-based policies which threaten the 
secular state of Turkey (such as cancelling the ban on the wearing of headscarves in 
public spaces) or which threaten the unity of the state by inciting the public to religion- 
based division. It is on the basis of such suspicions that, at least theoretically, certain 
strict secularist policies have been implemented in Turkey4. 
For instance, speculations about the Islamists' real intentions were the 
justification for the `February 28th process', calculated to curb religious `reactionaryism' 
and political Islam simultaneously, and for the closure of the Fazilet Party in 2001 by the 
Turkish Constitutional Court. Further manifestations of this distrust are the ways in 
which Article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code (which covers the crime of `inciting people 
to hatred and enmity on the basis of ethnic, religious, regional and sectarian differences') 
has been liberally applied to imprison individuals considered a threat to the secular state 5; 
that the Civil Servant's Decree (KHK) was designed to purge the Turkish bureaucracy of 
individuals deemed to be religious `reactionaries'; that the liberal-minded Islamic leader 
Fethullah Gulen was pursued by Ankara State courts for plotting to subvert the secular 
Republic; and that the Justice and Development Party was so pursued by state 
prosecutors prior to and after it was democratically elected in 2002. 
2 J. Esposito, `Islam and secularism in the Twenty-first century', p. 7. 
3 The term `secularist elites' should be understood here as distinct from `secular elites', and as indicative of 
those in the governing ranks in Turkey who especially press secularist reforms in order to curb Islamists' 
activities. The term does not denote irreligiosity; nor does it merely indicate individuals advocating a 
separation of religion from politics (such individuals exist also amongst Turkish `Islamists'). 
4 Later in this chapter I will consider other possible driving forces behind such policies, as well as other 
explanations for the Islamists' `change' to pro-Europeanism beyond the February 28`h process. 
5 This article has been a centre of political debate, especially since Erbakan's conviction under it. The 
article was revised in February 2002. See chapter five for details of the revised version of Article312. 
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In response to such developments, currently Islamists (amongst others, some 
liberal secular-minded elites included) claim that the government attitude and policies 
towards Islam and Islamism in Turkey are the real barriers to Turkey's westernization 
and democratisation. Acute complaints are launched against the secularist elites for 
claiming to be, but not acting western and for, in fact, not actually desiring EU 
membership. A widespread and relatively radical discussion of this began in Turkey in 
2001 when (then) Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz identified forces within the 
government and military as impediments to EU accession. His statement chimed with 
General Tuncer Kilinc's public assertion that Turkey should seek fresh alternatives to 
Europe, `which looks negatively on Turkey's national interests', and retired General Suat 
Ilhan's remark that EU membership is contrary to Turkish history and the revolution 
based on Kemalist principles9. The nationalist National Action Party (MHP), in 
particular, was the focal point of criticism as the coalition partner (in the 1999-2002 
government) most resistant to crucial reforms: a prime example is the party's staunch 
stance against amending Article 312, which would free many Islamists from state 
prosecution10. Meanwhile, and particularly since the forced closure of the Fazilet Party, 
6 It should be noted that this chapter is mainly based on developments prior to the November 2002 
elections, when the Islamic-oriented Justice and Development Party came to power; the empirical research 
was conducted in 2000-2001. 
7 Secularist elites are often considered less than enthusiastic about EU membership for a number of 
different reasons, ranging from mild to extreme judgments: eg., not wishing to change the status quo; 
fearing the unveiling of a web of corruption behind them; national pride resisting a limitation of 
sovereignty, etc. Some of these assessments, as well as others, will be addressed later in the chapter. 
8 In August 2001, Yilmaz publicly claimed that sensitivities over national security issues were being 
manipulated with the intent to block EU-related reforms in Turkey. The Turkish media, as well as the 
Turkish military, interpreted this statement as a direct attack against the military. See `Motherland Party 
stands behind Yilmaz in row with the military', Turkish Daily News, 9 September 2001 [accessed online]. 
9 See coverage of the debate sparked by Kilinc's statements in `A General speaks his mind', The 
Economist, 16 March 2002, pp. 47-8; and `Retired Gen. Ilhan: EU membership contradicts Turkish 
revolution', Turkish Daily News, 26 March 2002 [accessed online]. 
10 Amendments were finally made to the Article in February of 2002; Fehmi Koru (one of the interviewees 
for this study, and journalist for Yeni Safak), was amongst the first to benefit from these amendments and 
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criticism of the perceived anti-democratic measures designed to limit Islamism in Turkey 
has heightened within EU ranks as well". The result is a cyclical debate in Turkey as to 
which constitutes the greater barrier between Turkey and the European Union-Islamism 
or (the Turkish version of) secularism. 
As Richard Tapper notes in his Islam in Modern Turkey, the question is frequently 
asked whether Islamic revival poses a political `threat' to the survival of the modem 
Turkish state; conspicuously missing in scholarship is `the age-old Western fear of Islam, 
now shared by many Turks, and the rarely articulated role of this fear in determining 
Turkey's relation to Europe' 12. Our intent here is to lay bare this role in the secularist- 
Islamist tensions in Turkey. Through this process, we shall see that not only do 
secularist-Islamist tensions affect Turkey's relation to Europe, but the prospect of EU 
membership affects the internal balance between secularist and Islamist tendencies in 
Turkey. First I will examine the `change' in Islamist perspectives on membership in the 
EU, focusing initially on political Islam and on the Refah Party in particular. Refah is 
notable because the process through which it was closed is considered a watershed for 
Islamist perspectives on Europe, and because continued anti-Islamist policies - 
increasingly considered as barriers to Turkey's EU membership - have been identified as 
a continuation of that February 28th process. Second, based upon interview research, I 
be acquitted from charges under Article 312. The MHP also adamantly resisted the ban on capital 
punishment (an EU requirement), mainly with reference to its will to have PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan 
executed. According to the MHP's 1999 Party Programme, `the unified Turkish nation [is] the sole social 
and cultural basis of the country's existence'. (See N. Canefe and T. Bora, `Intellectual roots of anti- 
European sentiments in Turkish politics: the case of radical Turkish nationalism'. ) The execution of Ocalan 
(representative of the Kurdish threat to Turkish national unity), was thus a top priority for the party. 
11 See I. Kemal `Turkey must adopt EU-standard democracy', in Turkish Daily News, 10 July 2000. It is 
crucial to note that closures of political parties are clearly not the only source of complaints from the EU 
with regards to the political Copenhagen Criteria. Abolition of the death penalty is a primary reform 
demanded by the EU, as well as provision of education and publication rights in mother languages. 12 Richard Tapper, `Introduction' (in ed. R. Tapper, Islam in Modern Turkey), p. 1. [Emphasis mine]. 
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will address the debate in Turkey over the questioned sincerity of Islamists' `change', 
including secular-minded elite opinions on this, and Islamists' own explanations for their 
current perspectives on Europe. I will close with a consideration of the `cyclical debate' 
in Turkey over whether Turkish secularism or Islamism is the greater barrier to Turkish 
membership in the EU. 
Political Islamist mobilisation 
The Refah ('Welfare', or `Prosperity') Party, was formed in 1983 after the 
National Security Council's forced closure of two previous religious parties led by 
Erbakan13. The party's rise to the premiership was one of the greatest shocks in Turkish 
political history, sparking much debate over the possibility of a `return to religion' in 
Turkey and an undermining of the secular republic 14. Refah shared a number of 
characteristics with religious movements in general, as analysed by political scientists15; 
we shall address two such characteristics which help explain Refah's appeal and rise to 
power, followed by two which are offered here as insight into political Islam's radical 
`change' in perspective on Turkish membership in the EU16. 
13 The National Order Party was founded in 1970 and subsequently closed by the Constitutional Court 
(May 1971) on the basis that it was acting against secularism; the National Salvation Party was created in 
its place in 1972. Erbakan was, prudently after NOP's closure, not the founder of NSP or Refah Party 
(Refah was initially established by Ali Turkmen), but he subsequently became the party's leader. The NSP 
fared well in 1973, and was an indispensable partner in coalition governments in the 1970's. Its closure 
came with that of all political parties in existence during the military intervention of 1980. 
14 A wealth of literature within the political science and sociology traditions analyses the extent to which 
Refah's appeal signaled a `re-Islamisation' of Turkish society (a subject which is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. ) See A. Ugur, `L'ordalie de la democratie en Turquie, le project "communautarien Islamique" d'Ali 
Bulac at la laicite'; see also M. Heper, `Islam, polity and society in Turkey: a Middle Eastern perspective'. 
is The work of several theorists is included in this text. For an outline of the theoretical framework 
underlying this section, see Stathis Kalyvas, `Unsecular politics and religious mobilisation'. 
16 The perspectives of Islamist elites outside of political Islam will be included later in the chapter. 
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First, religious mobilisation tends to be anti-system. This applies to Refah in so 
7 far as it did not share the values of the political order within which it operated, . Many 
analysts note Refah's attraction of protest, rather than specifically Islamist, votes18. 
Nilufer Narli describes the protest in terms of centre-periphery tensions (with the centre 
comprised of military officers, senior bureaucrats, notables, and the industrialists)19 
While rapid urbanisation in the 1950's yielded increasing social mobility of the 
periphery, rural poverty for the most part simply translated into urban poverty: a new 
periphery developed for the economically disadvantaged, culturally disintegrated, and 
politically isolated. Thus, as with other religious mobilizations, Refah reflected a 
`religious' cleavage in so far as it expressed the efforts of dominated actors (peasants and 
workers), allied with the middle classes (small and medium-sector businessmen, and 
some bureaucrats and Muslim intellectuals), to contest the hegemony of the ruling elites 
in the cultural and political field20. 
Second (and related to the first point), religious mobilisation tends to have cross- 
class appeal. According to Haldun Gulalp, Islamism as represented by the Refah Party 
was a multi-class political movement which `used class-related issues to promote a 
17 See Rusen Cakir, `Les movements islamistes Turcs et l'Europe', p. 19. See also unpublished paper by 
Nilufer Narli `Urbanization, Structural Change, and the rise of the Islamist movement in Turkey'. 
18 See Baskin Oran, `From Nation to where in globalising Turkey'. See also Metin Heper, `Islam, polity 
and society in Turkey: a Middle Eastern perspective'. 
19 N. Narli, `The tension between the center and peripheral economy and the rise of a counter business elite 
in Turkey'. 
20 This too is in line with Kalyvas' assessment of religious mobilisation; see Kalyvas, `Unsecular politics 
and religious mobilisation', p. 305. See also Nilufer Gole, `Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: the making 
of elites and counter-elites'. The term `Muslim intellectual' is used, in academic texts, interchangeably with 
`Islamic intellectual', or `Islamist intellectual'. The term `Muslim intellectual', as per Meeker's definition, 
refers to elite figures who, mainly as columnists and essayists, critique republican political and cultural 
institutions and call for re-Islamization of the way of life of Turkish believers. See M. Meeker, `The new 
Muslim intellectuals in the Republic of Turkey', p. 189; see also B. Toprak, `Islamist intellectuals: revolt 
against industry and technology'. 
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project of change in lifestyle and to establish its own version of Islamic society'21. As 
political scientist Stathis Kalyvas notes, `religious parties solve the collective action 
problem not through abstract religious ideas but through selective incentives'22. Such 
incentives tend to be based upon provision of local social services (hospitals, clinics, 
legal-aid societies), sponsoring of economic projects (banks, credit and investment 
houses, insurance companies), subsidizing education centres (schools, child-care centers, 
youth camps), and wide networks of religious publishing and broadcasting. It is through 
such policies that Refah was able to secure the support and involvement especially of the 
youth, the economically disadvantaged, and businessmen in the small-to-medium sized 
sectors. According to Nilufer Narli, `the Islamist groups have met their diverse economic 
needs by providing food to the needy, and scholarships and hostel to the university 
students. They have also offered a network to the young graduates looking for jobs, and 
have provided credit to the shop keepers, industrialists and the merchants 123 . 
These points should help us understand Refah's appeal and rise to power. The 
party had many strengths which other political parties lacked. These are summarized by 
one scholar as `money, purpose, and an alternative vision for Turks which has not yet 
been tested... perhaps Refah's strongest advantage is the increasing ineffectiveness of 
Turkey's other political parties'24. Writing at the time of Refah's success, the author of 
this study states as a generally accepted fact that much, if not most, of the party's support 
was driven by economic rather than ideological reasons. While economic conditions 
21 H. Gulalp, `Globalization and political Islam: the social bases of Turkey's Welfare Party', unpublished 
paper. 
22 S. Kalyvas, `Unsecular politics and religious mobilisation', p. 305. 
23 N. Narli, `The tension between the center and the peripheral economy and the rise of a counter business 
elite in Turkey', p. 61. 
24 M. Goksel, `Islamic Fundamentalism in Turkey', unpublished paper. 
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regressed for many Turks, and the secular parties failed to address this, the promise of the 
Welfare, or Prosperity party was especially appealing. The party had worked actively to 
set up an infrastructure throughout the country through which it provided for the needs of 
some of Turkey's poorest, particularly Anatolian peasants, new arrivals to the cities. 
Furthermore, Refah gave special emphasis to certain critical issues which had long been 
neglected by other parties, such as corruption, the problems of the urban poor, and the 
growing lawlessness and social chaos of large Turkish cities. The municipal 
administrations controlled by the Islamist mayors since the 1994 local elections were 
generally well-received, particularly because of their effectiveness in curtailing 
corruption in the city halls and providing municipal services in deprived 
neighbourhoods 25. 
A third factor common to religion-based movements, relevant to the party's 
modified policy on Europe, is that ideology is a poor predictor of their behaviour. Metin 
Heper draws our attention to two related facts: religion is a multi-functional institution, 
and Islam has been used by different groups for entirely different purposes26. Likewise, 
Stathis Kalyvas notes that `religious movements constitute a social and political 
phenomenon that cannot be reduced to the religions from which they sprang up': 
While they emerge in the context of a broad societal diffusion of religious 
symbols, they do not just mobilize existing religious identities; they 
reconstruct them by blending religious, social, economic, and political 
concerns, by synthesizing traditional and modem appeals, and by mixing 
utopian millenarist messages with concrete political action. In short, these 
parties are not just an expression of dormant identities; they redefine these 
identities. In this sense, they are revolutionary and radical not just within 
the context of the political regimes within which they operate but also, and 
this is crucial and often overlooked, [even] within the religious structure 
25 Sabri Sayari, `Turkey's Islamist Challenge'. [accessed online] 
26 M. Heper, `Islam, polity and society in Turkey: a Middle Eastern perspective', p. 346. 
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they claim to uphold and represent. Indeed, their practice more often than 
not diverges in significant ways from their religious matrices. 27 
Accordingly, both Heper and Kalyvas suggest that, rather than examining political 
Islam's ideology, we should consider its leadership and `situational factors' such as the 
cultural, economic, political, and social variables relevant at a given time 2ß. For instance, 
in the case of Refah's policies it is crucial to understand Erbakan as a populist leader, 
variously nationalistic and anti-national29. Specifically in terms of Refah's traditional 
anti-Europeanism, one must also consider the fact that Erbakan played on nationalistic 
reactions--across the political spectrum--to the Luxembourg Summit rejection of Turkey. 
Finally, a fourth element of religious mobilisation, relevant to Refah's changed 
policy on Europe, is that success depends on a party's willingness or ability to moderate 
its stances. According to Kalyvas, religion-based parties often face two major decisions. 
The first decision is whether to modify their religious goals in order to operate within a 
secular and competitive political environment. Kalyvas deems that religious parties are 
generally willing to moderate their stances because of a number of electoral and non- 
electoral constraints: `Although the rise of new parties (of any kind) tends to be fueled by 
"antisystem" positions, the realization that power is within reach creates an incentive to 
moderate so as to appeal to broader sections of the electorate'30. Second, religious parties 
must decide how to moderate. This challenge often leads to a division within the party 
between traditionalists and modernists. 
27 S. Kalyvas, `Unsecular politics and religious mobilisation', p. 303. The reader should be reminded that 
our focus is on Islamism and not on Islam; as Kalyvas notes, `Islamism diverges from traditional Islam in 
that it is thoroughly modem in its leadership and organisation and the articulation of its message' (p. 303). 
28 See M. Heper, `Islam, polity and society in Turkey: a Middle Eastern perspective', p. 347; Kalyvas makes 
this argument with reference to religious movements in general (through a comparison of Islamic 
fundamentalism in the Middle East and European Christian Democracy). 
29 See Sarni Zubaida, `Trajectories of political Islam: Egypt, Iran and Turkey'. 
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Political Islamist anti-Europeanism and its constraints 
In the Turkish case we see both these principles (moderation in response to 
electoral and non-electoral constraints, and divisions within the movement) through 
Refah's tendency to moderation, and in its successor party, Fazilet's, split between 
traditionalists and modernisers. The traditionalists were led by Recai Kutan. The 
modernizers were led by Abdullah Gut (and, informally, by Tayyip Erdogan). Since 
Fazilet was closed in June 2001, the division between modernists and traditionalists has 
taken institutional form, with the Justice and Development Party (AKP) formed under the 
leadership of Tayyip Erdogan and the Saadet (`Happiness' or `Contentment') Party led by 
Recai Kutan. In light of the above, it is helpful to consider in greater depth the various 
constraints faced by political Islamism. Accordingly, I now focus on a series of electoral 
and non-electoral constraints on Refah which may shed light on its change from an anti- 
European stance to an openly pro-European platform. 
Electoral constraints 
Our attention to Refah's appeal explains, relatively clearly, the party's steady 
growth from 1991 to 1995 (from 10% in the 1991 parliamentary elections, 19% of the 
vote and control of the government of several large cities, including Istanbul and Ankara, 
in the 1994 municipal elections, to 21% of the vote in the 1995 parliamentary elections- 
the largest percentage won by any political party). However, Refah's ascendancy to the 
premiership-albeit with this high percentage of the vote-was intricate and shifty. As 
30S. Kalyvas, `Unsecular politics and religious mobilisation', p. 309. 
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one analyst noted at the time, `the coalition is the product of the cynical opportunism that 
currently afflicts Turkish society' 31 
Refah's path from the December 1995 success to leadership of a coalition owed 
much to the tensions between Tansu Ciller and Mesut Yilmaz before and after the 
collapse of the former's coalition government in September 1995. Personal-style 
accusations flowed between the two quite publicly, with Ciller referring to Yilmaz as `a 
political disaster', and Yilmaz labelling Ciller `the worst Prime Minister the Turks have 
seen'32. In the ensuing parliamentary elections Refah gained a majority of the votes but 
not enough to rule on its own, whilst Ciller and Yilmaz' parties fell closely behind Refah 
in terms of number of votes won. President Suleyman Demirel was expected to invite 
Erbakan to form a government, but the other parties declared they would not enter a 
coalition with Erbakan because of his anti-western policies. Ciller in particular decried 
Erbakan's political movement as a threat to Turkish secularism and to the nation's 
western orientation33. A coalition between Ciller and Yilmaz' parties was the obvious 
solution, the two parties having similar platforms. Within three months (by June 1996), 
the coalition collapsed due to in-fighting and to corruption charges launched against 
Ciller by Erbakan. With Yilmaz' refusal of a proposed coalition with Erbakan, on the 
one hand, and Ciller's potential freedom from the corruption charges (pending a Refah 
31 `Turkey: new government, continuing uncertainty', in CSIS Turkey Update, August 1996. [accessed online] 
32 James A. Jackson, `Shotgun Marriage', Time International, Vol. 147, No. 12,18 March 1996 [accessed 
online]. According to Jackson, `they accuse each other of corruption, and each has denounced the other as 
liar and traitor on at least three nationally televised occasions'. 
33 In fact, on her 1995 trip to Europe to plea for fulfilment of the Customs Union with Turkey, Ciller 
heavily emphasized the danger facing Turkey if Erbakan's anti-Europeanism were encouraged by a rebuff 
from Europe. She made strong references to `the fundamentalists' and their `deceptive attachment to 
democracy'. See `Ciller to Europe', Turkish Daily News, 3 November 1995. [accessed online] 
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`no' vote to the investigation's continuation), on the other, the unlikely political marriage 
between Ciller and Erbakan resulted 34 
An examination of the circumstances which led to Refah's ascendancy reveals a 
change in Erbakan's anti-European rhetoric even before assuming office. This changed 
perspective dates from the December 1995 parliamentary elections when the party 
received the largest majority of votes, but not enough to govern on its own. According to 
one journalist writing on the day after the 1995 parliamentary elections, `Mr. Erbakan's 
extravagant anti-western and anti-Zionist rhetoric proved to be far worse than his bite. 
Even as the election results were coming in, Bahri Zengin, a close advisor, was 
modifying a pledge to "tear up" a recently approved customs union with the European 
Union, saying the party would "renegotiate" the deal 735. Thus, Erbakan changed his tone 
on knowing he would have to form a coalition with at least one of two leading western- 
leaning opposition groups (The True Path and Motherland Parties). 
Non-electoral constraints 
As Stathis Kalyvas notes, because many religious parties operate in semi- 
authoritarian environments, they face heavy non-electoral constraints. Such constraints 
often come from ruling elites which control, or are closely intertwined with, military 
establishments: `When this is the case victorious religious parties will have to moderate 
34Furthermore, the corruption charges against Ciller proved an important bargaining chip for Erbakan, as he 
was able to use it to negotiate his role as Prime Minister for the start of the term, with Ciller serving as 
Foreign Minister. See `RP concession to DYP for coalition', Turkish Daily News, 19 June 1996. [accessed 
online] 
35 Andrew Finkel, `Ciller stays as caretaker amid search for coalition', The Times, 26 December 1995. 
[accessed online] 
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in order to accede to power, otherwise the military will be likely to subvert their victory 
(and the process of democratisation)'36. In the case of Refah, we clearly see how the 
non-electoral constraints imposed by the National Security Council limited Erbakan's 
anti-European policies. 
During his campaign for the premiership Erbakan had voiced pointed complaints 
about Turkey's efforts to join the European Union and, in particular, about the Customs 
Union. He referred to the agreement negotiated by former Prime Minister Tansu Ciller as 
a `Frankenstein' which would make Turks `servants of the infidel' and pledged to destroy 
it37. Erbakan had long been identifying the European Community as a Christian Club and 
proposing an Islamic Union and Islamic Common Market in opposition to the EC. 
Indeed, as expression of both an anti-Europeanism and an intention to turn Turkey's 
orientation eastward, Erbakan also proposed an Islamic United Nations, an Islamic 
NATO, and the introduction of an Islamic currency in Turkey38. Furthermore, Refah 
pledged to cancel Operation Provide Comfort39 and Turkey's military arrangements with 
Israel. Erbakan's actions drew considerable international attention40. While in office he 
only visited Islamic countries such as Iran, Libya and Nigeria. Erbakan's travels to the 
Middle East were part of his efforts to establish the D-8, a framework for co-operation 
36 S. Kalyvas, `Unsecular politics and religious mobilisation', p. 313. 
37 Mehmed Ali Kislali and James Wilde, `Odd couple in power', in Time International, Vol. 148, No. 4,22 
July 1996. [accessed online] 
38 James Dorsey, `European Rebuffs Strengthen Erbakan's dreams of closer Islamic ties', The Washington 
Report, March 1997. [accessed online] 
39 The U. S. -led force stationed in southeastern Turkey to protect the Kurds of northern Iraq against the 
wrath of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. See James Dorsey, `Erbakan Striking a balance between Islamic 
neighbours and Secular Army', The Washington Report, October 1996. [accessed online] 
40 To be sure, the United States, rather than the EU, voiced the greatest concerns about Erbakan's politices: 
`while Mr. Erbakan's moves appear so far to have put a dent in US efforts to isolate Iran, they have done 
little to provoke great concern among Europeans already up in arms about US efforts to restrict their trade 
not only with Iran, but also with Libya'. `I'm certainly not being flooded with calls from Brussels', stated 
Alexander Borges Gomez, a senior EU diplomat in Ankara at the time. See J. Dorsey, `Erbakan Striking a 
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between eight Islamic countries. The trip to Libya was especially controversial and an 
embarrassment for Erbakan as, in his press conference with Khaddafi, the latter criticised 
Turkey for its attitude towards the Kurds and pressed for recognition of an independent 
Kurdish state. 
In the end, Erbakan's only major dealing with the EU was the rejection of an 
invitation to dine with EU leaders during their February 1997 Dublin summit41. His 
explanation was delivered on clearly nationalist lines which were generally well-received 
in Turkey: Erbakan refused to attend because the dinner was scheduled after the end of 
the summit, when some of the leaders would have already departed. This invitation was 
an insult to Turkey: `Turkey is a powerful country at the centre of the world. The 
European countries have to review their policies on world affairs and on Islam. That is 
why we are warning them'42. His decision to reject the EU invitation received the 
support of Ciller at the time and was reinforced by media opinion. 
In terms of all other policies related to the EU and `the West', however, Erbakan's 
actions while in office were severely restricted by the coalition and by the active role 
taken by the military-dominated National Security Council in influencing the 
government. His pledges to cancel Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) and to end all 
agreements with Israel came to nothing. OPC was extended twice during Erbakan's rule, 
and three additional military-related agreements were signed with Israel. Nor were there 
balance between Islamic neighbours and Secular Army', The Washington Report, October 1996. [accessed 
online] 
41 See Ilnur Cevik `Victory in the East, setbacks in the West', in Turkish Daily News 17 December 1996 
[accessed online]: according to Cevik, `Prime Minister Erbakan once gain was proven right with his 
decision not to attend a dinner given in his honor by the Dublin Summit leaders'. See also Stephen Kinzer, 
`Empty seat at dinner signals Turkey's sensitivity over role', in New York Times, 11 December 1996. 
[accessed online] 
42 Stephen Kinzer, `Empty seat at dinner signals Turkey's sensitivity over role', in New York Times, 11 
December 1996. [accessed online] 
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any moves to cancel European agreements already in progress43. Parallel to these 
limitations on Erbakan's foreign policy were, of course, those aimed to curb the domestic 
force of Islamism through the February 28`x' process (which, as noted in chapter five, led 
to Erbakan's ousting from power and ban from future political activity). 
Questioned sincerity 
In view of these limitations -both electoral and non-electoral constraints-it is 
difficult to judge Erbakan and Refah's true intentions and the extent of their anti- 
westernness and anti-Europeanness. Most foreign observers and many of the Turkish 
elites consulted for this study refer to the February 28`h process as the turning point in 
political Islamists' anti-European attitudes. `They learned their lesson' is one of the 
most popular of analyses. More cynical views consider the change to be post-February 
28th political opportunism: it was the only way to save themselves, as Erbakan rushed to 
European judicial processes hoping for a reversal of his party's, and his personal, ban 
from politics. 
Takiye is a word of Arabic origin, variously defined as `presenting yourself as 
something you are not', or `hiding your true identity in order to preserve yourself 45. The 
term was used by many of this study's interviewees to explain Turkish Islamists' 
European orientation. According to Rusen Cakir (respected journalist and specialist on 
43 J. Dorsey, `Erbakan Striking a balance between Islamic neighbours and Secular Army', The Washington 
Report, Oct 1996. [accessed online] 
44 This and the following section draw on information from over 100 interviews conducted in Turkey with 
religious and political leaders, scholars, journalists and businessmen, conducted in June, July and 
September 2000 and May 2001. This section on `Questioned sincerity' refers to interviews with secular- 
minded elites, whiles the next section focuses on religion-minded elites. See Appendix for further details. 
45 The Arabic spelling is 'takiyye'. 
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Islamism in Turkey), instead of trying to understand the real causes of this change over 
the last 10 years, many observers have tried to simplify the issue by considering the 
change a matter of takiye, `just as they did each time they faced an issue which did not fit 
the typical Islamist image in their minds746 
Interview research with the Turkish secular-minded elite reveals an acute division 
on the question of whether the Islamist change in perspective on Europe may be 
considered sincere. On the one hand, we have lively discussions about the compatibility 
of Islam with democracy, the benefits Islamists expect European Union membership 
would bring in terms of enhanced democracy and freedom in Turkey, and their desire to 
be a bridge between Europe and the East. Relatively more cynical views consider that a 
change of perspective has indeed taken place, but only through the experiences of the 
Refah Party as they have realized that they've no other choice but to follow the path of 
Turkey's Europeanisation - as pursued by the secular elite. On the other hand, though, 
there is the sentiment within certain segments of Turkish society, and particularly within 
the hardline secularist political elites47, that no sincere change of Islamists' perspectives 
has taken place: Islam cannot be compatible with democracy, and Turkish Islamists 
continue to hope and strive toward the establishment of an Islamist state and a return to 
the sharia. Furthermore, Islamists are identified by such individuals as a threat to the 
secular state and, thus, to Turkey's western and European orientation. Islamists are also, 
perhaps more poignantly, regarded as a threat to national unity by encouraging division 
46 R. Cakir, `The Westernisation process of the Islamists', pp. 50- 51. [in Turkish]. In Cakir's estimation, 
`takiye' does not apply in this case; rather, Islamists have undergone a sincere alteration in their attitudes 
towards Europe, unwillingly but necessarily. He contends that Islamists are `at the very beginning, the first 
steps towards westernisation'; they defend some general principles, but they cannot support these in detail- 
-only superficially. Cakir, believes that, while the outcome of this process is not certain, there will definitely 
be no traces of classical Islamism. 
47 Especially the National Security Council. 
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within society. Selected interviews are referenced below merely to present the broad 
spectrum of opinion which arose through the research. 
As noted above, in accordance with political science theories about religious 
mobilisation, it is quite logical that Refah would use the strategy of conforming to the 
Turkish political system and thus drop its anti-European stance, in order to be able to 
participate in the political process. It also makes sense that once ousted from its 
leadership role, Refah would be even more emphatically pro-European in order to protect 
political Islam's right to future existence through other parties. Such realpolitik. is what 
many `secular-minded' Turkish elites attribute the Islamists' changed perspective to. 
Opinion varies, however, as to exactly when the change came about. Dr. Nilufer Narli 
states plainly that Fazilet's embracing of Turkish EU membership was a defence 
mechanism following the 1997 military intervention in politics. According to Professor 
Nilufer Gole, Islamists began transforming themselves after they were `ridiculed for their 
experiment of going to their Muslim brothers' [with reference to Erbakan's trip to Libya]; 
`this is realpolitik: encounter with reality changes your ideological stand'. Ambassador 
(ret. ) Cem Duna argues that the Islamists `changed overnight': they are pro-European 
today because they realised that democracy is something good for them as well. 
Professor Metin Heper, on the other hand, takes a broader perspective of the Islamist 
movement from its earliest political formations to the present, and ascertains that 
Islamists changed slowly, becoming more secular with each successive political party: 
`they saw their parties could not survive as only religion-oriented, so they began 
providing goods and services.. . now the religion-oriented party48 is no longer anti- 
system'. Likewise, Professor Halil. Berktay explains in theoretical terms that the closer 
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doctrinaire parties come to power, the less they can remain doctrinaire, pure and 
radical-thus also indicating a gradual change. 
According to Professor Soli Ozel, Refah learned, or received, a precious lesson in 
1997; `how much of it they actually learned, or are willing to learn, or are able to apply, 
we don't know'. This point raises the question of sincerity, or level of sincerity in any 
case. Nilufer Gole also notes that, though Islamists are transforming themselves, their 
current,. strong pro-Europeanness is not accompanied by any greater degree of 
preparation for membership: `they haven't thought about what they need to do'. Her 
stance regarding Islamists' future co-operation with Europe is cautious: `We will see. 
That's experimentation'. Nilufer Narli too tempers a comment on the current, 
overwhelming pro-EU sentiment amongst Islamists by questioning the extent to which 
they like the EU, or feel comfortable in it49. Cern Duna states emphatically that 
Islamists' support of EU membership should in no way be interpreted as an indication of 
their understanding of Europe as `the idea', or of identifying Turkey within that 
understanding. 
According to Ambassador (ret. ) Gunduz Aktan's strict assessment, `Islamists 
want Europe to soften secularism'. Religious groups are very pro-EU because they 
expect enhanced democracy and freedom there, `but they don't want freedom. They have 
it in Turkey'. `They want more', he argues, citing Erbakan's earlier stated wish for a 
dual-legal system as an example. Professor Sule Kut. believes that political Islamists have 
gone through a metamorphosis and indicates that she is not sure `whether they have 
arrived yet'. Like Aktan, though, she places their motives with regards to EU 
48 Fazilet Party, at the time of the interview. 
49 This, according to Narli, will take interviews to know. See section below on Islamist elite opinions. 
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membership into question: `they have a false consciousness that the EU or ECHR will be 
their saviours; they think that their religious freedom will be preserved by the EU, but 
they have this much freedom in Turkey'. Kut cites the headscarf issue as an example, in 
that France and Germany have also had struggles similar to those in Turkey over 
government policies on the wearing of headscarves in public spaces (and in schools and 
universities in particular). Nilufer Narli also chooses the headscarf issue to demonstrate 
how the Islamists are `creating a myth': they want the EU for enhanced freedom of 
religious expression, and think the headscarf issue will be solved, but they are 
overlooking, for instance, the French experience with the headscarf issue'. It is important 
to note, however, that many interviewees cited the split in the political Islamist 
movement between reformers and traditionalists as evidence of a sincere change on the 
part of the reformers. 
Thus we have a range of perspectives as to why the change came about and 
whether it is sincere. What is important to note is that the overwhelming majority of 
secular-minded respondents consider the change a direct effect of the February 28th 
process, rather than a gradual modification of previous stances on Europe as might come 
with shedding of Islamic orthodoxy or traditionalism. Likewise, the majority consider 
the change either merely tactical or simply naive. Again, the prevalence of these 
sentiments amongst `mainstream' Turkish elites is especially significant as it is on the 
basis of mistrust of Islamists' motivations that the National Security Council has 
continually pursued strict secularist measures-measures which are increasingly 
identified as anti-democratic and thus barriers to Turkish membership in the European 
Union. 
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Islamist perspectives 
We will pay considerably more attention here to Islamists' own explanations for 
their current pro-Europeanness. I shall address both the opinions of individuals formally 
part of political Islamist movements, and those of other elite figures who identify religion 
as a primary aspect of their identities. It is significant to note that several individuals 
consulted for this study objected to a self-distinction of `religious' or `secular', stating 
that they were both religious and in support of secular institutions50. It must also be 
emphasised that these are elite opinions; many of these interviewees admitted that it is a 
struggle to convince their `masses' of their opinions on Europe51. 
Islamists' accounts of their changed perspective also reveal a broad spectrum of 
opinion, ranging from survivalist attitudes, expressions of a heightened desire for 
improved democracy, to assertions that the change to pro-Europeanness has been a 
gradual process, stemming from issues beyond secularist policies. In explaining reasons 
for the change in political Islamist perspective on EU membership, Abdullah Gul 
declares that `we now realize we will have more freedom there than in our own country'. 
Gul indicates his personal preference for bilateral relations with the EU but, `because 
democracy and human rights standards are low in Turkey, and because internal 
li 
50 Such statements came in response to the question `would you classify yourself as religious or secular? '; 
certain respondents explained that a person cannot be secular, only institutions. Their perspectives on 
whether Turkish institutions are actually secular, in terms of separation of `church' and `state' are 
addressed below. It should be noted that these interviewees have not identified themselves as Islamists; I 
have classified them as such here on the basis of the definition of `Islamist' provided in chapter five. 
51 An ANAR report reveals that, in terms of grassroots support of Turkish membership in the EU, the AKP 
ranks second to last, above only the Saadet's grassroots support (69 and 56% respectively). See T. Akyol, 
`For the love of Europe! '. See also A. Carkoglu, `Who wants full membership? Characteristics of Turkish 
public support for EU membership'. But more important to the present analysis is the interaction between a 
strongly pro-EU political Islamist structure and the Turkish state structure (i. e., the elite and institutional 
level). For more on Islam at the grassroots level, see Mehmet Tokay, Islamic Identity and Development. 
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dynamism is not, and will not be, sufficient to bring about the necessary changes, we are 
obliged to join'. For his part, Tayyip Erdogan admits that he, in line with the Refah 
Party, was against membership in the EC/EU because of the perceived religious prejudice 
coming from Europe. `But now, especially for universal rights, human rights, 
democracy, freedoms, rule of law, freedom of finance, I no longer think so'. Together 
these two political Islamist opinions are representative of the new pro-Europeanness 
within political Islam: a negative, defensive and survivalist attitude with regard to the 
Turkish internal political situation; a positive embrace of European democracy; and an 
explicit shelving of previous anti-European feeling which was based on a sense of 
prejudice coming from Europe 52 
Islamists outside the realm of politics also offer their considerations of how and 
why political Islam changed its stance on Europe, ranging from sympathetic to very 
critical. According to journalist Fehmi Koru, `February 28`''' changed political Islam, but 
Erbakan's current pro-Europeanism, and that of Islamists in general, is the result of a 
process. First, Erbakan was against the EU because it was a kind of Christian Club, and 
was afraid that with membership, Muslims would somehow `lose ground', and Christian 
missionaries would be all around; `but without Turkey's membership, Turkey has 
become as such' [i. e., with Muslims losing ground and infiltrated by Christian 
missionaries]. Second, according to Koru, Erbakan's previous anti-European stance 
stemmed from his fear that the Turkish economy would be negatively affected; `but this 
is not the case, and I think he realised this'. Other `religious' perspectives present a 
52 For academic studies on the potential effects of EU membership on Turkey's human rights provisions, 
see Bertil Duner and Edward Deverell, `Country cousin: Turkey, the European Union and human rights', 
and I. Dagi, `The politics of promoting human rights: Turkey and western diplomacy', unpublished paper. 
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relatively harsh assessment of political Islam's change. According to Tayyar Altikulac53, 
Refah's pro-Europeanism stems clearly from the electoral constraints faced by Erbakan 
in his efforts to form a governing coalition with Ciller. Refah's change in perspective 
`has nothing to do with the February 28th process' but can be understood, rather, as 
political convenience: `they dropped their anti-EU stance... in order to open more 
political space for themselves. These are political manoeuvres'. All parties more or less 
misuse religion, contends Altikulac, and they see that nobody gained from this; `the 
party which misused religion the most got the worst lesson. I think Turkey lived this 
process and it came to an end'. Likewise, journalist and Muslim intellectual Kazim 
Gulecguz takes a critical stance on Refah's motivation for change. The most hard-line 
opposition to EU membership was from Refah voters, he notes, and now even they want 
to join: `we believe the Refah party interpreted religion wrongly. They saw democracy 
as a means, not an end. After February 28th, they learned the true value of democracy. 
They ended up fighting in European courts after their party's closure. People have 
understood that we are in a world of globalisation. We can exist in the world with the 
Islamic culture'. The most critical stance against Refah and its intentions, though, comes 
from Alevi spokesman Izzetin Dogan: `they were against Europe, tried to establish an 
Islamic common market, etc., and now, if they seemed to change, their idea is not a 
sincere change. Because in Europe and in the EU, they will have the opportunity for a 
much more liberal expression of their ideas and, once they come to power, they will say 
"it's until here.. . now we will create our own [Islamic] federation"'. 
These opinions are noteworthy especially for two reasons. First, for the varying 
degrees of explicit self-distancing from political Islam. Second, for the diversity of 
53 Former director of Diyanet and ex-MP for the True Path Party (DYP). 
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opinion we see here-which discourages generalisations about Turkish Islamists. As 
Peter Berger notes, we must be sensitive to differences amongst Islamists, often 
stemming from Sunni and Shiite distinctions, but also within each of these traditions: 
`Where the political circumstances allow it, there is a lively discussion about the 
relationship of Islam to various modem realities, and there are sharp disagreements 
between individuals who are equally committed to a revitalised Islam'54. This clearly 
applies to Turkish Islamist stances on political Islam, as well as to their perspectives on 
Europe, as we shall see below. 
In explaining their own reasons for their pro-EU stances, in general we see 
aspects of both realism and ideology in Islamists' views. Ali Bayramonglu55 reflects a 
realistic standpoint: `there are problems in Turkey, such as limitations of freedom and 
Article 312. These problems make some, especially intellectuals, think that Turkey will 
not be able to change these laws. But if we join the EU, we will be able to make these 
changes more easily. Those who are pro-EU are so first for economic reasons, and 
second for solving democratic problems'. Journalist Bulent Kanes, displaying a more 
ideologically-based view, identifies both an awakened need for greater democracy and 
other factors for changed Islamist perspectives on Europe. He contends that the February 
28th process was an important element, influential in terms of teaching the Islamic circles 
the importance of democracy; `before February 28`x', Islamic communities had not . 
encountered a real danger to themselves'. But, whilst a very strong factor in the change, 
Kanes argues that it is a social process: `we saw the realities of the world. As religious 
54 Peter Berger, `Secularism in retreat', p. 43. 
ss At the time of the interview, General Director of MUSIAD (Independent Industrialist's and 
Businessmen's Association, considered the Islamist equivalent of the politically influential TUSIAD, 
Turkish Industrialist's and Businessmen's Association). 
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groups became increasingly active in political, economic, and social circles in Turkey and 
made real contact with the Turkish system, they had to leave behind the utopia in which 
they were living'. Speaking specifically on the popular and now global Islamic group to 
which he belonged, the Gulen Cemaat, Kanes explains that, `they saw the US, Europe, 
saw the importance of democracy in those countries and the vision of these people'. 
The Fethullah Gulen group was, indeed, one of the first Turkish Islamist groups to 
openly change from anti-European to pro-European attitudes. This has to do with, as 
mentioned by Kanes, the relatively greater international exposure of the group. Still, two 
members of a Fetullah Gulen-based Journalists' and Writers' Association express reasons 
for their pro-European stances mostly related to secularist-Islamist tensions within 
Turkey. Mustafa Armagan communicates his hopes for broader horizons for Turks: 
someone who has established himself in Germany has a better position than him because 
of education and opportunities. Instead, in Turkey he has been subjected to structural 
violence, constrained and victimized, and thus restricted in his ability to contribute more 
to humanity. Cemal Ussak, the Association's director, states similar reasons for his wish 
for Turkish membership in the European Union: `the EU means for me to live my 
religion privately and freely. But in Turkey, people do not feel free. I feel more free as a 
Muslim in Germany, so how can I be anti-EU? What is important is to live as a Muslim, 
freely'. 
The Nurcu group lays even earlier claims to pro-Europeanness56. Offering a 
voice representative of the Nurcu perspective, Kazim Gulecguz cites the ideas of Said-I 
Nursi, the founder of the Nurcu group: `Said-I Nursi says there are two Europes. The 
first, the Christian Europe, leads Europeans to promote human rights and justice. The 
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second Europe is extreme secularism without any beliefs. We love the first Europe. 
According to us, there is no problem from a religious perspective. We are open to the 
world'. 
Thus pro-Europeanism is not a purely post-February 28th phenomenon for all 
religious elites57. It is, however, in contrast with the general anti-Europeanism which 
existed in the past amongst Islamist groups in Turkey. When asked how Islamists 
reconcile their past anti-Europeanism with their current views, Armagan cautions us to 
distinguish between facts and ideology. The fact is that, considering the Turkish 
communities living in Germany, Islamists have no problem going to Europe. 
Ideologically, though, they may have a negative view, because of historical prejudices: 
relations with Europe were a central component in the construction of Turkish national 
identity (as is the case with European identity formed in relation to Turkey). `There is, 
then', he argues, `a fundamental conflict between ideology and facts'. Furthermore, such 
a negative prejudice against Europe reigned in Turkey especially in the 1970's and 80's; 
`in the 80's and 90's Europe presented itself freely and technologically. Europe has 
changed, and Turkey has changed'. Armagan considers the reduction in tension against 
the EU in general, and within political Islam specifically, proof that the ideological 
approaches are being replaced by factual developments-developments which, he posits, 
can be explained by secularisation-modernisation theories. 
Ali Bulac, a renowned Muslim intellectual, accounts for past Islamist anti- 
Europeanism in terms of reaction to a religious prejudice coming from Europe: `before, 
56 The Fethullanci are a splinter group of the Nurcu. See chapter five. 
57 The discussion of `liberal Islam' beyond the Turkish case, including the compatibility of Islam with 
democracy and with European norms is vast, and beyond the scope of this chapter. For a brief introduction, 
see C. Kurzman, `Liberal Islam: Prospects and challenges'. 
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the Germans-especially the Christian Democrats-were the governing part of the EU, 
and they see the EU as a Christian Club'. This, Bulac emphasises, provides the main 
reason for past anti-Europeanism amongst Islamists-perceptions that the EU is 
exclusive. But because `Turkey is very top in suppression of religion', Islamists have 
begun to see the EU as a community in which religious freedom is protected (Bulac uses 
the example of freedom for women to wear the headscarf in European universities). 
However, the change in perspective also has to do with globalisation and the greater 
interconnectedness of people in general, and with economics: `we want to grow 
economically with Europe. Muslim business too is suppressed58. `Muslim business' is 
restricted in its investments in Turkey, according to Bulac, which leads Islamists to invest 
elsewhere. Turkish economic and judicial systems are hard to change, Bulac declares; 
membership in the EU will help bring about change. 
Others explain past anti-European sentiment with reference to the even longer 
history of antagonism between the Ottoman Empire and Christian Europe. Ahmet 
Helvaci, secretary general of MUSIAD, says this past cannot be forgotten easily, neither 
by Turks, `nor by Europeans, considering their history books'. Religion plays an 
important role in this historical prejudice. Furthermore, he states apologetically, `it was 
not easy for Turkey, especially for those Turks who think of Ottoman times as our glory 
days, it was not easy for them to accept the superiority of Europeans. They were thinking 
again, as in the past, Europeans will dominate us'. This is not a nationalistic feeling, he 
argues; `it's just that at one time we were shaping European history, now we are in the 
palm of [Europe's] hand, a pawn in [Europe's] game. Because the Ottoman Empire's 
58 During the interview Bulac brought up the case of the Kombasa Holding Company's owner who 
publically vowed to supply the Turkish government with the necessary funds to pay off IMF debts `if you 
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confrontation with Europe was not just economic and political but had cultural and 
religious dimensions as well'. Still, he concludes by saying that the change in Islamists' 
perspective was inevitable, for social, economic and cultural reasons. Professor Ahmet 
Davutoglu also explains past Islamist anti-Europeanism first in terms of the long 
historical imagination that Europe tried to colonise Turkey, and second as an expressed 
desire for national sovereignty, for `a strong Turkey, independent of foreign 
intervention'. Religion is part of this, he argues, but not the only reason. As insight into 
current Islamist pro-Europeanism, Davutoglu gives details of such social, economic and 
cultural reasons as Helvaci may have been referring to: the new perspective, he argues, 
stems from three facts. First, Turkish Muslims have suffered a great deal under several 
anti-religious practices, and have grown to see secularism as `another religion'. Second, 
Islamists think that in Europe there will be more freedom (also citing the headscarf issue 
as an example). Third, Muslims today, unlike in the 50's and 60's, are not confined to 
small, closed communitarian groups. Muslim businessmen are traveling all over the 
world, and want to have a direct path into Europe. Current Islamists, Davutoglu 
emphasises, also include intellectuals who want to have enhanced connections with 
Europe and all over the world, and who seek a more global rather'than a local approach. 
Three of the main criticisms launched by the secular-minded elite with reference 
to Islamists' pro-Europeanism are that they are creating a myth (especially with their 
expectations related to the headscarf); that Islamists are blatantly insincere and have not 
changed fundamentally to become more open; and that they are naive (not really 
knowing, or not having really thought through what membership entails). We have seen, 
take away restrictions from us' (in Bulac's words). 
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thus far, information in support of the first criticism, through interviewees' frequent 
references to the headscarf issue in their explanations of their pro-European feeling. 
With reference to the second major criticism launched by secular-minded elites- 
that no real change amongst Islamists has taken place-the views offered by two 
Islamists could perhaps be considered to support this claim. Both Fehmi Koru and Nazli 
Ilicak59 explain that a major motivation for Islamist pro-Europeanism is the thought that 
EU membership will provide Islamists with the chance to `expand themselves' in Europe. 
For example, with reference to his statement noted earlier about Christian missionaries 
proliferating in Turkey, Koru states: 
[B]ut this without the benefit of Muslim movement in Europe. 
Membership means many Muslims will also have the position to affect 
European minds... Muslims can adapt to new circumstances. We have 2 
million Muslims living in Germany, and they are more religious than 
they would be in Turkey now. Some discovered religion there, in 
Europe. And they live freely. So there is no real obstacle in the minds 
of Muslims to becoming a member of the EU60 
Meanwhile, Nazli Ilicak says that Turkey is already culturally attacked, by European and 
US films. Thus membership `will not change things religiously. ' On the contrary, she 
adds, `it will give us the opportunity to spread'. In fact, she goes further to declare: `we 
think that we will dominate. First, we have a strong army. Second, Turks can work for 
less money, but make more money. There will be no cultural threat, and it will give us 
the opportunity to spread there'. 
With reference to the third criticism-concerning naivete with regards to EU 
membership-Islamist elites were asked if they felt membership might threaten Turkish 
59 Part of the `reformist' wing of the former Fazilet Party, and one of the two Members of Parliament which 
was convicted, with the Party, for posing a threat to the secular state. 
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Islamic values. According to Tayyar Altikulac, there are Turks who feel they will lose 
their values if Turkey enters the EU, an observation which leads him to identify religion 
as the primary obstacle to Turkey's membership in the EU. But he proceeds to state his 
own view that `this should not be, and is not, an obstacle. Europeans have unnecessary 
doubts and don't express them openly61. And on the Turkish side, there is no foundation 
to their concern: if you want to lose your values, even now, you can easily do so. ' He 
feels, rather, that Turkey will benefit from entering the EU. Abdullah Gul also holds the 
view that membership represents no threat to Turkish Islamic identity. The EU, 
according to Gul, is secular: `they don't involve in your religion and religious activities. 
That's good. That's enough. ' As for loss of Muslim identity, he posits that `you cannot 
prevent something by keeping yourself out. Islam is broad, and is not against science or 
development. With freedom to educate oneself, you can keep your own identity'. The 
EU does not want us to change our religion, notes Tayyip Erdogan, `it is not one of the 
criteria. We as individuals can be a part of any kind of society with our belief. Turkish 
Muslims do not have a problem with integration, but in terms of assimilation, that 
becomes hard. If Europe wants to go through assimilation, there will be a problem. ' But, 
citing the example of the UK, integrated in the EU but opting out of the monetary union, 
Erdogan notes `there's no negative thinking about the UK. ' Asked whether he expected 
`negative thinking' from the EU towards Turkey for the latter's resistance to assimilation 
in some respects, Erdogan asserts: `we haven't yet solved our integration problems; 
assimilation will come later'. 
60 Koru, at this point in the interview, was not expressing his own opinion, but elucidating his perception of 
the bulk of Islamist pro-Europeanism. 
61 Altikulac states, earlier in the interview, that Europeans are afraid to have a Muslim member state in the 
EU. 
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These opinions may perhaps be considered naive, if only in their optimism, or, in 
Erdogan's case, in the deferment of certain crucial questions to do with assimilation. 
Other interviewees, however, express well thought-out concerns about ways membership 
may jeopardize their interests as practicing Muslims. For example, Cemal Ussak feels 
that EU membership does not present a threat to Islamic identity, but it may negatively 
affect Turkish family values. Mustafa Armagan believes that there will be some conflict 
in the sphere of religion if Turkey joins the EU: `in Europe, religion is well-established in 
the social sphere; in Turkey, there is a vacuum here. If Turkey enters the EU, it will be 
difficult to fill this vacuum'. Abdurrahman Dilipak62 is much more explicit in his 
concerns: `There will be problems. I am concerned about our souls, because the 
European way of life, sex, drugs, etc. will definitely come here. These problems are 
contagious, and I'm not sure that they will be controlled if they come to a society like 
Turkey'. Yet he proceeds to declare that he is not opposed to membership in the EU, 
stating that Islam is open to the world: `Islam wants to express itself within other 
religions... Islam is for peaceful coexistence, pluralism, etc. '. `But', he admits, `not all 
the Muslims today think the same way'. 
Also important with reference to the question of Islamists' naivete are the serious 
reservations expressed by certain interviewees, as well as openly ambivalent stances, on 
EU membership. Muslim intellectuals Ali Bulac and Ahmet Davutoglu present their 
carefully-measured critiques of the EU. For Bulac, there is a critical problem in that 
`European democracy is not culturally plural. There is political pluralism, but not 
cultural'. If cultural pluralism cannot be established in institutional terms, Bulac 
62 Journalist for far-right newspaper Akit and well known in Turkey for his strictly conservative 
perspectives. 
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declares, `we will be administered by Brussels, and I am very afraid of this. With such a 
big state, what will happen to the little people, to the civilians? ' Bulac expresses his clear 
dislike of trends towards `the standardisation of everything... which leads people to be 
like social puppets. We have to keep our freedom to have a critical view against the 
technocrats and the bureaucrats who define these standards'. Davutoglu is also resistant 
to such domination by the EU: `A self-confident Muslim is not afraid of interaction with 
Europe. But a two-way relationship must be established. Such a relationship cannot 
exist when Turkey feels a passive follower of a Euro-centric development'. The 
important thing, "argues Davutoglu, is `our dignity-we can't sacrifice our own values, 
and culture, in our relations. We would prefer dignity rather than wealth'. 
The most extreme expression of reservations comes from Abdurrahman Dilipak. 
Dilipak declares that he `cannot say yes or no at the moment' to Turkish membership in 
the EU: `It depends on the conditions of accession. The economic, political and cultural 
freedoms prevalent in European countries is desirable. But it depends on whether these 
conditions will be put in front of Turkey as well'. Dilipak has considerable doubts as to 
whether this will be the case: `Turkey's Islamic identity creates some problems, because 
Islam is not only a creed, but a whole civilisational philosophy. The problem is to see 
whether Europe and its institutions can cope with this civilisation and with those 
institutions. Many of the values and beliefs that have existed in Europe will be shaken 
totally when they enter into contact with Islam'. This belief leads him to the defensive 
conclusion that 
[T]hat's what stands behind the pressure on Turkey which they [the EU] 
impose (eg., measures against compulsory religious courses in schools, 
the problems at universities with headscarves)-these are attempts to 
create a mosque like a church, an imam like the priest, a Koran like the 
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Bible, finally, a Muslim like the Christian. So the thing is, whether we 
will accept this project or not. Carrot or stick? 
Thus, while he states that he is not against EU membership for Turkey, neither does he 
desire membership specifically for the improvement of human rights, democracy, etc, 
`because I don't trust that the Europeans will provide that'. Dilipak's mistrust of Europe 
is extensive, and he outlines two ways in which he believes Europe is less than honest 
with Turkey. First, he argues that the factories `they' build in Turkey are those they 
would not build in their own countries [for reasons of pollution]: `My fear is that we will 
be like a bad guy of Europe'. Second, Turkey will not fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria 
because `they want it not to fulfil the criteria'63. The reason, which Dilipak finds 
justified, has to do with Turkey's large population: `if the visa is abolished, any Anatolian 
will take the rings off his wife's fingers, sell them, and go to Bonn, Paris, wherever, will 
find a German or French woman and settle there'. There are certain risks involved for 
both sides, he argues: the Turkish mafia, for instance, would surpass the Italian one; and 
the degree of freedom which exists in Europe would not be good for Turkey in things like 
prostitution. Accordingly, Dilipak concludes that `at the moment Europe is not ready for 
us, and we're not ready for Europe'. 
The vastly diverse perspectives. of Turkish Islamists preclude any simple 
conclusions about their current pro-European attitudes, including when the change in 
perspective came about, what its decisive motivating factors were, and-most 
importantly-the degree of its sincerity. Much room is left for interpretation. For 
63 Dilipak refers here to the criteria for EU membership established at the Copenhagen European Council in 
1993. Beyond certain financial criteria (a functioning market economy), the Copenhagen Criteria include 
the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities. 
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instance, the different degrees of pro-Europeanness may either be interpreted as difficulty 
for some Islamists in embracing Europe (whether for `religious' or cultural reasons), or as 
reflection of honest and healthy critical thinking (as exists within `secular' perspectives 
on Europe as well). What is, however, much less ambiguous is the tension between 
secularists and Islamists over the role of each in national-EU relations. Below I address 
the views of both secular and religion-minded elites in Turkey on secularist-Islamist 
tensions in Turkey and how these affect Turkey's place vis-a-vis the European Union. 
Which is the greater barrier-Islamism or secularism in Turkey? 
Currently there is a great deal of debate and uncertainty in Turkey as to what is 
more important to the European Union with regards to Turkey's accession: limitation of 
Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey, or democracy (which would entail curbing the 
military's role in politics, and guaranteeing religious freedoms). According to Metin 
Heper, `A marriage between Islam and democracy in Turkey can be consummated if the 
radical secularists stop trying to impose their preferred life-style and set of values upon 
the Islamists, and if the latter do not attempt to undermine by word or deed the basic 
tenets of the secular democratic state in Turkey'64. Reflection on the current situation in 
Turkey, however, reveals that Islamists are not visibly trying to undermine the secular 
democratic state of Turkey. Thus, a more precise proposition is that the attainment of 
true democracy in Turkey, and, by extension, of EU membership, is contingent on two 
things: whether, indeed, the Islamist groups are embracing democracy as sincerely as 
64 Quoted by John Esposito in `Islam and secularism in the Twenty-first century', p. 7. 
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they claim to be; and whether the military-led secularist elites are sincere in their motives 
behind their militant secularist policies. 
The views of Ozdem Sanberk65 and Professor Sencer Ayata are representative of 
the perspective that restraint of Islamists has been crucial, thus far, for Turkey's progress 
towards EU membership. According to Sanberk: 
Despite secularism, or perhaps because of secularism, Turkey cavoin a 
secular, but of strong religious identity, institution such as the EU 6. 
Religion in Turkey, except the political religion, has become an element of 
stability, and conservatism-it is not destructive. Through the Turkish- 
Islamic synthesis, the secular state has adopted a new approach to 
conciliation between religion and secularism in a peaceful way. Until 
Erbakan, who resisted the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. He was forced out 
of the system because for him, religion was so dominant, or orthodox, that 
he enhanced religious identity above the other identities. Europe will 
accept the Muslim religion; it is open to differences. But 
Erbakan ... always rejected such right to 
difference. Here religion has 
played a negative role: Erbakan caused major damage in creating a 
polarity between secularists and Islamists in Turkey. Thus, the paradox is 
that the military intervention made Helsinki possible. Today, Erbakan 
enters this synthesis family, to recuperate his political rights. Takiye. 
Now Islamists are very pro-EU, and the secularists started to say Europe 
will divide us. 
Likewise, Sencer Ayata declares: 
If the Welfare [Refah] Party was in power during the time of the Helsinki 
Summit, I wouldn't give Turkey a chance. It was mainly through the 
influence of the military, and other factors, which curbed the influence of 
the Welfare Party. Otherwise I don't think it would have been possible for 
Turkey to have been included among the 13 candidates. However, now 
we have a different story: now the military itself is seen as some sort of 
obstacle to Turkey's integration to the EU. But without this sort of 
counter-attack by the secularist forces, which include mainly the military, 
65 President of the politically influential Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV). 
66 This phrase is, in my view, indicative of a great deal of ambiguity surrounding the role of religion in 
Turkey-EU relations: the EU is thought to be simultaneously `secular' and `of strong religious (i. e., 
Christian) identity', and Turkey is thought to be compatible with the EU either in spite of its secularism 
(because its secularism distinguishes it from an EU with a `strong religious identity'), or because of its 
secularism (since the EU, too, is secular). In other words, at least part of the ambiguity stems from 
somewhat contradictory views of what the EU itself stands for (i. e., whether it is `secular' or `of strong 
religious identity'). 
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I don't think that Turkey would have a chance. So it's a very paradoxical 
situation: on the one hand, the EU and Europe is extremely critical of the 
military, it's role in Turkish society, in politics, but on the other hand, 
without the military, with another party in power, Turkey would have no 
chance. 
We find resonance with this opinion even amongst certain Islamists. Izzetin 
Dogan's viewpoint, as representative of the Alevis, is, to a certain extent, to be 
expected67: `Europe does not understand the Turkish Army's position well: without its 
intervention, an occidental type of democracy cannot survive. No other political force, 
besides the army, would have been able to prevent Erbakan's access, in his efforts to 
create an Islamic state'. Kazim Gulecguz, as well, shows understanding, albeit reserved, 
of such secularist measures. `We do not agree with the secular approach of the 
government', he declares, `which sees religion as a threat'. However, the military 
interventions were provoked by what he terms `mistakes': `Refah used religion for 
political purposes, and Gulen tried to capture the state from inside by planting people 
with the ideology in key positions'. Whilst most Islamist interviewees expressed some 
criticism of Erbakan and Refah, such sympathetic attitudes towards military interventions 
against political Islam were rare. 
Where most opinion does converge-from interviews with both `secular-minded' 
and `Islamist' interviewees-is in the recognition of what Sandberk and Aktan (amongst 
others) term an `ultimate irony' or paradox: that is, the traditionally pro-western and pro- 
European Turkish governing structure's unwillingness (not simply inability) to conform 
to European standards and implement the Copenhagen Criteria. Turkish nationalism is 
the reason most commonly cited for this state of affairs-and linked to this, of course, the 
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strength of the military in Turkish politics. More cynical views consider the 
government's unwillingness to conform to European demands as part of their efforts to 
protect their own positions of power. For the civilian leaders, this entails maintaining 
national sovereignty in its most benign forms, and at its worst, simply trying to preserve 
the current lack of transparency which masks the corruption underlying the Turkish 
political structure. For the military leaders, this resistance to conformity with EU 
requirements is a more visible protection of their positions of strength in Turkish politics, 
which would be necessarily limited by EU membership. This much is clear through anti- 
EU statements made (and often retracted) publicly by military officials. 
Some of the harshest criticism comes, of course, from Islamists. And through this 
criticism we see responsibility variously placed on the civil, military, or economic elite. 
One interviewee declares: `there are two powers in Turkey-political and military. 
Politicians make promises to Europe, but at home they have to deal with the military, 
which doesn't want to allow fulfilment of their promises. This is the problem: not 
religion, but the battle between these two powers. They just use religion as a 
scapegoat'68. According to Ali Bulac, certain leaders in political circles are against the 
EU, because they are afraid of losing their `shares' of power. Bulac also lays blame on 
the economic giants of Turkey. According to Copenhagen Criteria, Turkey is required to 
have a liberal economy, `but in Turkey the big capital does not want the EU; the big 
capitalists do not support membership because they have become so with the support of 
the state, and they are afraid of big competition'. Small businesses, however, desire EU 
membership; and, in the Turkish case, the big capitalists are more secular, and the 
67 See chapter five, which outlines Alevi-Sunni tensions; Refah was representative of `mainstream' Sunni 
Islam in Turkey. 
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smaller, middle class business is religious, `so it's very interesting'. Analyzing the 
programme of TUSIAD specifically, Bulac says tellingly that `they want the EU with 
support of the state '69. For his part, Mustafa Armagan spreads the blame evenly across 
the secular elite: `a majority of Turks are pro-EU, but a small group of power-holders try 
to stop membership because their influence would be damaged. Now they benefit from 
their opportunities. We cannot generalise about all politicians, bureaucrats, military, but 
within each, such a section exists, and this section does not want transparency'. Armagan 
cites as an example a privilege which the military stands to protect in thwarting EU 
membership: in the case of dismissal from the military, there is currently no legal 
recourse for challenging this decision, `but the EU wouldn't allow this'. 
Closely intertwined with such criticisms are complaints about the insincerity of 
the secularist elites' concern about `reactionaryism'. The findings of a recent POLAR 
Institute Survey, conducted at a time when the military was pinpointing reactionaryism as 
a primary threat to the Turkish Republic, are quite interesting: reactionaryism was 
ranked sixth of eight top national concerns, after economy, crime, political instability, 
traffic, and human rights and democracy70. It is true that we cannot be certain of 
Islamists' sincerity either, in their pro-democracy and pro-EU expressions. But it is 
worthwhile to consider Turkish Islamists' own judgement that the possibility of a 
democracy in Turkey along the lines of the reforms demanded by the EU depends upon 
whether the harsh policies driven by the Turkish secularist elite are actually based on a 
66 The interviewee wished to remain anonymous. 
69 I assume Bulac means that TUSIAD's loyalty lies with the Turkish state first, even when the latter 
exhibits tendencies against EU membership. 
70 POLAR Institute Survey, `The Report of the Evolution of the First Half Year of 2000', of August 2000. 
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true concern about reactionaryism and separatism, or are rather motivated by other 
agendas. 
In conclusion, let us return to our starting point -- Richard Tapper's observation of 
the `rarely articulated role' of the fear of Islam, now shared by many Turks, in 
determining Turkey's relations with the EU. Crucially at issue here is what John 
Esposito explains: `Secular presuppositions which inform our academic disciplines and 
outlook on life, our Western secular worldview, have been a major obstacle to our 
understanding and analysis of Islamic politics and have contributed to a tendency to 
reduce Islam to fundamentalism and fundamentalism to religious extremism'71. We 
clearly see this tendency at play in the Turkish context; and, in light of the diversity we 
have observed within Islamist opinion, including serious criticisms of political Islam, we 
should, I contend, take into account the Islamists' strong critique of the secularist elites' 
use of the `reactionaryism' argument as the motivation for strict and anti-democratic 
policies. Fehmi Koru complains that 
they [secularist elites] don't have any idea that people with different 
identities should be recognised as such. Turkey has been seeking 
modernity for the last 200 years, with modernity including a positivism 
against anything religious. But modernity has changed, and leaves space 
for spirituality, and positivism is replaced with morality. So our 
modernisers were in favour of modernity when modernity was defined 
by positivism. But when modernity has become different, their attitude 
was also changed. 
Religion, Koru argues, is supposedly not at issue here, but reactionaryism, or 
fundamentalism: 
Until the February 28th process, they made a real distinction between 
religion and reactionaryism or fundamentalism, and never did anything 
to give the assumption that religion is equitable with reactionaryism. 
But now it's a mixture of everything. When they talk of reactionaryism 
71 John Esposito, `Islam and secularism in the Twenty-first century', p. 10. 
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or fundamentalism, some people also take it up as a matter of religion 
itself.. 
. 
if you are Muslim, you are by definition reactionary and 
fundamentalist, calling for sharia or an Islamic state. If you are a 
graduate from a religious school, you are a traitor. These things are very 
new... 
Through Koru's explanation, we find two especially noteworthy points. First, the 
view that the February 28th process was a turning point for the hard line secularists' 
attitudes towards Islamism: he notes that the National Security Council has existed since 
1961, but was never as powerful as it has been since 1997 (from which point it has 
become the `heart of the state system'). According to the Turkish Constitution, the NSC 
it is a consultative body, `but now it is a body giving orders to the government, 
parliament, and judiciary. Why I don't know. But of course, EU membership will mean 
civilian control of the army, and maybe they're taking precautions so it won't happen'. 
Second, Koru's statement draws attention to the grey area between the secularist elites' 
conceptions of reactionaryism and pursuit of their own agendas far beyond any concern 
about Islamism. Thus, in efforts to explain why the NSC has acted as it has since 
February 28th, Koru offers the following: `because with more democratic rights, people 
will have the upper hand in every matter. But in our tradition, hundreds, maybe a 
thousand people, decide everything. They will lose this, and true democracy will make 
these people redundant. And they are afraid of this. How to stop this? Going away from 
the EU... this is the current trend'. 
Bulent Kanes also launches complaints against the `misperceptions of the army 
and the deep state': `they use marginal, very fundamentalist Islamic groups to accuse all 
Islamic communities'. In Islamic circles, he argues, there are no reservations about EU 
membership. Accordingly, Kanes deduces, `the problem is not Islam or laicism or 
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democracy. The problem is that some hegemons in Turkey don't want to share power- 
political, economic, cultural hegemons protecting their positions'. 
Overwhelmingly, the most commonly stated view amongst the Islamist 
interviewees is that the Turkish version of secularism is in need of revision. The specific 
type of Turkish secularist policy is the target of an increasingly vocal Islamist elite-not, 
one must note, the concept of a secular Turkish state. `It is not secularism', is one of the 
most common assessments one encounters. The mere existence of the national 
Directorate of Religious Affairs, the Diyanet, is often cited as problematic in and of itself. 
But beyond political formalities, what is clearly most troubling to the Turkish Islamist 
elite is the governing elites' tendency to treat secularism as a religion itself. This has led 
the bulk of Islamist elites to emphatically call for European, or Anglo-Saxon, types of 
secularism. It has also led many to hope that EU membership will bring about a `true' 
secularism in Turkey-a true separation of `church' and state, rather than subordination 
of the former to the latter. According to Tayyip Erdogan, 
our serious problem in Turkey is the difference between perceptions of 
secularism in Turkey and in Europe. Secularists in Turkey think they 
own secularism. I see two kinds of secularism: that of those in power 
now, and the European kind of secularism. We accept secularism from a 
European perspective, Anglo-Saxon, but not the one in Turkey. In 
Turkey, religion and the state are not differentiated right now, as they 
say. Religion is under the control of the state, and this gives birth to 
many problems. If Turkey enters the EU, the solution to this problem 
will come quicker. 
Tayyar Altikulac, a former director of Diyanet, voices similar wishes: `Turkey cannot 
continue in the path of the EU with the current policy concept of secularism. We must 
update this current system of secularism. Here, religion is completely under state rule'. 
Citing more specific problems linking EU membership to Turkish secularism, Altikulac 
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explains that `the government's anti-EU politics play a great role in the choosing of 
officials for the words which will be spoken in religious services. It is impossible for 
Turkey to enter the EU with the current structure of religious services and the religious 
education system. The Turkish state claims to be secular, so it should change and act in 
accordance with the European system'. Islam and democracy, Mustafa Armagan argues, 
are not incompatible. But `the way secularism is interpreted and practiced in Turkey, in 
the extent to which this influences Turkish democracy, affects Turkey's relations with the 
EU in a negative way'. 
Conclusion 
These are fitting words with which to close our assessment of the role played by 
religion in Turkey-EU relations. It is not possible to know, with any degree of certainty, 
the sincerity behind Turkish Islamists' current pro-Europeanism, nor that behind 
secularists' strict policies which stand in contradiction to EU democratic standards. 
There is no simple solution to this cyclical debate. But what emerges through 
consideration of the debate is that the tension between Turkish Islamists and secularists 
is, itself, incompatible with European norms and thus poses a significant barrier to 
Turkey's membership in the EU-only not a barrier testable in a clear manner through- 
the Copenhagen Criteria. 
We have seen in this chapter that the Islamists' `change' to pro-Europeanism, and 
contemporary relations between `secularists' and `Islamists' are very much shaped by the 
historical relationship between religion and national identity in Turkey, and by the 
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tensions between religion and state which this relationship bred. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, since the establishment of the modem Turkish nation in particular, there 
has been a fundamental conflict in Turkey over the place of religion in state and society. 
The February 28`h process, its `legacies', and current Islamist pro-Europeanism are all 
part of a continued struggle over the place of Islam in Turkish state and society. Potential 
membership in the EU largely shapes the interests of Islamists and secularists in this 
struggle. And, as we have seen above, the conflict between their interests affects 
Turkey's place in the EU, because this conflict breeds undemocratic developments (such 
as political party closures, purges of religious individuals from state institutions, etc. ). 
The sum of interviews reveals a significant ambiguity reigning in the Turkish 
political scene: is strict secularism necessary for EU membership, or is its anti- 
democratic manifestation a barrier to EU membership? This ambiguity is perhaps a 
reflection of that which emanates from the EU itself. On the one hand, the EU promotes 
an expansion of human rights provisions and, with reference to Turkey, has specifically 
condemned Turkish undemocratic policies toward religion. In a recent draft report on 
Turkey's application for EU membership, an EU Parliamentary Committee declared: `the 
underlying philosophy of the Turkish state, "Kemalism", implies an exaggerated fear ... an 
important role for the army, and a very rigid attitude to religion, which means that this 
underlying philosophy is itself a barrier to EU membership'72. On the other hand 
however, it remains remarkably unclear (within but also beyond Turkey) whether the EU 
'` The Committee's full title is 'European Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, 
Common Security and Defence Policy. The 'Draft Report on Turkey's application for membership of the 
EU' was issued on 12 March 2003. Quite notably, after many complaints on the matter within Turkey, 
references to Kemalism were removed in the final report (issued in May 2003). The final text does, 
however, refer to the army as an obstacle to Turkish democratization. See 'European parliament committee 
says army obstacle to democratisation', Turkish Daily News, 14 May 2003, and European Parliament 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (htto: //www abhaber com/bdt2/oostlanderrapor pdf). 
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actually ivants a Muslim member-state. Furthermore, the extent to which freedoms 
sought by many Turkish Muslims (such as the right to wear headscarves in public spaces) 
are considered fundamental rights within the EU is also quite uncertain (as evinced by the 
2004 debates in France over this same issue). Accordingly, the EU itself has an 
important part to play in solving the cyclical debate over whether Islamism or the Turkish 
version of secularism is the greater barrier to Turkish membership in the EU. 
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Conclusion 
In the preceding chapters, I have sought to explain the complex role played by 
religion in national-EU relations from a perspective internal to the cases of Greece and 
Turkey. My main argument is that the place of religion in state and society plays a 
significant role in national-EU relations, because membership (or potential membership) 
in the EU affects the institutional interests of `church' and `state'. It is mainly in the 
pursuit of these interests that we see an effect on national-EU relations. These interests, 
in turn, are shaped by the historical relationships between religion and national identity 
and between `church' and `state' in each case. The complexity to which I refer above, 
then, stems from differences in these relationships. 
Furthermore, I argue that the role of religion is very important, both in theoretical 
and empirical terms. I have demonstrated the impact of religion in empirical terms 
through examples of how religion-state relations affect national-EU. relations, and how 
the EU affects religion-state relations in each case. In theoretical terms, we see through 
these two cases that religious difference from or similarity with a `core' of religious 
traditions within the European Union (that is, Western Christianity) tells us very little 
about the role of religion in national-EU relations. Accordingly, and in contrast with the 
Huntingtonian perspective, I argue that the historical and contemporary relationships 
between religion and national identity and between church and state are far more 
instructive in our understanding the role of religion in national-EU relations. Rather than 
theological content, our attention is turned here to institutional interests. Thus, on the 
basis of these two cases I also argue against generalisations about the role of religion: the 
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relevant institutions, the factors which shape their interests, and the actors involved are 
all contingent on various historical, social and political factors specific to individual 
national contexts. 
We also draw significant lessons from these two cases with regard to theories of 
secularisation and theories of nationalism. Scholarship in both these fields has not been 
very helpful in addressing the cases of Greece and Turkey in a comparative framework. 
Rather, points which are useful in our understanding of each case had to be drawn 
together in a selective manner. With regard to theories of secularisation, it is obvious that 
cross-cultural and comparative approaches have been critical to our understanding of 
certain fundamental terms. Yet there is very little reference made within the field to the 
cases of Greece and Turkey and to the two main faiths represented in each country. In 
general and, paradoxically, most of the information within the field which is relevant to 
Turkey may be found in those discussions of Orthodoxy in Communist Eastern Europe; 
whilst, I dare say, some of that relevant to my Greek case comes closer to discussions on 
Islamic, anti-modern fundamentalism. Thus I believe there is a need for a language 
within the sociological study of religion which could accurately address both faiths in 
their national contexts'. With reference to theories of nationalism, the cases of Greece 
and Turkey examined together represent a challenge to prevalent scholarship and reveal 
significant gaps due to presuppositions, for example, on `western' or `eastern' 
nationalisms. We have seen, through these two cases, that there are usually major 
intersections between institutions and activities which are often, in scholarship, 
1 Perhaps particularly since Greece is currently a member, and Turkey relatively close to being a member 
of the, until now western European Union: the fact that the sociology of religion is so centred on Western 
Christianity is problematic from the perspective of study of the European Union, which is increasingly 
inclusive of non-western faiths. 
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compartmentalised into opposing frameworks2. In short, this thesis fills gaps in 
scholarship within both the fields of the sociology of religion and the study of 
nationalism through an interdisciplinary approach which draws on both these fields. 
Religion and national identity 
My study of the relationships between religion and national identity in the Greek 
and Turkish cases addressed certain similarities as well as vast differences between these 
relationships. In both cases the periods before the establishments of their modern states 
are characterised by especially close links between ecclesiastical and state power, in the 
Byzantine and Ottoman Empires respectively. In the Greek case these links were actually 
enhanced under Ottoman rule, since the Church effectively was the state, for the 
Orthodox subjects. But it is at the point of establishment of modem states in Greece and 
Turkey that contemporary relationships between religion and national identity were 
shaped in each case, and it is at this point that our two cases critically diverge. For, in 
contemporary terms, a strong link between Orthodoxy and Greek national identity has as 
its main reference point the experiences and activities of the Church under Ottoman rule 
and during the Greek national revolution3. Religion thus took on special importance as 
defender of the nation against the oppressor and, not least, against the religious `other'. 
Several historical and sociological studies have indicated that the role of the Church in 
preserving and defending Greek national identity throughout these periods is overstated 
2 Here, as noted in chapter two, the work of Anthony Smith is helpful in countering certain such 
presuppositions (for instance, those to do with the relative harm caused to religious minorities by either 
ethnic or civic nationalism). 
' Though, as observed in chapter three, the Byzantine era is also crucial to contemporary perceptions of the 
relationship between religion and national identity. 
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and, in some cases, simply mythical4. Yet such `images' obtain, and the image of a 
Church which preserves national identity retains its social force in Greece. Conversely, 
in the case of Turkey, Islam and its institutions were largely blamed for the weakness of 
the Ottoman Empire and for its eventual collapse. Accordingly, whilst the Young Turks' 
revolution entailed use of religion for the purpose of mobilising the masses, the Republic 
established following the Kemalist revolution programmatically limited the political, 
social and cultural influence of Islam. Thus, the relevant `images' which obtain in the 
case of Turkey are those of a nation much-strengthened, compared to the then weak 
Ottoman Empire, not least due to the usurpation of power by the Young Turks from 
religious institutions. Turkey's western and European course was henceforth to be 
sought through the maintenance of a strong, unified, secular nation. 
`Church '- `state' relations 
What did all of this mean in institutional terms for religion-i. e., for `church'- 
`state' relations? In Greece, the establishment of the Autocephalous Church of Greece 
was (and continues to be) symbolic of the relationship between religion and nation, in 
spite of the fact that it entailed subjugation of the Church to the state. For, though it was 
subordinated to state interests, the Church was effectively strengthened by becoming part 
of the public sectors. In Turkey too religion was subjugated to the state, through the 
As explained in chapter two, the Church generally disapproved of revolutionary ideas and preferred to 
maintain the status quo of power relations under the Ottoman Empire. It was only after the Greek 
Revolution had become an irreversible process that individual clerics began supporting it. 
S Or in Manitakis' words (cited in chapter three), the state's right to interfere in ecclesiastical matters was 
legalised, whilst ecclesiastical issues were recognised as public issues. 
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establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet)6. Whilst this may be seen 
as a tribute to the importance of Islam to the Turkish nation, the Diyanet's establishment 
clearly reflected an intention to limit and control religion, as was evident in the broad 
range of anti-religious reforms. Nevertheless, it is clear that in neither case do we have 
secularism as in full separation of `church' and `state'. The critical difference between 
the cases is in the ensuing relationships between `church' and `state'. 
In the case of Greece, this relationship was one of both tension and intensity. 
Tension manifested itself in state efforts to curb the power of the Church, efforts which 
were often met with staunch resistance on the part of the Church and thus resulted in 
compromise. This, as explained in chapter two, is because religion wields considerable 
strength when linked to the national myth: the Church of Greece was thus able to 
mobilise masses against unfavourable state policies on the basis of nationalism. 
Meanwhile, church-state relations were intense in the sense that each institution often 
enlisted the support of the other-with nationalism as the common ground between them. 
Thus, the development of secularisation in Greece took the form of nationalisation of the 
Church and its use as a buttress for state power; a skewed balance of power between 
church and state was established (within `agreed limits of tolerable diversity'), and the 
Church gained from this arrangement certain privileges which it would, henceforth, 
actively defend. 
6 Diyanel is the state institution which administers mosques, religious education, and foundations and 
charities in accordance with the dictates of Sunni Islam. Again, herein lay one of the major asymmetries in 
these two cases: in the case of Greece I am referring to the establishment of a national church, and in 
Turkey to the establishment of a state institution. But this inconsistency simply reflects the divergent 
realities of the two cases, and must be understood within the context of the differences between the 
experience of secularisation in the case of Greece, and the specific version of secularism, laicism, which 
was implemented in Turkey. 
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In Turkey too relations between religion and the state are characterised by tension 
and intensity. The tension manifests itself in Kemalist secularist policies pitted against 
Islamist efforts to assert themselves in the public sphere. But the operative `myth' in 
Turkey, is that of the strength of the Turkish nation due to Kemalism; and `official' 
Turkish nationalism henceforth included notions of a strong, sovereign, western-oriented 
and secular state, and it thus excluded religion from its foundations. Thus Islamists have 
not had an advantageous recourse to nationalism in their contest against the state, as has 
had the Greek Church. However, Turkish political history is marked by major 
fluctuations in state secularist parties, with governments variously broadening the 
freedoms of Turkish Islamists (in the political, social and religious realms), and then 
limiting them drastically. Accordingly, though in general Turkish secularism rendered 
Islamism a `buttress for reaction', this process was neither constant and stable, nor linear. 
Rather, in spite of the fact that generally secularism entailed repression of Islam, religion 
was also used at times as a buttress for state power (as in the case of Greece), and in such 
cases Islamism and nationalism merged. The period of the `Turkish-Islamist synthesis' is 
7 a characteristic example. 
Institutional interests 
I then examined how the relationships between religion and national identity and 
`church' and `state' led to different institutional interests on the part of the `church' and 
`state'. The pursuit of these institutional interests was examined through the identity card 
7A comparable period in Greek political history is that of the military dictatorship of 1967-74, during 
which there was an especially close link between the Greek Church and the military leaders. 
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issue, in the case of Greece, and through the February 28`h process and its `legacies', in 
the case of Turkey. As explained in chapter four, the Greek government's decision to 
remove reference to religion from the national identity cards was preceded by extensive 
European legislation on the protection of personal data, as well as a series of convictions 
in the ECHR against the Greek state8. Religious elites, however, conceived of the 
decision as an effort towards the `religious discolouration' of Greece, and thus as an 
affront to the relationship between religion and national identity. Additionally, the state's 
decision to change the identity cards without consulting the Church, and without 
compromising on the issue, was perceived as a concerted effort to limit the social and 
political influence of the Church, and thus as an affront to the relationship between 
church and state. Accordingly, the Simitis government, rather than the European Union, 
was the focal point for Church complaints. Church spokespersons emphasised that the 
European Union did not demand this change, and that according to EU treaties, the EU 
does not involve itself in national religious matters. Thus the state was increasingly 
accused by the Church of using the European Union as an excuse to limit the power of 
the Church, the social functions of Orthodoxy and, in general, the presence of religion in 
Greece. In fact, the Church's actions indicated that this was a battle to be fought at the 
national level (between church and state), and thus revealed a clear interest in preserving 
the status quo in church-state relations. The Archbishop treated the issue as a direct 
confrontation between himself and the Prime Minister and, in general, the means with 
which the Church chose to resist the change to the identity cards (public rallies, private 
8 Again, the immediate and major precursor to the church-state conflict over this issue was the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs' efforts to form a group of academics and clerics to discuss issues, including that of the 
identity cards, which were problematic in Greek-EU relations. As noted in chapter two (footnote 84), there 
were 102 ECHR cases against the Greek state between 1999 and 2003. 
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meetings with state officials, the drive to collect signatures in petition for a referendum), 
were all heavily politicised and manifested an anti-state perspective. 
In my view, the Church's mobilisation on the identity card issue is best 
understood within the more general context in which it arose in terms of the decreasing 
ethnic, and religious, homogeneity of Greek society9, and a dwindling alliance between 
church and state. Viewed from within this prism, the identity card issue was a propitious 
basis upon which the Church could reassert itself in the public sphere. And ambiguous 
Church perspectives on the EU in light of the identity card issue seem to confirm this 
fact. `Nai men, alla' (`Yes, but') was the characteristic phrase used with reference to the 
European Union: yes to the EU, as long as it does not seek the religious discolouration of 
Greek society, and as long as it does not threaten the Church's relations with the state or 
the Church's constitutional privileges. Yet, in spite of this ambiguous stance, it is 
difficult to overlook the clear challenges which EU membership represents for the 
Church. At a superficial level at least, EU membership signifies a de-nationalisation of 
the Greek state, in terms of identifying itself more with the supranational EU dimension. 
Again, given that its role as `protector' of Greek national identity is a main foundation of 
the Church's contemporary presence in Greek society, this development would naturally 
be unsettling to the Church. But at a more practical level, the Church's position in Greek 
society has been greatly strengthened through its close relation to the state-from 
subsidies enjoyed by its clergy to state recourse to Church mobilisation on issues of 
national importance (e. g., the `Macedonian issue'). The Greek state is under mounting 
pressure from the EU to provide enhanced religious freedoms and equality for non- 
9 Its staunch resistance to the building of a mosque in Athens is clearly symptomatic of the Church's 
preoccupation with preserving, if only superficially, religious homogeneity in Greece. 
270 
Orthodox citizens of Greece. Thus, in the light of the state's efforts to conform to EU 
standards (following many ECHR convictions), the Church perceives a heightened threat 
to the cultural, linguistic and religious homogeneity of Greece-all elements which are 
central to conceptions of Greek national identity-and to its traditional close relationship 
with the state. 
In chapter six, I examined the `February 28th process' in Turkey and what I have 
identified as its `legacies'. The February 28th process was, in effect, a military coup 
directed exclusively against political Islam. Its `legacies' entailed the closure of Refah's 
successor party, Fazilet, as well as a series of other measures directed against Islamists. 
The main justification for such measures, according to the actors behind them and to 
many secularist elites, is that Islamists are insincere in their embrace of democracy and 
that they represent a threat to national unity and preservation of the democratic (read 
secular) Turkish Republic. Meanwhile, Turkish Islamists argue that such limitations on 
Islamism are, themselves, undemocratic. In their view, the secularist elite structure is 
simply using Islamism as a scapegoat and as a basis upon which to justify the status quo 
in power relations (e. g., an active role for the military in Turkish governance, and a 
continued dominance of secularist elites over Turkish political and economic life). Thus 
each side accused the other of being the `greater barrier' to Turkish membership in the 
European Union, with political Islamists representing `religion' and the military and 
secularist elites the `state'. 
Turkish Islamists' attitudes to the EU, examined in the light of the February 28th 
process, are clearly pro-European. This makes sense because it is Turkish Islamists who 
stand to gain from the EU's influence on religious reforms that will lead to increased 
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pluralism. It is crucial to note here that Turkish Muslims who do not identify themselves 
with political Islam do not exhibit the same degree of pro-Europeanism for the same 
reasons: they prefer a measure of state regulation of religion, so as to prevent the 
predominance of political Islamists. But they insist on a form of secularism in line with 
Anglo-Saxon and European norms, rather than the current, strict form of Turkish 
secularism (laicism). 
In the Turkish case it is- the Kemalist elites who staunchly resist EU-related 
reforms which would expand freedoms for Islamists, as well as other reforms demanded 
as part of the EU harmonisation package. For instance, the National Action Party (MHP) 
openly opposed many reforms demanded by the European Union as part of the 
`harmonisation' process necessary for EU membership10. This opposition was directed 
against abolition of the death penalty, provisions for Kurdish-language education and 
media, but also reforms to Turkish Penal Code article 312 (which is the basis upon which 
both Erbakan and Erdogan were forced out of political activity, and upon which many 
other Islamists were convicted in Turkish courts). Furthermore, spokespersons for the 
Turkish Armed Forces have voiced pointed complaints against the pressures from the EU 
for certain reforms which threaten national unity and territorial sovereignty. Religion is 
simply one domain, but a significantly visible one (considering the fact that even a Prime 
Minister was ousted from power), in which Kemalist elites assert their attitudes and 
policies against EU-related reforms. And it is a particularly propitious domain, since, 
again, secularism (or laicism) is linked so closely to the Turkish `national myth'. As 
guardians of Kemalist ideology, then, this sector of Turkish elites is relatively successful 
10 Particularly in its role as part of the governing coalition immediately preceding the AKP's current 
governance. 
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in mobilising the Turkish public, on the basis of nationalism, against any perceived 
threats to Kemalist principles. 
Thus we see very interesting parallels, as well as contrary tendencies, between the 
two cases. The curious `twist' arises when we consider the fact that in Greece, it is the 
Church which uses nationalism to mobilise people for its cause, and in Turkey it is the 
Kemalist elite structure; and, furthermore, it is mainly these `institutions' which resist 
EU-related reforms to do with religious freedoms. Thus we see that the Greek Church 
and the Kemalist elite structure have in common vested interest in resisting EU reforms 
to do with religious freedoms. And it is through their pursuit of their interests that they 
affect, albeit in different ways, their nations' relations with the European Union. It has 
been central to my argument that these interests have developed in relation to the 
historical links between religion and national identity, and between `church' and `state' in 
each case. 
National-EU relations 
What does this all mean for national-EU relations in each case? In the case of 
Greece, privileges enjoyed by the Orthodox Church of Greece over and against other 
faiths, limiting religious freedoms for the non-Orthodox, are clearly a problematic point 
in national-EU relations. To the extent to which the Church succeeds in delaying 
relevant legislative (and, most important, functional) changes in conformity with EU 
norms, then it plays a negative role in national-EU relations. As we saw with the identity 
card issue and subsequent events, the Greek state faced significant difficulty in 
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introducing one such a reform, and the Church's influence over domestic politics remains 
considerable: intra- and inter-party conflict resulted from the identity card issue, and in its 
aftermath the mainline political parties are reluctant to address any further religion- 
related policies (such as reforms to religious education in public schools). Meanwhile, 
inasmuch as the EU is indeed the driving force behind reforms introduced by the state (a 
matter which, again, is surrounded by controversy), then the EU, in turn, affects religion- 
state relations by provoking church-state conflict. 
In the case of Turkey, it is clear that developments such as resistance to reform of 
Turkish Penal code Article 312, the forced closures of Islamist parties and arbitrary 
convictions of Turkish Islamists, and the military's role in the latter represent problems in 
Turkey's relations with the European Union". Most importantly, there is the fact that the 
European Union itself has implicated the Kemalist tradition of secularism as a barrier to 
EU membership. Thus, to the extent to which anti-democratic measures are used to 
suppress Islamism in Turkey, religion plays a significant-albeit indirect role in 
Turkey's relations with the European Union. Meanwhile, the EU, through its insistence 
on conformity with European norms, affects the internal balance between religion and 
state in Turkey: the path to EU membership places Turkish Islamism in a position from 
which it can rightfully claim that Turkish secularism represents a barrier to EU 
membership. Furthermore, inasmuch as the EU succeeds in encouraging certain reforms 
relating to religious freedoms, Turkish Islamists enjoy more freedom, and more power, 
vis-ä-vis the Turkish state structure. At the very least it is clear from our examination of 
the Turkish case that the current state of religion-state relations is, itself, incompatible 
11I should note that the EU did not disapprove of all such party closures. Again, the ECHR ruled in favour 
of the Turkish state in the Refah Party and others v. Turkey case. 
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with European norms and, in fact, a negative factor in Turkey's relations with the 
European Union. 
On the basis of these two cases I argue that, beyond certain delayed, 
unimplemented, and/or avoided reforms, the form of religion-state relations (which 
allows one institution or another to delay or block certain reforms) is an important factor 
in each of these cases. Thus, in light of theories which point to emerging European and, 
perhaps, EU norms in religion-state relations, I now examine where Greece and Turkey 
stand in relation to such norms. 
In Greece, the Church's efforts to maintain certain privileges through the state and 
vis h-vis other faiths is little different to John Francis' description of how Western 
European established religions have adapted to, and benefited from, certain changes to 
the regulatory structure, and have struggled to maintain that degree of regulation which 
most benefits theme. Beyond the wishes of established churches to accept regulation in 
exchange for some delimitation of state recognition of newer churches that threaten their 
membership bases, Francis also explains that established churches may simply act out of 
a concern to maintain their existing obligations to staffs, buildings, and educational 
programs: `the longer established the church, presumably the greater the obligations it 
has to sustain existing organisations' 13. This certainly goes a long way towards 
explaining the Greek Orthodox Church's resistance to EU-incited reforms that threaten 
its existing privileges-many of which are financial 14. Furthermore, those ambivalent 
12 Of course, `benefit' is relative, and there can be institutional or `religious' benefits. 
13 J. Francis, `The evolving regulatory structure of European Church-state relationships', p. 779. 
14 For instance, a weakening of the church-state link in Greece could result in the state's ceasing to 
remunerate all clerical staff, or to favour the Church as much as it does with large sums of EU funding. I 
will not assess here the Greek state's motivations in its relations with the Church, but in chapter four I 
argue that beyond its intention to conform to European standards, also relevant is what Demerath describes 
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and sporadic vestiges of resistance to the EU within the Orthodox Church of Greece seem 
little different to Lilian Voye's description of the same phenomenon which existed within 
European Protestant churches in times pasts, or from anti-European voices heard within 
conservative Catholic circles in contemporary Poland. 
Public religion in Turkey has fewer obvious similarities with European historical 
and contemporary developments, but certain critical exceptions deserve notice. Its 
closest historical comparison may be found in Enlightenment France, from which the 
Turkish version of secularism, laicism, takes its name. Also, the experiences of churches 
under the anti-church model that existed in some of the Communist regimes in Eastern 
Europe is quite similar to those of Islamist groups in Turkey. Many Eastern European 
churches clearly gained from the severe regulatory climate the advantage of becoming an 
institutional magnet for those critical of the state. Paradoxically then, churches were 
strengthened as a force in opposition to the state16. The same applies to Turkish 
Islamism, and for political Islam in particular. In both cases of political Islam's rise to 
power in Turkey (in 1996 and in 2002), the active parties capitalised on votes of protest 
against the Turkish state. In terms of contemporary similarities with European 
developments, public religion in Turkey functions much like what John Francis describes 
as the emerging trend within European churches: increasing involvement in education, 
charity, and political commentary, rather than the direct encouragement of religious 
life'7. For instance, the Catholic Church in France is identified more as a producer of 
as a desire to weaken the `cultural wild card' of religion which poses a threat to established policies and 
policymakers. 
15 L. Voye, `Secularisation in a context of advanced modernity', pp. 280-2. Jean-Paul. Willaime has also 
written extensively on this subject. 
16 See J. Francis, `The evolving regulatory structure of European Church-state relationships', p. 802. 
17 See Francis, ibid, pp. 775-776. 
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quality education rather than as a political advocate of a former regime; these schools are 
popular not as bastions of faith and morals, but as institutions of quality secular 
education. Similarly in Germany, churches no longer define themselves in support of or 
in opposition to a particular regime, but are active mainly in the arena of health care and 
social need18. Likewise in Turkey, religious groups and political parties have become 
increasingly active in such domains as education and social welfare. But this 
development in the case of Turkey comes closer to what Bryan Wilson describes as 
pillarisation -'the response by which some sought to contain the process of 
secularisation in some European countries' 19. The term applies best to such contexts as 
Ireland and Belgium, where religious divisions were reflected in the development of 
distinctly Catholic or Protestant schools, universities, hospitals, etc20. In Turkey, 
pillarisation primarily reflects a distinction between secular and religious institutions, 
rather than between different religious groups. These similarities between contemporary 
Turkey and certain historical and contemporary developments in Europe may also lead us 
to the conclusion that, as with Greece, Turkey too might be on a path toward convergence 
with a European norm in religion-state relations. 
Perhaps more interesting is the question of whether this `European norm' will 
spread, as Peter Berger predicts, with the extension of the European Union's borders21. 
In both Greece and Turkey, institutional interests are the product of long histories of a 
developed status quo and concerted efforts, through formalism, to maintain this status 
I8 Francis, ibid, pp. 779-780. 
19 B. Wilson, "`Secularisation": religion in the modem world', p. 200. 
20 See J. Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, p. 61, where the author argues that the age of 
pillarisation in Western Europe has come to an end. 
21 According to Berger, '[i]t is not fanciful to predict that there will be similar developments in Eastern 
Europe, precisely to the degree that these countries too will be integrated into the new Europe'. P. Berger, 
`Secularism in retreat', p. 44. 
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quo. These factors will be difficult to change. However, based on my study of Greece 
and Turkey, I contend that to the extent to which the European Union presses potential 
and current member states for a convergence in provisions of religious freedoms, it is 
indeed effecting a convergence with European norms. 
We are seeing that this is already the case with Greece, as changes to the status 
quo in the Church's institutional locale are most often either sought as direct consequence 
of European Court of Human Rights convictions22, or are openly discussed as 
governmental efforts to conform with norms within the European Union. In an article 
entitled, `The political culture of secularisation', Brian Girvin cites Greece as the 
exception within the EU, for its maintenance of more traditional church-state norms 23 
But an examination of contemporary developments in church-state relations in Greece 
indicates that, in time, this will cease to be the case. As one of my interviewees asserted, 
in the wake of the identity card issue (ie., the fact that the government did not 
compromise with the Church, and the issue was gradually forgotten by the wider public), 
it will be difficult for the Church to mobilise the people again on similar issues24. Further 
reforms will likely be delayed, in light of the disruption which the Church did bring to the 
domestic political scene, but carefully measured and consistent efforts on the part of the 
state should limit the occasions for future intense reactions on the part of the Church. 
Second, the recent enlargement of the European Union entails a significantly larger 
Eastern Orthodox presence within the EU. This means two things: the Greek Church will 
22 Although the ECHR is a Council of Europe, rather than formally an EU institution, the EU has made it 
clear that a given county's record in the ECHR is critical to its relations with the EU. 
23 B. Girvin, `The political culture of secularisation: European trends and comparative perspectives', p. 21. 
24 However, within days of the formation of the New Democracy government (elected in the March 2004 
Greek elections), there was discussion of the Archbishop's plan to request that the new government 
reconsider the possibility of the voluntary. inclusion of religion on the national identity cards. See `The 
issue of the identity cards and the stance of the Archbishop', To Vima, ' 10 March 2004, p. A12; and 
P. Galiatsatos, `Middle space with right tails', Ta Nea, 10 March 2004, p. 7. 
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feel less as a threatened minority, and as it increasingly identifies itself with the interests 
of other Orthodox populations, in the context of the EU, it will be less likely to play on 
specifically Greek nationalistic sensitivities. Third, through a process of more active 
involvement in EU affairs which are of interest to it, the Church has found that it is not 
alone in many of its concerns. Rather, it has begun to cooperate with churches of other 
faiths in Europe in joint efforts to promote such causes as including reference to religion 
in the European Treaty currently being drafted. Finally, the Greek Orthodox Church is 
not a monolith. This much was clear in the division amongst the hierarchs over the 
identity card issue, with a number of clerics refraining from participation in the 
demonstrations and signature collection, and some even publicly criticising the 
Archbishop's tactics. Recently there has been especially open critique of the Church 
from within, as well as criticism from without25. Such criticism is likely to influence 
positively the Church in the long run. 
Turkey is a more obvious exception amongst current and potential EU members, 
for its extremely strict version of laicism. Convergence with European norms in this case 
is considerably more complex, and more dependent on the European Union's influence. 
Moderation of Turkish Islamism has not, thus far, succeeded in overcoming secularists' 
suspicions. The political Islamist party currently in leadership in Turkey does not clash 
with a liberal-democratic state and has neither directly challenged the secular state nor 
democratic principles26. Yet perceptions of indirect challenges, such as appointments of 
`pro-Islamic' figures to key state posts, have been enough to spark rumours of a military 
25 Though subtle and sometimes indirect, from the Ecumenical Patriarch and Archbishop of Albania-both 
of whom are widely respected in Greece. 
26 See M. Heper and S. Toktas, `Islam, modernity, and democracy in contemporary Turkey: the case of 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan'. See also A. Insel, `The AKP and normalizing democracy in Turkey'. 
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coup27. As long as these suspicions are manifested in undemocratic policies towards 
religious groups, individuals and political parties, religion-state relations in Turkey'will 
remain incompatible with European norms. A longer life-span of the current religious- 
oriented government in Turkey (through which the Turkish population at large could 
better judge its performance as a democratic government which accepts secularisation as 
institutional differentiation), together with continued pressure from the EU for human 
rights provisions (of which religious freedoms are a key aspect in Turkey), will most 
likely render the current form of mobilised public religion in Turkey compatible with EU 
standards. 
Future religion-state relations are likely to be affected by increasingly open 
discussions on Kemalist ideology and the extent to which its espousal, mainly by the 
Turkish military, is problematic in terms of Turkey-EU relations28. The internal debate 
generated by the draft report prepared by the European Parliament Committee on foreign 
affairs (in which Kemalism was directly implicated as a barrier to EU membership)29, 
indicates a significant move in this direction. However, it should be noted that a critical 
complication arises when one tries to ascertain the European Union's true intentions vis- 
ä-vis Turkey as well. For example, to what extent is the EU willing to accommodate an 
Islamic-oriented regime and a predominantly Muslim country? In Turkey, answers to this 
question are marked with an evident degree of pessimism. In fact, Islamists' age-old 
27 Such rumours were rampant in Turkey in May of 2003 and were, notably, contested by the Chief of Staff 
General Ozkok himself. 
28 As expressed in an article entitled `Ankara stand-off: how EU reforms have turned into a struggle 
between the government and the military' (L. Boulton and D. Gardner), Turkey's EU membership will be 
determined, to a large extent, by whether the AKP is `in power or only in office; and whether the military is 
an agent of change or seeks to defend the status quo'. 
29 The `Draft Report on Turkey's application for membership of the EU' was issued on 12 March 2003. As 
noted in chapter six, the report was revised (following Turks' complaints about the negative critique of 
Kemalism). See `European parliament committee says army obstacle to democratisation', and European 
Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs (httR: //www. abhaber. com/t)df2/oostianderrapor. pd fl. 
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complaints that the EU is an `exclusive Christian Club' are now being voiced within 
Turkey's secularist circles as well30. There is a marked tendency, even among the pro- 
western elite, to view with suspicion even the `constructive criticism' that the EU may 
have to offer. Accordingly, even the aforementioned European Parliament statements on 
the nature of Kemalist ideology may, in the end, be discounted as simply another 
`excuse' for not admitting Turkey to the European Union. 
Part of the solution to this problem will depend on future EU policies towards 
Turkey -- which must be consistent towards both secularist and Islamist trends, and set a 
clear and viable path to Turkish membership in the EU. The other, and perhaps more 
significant, part of the solution to the problem depends on the extent to which secularist 
and Islamist circles in Turkey will prove capable of discussing their differences in a way 
that would be compatible with the principle of accommodation that characterizes the EU 
system. The rise of the Erdogan-led AKP to the premiership in 2002 offers an 
unprecedented opportunity to judge better Islamists' true intentions, thus removing one of 
the complexes of secularist-Islamist tensions: though the AKP does continue to face the 
`non-electoral' constraint of National Security Council influence, it is at least freed to a 
great degree of the electoral constraint entailed by coalition formation, since it won a 
sufficient majority in the national election to form a government on its own. 
I close with a few words on the role of religion in the European Union itself. 
There is, in my view, a fundamental tension between two of the EU's foundational 
principles with regard to religion: the principle of subsidiarity, and the principle of 
pluralism. On the one hand, its treaties indicate that, by way of respect to national 
30 A notable example is a speech made by the Secretary General of the National Security Council, Tuncer 
Kilinc: `the EU is a Christian Club, a neo-colonialist force, and is determined to divide Turkey'. Cited in 
G. Avci, `Turkey's slow EU candidacy', p. 164. 
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specificity in terms of cultural and religious traditions of member states, religious matters 
and `ecclesiastical' laws are to be regulated by the individual member states. Under the 
principle of subsidiarity, only in certain circumstances (ie., on matters of fundamental 
importance to all member states, matters which because of their scale and the importance 
of their effect, cannot be adequately managed at the national level) may the EU intervene. 
On the other hand, the EU claims to be religiously and philosophically neutral, but 
devoted to the principle of pluralism. Accordingly, it aims to influence member states in 
such a way as to create environments conducive to the flourishing of diversity and 
pluralism. And the European Union directly influences member states in this direction by 
proscribing discrimination on such bases as religion. This is especially crucial in the 
context of increasing religious diversity across Europe (not least due to mass immigration 
to EU member states, but also to the proliferation of new religious movements). Thus, to 
the extent to which the European Union seeks to establish a social model which embraces 
pluralism and provides equal rights for all its citizens, it would appear that a degree of 
regulation of national religion-related policies is inevitable. 
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Appendix - Interview research 
The research for this study was conducted in 2000-1 in Ankara and Istanbul, and 
in 2002-3 in Athens. The questions asked centred on the perceived role of religion in 
relations between Greece and the EU, and between Turkey and the EU respectively'. The 
interviews were semi-structured, and generally lasted between 1 and 1 %2 hours. The fact 
that the scholarly nature of this inquiry was fully explained enhanced the likelihood that 
the respondent would express his or her genuine views. 
The sample for this study is non-random, as my intent was to compile a sample of 
potentially knowledgeable and influential leaders. For the Turkish case, I concentrated on 
the following groups: political, mass media, diplomatic, intellectual, religious, civil 
service and business elites'-. For the Greek case, I focused on political, intellectual, 
bureaucratic and religious elites. This discrepancy is mainly due to my relative 
familiarity with the Greek case and my knowledge of the Greek language, which allowed 
me to use Greek-language sources. Because this is an elite survey, the sample does not 
mirror overall population characteristics such as sex, education, social background, age or 
region of origin. The sample was not designed to be representative of the mass of Greek 
or Turkish voters, but of the leadership community in each country. 
A general balance was stuck between `secular-minded' respondents and `religion- 
oriented' respondents. Within each group, the sample covers a broad range of ideological 
perspective, from conservative to liberal. In terms of the `religion-oriented' respondents, 
in Greece this group includes clerics, hierarchs, theologians, a representative of the `neo- 
Orthodox' movement, and one bureaucrat (all of the Greek Orthodox faith). In Turkey, 
1 Turkish interviewees were asked to comment solely on the case of Turkey, and Greeks on the case of 
Greece. 
2I use the term `elites' to indicate both formal and informal decision-makers at the society's national level, 
interested and/or involved in decisions important for the politics of that society. Elite surveys are valuable 
for three reasons. First, elites play a crucial role in a state's political process. Second, although other elite 
groupings (e. g., business or media) may play a less direct role in politics, they are important in terms of 
their actions as interest groups lobbying to secure certain goals; as veto groups who must be appeased 
before a given policy may be implemented; or as shapers of public opinion. Third,. and as a less manifest 
source of policy, the values, beliefs and attitudes of the broad stratum of elites may be indicative of those 
that go into the making of policy. 
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this group includes bureaucrats, politicians, Muslim intellectuals, theologians, business 
figures and journalists. The sample reflects a spectrum of Turkish Islamism, including 
representatives of Nurcu, Naksibendi, Fetullanci, and Alevi groups. 
To identify which leaders I would interview for the Turkish case, I began with a 
basic list of contact details for a number of Turkish elites, provided to me by ELIAMEP 
(Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy). I added to this list names from 
my readings on the subject of my research, and sought their contact details once in 
Turkey. My sample further expanded through the suggestions of those interviewees on 
the original list. The sample thus also reflects the reputational and positional 
characteristics of the respondents. In the Greek case, I sought interviews with leaders 
who were especially knowledgeable on, or personally involved in, the identity card issue. 
Of course, self-selection was an important element shaping the panel of 
respondents. I contacted potential interviewees via e-mail or telephone, and depended 
upon the individuals' willingness or ability (e. g., if they were in town at the time of my 
research), to meet with me. For the case of some politicians and some `religious figures', 
I relied on other contacts to secure my interviews with them. For the Turkish case, no 
one declined, and few never responded to my letters (only two journalists, who I had tried 
to contact via their newspapers' e-mail addresses). I had a significantly more difficult 
time securing interviews in Greece, particularly with clerics: many clerics preferred to 
submit their responses in written form (as indicated below). 
Below is a list of interviewees cited in the Greek and Turkish case studies, 
respectively. I provide here the institutional affiliation of each respondent (at the time of 
the interview), and the date of the interview. All of the interviews with Greek elites listed 
below took place in Athens (I met with one further interviewee, who wished to remain 
anonymous, in a different Greek city). The location of the interviews with Turkish elites 
(either in Istanbul or Ankara) is indicated following the date of the interview. 
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Interviewees in Greece 
Sawas Agouridis, Professor of Theology, University of Athens. 27 November 2002 
Alekos Alavanos, MP, Synaspismos (Coalition of the Left of Movements and Ecology), 
Member of the European Parliament. 27 January 2003 
Metropolitan Anthimos, Metropolitan of Alexandroupoli. 11 January 2003 
Constantinos Cholevas, General Editor of publications of the Church of Greece, Holy 
Synod, Athens. 9 January 2003 
Metropolitan Chrysostomos, Metropolitan of Zakynthos. 20 February 2003 (written 
communication; date of receipt) 
Nikiforos Diamandouros, Greek Ombudsman. 28 January 2003 
Metropolitan Ignatios, Metropolitan of Dimitriada. 23 February 2003 (written 
communication; date of receipt) 
loannis Konidaris, General Secretary of Religious Affairs, Ministry of Education and 
Religious Affairs (also Professor of Ecclesiastical Law). 14 January 2003 
Thanos Lipowatz, Professor of Sociology, Panteion University, Athens. 11 November 
2002 
Father George Metallinos, Professor of Theology, University of Athens. 7 January 2003 
(written communication; date of receipt) 
Nicos Mouzelis, Professor of Sociology (ret. ), London School of Economics. 12 
February 2003 
Antonis Paparizos, Assistant Professor of Sociology, Panteion University, Athens. 12 
November 2002 
Stelios Papathemelis, MP, Panhellenic Socialist Party (now a candidate MP for the New 
Democracy Party). 15 January 2003 
Michalis Stathopoulos, Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Athens (former 
Minister of Justice). 10 December 2002 
Christos Yiannaras, Professor of Philosophy, Panteion University, Athens. 23 December 
2002 
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Interviewees in Turkey 
Gunduz Aktan, Ret. Ambassador to Greece, former director of TESEV (Turkish 
Economic and Social Studies Foundation), and author of Turkey's application to 
the European Union. 12 September 2000, Ankara 
Tayyar Altikulac, Former director of Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs) and ex- 
MP for the True Path Party (DYP). Currently a researcher at the Center for 
Islamic Studies, Istanbul. 17 May 2001, Istanbul 
Mustafa Armagan, Director of Publications Department, Journalists' and Writers' 
Foundation (a Fethullah Gulen group). 12 May 2001, Istanbul 
Sencer Ayata, Professor of Sociology (and Chair of that department), Middle East 
Technical University, Ankara. 2 July 2000, Ankara 
Ali Bayromoglu, Director of MUSIAD (Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's 
Association). II July 2000, Istanbul 
Halil Berktay, Associate Professor of History, Sabanci University, Istanbul. 20 June 
2000, Istanbul 
Ali Bulac, Muslim intellectual and Zaman (a religious-oriented publication) columnist. 
18 May 2001, Istanbul 
Ahmet Davutoglu, Professor of International Relations, Beykent University, Istanbul. 17 
May 2001, Istanbul 
Abdurraliman Dilipak, Journalist, Akit (a conservative, religious-oriented newspaper). 16 
September 2000, Istanbul 
Izzetin Dogan, Professor of Law, University of Istanbul, and an Alevi spokesperson. 18 
May 2001, Istanbul 
Cern Duna, Ret. Ambassador to the EU, Member of the Board of TUSIAD (Turkish 
Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association), Director of AB Consultancy and 
Investment Services. 26 June 2000, Istanbul 
Tayyip Erdogan, Former Mayor of Istanbul (now Prime Minister and leader of AKP). 11 
July 2000, Istanbul 
Nilufer Gole, Professor of Sociology, Bogazici University, Istanbul (now Professor of 
Sociology at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes in Paris). 12 July 2000, Istanbul 
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Abdullah Gul, MP, Fazilet Party (now Foreign Minister of AKP). 6 July 2000, Ankara 
Kazim Gulecguz, Journalist, YeniAsya (a Nurcu publication). 15 May 2001, Istanbul 
Ahmet Helvaci, General Secretary, MUSIAD (Independent Industrialists' and 
Businessmen's Association). 18 May 2001, Istanbul 
Metin Heper, Professor of Political Science, Bilkent University, Ankara. 3 July 2000, 
Ankara 
Nazli Ilicak, MP, Fazilet Party. II July 2000 
Bulent Kanes, Journalist, Turkish Daily News. 14 September 2000, Ankara 
Fehmi Koru, Journalist, Yeni Safak (a religious-oriented publication). 14 September 
2000, Ankara 
Sule Kut, Professor of International Relations and Vice Rector of Bilgi University, 
Istanbul. 26 June 2000, Istanbul 
Nilufer Narli , Associate Professor, International Relations, Marmara University, Istanbul. 
13 July 2000, Istanbul 
Soli Ozel, Professor of International Relations, Bilgi University, Istanbul (also, editor of 
Private View, a TUSIAD journal). 4 September 2000, Istanbul 
Ozdem Sanberk, Director of TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation). 
14 July 2000, Istanbul 
Cemal Ussak, Vice Chairman, Journalists' and Writers' Foundation (a Fethullah Gulen 
group), and General Secretary, Intercultural Dialogue Platform. 16 May 2001, 
Istanbul 
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